U. S. Foreign Policy

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RAVAGING THE POOR: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDICTED BY ITS OWN DATA

Gabriel Kolko

Recent International Monetary Fund studies on the impact of its structural adjustment programs on the poorest nations reveal that most have stagnated or declined economically. The IMF's requirement that these countries increase exports despite falling world commodity prices has been a principal cause of their economic malaise. Meanwhile, IMF loan conditions demanding lower government expenditures have led to sharp reductions in general social spending, from which the wealthiest quintile of the population receives a disproportionately larger share of outlays for health and education.

For the first time since its creation a half-century ago, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is being subjected to severe criticisms from establishment sources that may profoundly alter its future role in guiding the world economy.

The IMF's failure to reverse the economic crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, which is now spreading throughout Asia, is producing unprecedented condemnations from powerful voices within business and policy circles who believe that the Fund's conservative strategy, with its insistence on slashing government spending to balance budgets, is endangering the stability of the entire world economy. Since the beginning of the year (1998), Harvard Professor Martin Feldstein, former chair of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers and arguably the single most influential U.S. economist, the prestigious *Financial Times*, billionaire speculator George Soros, and many others have raised fundamental questions about the IMF's direction of the world economy. In March, the World Bank formally withdrew from joint sponsorship of the quarterly *Finance & Development*, which for 34 years had reflected the profound consensus between the two institutions, and Bank officials have publicly attacked the IMF's core policies in Asia.

Far less powerful critics have long condemned the IMF on a different score. They have contended that IMF "structural adjustment" programs, imposed on dozens of poor Third World nations, perpetuate and even intensify poverty. The

IMF always admitted that adjustment may involve short-term social costs for vulnerable groups, but asserted that this short-term pain would ultimately benefit the poor themselves, since Fund-spurred economic growth would solve the basic problem of underdevelopment. Well before the economic storm in East Asia began to rage, the IMF was under mounting attack.

THE IMF IMPOSES RULES

In December 1987, the IMF expanded its existing structural adjustment program to create an "Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility" (ESAF). It invited "low-income developing nations" to borrow from it. By August 1997, 79 countries were eligible to join ESAF but only 36, with a combined population of around 670 million, had done so. In order to receive ESAF loans, countries must agree to the IMF's "conditionality" and make "general commitments to cooperate with the IMF in setting policies to the formulation of specific, quantifiable plans for financial policies."

These conditions include fundamental domestic and external policies that, depending on the IMF's intentions, can effectively control a state's crucial social and economic priorities. Among the standard IMF prescriptions for developing countries: reducing government spending and involvement in the economy; promoting exports and removing trade restrictions; deregulating the economy; privatizing government-run enterprises; eliminating price subsidies, including on essentials like food and housing; and imposing consumption taxes. The IMF reviews country compliance with "performance criteria" designed to measure adoption of these policies on a semi-annual or even monthly basis. Countries that fail to pass the test are denied additional drawings on previously agreed-to loans.

Most World Bank aid, and much of the development aid that nations give, is dependent on a country satisfying IMF criteria. The Fund therefore serves as a gatekeeper to official loans and aid, and has far more power than the funds it provides directly would suggest.

The IMF has always defended its draconian demands as the essential preconditions to economic growth, without which poverty and stagnation will continue. But growth in the developing nations under IMF tutelage has either not occurred or occurred only very unevenly. Indeed, a number of national economies following IMF prescriptions have even shrunk. In the face of mounting criticism of its performance, in 1996 the IMF initiated a review of its impact "in strengthening economic performance in ESAF countries." On July 28, 1997, the IMF issued a laudatory summary, but postponed releasing a carefully edited complete text until late February.

The policy implications of this review are very profound; the IMF cannot allow the data it gathers to be used to prove that a major aspect of its work is useless, much less harmful, to the nations accepting its guidance. Not surprisingly, the IMF interpreted the data it released as vindication of its success. But no amount

of statistical manipulation can reverse the fact that the majority of those nations that have followed the IMF's advice have experienced profound economic crises: low or even declining growth, much larger foreign debts, and the stagnation that perpetuates systemic poverty. Carefully analyzed, the IMF's own studies provide a devastating assessment of the social and economic consequences of its guidance of dozens of poor nations.

ASSESSING POOR NATIONS

The July 28, 1997, IMF release of the preliminary results of its internal review of all 79 low-income developing nations gave the best possible interpretation of the ESAF nations' performance, but it was unconvincing. Even on the basis of the data as the IMF presented them, countries that stayed out of ESAF began and remained better off by not accepting its advice. The value of all such comparisons is limited by the fact that most of the poor countries not participating in ESAF chose nonetheless to adopt IMF-preferred policies, though often not as fully as the Fund would like.

The IMF claimed per capita annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for ESAF countries declined 1.1 percent in 1981–1985, before the ESAF program began, and rose to zero growth during 1990–1995. Non-ESAF developing nations rose from 0.3 percent in 1981–1985 to 1.0 percent in 1991–1995.

ESAF failed at one of its key, ostensible purposes: reducing poor countries' foreign debt. External debt as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) for the ESAF nations grew from 82 percent in 1980–1985 to 154 percent in 1991–1995. Non-ESAF nations were far less encumbered: their external debt grew from 56 to 76 percent of their GNP.

The biggest difference between ESAF and non-ESAF country performance was in exports, not surprising since maximizing exports and integrating developing countries into the world economy is the ultimate objective of all IMF programs. The annual export growth of the ESAF nations increased more than four times, according to the August 5, 1997, *IMF Survey* (the IMF's biweekly publication reporting on Fund activities, policies and research), from 1.7 percent in 1981–1985 to 7.9 percent in 1991–1994, while the non-ESAF nations' exports grew modestly, from 4.4 percent to 5.7 percent.

To assess the impact of the IMF's structural adjustment programs accurately, however, a different methodology than the IMF's should be used: only nations that are economically similar should be compared. Some of the non-ESAF nations had 1995 per capita incomes of $3,000 or more, and should not be compared to countries with per capita incomes roughly a tenth as large. There are 23 nations under ESAF for which data exist (with approximately 436 million population) with a per capita income below $400, and 13 non-ESAF nations (with 1.2 billion population) with similarly low incomes. These are the countries that should be studied to evaluate the IMF's ESAF program.

There are also limits in comparing the two groups of states under $400 annual per capita income, however. Significantly, averaging the 22 poorest ESAF nations for which there are sufficient data against the 13 that were independent fails to weight them by population size, which varies enormously; but to weight them introduces other distortions. The vast bulk of the non-ESAF population lived in India, while Pakistan and Bangladesh accounted for about half those under the ESAF.

Ignoring population, during 1985–1995 the poorest ESAF nations had a negative growth of 0.1 percent annually, while the 11 poorest non-ESAF nations declined 0.4 percent annually. The external debt of ESAF countries as a percent of the GNP grew from 52 percent in 1980 (in the 16 countries for which there are data) to 154 percent in 1995 (23 nations). For 11 non-ESAF nations it increased three times, to 117 percent—about the same for both groups. Debt service (interest payments on foreign debt) as a percentage of exports of goods and services over the same time grew from 16 percent to 21 percent for ESAF countries, 11 to 23 percent for the others.

On the basis of these data, there was no great difference between these two groups—all were in severe economic difficulty. But if India is assigned its importance by population, the non-ESAF poor nations as an aggregate performed far better. India had an annual growth rate from 1985 through 1995 of 3.2 percent, nearly three times that of Pakistan and one-half more than Bangladesh. Although it has begun to move to implement IMF-style liberalization in the 1990s, India remains far less dependent on exports than other low-income nations, and this has insulated it from external pressures and made stable, steady growth possible. More important, unlike its two large neighbors, its terms-of-trade (the relative value of the goods and services a nation imports compared to its exports) since 1985 have not varied greatly, further protecting it from the fluctuations of the world economy. Given the experience of these three nations only, there is a powerful argument against integrating a nation into the world economy and linking its development more than is absolutely essential into an inherently unstable export system.

Increasing exports is an absolute condition for IMF loans and ESAF nations embarked on an export-led development strategy. This decision was a recipe for stagnation and explains one crucial reason for the decline in growth for most of those who pursued it. Between 1985 and 1995 the terms-of-trade for the 18 very poor ESAF nations for which data exist fell 27 percent, according to the World Bank's *World Development Report 1997*, the basic source for the IMF's reviews and this article. This emphasis on exports in the face of declining prices was a disastrous strategic choice for development, because it is highly unlikely for a nation to export its way out of poverty in the face of falling prices for its goods. The result was that the states that the IMF directed, containing 670 million people, continue on a cycle that produces growing debts and sustains human deprivation. India chose another course, and

notwithstanding its other difficulties, it averted many of the grave problems existing elsewhere.

Despite some modest differences, all very poor nations have fared badly, and debts have aggravated rather than cured their basic problems. Indeed, it is the very fact they become indebted that compels many of them to submit to the IMF's control, creating a vicious cycle of yet greater obligations—and poverty.

SEVERELY INDEBTED

Nothing proves the danger of excessive reliance on exports more than the World Bank's list, published in the *World Development Report 1996*, of 25 countries that are "severely indebted exporters of nonfuel primary products." These are among the world's poorest nations, and 16 of them (with a 1995 population of 217 million) were under the IMF's ESAF guidance; nine (with 143 million persons) were not. Of the 23 nations under IMF control with per capita income below $400, 13 were in the especially troubled economy category.

The 10 highly indebted ESAF nations under $400 per capita for which data exist during 1985–1995 had an average per capita GNP decline of 0.6 percent (compared to 0.2 percent for all ESAF nations together). For the seven non-ESAF states for which there are data, the average annual decline was 1.4 percent. What united all of these nations was that their external debt as a percentage of the GNP increased about three times between 1980 and 1995, their debt service consumed about a quarter of their exports of goods and services, and they became more deeply mired in debt. The terms-of-trade for their exports fell 23 percent between 1985 and 1995. Although nine were not under direct IMF supervision, they all nonetheless pursued its program for export-oriented development and staked their economic future on exports. The gamble failed: they stagnated and became poorer.

THE IMF'S SOCIAL COSTS

It is, above all else, the human and social consequences of the IMF's structural reform programs that has evoked the most condemnation, compelling the IMF to embark on an aggressive defense of its crucial role in the Third World. But the emerging IMF data only confirm that IMF policies have eroded existing social services and aggravated the poverty and suffering of hundreds of millions of people.

One IMF structural reform program demand that directly affects the poor is the forced reduction of government deficits. This comprises everything from slashing price subsidies for rice and fuel—which, as in Indonesia last May, often produces social disorder where implemented—to health clinics and public works. "Due regard needs to be paid to the cost-effectiveness and financial viability of these safety nets," stated the Fund in the December 15, 1997, *IMF Survey*—which

means reducing them for the sake of a prosperous future which, so far, has never arrived.

As a companion to its defense of the ESAF, the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department last November (1997) produced a study, "The IMF and the Poor," which reported health and education spending in 23 ESAF-supported nations for which it had data, comparing the three years before each nation accepted the ESAF to 1994 or 1995. On balance, the IMF concluded, ESAF countries increased health and education spending after adopting structural adjustment programs.

However, six of the 23 countries examined, containing 122 million people—one-fifth of the ESAF nations' population—reduced the proportion of their GDP allocated to health and education. And the report does not include the 13 countries under ESAF for which it did not have data. Those excluded have a combined population of one-third of the 620 million persons in the ESAF countries in 1994. The report's optimistic conclusions therefore applied, at most, to slightly under half of the people under ESAF programs—but even here the IMF distorted the data.

The IMF report averaged real per capita spending for health and education in its 23 nations. But averages are wholly misleading; the real issue is which class within each nation's population gains most from socially sponsored health and education programs—that is, whether the benefits are spread evenly. In a sample of eight ESAF nations, the IMF study found that the wealthiest fifth of the population received 32 percent of the education benefits, and the poorest 13 percent. For five nations where health data existed, the wealthiest quintile received 30 percent of the allocations, the poorest 12 percent. In Vietnam, an ESAF nation whose relative spending on health and education has dropped, the wealthiest fifth receives 45 percent of the public subsidies for health and education, according to the World Bank's January 1995 "Viet Nam: Poverty Assessment and Strategy."

The IMF's own evidence shows that the poorest three-fifths of these nations are being largely excluded from whatever social "safety net" exists for education, health, housing, and social security and welfare; their position has either not changed or, for many, become worse.

In some ways, focusing on health and education spending is misleading. IMF conditionalities affect the population's economic security considerably more than does spending on health and education. ESAF programs routinely cut government wages and salaries and facilitate private sector wage cuts and layoffs, so that each nation becomes "cost-effective" in the world export market. Price subsidies on basic commodities like bread and cooking oil—most critical for the poor—are cut. The higher value-added taxes it advocates are regressive on income distribution.

Ignoring the fact that it did not benefit the poorest, the nominal increase for health and education as a percentage of GDP in its 23 nations was only one-seventh of the reduction in wages, salaries, subsidies, and transfers that the ESAF

program imposed on the total population, with the worst impact felt by the poorest. (The net decline for these functions combined was 1.8 percent of GDP.) The IMF's own data confirm that structural adjustment programs made the poor even poorer.

Unfortunately for the IMF, just as it was preparing its rebuttals of the widespread belief that its strategy hurts the poor, the World Bank, its sister institution, published a comprehensive analysis of poverty in the developing nations since 1980 which provides further evidence on how the IMF's programs have helped to sustain and create it. The Bank's study, published in the May 1997 *World Bank Economic Review*, traces poverty rates in 42 nations, divided by regions. It found that trends in living standards and absolute poverty are linked, above all else, to economic growth. No region displayed a consistent pattern, but Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa—regions where the IMF was most active—generally had a higher incidence of poverty since 1980, while poverty declined in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

THE IMF BURDEN

Most of the nations whose economic destinies the IMF has guided have not grown; they have either stagnated or declined economically, and the poor have suffered both in the short and long run in the name of the Fund's socially dangerous ideological mystifications. Save for India, which alone confirms the value of independent strategies, most of the poor nations which remained outside the ESAF program did not do much better, but they certainly did not do worse than the IMF-led countries.

The causes of the sustained crisis of development in the Third World are extremely complex, but it is certain that excessive reliance on export-led growth in an unstable world economy creates major structural problems that all growth strategies must avoid. But exports are at the core of the IMF philosophy, and its guidance has gravely hindered the struggle of innumerable poor nations to escape their suffering.

Note — This article is adapted from a report published in *Multinational Monitor*, June 1998, pp. 20–23.

ARTICLES

NAFTA at 10:
Where Do We Go From Here?

en years ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement was sold to the people of the United States, Mexico and Canada as a simple treaty eliminating tariffs on goods crossing the three countries' borders. But NAFTA is much more: It is the constitution of an emerging continental economy that recognizes one citizen—the business corporation. It gives corporations extraordinary protections from government policies that might limit future profits, and extraordinary rights to force the privatization of virtually all civilian public services. Disputes are settled by secret tribunals of experts, many of whom are employed privately as corporate lawyers and consultants. At the same time, NAFTA excludes protections for workers, the environment and the public that are part of the social contract established through long political struggle in each of the countries.

by JEFF FAUX

As Jorge Castañeda, Mexico's recent foreign secretary, observed, NAFTA was "an accord among magnates and potentates: an agreement for the rich and powerful…effectively excluding ordinary people in all three societies." Thus was NAFTA a model for the neoliberal governance of the global economy.

The business-backed politicians who pushed the agreement through the three legislatures promised that NAFTA would generate prosperity that would more than compensate "ordinary" people for its lack of social protections. Foreign investors would make Mexico an economic tiger, turning its poor workers into middle-class consumers who would then buy US and Canadian goods, creating more jobs in the high-wage countries.

But as soon as the ink was dry on NAFTA, US factories began to shift production to maquiladora factories along the border, where the Mexican government assures a docile labor force and virtually no environmental restrictions. The US trade surplus with Mexico quickly turned into a deficit, and since then at least a half-million jobs have been lost, many of them in small towns and rural areas where there are no job alternatives.

Meanwhile, Mexico's overall growth rate has been half of what it needs to be just to generate enough jobs for its growing labor force. The NAFTA-inspired strategy of export-led growth undermined Mexican industries that sold to the domestic market as well as the sixty-year-old social bargain in which workers and peasant farmers shared the benefits of growth in exchange for their support for a privileged oligarchy. NAFTA provided the oligarchs with new partners—the multinational corporations—allowing them to abandon their obligations to their fellow Mexicans. Average real wages in Mexican manufacturing are actually lower than they were ten years ago. Two and a half million farmers and their families have been driven out of their local markets and off their land by heavily subsidized US and Canadian agribusiness. For most Mexicans, half of whom live in poverty, basic food has gotten even more expensive: Today the Mexican minimum wage buys less than half the tortillas it bought in 1994. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans continue to risk their lives crossing the

border to get low-wage jobs in the United States.

Canada, which since 1989 has had a similar trade agreement with the United States, and which does much less business with Mexico, was less directly affected. But NAFTA strengthened Canadian corporations' ability to threaten workers and governments with moving south, helping undermine the country's traditionally strong labor and social standards.

In all three countries NAFTA has worsened the distribution of income and wealth. While ordinary people paid the costs, the benefits went to the continent's "rich and powerful." Canadian and US corporate investors got guaranteed access to Mexico's cheap labor as well as its privatized public assets. Mexican elites brokered the deals. In one example, well-connected Mexicans bought the country's second-largest commercial bank from the government for $3.3 billion and sold it to Citigroup for $12.5 billion.

Yet despite its failures, NAFTA set in motion the economic integration of Canada, Mexico and the United States, which cannot now be stopped. Every day, more intracontinental connections in finance, marketing, production and other business networks are being hard-wired for a consolidated North American market. Ford pickup trucks are assembled in Mexico with engines from Ontario and transmissions from Ohio and Michigan. Canadian, Mexican and US investors have created a labyrinth of interconnected corporate assets. After a temporary post-9/11 slowdown, the cross-border movement of people—unskilled workers, educated professionals, retirees—continued.

Expanded markets require expanded rules. Out of public sight, the rulebooks are being filled in by NAFTA tribunals, trigovernmental commissions, administrative judges. Business-supported academic centers are humming with new proposals, ranging from guestworker programs, to the privatization of Canadian water and Mexican oil, to continental business tax policies. As a former Canadian ambassador to the United States recently commented, "Few days go by without new ideas for deepening NAFTA."

But while corporate business and its political clients are organized continentally, progressives are not. One reason is that the opposition to NAFTA in all three countries was in large part rooted in economic and political nationalism. The political heat that almost defeated the agreement in the US Congress was fueled by the specter of American jobs moving to Mexico. The Canadian opposition painted NAFTA as a threat to Americanize Canadian culture. In Mexico, opposition was rooted in its people's historic mistrust of Yankee imperialism.

Once the fight over NAFTA was settled, opposition groups moved back to domestic issues or moved on to defend against neoliberalism in other global settings, such as the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas and the new round of World Trade Organization negotiations. These are important battles, but the capacity of North American activists to influence these negotiations is marginal. For example, if the FTAA is permanently derailed, it will not be over a lack of social protections but because Latin American and US business interests cannot make a deal.

Back home, however, North American opponents of neolib-

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eralism—because they can be a force in the domestic politics of all three nations—have more leverage to develop a socially responsive model of economic integration between rich and poor economies. Indeed, given the influence of the United States in setting the rules for the global economy, a visible, sustained challenge to the NAFTA model here may be the most important contribution progressives on this continent can make to the building of a more just global economic system.

A continental progressive movement would build on its existing infrastructure in each nation—labor, environmentalists, human rights activists, progressive churches and populist legislators—and the fact that the majority of ordinary citizens in all three nations want a market system with social protections.

One initial organizing step might be to connect existing demands to rewrite NAFTA. For example, over the past year Mexican farmers demonstrated throughout the country—including breaking down the door to the Mexican Congress—demanding that NAFTA's agricultural provisions be changed. Had US and Canadian small farmers, labor unions and environmentalists joined them with their own demands, the Mexican government would not have been able to isolate the farmers with the argument that changing NAFTA is politically impossible.

A new continental agreement could include financial assistance from the United States and Canada to Mexico for building the economic and social infrastructure it needs for growth, just as the European community has redistributed funds to its poorest members in order to create a stronger and more balanced economy. Continentwide enforceable labor, human rights and environ-

mental protections ought to be established to prevent the erosion of living standards in Canada and the United States, and to insure that Mexican workers share in the benefits of rising productivity. Provisions of NAFTA that erode the ability of the local public sectors in all three countries to promote the welfare of their citizens should be stricken.

Progressive legislators in all three countries could begin working out proposals covering issues such as corporate governance, public health and safety, and investment in education that could be simultaneously introduced in all three capitals. A continental labor organizing campaign against a single employer could have an electrifying effect—demonstrating that workers in Canada, Mexico and the United States have more in common with one another than with the CEOs who may share their formal nationality.

Creating a continental political consciousness does not mean forming one nation. Few are ready for that—particularly the majority of Mexicans and Canadians appalled by the US governing class's current imperial obsessions. But despite all the obvious difficulties, if progressives do not want to see a continental society built on NAFTA's reactionary template, they have little choice but to grasp hands across the borders and work together to build an economy that serves the continent's "ordinary" people.   ∎

The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is the latest effort by the Bush Administration to extend NAFTA southward. Read Mark Engler's analysis at www.thenation.com.

The View From Mexico

This past November, along with six other members of the US Congress, I visited Mexico on a Teamsters-sponsored trip in order to assess what NAFTA has done to Mexico. What we saw and heard was not pretty. We encountered horrendous poverty, environmental degradation and a lawless and corrupt environment. We talked with mothers who couldn't afford to send their kids to school, workers who were fired for the crime of trying to organize a union and religious workers who were trying to protect young women from the murders and rapes that were taking place in Ciudad Juárez, right across the border from El Paso. We also met people who displayed enormous courage and tenacity.

In the Anapra *colonia* of Juárez we visited the dilapidated shack of a young mother: one light bulb, a dirt floor and no healthcare available for her sick child. Not an uncommon situation for that community, where tens of thousands of Mexicans had migrated from the southern and even poorer part of the country in search of a better life. As these people flooded into the Juárez area in search of maquiladora jobs, the infrastructure crumbled and the already low quality of life deteriorated. At a health clinic in the area we were told that many of the illnesses they dealt with resulted from malnutrition and other dietary problems.

In a nearby home another mother feared for the well-being of her older daughter, who traveled an hour and a half to work in a maquiladora factory—where she earned $35 a week. (Maquiladoras mostly hire women because they think they will be less likely to fight back against poor wages and working conditions.) Would she make it home safely or become another "disappeared" woman whose body would be found in the desert? In talking to law enforcement officials in Texas we were told that police and governmental corruption were rampant in Juárez. At least one high-ranking US law enforcement official told us that he would not go south of the border for fear that he might be killed.

In the city of Puebla we met with textile workers at one maquila who made blue jeans for export to the United States. They had the radical idea that they should have minimal rights on the job and be compensated when they worked overtime. They also wanted protection against chemicals that colored their hands and hair. When they attempted to form an independent union to negotiate for them, they were fired. (In Mexico, almost all union workers are represented by "official" unions, which are authorized by the government and sponsored by the companies. They do nothing to represent the interests of workers.) In Puebla we also met with the leader of one of the few independent unions in the country, José Luis Rodríguez Salazar, secretary general of the Independent Union of Volkswagen Workers. His union, under very difficult circumstances, has managed to negotiate a contract with VW that pays most workers there $25 a day—a very good wage in Mexico. They are currently struggling against downsizing and fear that in years to come, globalization could mean a reduction of auto manufacturing in Mexico

as companies move to countries with even cheaper labor.

In the countryside, we met farmers whose communities had been devastated by the importation of subsidized, cheap corn from US agribusiness corporations. Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico's agricultural sector has lost at least 1.3 million jobs. In the community that we visited there are almost no young workers left on the farms. Most of them are either in the cities or in the United States illegally. In an attempt to get a decent price for their corn, some of the farmers have created a cooperative business in which local corn is made into tortillas and sold in the cities. While they were cautiously optimistic about this new enterprise, they were distressed by the destruction of a way of life that their families had experienced for hundreds of years.

In the US Congress, a funny thing is happening with regard to trade policy. With NAFTA resulting in the loss of almost 900,000 decent-paying American manufacturing jobs, more and more members, Republicans and Democrats, are finding it harder and harder to defend unfettered free trade. I know of a number of members who voted for NAFTA who now see that vote as a mistake. I know of no member who voted against NAFTA who regrets that vote. Interestingly, since I recently introduced legislation to repeal Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China, fifteen conservative Republicans have joined forty-two Democrats as co-sponsors.

The immediate task in Congress is threefold. First, we need to place a moratorium on the passage of all new free-trade legislation that the President is negotiating. Why should we exacerbate an already bad situation? No Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), no trade agreement with Australia, no Central American agreement (CAFTA), no bilateral agreements with individual countries. Second, we must move to terminate those trade agreements that currently exist and that are causing us huge job losses—such as NAFTA and PNTR with China. Third, we need a national conversation and appropriate legislation to create a trade policy that works for the average American as well as our trading partners throughout the world.

The word is getting out and the momentum is building. Unfettered free trade has been a disaster not only for Americans but for the working people of Mexico and Canada as well. Our difficult but important job now is to build a new coalition of trade unionists, environmentalists, small-business owners and manufacturers who put the people in their communities ahead of corporate America's reckless search for profits. Included in that coalition must be white-collar and high-tech workers who are also seeing their jobs move to low-wage countries.

If we join together we can create trade policies that expand the middle class in this country, protect the international environment and improve the lives of poor people in developing countries. Together, we can and must end the disastrous race to the bottom that we are currently experiencing.

BERNIE SANDERS

Bernie Sanders is an Independent US Representative from Vermont. For more information go to www.bernie.house.gov.

YOU CAN'T GO HOME AGAIN.

'Soft Multilateralism'

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

The hawks around George W. Bush believed the United States had been in a slow decline for at least thirty years. Their remedy called for the United States to flex its considerable military muscle, abandon all pretense of multilateral consultations with hesitant and weak allies, and proceed to intimidate both friends and enemies alike. Then it would be in the world driver's seat again. Instead, Iraq is a growing drain of lives and money, traditional allies are profoundly estranged, national security is more precarious than ever and economic power continues to erode. In short, the hawks have achieved the opposite of everything they intended on the world scene, except toppling Saddam Hussein.

Democratic presidential candidates and even Republican moderates are now calling for a return to the multilateralist foreign

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policy of previous administrations. They want to bring back the golden era of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Madeleine Albright. Is this a plausible alternative?

For the past thirty years, every administration, from Nixon to Clinton, including Reagan and Bush's father, pursued the same basic strategy, a policy I call "soft multilateralism." This policy had three elements: (1) offer our major allies "partnership"; (2) push hard to persuade potential nuclear powers not to "proliferate"; (3) persuade governments of the South that their economic future lay not in state-managed "development" but in export-oriented "globalization." None of these policies were entirely successful, but each was at least partially so.

Let's look at each of the three elements. First, when the United States found it was no longer economically dominant but had become merely one part of a so-called triad (the United States, Western Europe and Japan/East Asia), each more or less competi-

The Erosion of American National Interests

Samuel P. Huntington

THE YEARS since the end of the Cold War have seen intense, wide-ranging, and confused debates about American national interests. Much of this confusion stems from the complexity of the post–Cold War world. The new environment has been variously interpreted as involving the end of history, bipolar conflict between rich and poor countries, movement back to a future of traditional power politics, the proliferation of ethnic conflict verging on anarchy, the clash of civilizations, and conflicting trends toward integration and fragmentation. The new world is all these things, and hence there is good reason for uncertainty about American interests in it. Yet that is not the only source of confusion. Efforts to define national interest presuppose agreement on the nature of the country whose interests are to be defined. National interest derives from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.

Historically, American identity has had two primary components: culture and creed. The first has been the values and institutions of the original settlers, who were Northern European, primarily British, and Christian, primarily Protestant. This culture included most importantly the English language and traditions concerning relations between church and state and the place of the individual in society.

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Over the course of three centuries, black people were slowly and only partially assimilated into this culture. Immigrants from western, southern, and eastern Europe were more fully assimilated, and the original culture evolved and was modified but not fundamentally altered as a result. In *The Next American Nation*, Michael Lind captures the broad outlines of this evolution when he argues that American culture developed through three phases: Anglo-America (1789-1861), Euro-America (1875-1957), and Multicultural America (1972-present). The cultural definition of national identity assumes that while the culture may change, it has a basic continuity.

The second component of American identity has been a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the founding documents by American leaders: liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism, limited government, private enterprise. These constitute what Gunnar Myrdal termed the American Creed, and the popular consensus on them has been commented on by foreign observers from Crevecoeur and Tocqueville down to the present. This identity was neatly summed up by Richard Hofstadter: "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one."

These dual sources of identity are, of course, closely related. The creed was a product of the culture. Now, however, the end of the Cold War and social, intellectual, and demographic changes in American society have brought into question the validity and relevance of both traditional components of American identity. Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and nonnational ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.

LOSS OF THE OTHER

THE MOST profound question concerning the American role in the post–Cold War world was improbably posed by Rabbit Angstrom, the harried central character of John Updike's novels: "Without the cold war, what's the point of being an American?" If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there

threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?

From the start, Americans have constructed their creedal identity in contrast to an undesirable "other." America's opponents are always defined as liberty's opponents. At the time of independence, Americans could not distinguish themselves culturally from Britain; hence they had to do so politically. Britain embodied tyranny, aristocracy, oppression; America, democracy, equality, republicanism. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the United States defined itself in opposition to Europe. Europe was the past: backward, unfree, unequal, characterized by feudalism, monarchy, and imperialism. The United States, in contrast, was the future: progressive, free, equal, republican. In the twentieth century, the United States emerged on the world scene and increasingly saw itself not as the antithesis of Europe but rather as the leader of European-American civilization against upstart challengers to that civilization, imperial and then Nazi Germany.

After World War II the United States defined itself as the leader of the democratic free world against the Soviet Union and world communism. During the Cold War the United States pursued many foreign policy goals, but its one overriding national purpose was to contain and defeat communism. When other goals and interests clashed with this purpose, they were usually subordinated to it. For 40 years virtually all the great American initiatives in foreign policy, as well as many in domestic policy, were justified by this overriding priority: the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Korean War, nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, foreign aid, intelligence operations, reduction of trade barriers, the space program, the Alliance for Progress, military alliances with Japan and Korea, support for Israel, overseas military deployments, an unprecedentedly large military establishment, the Vietnam War, the openings to China, support for the Afghan mujahideen and other anticommunist insurgencies. If there is no Cold War, the rationale for major programs and initiatives like these disappears.

As the Cold War wound down in the late 1980s, Gorbachev's adviser Georgiy Arbatov commented: "We are doing something really terrible to you—we are depriving you of an enemy." Psychologists generally agree that individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition

to others.[1] While wars at times may have a divisive effect on society, a common enemy can often help to promote identity and cohesion among people. The weakening or absence of a common enemy can do just the reverse. Abraham Lincoln commented on this effect in his Lyceum speech in 1837 when he argued that the American Revolution and its aftermath had directed enmity outward: "The jealousy, envy, avarice incident to our nature, and so common to a state of peace, prosperity, and conscious strength, were for a time in a great measure smothered and rendered inactive, while the deep-rooted principles of hate, and the powerful motive of revenge, instead of being turned against each other, were directed exclusively against the British nation." Hence, he said, "the basest principles of our nature" were either dormant or "the active agents in the advancement of the noblest of causes—that of establishing and maintaining civil and religious liberty." But he warned, "this state of feeling must fade, is fading, has faded, with the circumstances that produced it." He spoke, of course, as the nation was starting to disintegrate. As the heritage of World War II and the Cold War fades, America may be faced with a comparable dynamic.

The Cold War fostered a common identity between American people and government. Its end is likely to weaken or at least alter that identity. One possible consequence is the rising opposition to the federal government, which is, after all, the principal institutional manifestation of American national identity and unity. Would nationalist fanatics bomb federal buildings and attack federal agents if the federal government was still defending the country against a serious foreign threat? Would the militia movement be as strong as it is today? In the past, comparable bombing attacks were usually the work of foreigners who saw the United States as their enemy, and the first response of many people to the Oklahoma City bombing was to assume that it was the work of a "new enemy," Muslim terrorists. That response could reflect a psychological need to believe that such an act must have been carried out by an external enemy. Ironically, the bombing may have been in part the result of the absence of such an enemy.

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[1]See Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*, Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1994, and Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, Spring 1996, pp. 237-68.

Georg Simmel, Lewis A. Coser, and other scholars have shown that in some ways and circumstances the existence of an enemy may have positive consequences for group cohesion, morale, and achievement. World War II and the Cold War were responsible for much American economic, technological, and social progress, and the perceived economic challenge from Japan in the 1980s generated public and private efforts to increase American productivity and competitiveness. At present, thanks to the extent to which democracy and market economies have been embraced throughout the world, the United States lacks any single country or threat against which it can convincingly counterpose itself. Saddam Hussein simply does not suffice as a foil. Islamic fundamentalism is too diffuse and too remote geographically. China is too problematic and its potential dangers too distant in the future.

Given the domestic forces pushing toward heterogeneity, diversity, multiculturalism, and ethnic and racial division, however, the United States, perhaps more than most countries, may need an opposing other to maintain its unity. Two millennia ago in 84 B.C., after the Romans had completed their conquest of the known world by defeating the armies of Mithradates, Sulla posed the question: "Now the universe offers us no more enemies, what may be the fate of the Republic?" The answer came quickly; the republic collapsed a few years later. It is unlikely that a similar fate awaits the United States, yet to what extent will the American Creed retain its appeal, command support, and stay vibrant in the absence of competing ideologies? The end of history, the global victory of democracy, if it occurs, could be a most traumatic and unsettling event for America.

THE DISINTEGRATIVE effects of the end of the Cold War have been reinforced by the interaction of two trends in American society: changes in the scope and sources of immigration and the rise of the cult of multiculturalism.

Immigration, legal and illegal, has increased dramatically since the immigration laws were changed in 1965. Recent immigration is overwhelmingly from Latin America and Asia. Coupled with the high birth rates of some immigrant groups, it is changing the racial, religious, and ethnic makeup of the United States. By the middle of the next century, according to the Census Bureau, non-Hispanic whites will have dropped from more than three-quarters of the population to only slightly more than half, and one-quarter of Americans will be Hispanic, 14 percent black, and 8 percent of Asian and Pacific heritage. The religious balance is also shifting, with Muslims already reportedly outnumbering Episcopalians.

In the past, assimilation, American style, in Peter Salins' phrase, involved an implicit contract in which immigrants were welcomed as equal members of the national community and urged to become citizens, provided they accepted English as the national language and committed themselves to the principles of the American Creed and the Protestant work ethic.[2] In return, immigrants could be as ethnic as they wished in their homes and local communities. At times, particularly during the great waves of Irish immigration in the 1840s and 1850s and of the southern and eastern European immigration at the turn of the century, immigrants were discriminated against and simultaneously subjected to major programs of "Americanization" to incorporate them into the national culture and society. Overall, however, assimilation American style worked well. Immigration renewed American society; assimilation preserved American culture.

Past worries about the assimilation of immigrants have proved unfounded: Until recently immigrant groups came to America because they saw immigration as an opportunity to become American. To what extent now, however, do people come because they see it as an opportunity to remain themselves? Previously immigrants felt discriminated against if they were not permitted to join the mainstream. Now it appears that some groups feel discriminated against if they are not allowed to remain apart from the mainstream.

The ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity reinforce and legitimate these trends. They deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings. They also question a central element in the American Creed by substituting for the rights of individuals the rights of groups, defined

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[2]Peter D. Salins, *Assimilation, American Style,* New York: Basic Books, 1996, pp. 6-7.

largely in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. These goals were manifested in a variety of statutes that followed the civil rights acts of the 1960s, and in the 1990s the Clinton administration made the encouragement of diversity one of its major goals.

The contrast with the past is striking. The Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and a problem: hence the national motto, *e pluribus unum*. Later political leaders, also fearful of the dangers of racial, sectional, ethnic, economic, and cultural diversity (which, indeed, produced the biggest war of the century between 1815 and 1914), responded to the need to bring us together, and made the promotion of national unity their central responsibility. "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all," warned Theodore Roosevelt, "would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities . . ."[3] Bill Clinton, in contrast, is almost certainly the first president to promote the diversity rather than the unity of the country he leads. This promotion of ethnic and racial identities means that recent immigrants are not subject to the same pressures and inducements as previous immigrants to integrate themselves into American culture. As a result, ethnic identities are becoming more meaningful and appear to be increasing in relevance compared

IN SEARCH OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

A NATIONAL interest is a public good of concern to all or most Americans; a vital national interest is one which they are willing to expend blood and treasure to defend. National interests usually combine security and material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other. Military action against Saddam Hussein was seen as a vital national interest because he threatened reliable and inexpensive access to Persian Gulf oil and because he was a rapacious dictator who had blatantly invaded and annexed another country. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and communism were perceived as threats to both American security and American values; a happy coincidence existed between the demands of power politics and the demands of morality. Hence broad public support buttressed government efforts to defeat communism and thus, in Walter Lippmann's terms, to maintain a balance between capabilities and commitments. That balance was often tenuous and arguably got skewed in the 1970s. With the end of the Cold War, however, the danger of a "Lippmann gap" vanished, and instead the United States appears to have a Lippmann surplus. Now the need is not to find the power to serve American purposes but rather to find purposes for the use of American power.

This need has led the American foreign policy establishment to search frantically for new purposes that would justify a continuing U.S. role in world affairs comparable to that in the Cold War. The Commission on America's National Interests put the problem this way in 1996: "After four decades of unusual single-mindedness in containing Soviet Communist expansion, we have seen five years of ad hoc fits and starts. If it continues, this drift will threaten our values, our fortunes, and indeed our lives."[4]

The commission identified five vital national interests: prevent attacks on the United States with weapons of mass destruction, prevent the emergence of hostile hegemons in Europe or Asia and of hostile powers on U.S. borders or in control of the seas, prevent the collapse of the global systems for trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and the environment, and ensure the survival of U.S. allies.

What, however, are the threats to these interests? Nuclear terrorism against the United States could be a near-term threat, and the emergence of China as an East Asian hegemon could be a longer-term one. Apart from these, however, it is hard to see any major looming challenges to the commission's vital interests. New threats will undoubtedly arise, but given the scarcity of current ones, campaigns to arouse interest in foreign affairs and support for major foreign policy initiatives now fall on deaf ears. The administration's call for the "enlargement" of democracy does not resonate with the public and is belied by the administration's own actions. Arguments from neoconservatives for big increases in defense spending have the same air of unreality that arguments for the abolition of nuclear weapons had during the Cold War.

The argument is frequently made that American "leadership" is needed to deal with world problems. Often it is. The call for leadership, however, begs the question of leadership to do what, and rests on the assumption that the world's problems are America's problems. Often they are not. The fact that things are going wrong in many places in the world is unfortunate, but it does not mean that the United States has either an interest in or the responsibility for correcting

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[4]*America's National Interests, A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests,* Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996, p. 1.

them. The National Interests Commission said that presidential leadership is necessary to create a consensus on national interests. In some measure, however, a consensus already exists that American national interests do not warrant extensive American involvement in most problems in most of the world. The foreign policy establishment is asking the president to make a case for a cause that simply will not sell. The most striking feature of the search for national interests has been its failure to generate purposes that command anything remotely resembling broad support and to which people are willing to commit significant resources.

COMMERCIALISM AND ETHNICITY

THE LACK of national interests that command widespread support does not imply a return to isolationism. America remains involved in the world, but its involvement is now directed at commercial and ethnic interests rather than national interests. Economic and ethnic particularism define the current American role in the world. The institutions and capabilities—political, military, economic, intelligence—created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War are now being suborned and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes. Increasingly people are arguing that these are precisely the interests foreign policy should serve.

The Clinton administration has given priority to "commercial diplomacy," making the promotion of American exports a primary foreign policy objective. It has been successful in wringing access to some foreign markets for American products. Commercial achievements have become a primary criterion for judging the performance of American ambassadors. President Clinton may well be spending more time promoting American sales abroad than doing anything else in foreign affairs. If so, that would be a dramatic sign of the redirection of American foreign policy. In case after case, country after country, the dictates of commercialism have prevailed over other purposes including human rights, democracy, alliance relationships, maintaining the balance of power, technology export controls, and other strategic and political considerations described by one administration official as

"stratocrap and globaloney."[5] "Many in the administration, Congress, and the broader foreign policy community," a former senior official in the Clinton Commerce Department argued in these pages, "still believe that commercial policy is a tool of foreign policy, when it should more often be the other way around—the United States should use all its foreign policy levers to achieve commercial goals." The funds devoted to promoting commercial goals should be greatly increased; the personnel working on these goals should be upgraded and professionalized; the agencies concerned with export promotion need to be strengthened and reorganized. Landing the contract is the name of the game in foreign policy.

Or at least it is the name of one game. The other game is the promotion of ethnic interests. While economic interests are usually subnational, ethnic interests are generally transnational or nonnational. The promotion of particular businesses and industries may not involve a broad public good, as does a general reduction in trade barriers, but it does promote the interests of some Americans. Ethnic groups promote the interests of people and entities outside the United States. Boeing has an interest in aircraft sales and the Polish-American Congress in help for Poland, but the former benefits residents of Seattle, the latter residents of the Eastern Europe.

The growing role of ethnic groups in shaping American foreign policy is reinforced by the waves of recent immigration and by the arguments for diversity and multiculturalism. In addition, the greater wealth of ethnic communities and the dramatic improvements in communications and transportation now make it much easier for ethnic groups to remain in touch with their home countries. As a result, these groups are being transformed from cultural communities within the boundaries of a state into diasporas that transcend these boundaries. State-based diasporas, that is, trans-state cultural communities that control at least one state, are increasingly important and increasingly identify with the interests of their homeland. "Full assimilation into their host societies," a leading expert, Gabriel Sheffer, has observed in *Survival*, "has become unfashionable among both

[5]Lawrence F. Kaplan, "The Selling of American Foreign Policy," *The Weekly Standard*, April 23, 1997, pp. 19-22.

established and incipient state-based diasporas . . . many diasporal communities neither confront overwhelming pressure to assimilate nor feel any marked advantage in assimilating into their host societies

or even obtaining citizenship there." Since the United States is the premier immigrant country in the world, it is most affected by the shifts from assimilation to diversity and from ethnic group to diaspora.

During the Cold War, immigrants and refugees from communist countries usually vigorously opposed, for political and ideological reasons, the governments of their home countries and actively supported American anticommunist policies against them. Now, diasporas in the United States support their home governments. Products of the Cold War, Cuban-Americans ardently support U.S. anti-Castro policies. Chinese-Americans, in contrast, overwhelmingly pressure the United States to adopt favorable policies towards China. Culture has supplanted ideology in shaping attitudes in diaspora populations.

Diasporas provide many benefits to their home countries. Economically prosperous diasporas furnish major financial support to the homeland, Jewish-Americans, for instance, contributing up to $1 billion a year to Israel. Armenian-Americans send enough to earn Armenia the sobriquet of "the Israel of the Caucasus." Diasporas supply expertise, military recruits, and on occasion political leadership to the homeland. They often pressure their home governments to adopt more nationalist and assertive policies towards neighboring countries. Recent cases in the United States show that they can be a source of spies used to gather information for their homeland governments.

Most important, diasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of their homeland. Ethnic groups have played active roles in politics throughout American history. Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political clout. In recent years, diasporas have had a major impact on American policy towards Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, the recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions

against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, sanctions against Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel and its neighbors. Diaspora-based policies may at times coincide with broader national interests, as could arguably be the case with NATO expansion, but they are also often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing allies. Overall, as James R. Schlesinger observed in a 1997 lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States has "less of a foreign policy in a traditional sense of a great power than we have the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic constituency groups . . . The result is that American foreign policy is incoherent. It is scarcely what one would expect from the leading world power."

Schlesinger had to recognize, however, that multiculturalism and heightened ethnic consciousness have caused many political leaders to believe this is "the *appropriate* way to make foreign policy." In the scholarly community some argue that diasporas can help promote American values in their home countries and hence "the participation of ethnic disaporas in shaping U.S. foreign policy is a truly positive phenomenon."[6] The validity of diaspora interests was a central theme at a May 1996 conference on "Defining the National Interest: Minorities and U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century." Conference participants attacked the Cold War definition of national interest and what was described as "the traditional policy community's apparent animosity toward the very idea of minority involvement in international affairs." Conferees explored "the experiences of Jewish-Americans and Cuban-Americans and sought to extract lessons from the way these two groups succeeded in influencing foreign policy while others failed." The sponsorship of this conference by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, once the capstone institution of the foreign policy establishment, was the ultimate symbol of the triumph of diaspora interests over national interests in American foreign policy.

The displacement of national interests by commercial and ethnic interests reflects the domesticization of foreign policy. Domestic politics and interests have always inevitably and appropriately influenced

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[6]Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995, p. 87.

Whose national interests?
Ethnic groups protest to shape U.S. foreign policy

foreign policy. Now, however, previous assumptions that the foreign and domestic policymaking processes differ from each other for important reasons no longer hold. For an understanding of American foreign policy it is necessary to study not the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but rather the play of economic and ethnic interests in American domestic politics. At least in recent years, the latter has been a superb predictor of foreign policy stands. Foreign policy, in the sense of actions consciously designed to promote the interests of the United States as a collective entity in relation to similar collective entities, is slowly but steadily disappearing.

THE PUSH AND PULL OF AMERICAN POWER

A DECADE after the end of the Cold War, a paradox exists with respect to American power. On the one hand, the United States is the only superpower in the world. It has the largest economy and the highest levels of prosperity. Its political and economic principles are increasingly endorsed throughout the world. It spends more on defense than all the other major powers combined and has the only military force capable of acting effectively in almost every part of the world. It is far ahead of any other country in technology and appears certain to retain that lead in the foreseeable future. American popular culture and consumer products have swept the world, permeating the most distant and resistant societies. American economic, ideological, military, technological, and cultural primacy, in short, is overwhelming.

American influence, on the other hand, falls far short of that. Countries large and small, rich and poor, friendly and antagonistic, democratic and authoritarian, all seem able to resist the blandishments and threats of American policymakers. On issues of protectionism, sanctions, intervention, human rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peacekeeping, and others, officials of foreign governments listen politely to American demands and entreaties, perhaps express general agreement with the ideas advanced, and then quietly go their own way. This tendency "to follow their own counsels," Jonathan Clarke observed in *Foreign Policy* in 1996, "includes both great and small nations. Defying intense American pressure in 1994, tiny Singapore proceeded to cane an American teenager. Bankrupt, isolated

Cuba has successfully changed American immigration policy. Poland has defied American requests not to proceed with an arms deal with Iran. Jordan has resisted American pressure to break off commercial links with Iraq . . . China has rebuffed American demands on human rights." The United States has been unable to achieve its goals on trade policy with China and Japan, unable to induce Russia to restrain arms and technology transfers to China and Iran, unable to get rid of Saddam Hussein, Castro, and Qaddafi, unable to pressure Israelis and Palestinians to be more accommodating with each other, unable to induce Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to cooperate meaningfully in Bosnia, unable to secure significant economic reform in Japan. The United States still clearly is able to veto any major international action, but its ability to induce other countries to act in the way it thinks they should act is hardly commensurate with its image as the "world's only superpower."

What explains this apparent gap between the extent of American power and the ineffectiveness of American influence? In part, the gap is a result of comparing the resources of a country with the strength of its government. Historically the United States has been a strong country with a weak government.[7] Apart from the military, most of the resources cited as evidence of American power are not easily subject to the control of the American government. Although its economy is the largest in the world, national government revenues are a smaller proportion of GNP (19.7 percent in 1993) than in all but two (Japan, Switzerland) of 24 high income countries. Similarly, the demands of the American government are not strengthened by the popularity of "Baywatch" and rap music. During the Cold War, major technological advances were in large part a product of the Department of Defense and its requirements. Now the military establishment is increasingly dependent on technological developments in the private sector. Antigovernmentalism is a pervasive

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[7]For an explanation that links the structure of the American state to its foreign policy, see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

theme in the American Creed and is not easily overcome in the absence of a foreign enemy. The impetus to balance the budget leads to major cutbacks in key elements of foreign affairs spending.

A second related explanation for the gap between resources and influence stems from the changing nature of American power. The United States is and will remain a global hegemon. The nature of that dominant role, however, is changing, as it changed for other hegemonic states. In their first phase, the influence of hegemons stems from their power to expend resources. They deploy military force, economic investment, loans, bribes, diplomats, and bureaucrats into other countries and often bring those territories and populations under their direct or indirect rule. American expansion in the 1950s and 1960s did not expand American rule, but did produce an American military, political, and economic presence in large areas of the world. In the second phase of hegemony, the power to expend is replaced by the power to attract. By the 1970s, American hegemony began to move into this phase with the outward push in the first phase of hegemonic power giving way to the inward pull characteristic of the second phase, a process that also occurred in the evolution of Rome, Byzantium, Britain, and other hegemonic powers.

In the 1990s the United States still exports food, technology, ideas, culture, and military power. It is, however, importing people, capital, and goods. It has become the largest debtor in the world. It typically takes in more immigrants than all the other countries in the world combined. Farm laborers and Nobel prize winners alike want to move to the United States. Elites everywhere want to send their children to American universities. Most of all, businesses want access to the American market. American popular culture, as Josef Joffe has observed, "is unique; its power comes from pull, not push." American power, in short, has become in Joseph S. Nye's term, the "soft power" to attract rather than the hard power to compel.

The power to attract depends on the willingness of foreigners to find it in their interest to send their money, goods, and children to the United States. It is, however, still power, and the typical form of power for a second-phase hegemon. This became strikingly clear in the Persian Gulf crisis. The fact that the American secretary of state had to go around the world engaging in "tin cup diplomacy," collecting

money to pay for the war, was frequently cited as compelling evidence of American decline. In fact, it was imperial behavior of a classic sort: the collection of tribute by the imperial power from its satellites and dependents. The ability to impose and collect an unanticipated levy of more than $50 billion from other countries in a few months was an extraordinary exercise of second-phase hegemonic power. In the late 1940s the United States exercised its power in the Marshall Plan by giving large sums of money to its allies. In the 1990s the United States exercised its power by collecting comparable amounts of money from its allies.

In the past, the flow of money and people out of the United States far surpassed the flow into the United States. Increasingly, however, the gap has narrowed, as other countries have developed their resources and have found it desirable to send money and people to the United States. While the United States was previously the world's biggest creditor, by 1997 its net foreign debt was more than $1 trillion and was increasing at an annual rate of 15 to 20 percent, with Japan owning almost $300 billion and China more than $50 billion in U.S. treasury bonds.

Between 1963 and 1967, the outflow of foreign direct investment from the United States was more than ten times the inflow to the United States ($24.5 billion versus $2.1 billion). During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the inflow increased dramatically and by the early 1990s exceeded the outflow ($198.3 billion in versus $168.9 billion out for 1989-93.) In the early 1960s, the number of Americans going abroad far exceeded the number of foreigners coming to the United States, an average of 6.1 million foreigners arriving each year between 1960 and 1964. By 1990-1994 the inflows and outflows were equal, an average of 44.2 million Americans going abroad each year versus 44.1 million foreigners coming to the United States.

During its first phase as a hegemonic power, the United States expended billions of dollars each year attempting to influence government decisions, elections, and political outcomes in other countries. These efforts clearly exceeded those of any other government, except possibly the Soviet Union, and almost certainly exceeded the total resources expended by foreign governments to influence American politics. Now this balance has changed dramatically, and the shoe is on the other foot. American activities designed to influence foreign governments have either stopped or been greatly reduced. Foreign aid is down and is concentrated on a few countries. Covert intervention is rare, and the money spent trying to influence elections and other outcomes in foreign countries is only a vestige of what it once was. The efforts of foreign institutions to influence American decision-making, in contrast,

have increased significantly. The United States has thus become less of an actor and more of an arena.

Foreign governments and corporations now expend enormous resources on public relations and lobbying in the United States, with those from Japan, for instance, reportedly reaching $150 million a year. The governments of other foreign countries that have spent huge amounts to influence U.S. governmental decision-making reportedly include those of Saudi Arabia, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Israel, Germany, the Philippines, and more recently China. Foreign governments make a point of recruiting former U.S. government officials to help them in these efforts. They have also gradually learned that the place to concentrate their attention is not on the relatively powerless State Department but on America's extraordinarily powerful legislature.[8]

Over the years foreign influence on American elections has undoubtedly increased. Registered foreign agents make individual contributions to candidates, with Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), for instance, receiving $44,200 from them for his 1996 campaign, even though he refused funds from domestic PACS. Foreign influence has contributed to the defeat for reelection of several representatives whose policies went against the interests of those governments. The 1996 senatorial election in South Dakota was a contest between Indians and Pakistanis as well as between Republicans and

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[8]Allan Gotlieb, Canada's ambassador in Washington during most of the 1980s, entertainingly describes how he learned this lesson in *I'll Be With You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador: The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.

Democrats, with the defeat of Larry Pressler producing elation in Islamabad and dejection in New Delhi. In the coming years, as their numbers, wealth, and political savvy increase, Arabs are likely to fight it out with Jews in elections across the country. The China connection of John Huang and his associates and the millions of dollars they siphoned to the Democratic Party is only the latest and most publicized example of the expenditures of foreign resources to influence American politics.

American politics attracts foreign money because the decisions of its government have an impact on people and interests in every other country. The power to attract resources is thus a result of the power to expend them, and the resource inflow is aimed at affecting the direction of the resource outflow.

There are, however, obvious qualifications to the power to ingest. Elites in other countries have to see it in their interest to provide money and resources to the United States. It is hardly surprising that some allied leaders were heard muttering about "taxation without representation" during the Gulf War collection. And those who invest in capital facilities in the United States obviously expect to exercise some influence in American politics. In addition, the principal collective good the United States provided other countries during the Cold War, protection against the Soviet Union, has disappeared, and the United States may become increasingly unable to continue to provide other collective goods, such as an open world economy and access to the American market. What happens then if the United States levies tribute to support an American-led effort to provide a collective good and no one pays? Or, in a question asked in the 1980s, what happens if the Japanese and Saudis stop buying U.S. government obligations? By the end of the Cold War the United States had gradually lost much of its power to expend resources. It entered the post–Cold War era with substantial power to attract but this too can fade. The United States may then continue to believe that like Glendower it "can call spirits from the vasty deep." The relevant question, however, will be that put by Hotspur: "Why, so can I, or so can any man; / But will they come when you do call for them?"

AMERICAN FOREIGN policy is becoming a foreign policy of particularism increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad of highly specific commercial and ethnic interests. The institutions, resources, and influence generated to serve national interests in the Cold War are being redirected to serve these interests. These developments may have been furthered by the almost exclusive concern of the Clinton administration with domestic politics, but their roots lie in broader changes in the external and internal context of the United States and changing conceptions of American national identity.

The likelihood that these contextual factors will shift in the near future seems remote. Conceivably China could become a new enemy. Certainly, important groups in China think of the United States as *their* new enemy. A China threat sufficient to generate a new sense of national identity and purpose in the United States, however, is not imminent, and how serious that threat is judged to be will depend on the extent to which the Americans view Chinese hegemony in East Asia as damaging to American interests. Reviving a stronger sense of national identity would also require countering the cults of diversity and multiculturalism within the United States. It would probably involve limiting immigration along the lines proposed by the Jordan Commission and developing new public and private Americanization programs to counter the factors enhancing diaspora loyalties and to promote the assimilation of immigrants. These developments may well occur, but given the extent to which, in Nathan Glazer's phase, "we are all multiculturalists now," it will be a while before the recent denationalizing trends are reversed.

The replacement of particularism would require the American public to become committed to new national interests that would take priority over and lead to the subordination of commercial and ethnic concerns. At present, as polls show, majorities of the American public are unwilling to support the commitment of significant resources

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⁹See John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1994*, Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995, pp. 2–8.

to the defense of American allies, the protection of small nations against aggression, the promotion of human rights and democracy, or economic and social development in the Third World.[9] As a result the articulation of these and other broad goals by administration officials produces little follow-through, and with rare exceptions the calls of establishment figures for American leadership generate no effective action. Unable to deliver on its broad promises, American foreign policy becomes one of rhetoric and retreat, with the active energies of the administration concentrated on the advancement of particularistic concerns. Foreign governments have learned not to take seriously administration statements of its general policy goals and to take very seriously administration actions devoted to commercial and ethnic interests.

The alternative to particularism is thus not promulgation of a "grand design," "coherent strategy," or "foreign policy vision." It is a policy of restraint and reconstitution aimed at limiting the diversion of American resources to the service of particularistic subnational, transnational, and nonnational interests. The national interest is national restraint, and that appears to be the only national interest the American people are willing to support at this time in their history. Hence, instead of formulating unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad, foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests.

At some point in the future, the combination of security threat and moral challenge will require Americans once again to commit major resources to the defense of national interests. The *de novo* mobilization of those resources from a low base, experience suggests, is likely to be easier than the redirection of resources that have been committed to entrenched particularistic interests. A more restrained role now could facilitate America's assumption of a more positive role in the future when the time comes for it to renew its national identity and to pursue national purposes for which Americans are willing to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their national honor.

BUILDING UP NEW BOGEYMEN

by Stephen M. Walt

Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is an ambitious attempt to formulate a conceptual framework that can help citizens and policymakers to make sense of the post–Cold War world. Instead of focusing on power and ideology—as we did during the Cold War—Huntington's paradigm emphasizes cultural competition.

Huntington's central thesis is straightforward. "In the post-Cold War world," he writes, "the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural." Identities and loyalties are shifting from the state to the broader cultural entity of "civilization," and this shift is creating a radically different world order. "For the first time in history," he maintains, "global politics has become multipolar *and* multicivilizational." As a result, conflicts *between* civilizations will be more frequent than conflicts *within* them, and "the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will . . . [be] between peoples belonging to different cultural entities."

There are at least three reasons why *The Clash of Civilizations* is likely to enjoy a longer shelf life than some other efforts to formulate

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a post–Cold War paradigm. First, Huntington presents his argument with great skill and with a keen eye for the apt anecdote. Huntington has always been an adroit conceptualizer, and his knack for subsuming diverse phenomena into simple and memorable frameworks is evident throughout the book. He is also a master of the scholarly sound bite, as in his observation that "in Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner." These stylistic felicities make the book a lively read and greatly enhance the seductiveness of its argument.

Second, cultural explanations are very much in vogue these days, whether the subject is foreign policy, educational performance, gender roles, or family values. Huntington's arguments are thus in step with current intellectual fashions, even if many intellectuals will probably recoil from some of his conclusions.

Third, Huntington's arguments possess a powerful prima facie plausibility. We all know that cultural differences can foster misunderstanding and suspicion, and even a superficial reading of history reveals that groups from different cultural backgrounds have fought on countless occasions. A brief read of any newspaper seems to offer further support for a cultural perspective: "Western" Croats, Muslims, and "Orthodox" Serbs are at odds in Bosnia; Muslims and Hindus are quarreling over Kashmir; "Orthodox" Russians and Armenians have been fighting Muslim Chechens and Azerbaijanis; and trouble may now be brewing between China and its various non-Sinic neighbors. At first glance, therefore, recent events seem to be remarkably in sync with Huntington's assertions.

Yet despite these strengths, the book's central thesis does not stand up to close scrutiny. Huntington does not explain why loyalties are suddenly shifting from the level of nation-states to that of "civilizations," and he does not explain why this alleged shift will lead to greater intercivilizational conflict. Moreover, some of his central claims are contradicted by both historical and contemporary evidence. Finally, Huntington's focus on the broad concept of civilization has led him to overlook or obscure the far more potent role of nationalism. As a result, *The Clash of Civilizations* is an unreliable guide to the emerging world order and a potentially dangerous blueprint for policy.

A Blueprint for Policy?

Huntington begins by defining a civilization as the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. . . . defined by . . . language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people." Drawing upon the work of historians such as William McNeill, Fernand Braudel, Carroll Quigley, and Oswald Spengler, Huntington identifies six contemporary civilizations (Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Orthodox, Sinic, and Western) and two possible candidates (African and Latin American). Five of these eight civilizations have a dominant core state (India, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States), but the African, Islamic, and Latin American civilizations do not.

According to Huntington, the future world order will be shaped by several powerful trends. First, the era of Western dominance is coming to an end, and several non-Western states are emerging as great powers in their own right. Second, these new great powers increasingly reject Western values in favor of their own cultural norms, and the continuing decline in the West's material superiority will erode its cultural appeal even more. Thus, Huntington rejects the belief that modernization is leading to cultural convergence between the West and "the rest." Third, as different civilizations become more tightly connected by markets and media and as universalist ideologies like Marxism-Leninism or liberalism cease to command belief, the broad cultural values embodied in each civilization will become more important as sources of personal and political identity. Taken together, these trends herald the emergence of a new multipolar world in which each of the great powers is the core state of a different civilization. For Huntington, the end of the Cold-War is the critical historical divide between the old world of national rivalries and the new world of clashing civilizations.

What will world politics look like in this multipolar, multicivilizational world? Huntington recognizes that states remain the key actors in world politics, but he believes that they increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms. As a result, "they cooperate with and ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and are more often in conflict with countries of different culture." Or, as he says elsewhere, "alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are

giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization."

It follows that conflicts will occur either in "cleft countries"—defined as states where large segments of the population belong to different civilizations, like Ukraine—or in the "fault-line wars" that occur along the boundaries between two or more civilizations. The latter conflicts are likely to be especially complex, as local antagonists try to rally support from their cultural brethren and especially from the core state (if there is one). The chief danger is the possibility that one or more of these "fault-line wars" will escalate into a great-power conflict that transcends civilizational boundaries.

For the West, two dangers are especially salient. The first is Islam, where a demographic explosion, a cultural resurgence, and the absence of a strong core state combine to create a high propensity for conflict. Huntington recognizes that Islam is deeply divided and relatively weak (its share of world economic product is less than one-fourth that of the West), but these facts do not afford him much comfort. Indeed, he sees Islam and the West as very nearly at war already, observing that "dedicated Islamic militants exploit the open societies of the West and plant car bombs at selected targets. Western military professionals exploit the open skies of Islam and drop smart bombs on selected targets." He believes that the challenge from Islam is inherently cultural and likely to be prolonged.

The Clash of Civilizations is an unreliable guide to the emerging world order and a potentially dangerous blueprint for policy.

The second challenge arises from Asia, and especially from China. If the Islamic threat is partly a reflection of the unruly energies of millions of mobilized young Muslims, the Asian threat derives from the order and discipline that has fueled Asia's economic ascendance. Asian societies are rejecting the individualistic culture of the West, their economic success has reinforced their self-confidence and desire for greater global influence, and Huntington sees a clash of interests—and thus, a clash of civilizations—as virtually inevitable.

Huntington's prescriptions follow directly from his basic framework. In a world characterized by civilizational divisions, he favors greater political, economic, and military integration among the member states of the West; advocates expanding NATO to include other Western states (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland); and wants to bring Latin America into the Western fold while preventing Japan from moving toward China. Because the Sinic and Islamic civilizations pose the greatest threats, the West should also accept Russian hegemony among the Orthodox countries and strive to limit the growth of Sinic and Islamic power. On the home front, the United States must prevent advocates of "multiculturalism" from undermining the West's cultural traditions and encourage immigrants to embrace Western values. Huntington also warns that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations will be "the single most dangerous source of instability," but he does not suggest that we abstain from such activities entirely.

This summary does not do full justice to Huntington's often insightful analysis. He neatly debunks claims of cultural convergence and bolsters his own arguments with numerous examples of cross-cultural conflict. His analysis of the dynamics of "fault-line" conflicts is especially intriguing, as is his discussion of the conflictive character of contemporary Islamic societies. The civilizational paradigm has the merit of simplicity, and it seems to make sense of some important contemporary events. So why not simply send a copy of the book to every head of state, legislator, and senior government official in the West and gird our loins for the *kulturkampf* that lies ahead?

To fully grasp why *The Clash of Civilizations* should not become the blueprint for U.S. (let alone "Western") foreign policy, we must first consider what world politics was like in the past. Doing so will highlight how Huntington believes it is changing and help us to see the flaws in his argument.

DISSECTING THE THESIS

What was world politics like prior to the end of the Cold War, which Huntington identifies as the starting point for the new era of cultural competition? For the past 200 years or so, states—and especially the great powers—have been the key actors in world affairs. It was generally recognized that

some of these states belonged to different civilizations, but nobody argued that these differences mattered very much for understanding international politics. Cultural differences did matter, but their main political expression took the form of nationalism. The belief that distinct cultural groups—or nations—should have their own state proved to be an extremely powerful political ideology, and it reinforced the state system that has existed since the mid-17th century.

Great-power conflict was a common occurrence throughout this period. Wars occasionally arose for essentially "cultural" (i.e., nationalist) reasons, most notably in the War of Italian Unification (1859) and the wars of German unification (1864, 1866, and 1870). For the most part, however, great-power conflict resulted from the combination of fear, greed, and stupidity that is characteristic of life in the anarchic world of international politics.

According to Huntington, great-power conflict before 1990 was largely, if not entirely, intracivilizational. In his words, "for over four hundred years, the nation-states of the West—Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others—constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other." This characterization is wrong, however, because it omits the two non-Western great powers (Japan and Russia) that "interacted, competed, and fought wars" with the West (and with others) during these four centuries.

With Japan and Russia included, what does the historical record show? There have been four hegemonic conflicts since 1800 (the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War), all of which involved states from two or more civilizations. Moreover, most of the other wars involving great powers (including their colonial wars) were intercivilizational as well. Thus, Huntington is wrong to claim that "in the post–Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational."

Among other things, this error casts doubt on Huntington's claim that the end of the Cold War constitutes a radical historical watershed. It also means that he cannot use past intercivilizational wars as support for his own thesis, because these various conflicts did not arise from the cultural or "civilizational" differences that Huntington now sees as central to world politics.

At this point, one begins to suspect that Huntington has merely

given a new label to an old phenomenon: Sometimes states with different cultural backgrounds fight with one another. Such a view receives support from Huntington himself, when he writes that "the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power." Yet he clearly believes that something is different today, or why bother to formulate a new paradigm?

The novel feature is a shift in personal identities. He still regards states as the key actors in world politics but argues that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a profound shift in the locus of political loyalty. In a direct challenge to the concept of nationalism, he asserts that both the elites and the masses will increasingly identify with other states in their specific cultural group and that this shift in identities will largely eliminate conflict within each civilization while exacerbating tensions between them.

It is important to recognize how fundamental and far-reaching this claim is. For the past 2,000 years or so, assorted empires, city-states, tribes, and nation-states have repeatedly ignored cultural affinities in order to pursue particular selfish interests. These political units have always been willing to fight other members of their own civilization and have been equally willing to ally with groups from different civilizations when it seemed advantageous to do so. Huntington now claims that states are going to act very differently, however, and will place cultural values above all others.

Yet Huntington never explains why loyalties are shifting in the manner he depicts. He asserts that globalization and the increased contact between different cultures have made broad civilizational identities more powerful, but he provides no theory explaining why this is the case. Why are "civilizational" loyalties now trumping nationalism? Why is culture or ethnicity no longer focused on the state, but on the broader notion of "civilization"? Huntington provides no answer to these questions.

Not only is an answer lacking, but many of his examples of increasing cultural assertiveness are not about "civilizational" consciousness at all. To support his claim that the end of the Cold War led to a global "identity crisis," for example, he notes that "questions of national identity were actively debated . . . [in] Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Mo-

rocco, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States." Most of these "questions of identity" arose from nationalist movements rather than from any "civilizational" affinity, however, and thus do not support his thesis.

Moreover, although *The Clash of Civilizations* devotes roughly 300 pages to a cultural analysis of world politics, Huntington never explains why conflict is more likely to arise between civilizations than within them. He suggests that cultural values are not easily compromised and that people "naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them." Yet even if these propositions are correct—and I am inclined to agree with him on the last one—they do not explain why intercivilizational conflicts will shape the future world order.

Cultural differences do not cause war by themselves, just as cultural similarities do not guarantee harmony. Indeed, one could argue that cultural diversity makes conflict less likely, provided different groups are free to establish their own political and social orders. As Huntington's own analysis of "cleft states" suggests, cultural clashes are most likely not when separate groups come into contact, but when members of different cultures are forced to live in the same community. Once again, many of Huntington's more compelling examples of cultural conflict come from local settings rather than from true "civilizational" clashes. But the ways in which members of different cultures interact within a single community are quite different from the ways in which whole civilizations interact on a global scale.

Finally, the evidence in favor of Huntington's thesis is quite thin. As we have seen, past examples of intercivilizational conflict do not support his thesis, because these were simply conflicts of interest between states and not the result of "civilizational" differences. Given that Huntington sees the civilizational paradigm as relevant only for the post–Cold War period, we have roughly six years of experience with which to evaluate his claims. What does the record show thus far?

Huntington supports his argument by reference to numerous examples of contemporary political leaders employing cultural or even civilizational rhetoric. Not surprisingly, he takes these statements at face value and regards them as persuasive evidence of growing civilizational affinities. But the question is not just what Lee Kuan Yew or Muammar Qadaffi say, because talk is cheap and political rhetoric

serves many functions. The real issue is what these leaders (or their countries) will actually do, and how much blood and treasure they will devote to "civilizational" interests.

On this point, the record of state behavior since 1990 does not lend much support to Huntington's argument. Consider the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Huntington's paradigm predicts that conflicts between civilizations will be more frequent and intense than conflicts within them. Yet in the Gulf war, Iraq attacked a fellow Islamic state, only to be repulsed by a coalition of Western and Islamic states, with tacit support from Israel. Huntington tries to salvage his thesis by arguing that most Islamic populations actually favored Iraq, but, even if this were true, it merely underscores the fact that state interests mattered more than loosely felt and politically impotent loyalties to a particular "civilizational" entity. In the Gulf war, in short, civilizational identities were irrelevant.

What about Bosnia, where Muslims, "Western" Croats, and "Orthodox" Serbs were at war from 1991 to 1995? Although some aspects of the Bosnian tragedy are consistent with Huntington's argument, the overall picture is a striking refutation of it. More than 50,000 U.S.–led troops were deployed to Bosnia in 1996, but they were not there to defend Western (in this case, Croatian) culture. Rather, they were there primarily to protect Muslims. Indeed, although several Islamic countries did send modest amounts of aid to the Bosnian Muslims, the Western states ultimately did far more for them than did their Islamic brethren. Similarly, Russia offered some rhetorical support to the Serbs, but it backed away from its "Orthodox" brethren when Serbian bellicosity made Belgrade an unappealing ally. Even the Western states failed to line up according to cultural criteria, with Britain and France being more sympathetic to the Serbs, Germany backing the Croats, and the United States reserving ....most of its support for the Muslims.

What about the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent carnage in Zaire? Huntington is not certain whether a true "African civilization" exists, but it is abundantly clear that these bloodlettings did not arise from a clash of civilizations. And, as in the earlier humanitarian mission in Somalia, outside assistance is being provided by members of other civilizations, once again irrespective of the cultural criterion Huntington now claims is paramount.

Thus, conflict and cooperation do not observe the civilizational

boundaries that Huntington's thesis predicts. Interestingly, *The Clash of Civilizations* provides decisive evidence on precisely this point. On pages 256 to 258, Huntington presents two tables on current ethnopolitical conflicts in order to demonstrate the conflictive nature of contemporary Islam. These tables also show that conflicts *within* civilizations are roughly 50 per cent more frequent than conflicts between them. This result directly contradicts Huntington's core thesis, because the number of *potential* conflicts between members of different civilizations is much greater than the number of potential conflicts between members of the same civilization. For example, there are roughly 20 "Western" states with which the United States could find itself at odds, but there are more than 175 non-Western states that the United States could quarrel with as well. Even if conflict occurred on a purely random basis, we would expect most clashes to be *between* groups from *different* "civilizations." This gap should be even more pronounced if "civilizational" differences are a powerful cause of conflict, as Huntington posits, but the evidence he presents shows that exactly the opposite is occurring. This result merely underscores the fact that cultural differences are of secondary importance in explaining the origins of global conflict in the post–Cold War world.

The Clash of Civilizations is also strangely silent about Israel, which has been a central concern for U.S. foreign policy since its founding in 1948. During the Cold War, U.S. support for Israel could be justified on both ideological and strategic grounds. From a cultural perspective, however, the basis for close ties between Israel and the "West" is unclear. Israel is not a member of the West (at least not by Huntington's criteria) and is probably becoming less "Western" as religious fundamentalism becomes more salient and as the Sephardic population becomes more influential. A "civilizational" approach to U.S. foreign policy can justify close ties with Europeans (as the common descendants of Western Christendom) but not Israelis. Moreover, given that Huntington wants to avoid unnecessary clashes with rival civilizations and given that U.S. support for Israel is a source of tension with the Islamic world, his civilizational paradigm would seem to prescribe a sharp reduction in Western support for the Jewish state. I do not know whether Huntington favors such a step, but that is where the logic of his argument leads. His silence on this issue may reflect an awareness that making this conclusion explicit would not enhance the appeal of the book, or Israel may simply be an anomaly that lies outside of his framework.

In either case, however, the issue reveals a further limitation of the civilizational paradigm.

Cultural differences do not cause war by themselves, just as cultural similarities do not guarantee harmony.

What has gone wrong here? As should now be apparent, Huntington's central error is his belief that personal loyalties are increasingly centered on "civilizations" rather than on the nation-state. If there is a dominant trend in the world today, however, it is not the coalescing of a half-dozen or so multinational civilizations. On the contrary, the dominant trend is the tendency for existing political communities to split into smaller units, organized primarily along ethnic or national lines. Being part of some larger "civilization" did not convince the Abkhaz, Armenians, Azeris, Chechens, Croats, Eritreans, Georgians, Kurds, Ossetians, Quebecois, Serbs, or Slovaks to abandon the quest for their own state, just as being part of the West did not slow Germany's rush to reunify. Thus, it is not civilization that is thriving in the post–Cold War world; it is nationalism.

This neglect of nationalism is the Achilles' heel of the civilizational paradigm. As Huntington himself points out, "civilizations" do not make decisions; they are an abstract cultural category rather than a concrete political agency. States, on the other hand, have defined borders, designated leaders, established decision-making procedures, and direct control over political resources. States can mobilize their citizens, collect taxes, issue threats, reward friends, and wage war; in other words, states can act. Nationalism is a tremendously powerful force precisely because it marries individual cultural affinities to an agency—the state—that can actually do something. In the future as in the past, the principal conflicts in the world will be between states—not civilizations—and between existing states and groups within them who seek to establish states of their own. Some of these conflicts will occur across cultural boundaries—as in the "fault-line" areas that Huntington correctly highlights—but cultural differences

will be at best a secondary cause of conflict.

Once again, Huntington's analysis implicitly acknowledges this point. His emphasis on the "core states" within each civilization reaffirms the central role of the great powers—defined in traditional realist terms—and he admits that "the issues in [core state conflicts] are the classic ones of international politics," such as relative influence, economic and military power, and the control of territory. When it comes to the great powers, therefore, culture does not matter very much, and the concept of civilization largely drops out of his analysis.

The enduring relevance of the realist, statist paradigm is most clearly revealed at the end of the book, when Huntington lays out a possible scenario for a war between China and the West. Several details of this imagined war are striking. First, it begins with a Chinese attack on Vietnam, which by Huntington's criteria is a clash within a particular civilizational group. Thus, World War III is caused not by a clash of civilizations, but by a clash within one—precisely the sort of event that increasing cultural affinities were supposed to overcome. Second, cultural factors play virtually no role either in starting the war or in causing it to escalate; instead, it arises from a competition for oil and escalates because other states are worried about the long-term balance of power. Third, the subsequent war features a number of important intercivilizational alliances (for balance-of-power reasons), which further contradicts the claim that cultural factors are becoming decisive. In short, when he turns away from expounding his paradigm and describes what a 21st-century conflict might actually look like, Huntington largely ignores his own creation and relies on the traditional principles of realpolitik.

A CALL FOR NEW ENEMIES?

In the end, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is a book replete with ironies. It is ironic that a scholar whose earlier works offered brilliant analyses of the role of the state now offers a paradigm in which states are the handmaidens of diffuse cultural groups. It is also ironic that a scholar who effectively challenged the "declinist" arguments made by Paul Kennedy and others now goes them one better: Not only is the United States declining, but so is the rest of Western civilization. And it is surely

ironic that a scholar who was sounding alarm bells about Japan only four years ago is now obsessed with China and Islam and is calling for active efforts to preserve Japan's ties with the West.[1]

There may be a common theme in these ironies, however. Huntington has always been a staunch defender of Western civilization in general and the United States in particular, and he is clearly worried that the hedonistic, individualistic culture of the West is no longer up to the challenges it faces. By portraying the contemporary world as one of relentless cultural competition, therefore, he may be trying to provide us with the bogeymen we need to keep our own house in order.

He may be right, and a reaffirmation of certain "Western" values might be wholly desirable. But even if the West does need new enemies in order to hold it together, the civilizational paradigm that Huntington has offered is not a sound basis for making foreign policy. Relying upon an overly broad category like "civilization" would blind us to the differences within broad cultural groups and limit our ability to pursue a strategy of "divide and conquer." Thus, adopting Huntington's paradigm might unwittingly rob policymakers of the flexibility that has always been a cardinal diplomatic virtue. If the world is as dangerous as he seems to think, why limit our options in this way?

Moreover, if we treat all states who are part of some other "civilization" as intrinsically hostile, we are likely to create enemies that might otherwise be neutral or friendly. In fact, a civilizational approach to foreign policy is probably the surest way to get diverse foreign cultures to coordinate their actions and could even bring several civilizations together against us. The West is still the strongest civilization and will remain so for some time to come. Accordingly, a civilizational strategy could encourage two or more civilizations to gang up on us, solely out of a sense of self-preservation. In this sense, *The Clash of Civilizations* offers a dangerous, self-fulfilling prophecy: The more we believe it and make it the basis for action, the more likely it is to come true. Huntington would no doubt feel vindicated, but the rest of us would not be happy with the results.

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[1] For his earlier views, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 67:2 (Winter 1988/89); "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* 33:1 (January 1991); and "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17:4 (Spring 1993).

Why Consensus Is So Elusive in U.S. Foreign Policy
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Washington
May 22, 1998

Abstract:
US policies such as liberalized free trade, military spending, and foreign aid were once believed to serve the national interest; however, they are now objects of intense debate on Capitol Hill. Trubowitz suggests that bipartisanship has all but disappeared from US politics.

Full Text:
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FUTURE HISTORIANS are unlikely to give America's leaders high marks for foreign policy in the 1990s. In contrast to the postWorld War II era, when America moved decisively on the world stage, the post-Cold War period has reflected disarray and drift. Policies such as liberalized free trade, military spending, and foreign aid were all once widely believed to serve the national interest. They are now objects of intense and often inconclusive debate on Capitol Hill.

Although the White House still dominates foreign policy, it can no longer count on Congressional deference. President Clinton's failure last November to win Congress's backing for authority to negotiate trade agreements directly, something Presidents regularly enjoyed during the Cold War years, was a stunning reminder of how things have changed. Clinton had made free trade a top legislative priority, but members of his own party stymied him. Congress's message was clear: The power to define the nation's interests abroad is up for grabs.

The trouble, say some prominent scholars and policy makers, is multiculturalism⬜. Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs last October, the Harvard University political scientist Samuel Huntington blamed ethnic groups who revel in the rhetoric of cultural diversity and reject the idea of a one-size-fits-all foreign policy. The dramatic rise in immigration and the spread of what Huntington called "the cult of multiculturalism⬜" have turned foreign policy into a hodgepodge of policies catering to special-interest groups. Echoing this view, James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense, argued in the fall 1997 issue of The National Interest that "pandering to ethnic constituencies" has made a mockery of the national interest.

According to this view, the end of the Cold War has allowed groups to turn foreign policy into an instrument for promoting the interests of their real or imagined homelands. African Americans want more aid for Africa, Cuban Americans lobby for tougher sanctions against Castro, and so on. In the absence of a unifying threat such as the old "Evil Empire," the theory goes, our public officials are less hesitant to use foreign policy for narrow electoral ends.

That view is rapidly becoming conventional wisdom in the foreign-policy establishment and is also gaining currency among scholars. But it is misleading. Arguments that trace today's foreign-policy drift to multiculturalism⬜ not only misread the present, they also view the past through rose-colored glasses. To be sure, foreign-policy making today is highly politicized. But that is not new. Even at the height of the Cold War, electoral politics often had a heavy hand in shaping foreign-policy decisions, such as President Truman's policy of "containing" the Soviet Union and President Reagan's military buildup.

The real question today is why the political process can no longer manufacture consensus, the way it did in the decades after World War It. One thing is certain: The answer does not lie in the ethnic makeup of the American electorate. It is rooted instead in globalization and in the uneven impact that America's integration into the world economy has had on differing regions of the United States. The dislocations caused by international market forces have destroyed the historic compromise between the Northeast and the South that was the backbone of the Cold War consensus.

For well over a decade, debates over foreign policy have pitted the aging Rust Belt states of the Northeast against the growing Sun Belt states of the South and West. Politicians from these regional blocs regularly battle in Congress over issues including defense spending, foreign aid, and foreign trade. The fight over fasttrack trade legislation is a good example. Opposition was centered in the industrial states of the Northeast. Clinton's biggest backers-ironically, many of them Republicans-were overwhelmingly from the West and the South.

There is little mystery as to why. For years, the Northeast has been losing jobs, people, and income to the South and West. Congressional seats and electoral clout have followed. This power shift caught geographers' and demographers' attention in the 1970s. It accelerated throughout most of the 1980s and then again in the 1990s. A recent Census Bureau study indicates that the Northeastern states, some of which experienced a brief renaissance in the late 1980s, are again losing residents to the South and West.

Many factors explain the political and economic power shift from Northeast to South and West. Higher tax rates, labor costs, and energy prices in the Northeast played a role. So did the fact that more military bases and defense contractors are located in the South and West than in the Northeast-meaning that during the Cold War, the South and West benefited disproportionately from federal spending for defense.

Now that the Cold War is over, many Northern lawmakers are calling for large reductions in the Pentagon's budget and for increased public investment in the North's sluggish, densely populated cities. With many of its factories and industries having borne the brunt of the decline of America's commercial power in the 1980s, the Northeast has opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement and other proposals for freetrade zones in the 1990s. By contrast, the South and, especially, the export-oriented West today are positioned better than the Northeast to compete in international markets.

Roll-call votes in Congress underscore the regional cleavage on foreign-policy issues. The National Journal's recently published annual compilation of members' votes on key issues shows that lawmakers from the Sun Belt generally were much more supportive than those from the Rust Belt of increasing Pentagon spending, expanding trade with China, and projecting a more assertive foreign policy, free of today's deference to outside influences like the United Nations. Exceptions-such as bedrock-conservative New Hampshire and liberal-leaning northern Californiaonly prove the rule.

ALTHOUGH these fault lines on foreign-policy issues appeared in the 1980s, the chasm has widened since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The process has been fueled by partisan politics. On one side are Northern Democrats, such as Michigan's David Bonior, New York's Charles Rangel, and Massachusetts' Barney Frank, who are no longer willing to pay the "overhead charges" of American leadership: large defense budgets and low tariff barriers. On the other side are the Sun Belt Republicans, such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich, of Georgia, and House Majority Leader Dick Armey, of Texas. These lions of laissez faire liberated Congress in 1994 from the clutches of the Rust Belt politicians and now advocate a Reaganesque mix of military spending and freer trade.

This is not the first time that America's regions have been divided over foreign policy, of course. The country split along regional lines 100 years ago, in the great debate between the "imperialists" and "anti-imperialists" over colonial expansion in Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines. That fight pitted the industrial Northeast and the West, which saw those islands as strategic steppingstones to new markets in Latin America and Asia, against the South, which marketed its cotton in Europe and feared a European backlash against U. S. colonial adventurism.

During the Great Depression, politicians from the urban Northeast and the South found common ground in President Roosevelt's "internationalist" foreignpolicy agenda and waged a fierce battle against their "isolationist" rivals in the West. At issue was whether the United States should assume a more assertive role in promoting global economic recovery and preventing the emergence of closed spheres of influence in Europe and Asia. In the 1890s and the 1930s, like today, politicians from different parts of the country sought to equate the particular interests of their region with the nation's foreign-policy stances.

The parallels stop there, however. What makes consensus elusive today is the partisan nature of these sectional divisions. For much of the Cold War, party politics cut across regional boundaries. Eastern "Rockefeller Republicans" aligned with Southern Democrats on foreign-policy matters, keeping political divisiveness in check. This is no longer the case. The Republicans' rapid electoral gains in the West and South, culminating in the 1994 midterm elections that gave them control of Congress, have made them the party of the Sun Belt. The Democrats, once dominant in the South, are quickly becoming the party of the Rust Belt.

The result is predictable: Republicans favor policies such as free trade and military spending, which serve the core interests of the Sun Belt-aerospace, agribusiness, computers, construction, and real estate. Democrats oppose policies that might encourage companies to set up factories abroad and threaten Rust Belt jobs. Bipartisanship-what President Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once called the "oil of national government"-has all but disappeared from politics.

The foreign-policy imperatives facing the Rust Belt are not the same as those driving the Sun Belt. The polarization of the two-party system along this regional divide has entrenched divisions and significantly reduced the political room for maneuvering. Again, the fast-track trade legislation illustrates the problem. When President Clinton talked about the need for freer trade, he risked Democratic support; if he soft-pedaled free trade, he invited the wrath of the Republicans who control Congress.

Arguments that blame multiculturalism for Washington's foreign-policy failings are not just wrong. They are counterproductive. They make it harder to discuss America's real stakes in the post-Cold War world. Globalization will affect regions, industries, and socioeconomic groups unevenly. Who will gain? Who will pay? These are the questions that will drive foreignpolicy debates for many years to come.

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Ethnic conflict

Abstract:

The world was paralyzed by indecision as genocidal wars swept Bosnia and Rwanda. However, ethnic conflicts are neither as ancient nor as "ethnic" as they seem. Sadowski exposes some false ideas about ethnic conflict.

Full Text:

Ethnic conflict seems to have supplanted nuclear war as the most pressing issue on the minds of policymakers. But if yesterday's high priests of mutually assured destruction were guilty of hyper-rationality, today's prophets of anarchy suffer from a collective hysteria triggered by simplistic notions of ethnicity. Debates about intervention in Rwanda or stability in Bosnia demand a more sober perspective.

The Number of Ethnic Conflicts Rose Dramatically at the End of the Cold War

Nope. The idea that the number of ethnic conflicts has recently exploded, ushering us into a violent new era of ethnic "pandaemonium," is one of those optical illusions that round-the-clock and roundthe-world television coverage has helped to create. Ethnic conflicts have consistently formed the vast majority of wars ever since the epoch of decolonization began to sweep the developing countries after 1945. Although the number of ethnic conflicts has continued to grow since the Cold War ended, it has done so at a slow and steady rate, remaining consistent with the overall trend of the last 50 years.

In 1990 and 1991, however, several new and highly visible ethnic conflicts erupted as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The clashes between the armies of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the agonizing battle that pitted Bosnia's Croats, Muslims, and Serbs against each other, occurred on Europe's fringes, within easy reach of television cameras. The wars in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Tajikistan, while more distant, were still impressive in the way that they humbled the remnants of the former Soviet colossus. Many observers mistook these wars for the start of a new trend. Some were so impressed that they began to reclassify conflicts in Angola, Nicaragua, Peru, and Somalia-once seen as ideological or power struggles-as primarily ethnic conflicts.

The state-formation wars that accompanied the "Leninist extinction" now appear to have been a one-time event-a flash flood rather than a global deluge. Many of these battles have already been brought under control. Indeed, the most striking trend in warfare during the 1990s has been its decline: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute documented just 27 major armed conflicts (only one of which, India and Pakistan's slow-motion struggle over Kashmir, was an interstate war) in 1996, down from 33 such struggles in 1989. Once the Cold War ended, a long list of seemingly perennial struggles came to a halt: the Lebanese civil war, the Moro insurrection in the Philippines, regional clashes in Chad, the Eritrean secession and related battles in Ethiopia, the Sahrawi independence struggle, fratricide in South Africa, and the guerrilla wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

The majority of the wars that survive today are ethnic conflicts-but they are mostly persistent battles that have been simmering for decades. They include the (now possibly defunct) IRA insurgency in the United Kingdom; the struggle for Kurdish autonomy in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey; the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy; the Sri Lankan civil war; and long-standing regional insurrections in Burma, India, and Indonesia. Most Ethnic Conflicts Are Rooted in Ancient Tribal or Religious Rivalries No way. The claim that ethnic conflicts have deep roots has long been a standard argument for not getting involved. According to political journalist Elizabeth Drew's famous account, President Bill Clinton in 1993 had intended to intervene in Bosnia until he read Robert Kaplan's book Balkan Ghosts, which, as Drew said, conveyed the notion that "these people had been killing each other in tribal and religious wars for centuries." But the reality is that most ethnic conflicts are expressions of "modern hate" and largely products of the twentieth century. The case of Rwanda is typical. When Europeans first stumbled across it, most of the country was already united under a central monarchy whose inhabitants spoke the same language, shared the same cuisine and culture, and practiced the same religion. They were, however, divided into several castes. The largest group, the Hutus, were farmers. The ruling aristocracy, who collected tribute from all other groups, was recruited from the Tutsis, the caste of cattle herders. All groups supplied troops for their common king, and intermarriage was not unusual. Social mobility among castes was quite possible: A rich Hutu who purchased enough cattle could climb into the ranks of the Tutsi; an impoverished Tutsi could fall into the ranks of the Hutu. Anthropologists

considered all castes to be members of a single "tribe," the Banyarwanda.

Then came the Belgians. Upon occupying the country after World War I, they transformed the system. Like many colonial powers, the Belgians chose to rule through a local elite-the Tutsis were eager to collaborate in exchange for Belgian guarantees of their local power and for privileged access to modem education. Districts that had been under Hutu leadership were brought under Tutsi rule. Until 1929, about one-third of the chiefs in Rwanda had been Hutu, but then the Belgians decided to "streamline" the provincial administration by eliminating all non-Tutsi chiefs. In 1933, the Belgians issued mandatory identity cards to all Rwandans, eliminating fluid movement between castes and permanently fixing the identity of each individual, and his or her children, as either Hutu or Tutsi. As the colonial administration penetrated and grew more powerful, Belgian backing allowed the Tutsis to increase their exploitation of the Hutus to levels that would have been impossible in earlier times.

In the 1950s, the Belgians came under pressure from the United Nations to grant Rwanda independence. In preparation, Brussels began to accord the majority Hutus-the Tutsis constituted only 14 percent of the population-a share of political power and greater access to education. Although this policy alarmed the Tutsis, it did not come close to satisfying the Hutus: Both groups began to organize to defend their interests, and their confrontations became increasingly militant. Centrist groups that included both Hutus and Tutsis were gradually squeezed out by extremists on both sides. The era of modem communal violence began with the 1959 attack on a Hutu leader by Tutsi extremists; Hutus retaliated, and several hundred people were killed. This set in motion a cycle of violence that culminated in December 1963, when Hutus massacred 10,000 Tutsis and drove another 130,000-150,000 from the country. These tragedies laid the seeds for the genocide of 1994.

The late emergence of ethnic violence, such as in Rwanda, is the norm, not an exception. In Ceylon, riots that pitted Tamils against Sinhalese did not erupt until 1956. In Bosnia, Serbs and Croats coexisted with one another, and both claimed Muslims as members of their communities, until World War II-and peaceful relations resumed even after the bloodshed of that conflict. Turks and Kurds shared a common identity as Ottomans and wore the same uniforms during World War I; in fact, the first Kurdish revolt against Turkish rule was not recorded until 1925. Muslims and Jews in Palestine had no special history of intercommunal hatred (certainly nothing resembling European antiSemitism) until the riots of 1921, when nascent Arab nationalism began to conflict with the burgeoning Zionist movement. Although Hindu-Muslim clashes had a long history in India, they were highly localized; it was only after 1880 that the contention between these two groups began to gel into large-scale, organized movements. Of course, the agitators in all these conflicts tend to dream up fancy historic pedigrees for their disputes. Bosnian Serbs imagine that they are fighting to avenge their defeat by the Ottoman Turks in 1389; Hutus declare that Tutsis have "always" treated them as subhumans; and iRA bombers attack their victims in the name of a nationalist tradition they claim has burned since the Dark Ages. But these mythologies of hatred are themselves largely recent inventions.

Ethnic Conflict Was Powerful Enough to Rip Apart the USSR

Yeah, right. The idea that the Soviet Union was destroyed by an explosion of ethnic atavism has been put forth by a number of influential thinkers, most notably Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. But this theory is not only historically inaccurate, it has misleading policy implications. The collapse of states is more often the cause of ethnic conflicts rather than the result.

Prior to 1991, ethnic consciousness within the Soviet Union had only developed into mass nationalism in three regions: the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and Russia itself. Russian nationalism posed no threat to Soviet rule: It had been so successfully grafted onto communism during World War II that even today Leninists and Russian ultranationalists tend to flock to the same parties. In Transcaucasia, the Armenians and Georgians had developed potent national identities but were much more interested in pursuing local feuds (especially with Muslims) than in dismantling the Soviet Union. Only in the Baltic states, which had remained sovereign and independent until 1940, was powerful nationalist sentiment channeled directly against Moscow.

When the August 1991 coup paralyzed the Communist Party, the last threads holding the Soviet state together dissolved. Only then did rapid efforts to spread nationalism to other regions appear. In Belarus, Ukraine, and across Central Asia, the nomenklatura, searching for new instruments to legitimate their rule, began to embrace-and sometimes invent-nationalist mythologies. It was amidst this wave of post-Soviet nationalism that new or rekindled ethnic conflicts broke out in Chechnya, Moldova, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Yet even amid the chaos of state collapse, ethnonationalist movements remained weaker and less violent than many had expected. Despite the predictions of numerous pundits, revivalist Islamic movements only took root in a couple of places (Chechnya and Tajikistan). Relations between indigenous Turkic peoples and Russian immigrants across most of Central Asia remained civil.

Ethnic Conflicts Are More Savage and Genocidal Than Conventional Wars

Wrong. Although this assumption is inaccurate, the truth is not much more comforting. There appears to be no consistent difference between ethnic and nonethnic wars in terms of their lethality. In fact, the percentage of civilians in the share of total casualties is rising

for all types of warfare. During World War I, civilian casualties constituted about 15 percent of all deaths. That number skyrocketed to 65 percent during World War II, which, by popularizing the use of strategic bombing, blockade-induced famine, and guerrilla warfare, constituted a real, albeit underappreciated, watershed in the history of human slaughter. Ever since, the number of civilian dead has constituted twothirds or more of the total fatalities in most wars. Indeed, according to UNICEF, the share of civilian casualties has continued to grow since 1945-rising to almost 90 percent by the end of the 1980s and to more than 90 percent during this decade.

Furthermore, ethnic wars are less likely to be associated with genocide than "conventional" wars. The worst genocides of modem times have not been targeted along primarily ethnic lines. Rather, the genocides within Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, the Soviet Union, and even, to a great extent, Indonesia and Uganda, have focused on liquidating political dissidents: To employ the emerging vocabulary, they were politicides rather than ethnicides. Indeed, the largest genocides of this century were clearly ideologically driven politicides: the mass killings committed by the Maoist regime in China from 1949 to 1976, by the Leninist/Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1959, and by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.

Finally, some pundits have claimed that ethnic conflicts are more likely to be savage because they are often fought by irregular, or guerrilla, troops. In fact, (a) ethnic wars are usually fought by regular armies, and (b) regular armies are quite capable of vicious massacres. Contrary to the stereotypes played out on television, the worst killing in Bosnia did not occur where combatants were members of irregular militias, reeling drunk on slivovitz. The core of the Serb separatist forces consisted of highly disciplined troops that were seconded from the Yugoslav army and led by a spit-and-polish officer corps. It was precisely these units that made the massacres at Srebrenica possible: It required real organizational skill to take between 6,000 and 10,000 Bosnian troops prisoner, disarm and transport them to central locations, and systematically murder them and distribute their bodies among a network of carefully concealed mass graves. Similarly, the wave of ethnic cleansing that followed the seizure of northern and eastern Bosnia by the Serbs in 1991 was not the spontaneous work of crazed irregulars. Transporting the male Bosnian population to concentration camps at Omarska and elsewhere required the talents of men who knew how to coordinate military attacks, read railroad schedules, guard and (under-) supply large prison populations, and organize bus transport for expelling women and children.

Globalization Makes Ethnic Conflict More Likely

Think again. The claim that globalization-the spread of consumer values, democratic institutions, and capitalist enterprise-aggravates ethnic and cultural violence is at the core of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" hypothesis, Robert Kaplan's vision of "the coming anarchy," and Benjamin Barber's warning that we face a future of "Jihad vs. McWorld." Although these suggestions deserve further study, the early indications are that globalization plays no real role in spreading ethnic conflict and may actually inhibit it.

Despite the fears of cultural critics that the broad appeal of "Baywatch" heralds a collapse of worldwide values, there is not much concrete evidence linking the outbreak of ethnic wars to the global spread of crude materialism via film, television, radio, and boombox. Denmark has just as many television sets as the former Yugoslavia but has not erupted into ethnic carnage or even mass immigrant bashing. Meanwhile, Burundi, sitting on the distant outskirts of the global village with only one television set for every 4,860 people, has witnessed some of the worst violence in this decade.

The spread of democratic values seems a slightly more plausible candidate as a trigger for ethnic violence: The recent progress of democracy in Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, and South Africa has been attended by ethnic feuding in each country. But this is an inconsistent trend. Some of the most savage internal conflicts of the post-Cold War period have occurred in societies that were growing less free, such as Egypt, India (which faced major secessionist challenges by Kashmiris, Sikhs, Tamils, etc.), Iran, and Peru. For that matter, many of the worst recent ethnic conflicts occurred in countries where the regime type was unstable and vacillated back and forth between more and less free forms, as in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Lebanon, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tajikistan. Conversely, in numerous cases, such as the so-called third wave of democratization that swept Latin America and East Asia during the 1980s, political liberalization seems to have actually reduced most forms of political violence.

Investigating the impact of economic globalization leads to three surprises. First, the countries affected most by globalization-that is, those that have shown the greatest increase in international trade and benefited most significantly from foreign direct investment-are not the newly industrializing economies of East Asia and Latin America but the old industrial societies of Europe and North America. Second, ethnic conflicts are found, in some form or another, in every type of society: They are not concentrated among poor states, nor are they unusually common among countries experiencing economic globalization. Thus, the bad news is that ethnic conflicts do not disappear when societies "modernize."

The good news, however, lies in the third surprise: Ethnic conflicts are likely to be much less lethal in societies that are developed, economically open, and receptive to globalization. Ethnic battles in industrial and industrializing societies tend either to be

argued civilly or at least limited to the political violence of marginal groups, such as the provisional IRA in the United Kingdom, Mohawk secessionists in Canada, or the Ku Klux Klan in the United States. The most gruesome ethnic wars are found in poorer societies-Afghanistan and Sudan, for example-where economic frustration reinforces political rage. It seems, therefore, that if economic globalization contributes to a country's prosperity, then it also dampens the level of ethnic violence there.

Fanaticism Makes Ethnic Conflicts Harder to Terminate

Not really. Vojislav Seselj, the commander of one of the most murderous Serb paramilitary groups in Bosnia, once warned that if U.S. forces were used there, "the war [would] be total.... We would have tens of thousands of volunteers, and we would score a glorious victory. The Americans would have to send thousands of body bags. It would be a new Vietnam." Of course, several years later, after Serb forces had been handily defeated by a combination of Croat ground forces and NATO airpower, the president of the Serb separatists, Radovan Karadzic, admitted their leadership had thought all along that "if the West put in 10,000 men to cut off our supply corridors, we Serbs would be finished." Militarily, ethnic conflicts are not intrinsically different from any other type of combat. They can take on the form of guerrilla wars or conventional battles; they can be fought by determined and disciplined cadres or by poorly motivated slobs. How much military force will be required to end the fighting varies widely from one ethnic conflict to the next.

However, achieving a military victory and building a durable peace are two very different matters. Sealing the peace in ethnic conflicts may prove harder for political-not military-reasons. Ethnic conflicts are fought among neighbors, among people who live intermingled with one other, forced to share the same resources and institutions. When two states end a war, they may need only to agree to stop shooting and respect a mutual border. But in ethnic conflicts there are often no established borders to retreat behind. Sometimes, ethnic disputes can be resolved by drawing new borders-creating new states (such as Bangladesh and "rump" Pakistan) that allow the quarreling groups to live apart. Other times, they can be terminated by convincing the combatants that they must share power peaceably and learn to coexist. This is the objective of the Dayton accord on Bosnia.

In either case, ending ethnic warfare often requires the expensive and delicate construction of new political institutions. Not only may this be more difficult than terminating a "normal" interstate war, it may also take much longer. Building truly effective states takes time. For this reason, ethnic wars whose participants are already organized into states or protostates (which was true of the combatants in Croatia and Bosnia) are probably easier to bring to a conclusion than battles in regionsAfghanistan, for example, not to speak of Somalia-where real states have yet to congeal.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

The classic introduction to the study of ethnic conflict is still Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri) inventories changing patterns of warfare in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, annual). For a specialist's tally of particular ethnic conflicts, see Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993). An absorbing overview of the evolving relations between Tutsi and Hutu is Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). The Human Rights Watch report, Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Orgins of Communal Violence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), provides a broader survey of modem hate. An excellent account of the diversity of forms that ethnicity and nationalism have taken in territories of the former Soviet Union is Ronald Grigor Suny's The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Neal Ascherson reflects upon issues of nationality and ethnicity in his book Black Sea (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), which chronicles the expansive history of a region that has been a nexus of several Asian and European cultures□. David Rohde's chilling Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1997) documents the careful organizational planning underlying the genocide in Bosnia. A recent work that dissects the question of whether, or how, the United States should intervene in ethnic conflicts is David Callahan's Unwinnable Wars : American Power and Ethnic Conflict (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998).

For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.

Y A H Y At SA o W S K [is an associate professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. His latest book, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming), critiques the idea that globalization fuels ethnic conflict.

The clash of Samuel Huntingtons
The American Prospect
Princeton
Jul/Aug 1998

Abstract:

One of the fundamental dilemmas of US foreign policy is whether American democracy should be exported. Samuel P. Huntington's powerful case for both sides of the issue is presented.

Full Text:

Since the end of the Cold War, two opposing schools of thought on American foreign policy have emerged. The first school consists of what we might call triumphalists. Triumphalists argue that America has an obligation to democratize the world. For them the successful conclusion of the Cold War validates a Wilsonian approach to spreading democracy-a core tenet of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Triumphalists range from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to academics such as Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington. Then there is school number two: the debunkers. Debunkers view the post-Cold War era with apprehension and gloom. Far from believing that the end of the Cold War will usher in a new golden age of American foreign policy, debunkers insist that America should avoid foreign entanglements with a world now riven by ethnic conflict. America, they maintain, should seize the opportunity to mend its own woes rather than waste precious treasure on crusading abroad. Debunkers range from former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to academics such as . . . well, Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington.

Huntington may be America's most distinguished political scientist. He is certainly its most exasperating. In the .October 1997 issue of the National Endowment for Democracy's Journal of Democracy, Huntington wrote: "The Comintern is dead. The time for a Demintern has arrived." But in the September-October 1997 Foreign Affairs, he delivered just the opposite message: American foreign power is in decline and its foreign policy is fractured by ethnic lobbies, each pursuing its own particular interests. "[I]nstead of formulating unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad," he wrote, "foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests."

Whom are we to believe? Huntington I or Huntington II? One thing is certain: they can't both be right. Either a democratic international is a fool's errand or it is a sound strategy to safeguard future national interests. It can't be both.

Foreign policy experts can, and often do, change their minds. But to produce two concurrent and flatly contradictory articles is an exceptional feat. These articles do, however, point to a deeper conflict in Huntington, one on display in his most recent books, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) and The Clash of Civilizations (1996). Where Huntington I claimed that a third wave of democracy was washing across the globe, Huntington II now seems to argue that it never amounted to more than a momentary splash. The Clash of Civilizations holds that the United States is in decline, that democracy is limited to Western cultures, and that America must accept Asian authoritarianism as a good thing.

This is a profoundly illiberal doctrine, an emphatic denial of universalism. It not only denies that the United States should seek to spread its democratic creed; it also rejects the proposition that other peoples can, or even should, aspire to achieve democratic self-government. Regardless of American action, or inaction, immutable cultural differences dictate authoritarian democracy at best, or tribal warfare at worst. The universality of human rights is replaced with the parochiality of ethnic rights.

Huntington is hardly the only foreign policy thinker to cast doubt on the universality of American democracy. Fareed Zakaria recently wrote that we should distinguish between political democracy and constitutional liberalism, arguing that countries such as Russia and Argentina are "illiberal democracies." Others, such as Atlantic Monthly contributor Robert Kaplan and James Schlesinger, take a far more saturnine view: they highlight the rise of ethnic particularism and bemoan what they regard as American liberals' naive and foolish penchant for interventionism.

Huntington, however, is the most substantial and perplexing exponent of this newly fashionable doctrine of noninvolvement. Huntington has always been a Democrat, but never a liberal or a neoconservative. Instead, he is something different-a conservative realist. Realism has always held that in an anarchic world, states must ruthlessly pursue their national interest or face extinction. But defining the national interest has always

been a slippery task and realism a mutable doctrine. Now Huntington appears to have mutated along with it. While he attacks the United States as a decadent society, he apparently views Asian authoritarianism as superior to the American model of democracy. This amounts to a refurbished critique of the charges leveled against American intervention abroad by the 1960s left. Thus Huntington's intellectual odyssey is not just a story of how one of America's leading foreign policy thinkers has repudiated the democratic universalism he once espoused. It is also an example of how the right has begun to attack the country it used to defend: America.

FROM UNIVERSAL TO PARTICULAR

Huntington is a professor of government at Harvard, where he also heads the Olin Center for Strategic Studies. Since he began his career as a graduate student at Harvard along with Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Stanley Hoffmann, he has produced a steady stream of articles and books. Apart from tours of duty at the National Security Council during the Johnson and Carter administrations, he has spent his entire career as an academic.

Huntington initially focused on civil-military relations. His first book, The Soldier and the State (1957), offered a keen examination of the tensions between civilian control and military strategy. Since the book's appearance an entire subfield has emerged in political science to grapple with the question of civil-military relations-a topic that has acquired fresh importance in the post-Cold War era as doubts have surfaced about the reliability of the American officer corps. In his next book, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Huntington maintained that economic progress could not be divorced from political liberty-again, an argument that is now hotly debated, and one from which Huntington himself now seems to dissent.

It was with American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1981) that Huntington first displayed his interest in the question of ethnicity and national identity. Huntington maintained that there was a distinct American creed based on the Protestant ethic, natural rights, and equality. "[E]thnic cultural identities," he wrote, "coexist with a national identity rooted in a particular set of political ideas and institutions." In the United States, he maintained, ethnic groups did not claim to represent a separate national identity, and ideology and nationality were fused.

In his most recent book, The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington returns to the question of ethnicity, but on a global scale. He argues that the world is made up of seven major civilizations: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, and Latin American. The post-Cold War world is divided along rigidly civilizational-ethnic lines and therefore

is inhospitable to democracy. In Huntington's view, democracy is a Western creation that cannot be transplanted to the inhospitable environments of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Over the centuries, these countries have developed their own habits and practices, which the West should respect rather than attempt to change. Anything else would smack of cultural imperialism. The best that the U.S. can do is to team up with its western European partners to form a kind of imperium that can resist marauding foreigners.

GETTING REAL

The Clash of Civilizations is brilliant, provocative, and utterly unconvincing. Like so many previous efforts to devise grand theories of history and politics-from Spengler to Toynbee to Fukuyama-Huntington's collapses under the weight of its own assumptions. In fact Huntington's form of theorizing suffers from its own kind of malady. Though he stresses that he has written a popular book rather than a political science text, The Clash can be properly understood only in the context of conservative realist and neorealist theory.

Before the Second World War, the study of international relations was simply another term for diplomatic history. Political scientists such as Archibald Cary Coolidge and James Shotwell served on Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry Commission to determine European borders, and they wrote readable prose about America's role in the world. It was only with the arrival of European emigres such as Hans Morgenthau that the European realist tradition-with its neoclassical emphasis on a mechanical balance of power-became dominant in the United States. This tradition emphasized power politics, stability, and a diminished role for ideology-all themes that Henry Kissinger embraced at Harvard and later sought to follow as national security advisor and secretary of state in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

As political science became increasingly wedded to scientific and mechanistic thinking in the 1970s, international relations theory skidded off the rails. The weakness of "realist" theory had always been its assumption that a balance of power should be maintained among nations. Should any nation become too powerful, so the thinking went, opposing nations should form an alliance to balance against it. Neorealism, which emerged in the 1970s, went even further.

Neorealism held that the nature of a regime was largely irrelevant to its behavior. The leading neorealist, Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley, explains that the manner in which nations behave is best understood by viewing them in terms of neoclassical economic theory. Whether the Soviet Union was a totalitarian power or a democracy was secondary to its objective geopolitical interests. It was simply responding to the international environment, to the incentives and disincentives of an organized and coherent system. Any government or statesman running a Russian-led empire at mid-century would have behaved more or less like Stalin or Khruschev. Neorealism thus implies that given a sufficient number of case studies, political scientists should be able

scientifically to predict the behavior of regimes.

Huntington's book moves beyond these increasingly sterile debates. He attempts to integrate an analysis of cultural and civilizational distinctiveness into traditional realism. In arguing that ethnicity stands at the heart of international relations, Huntington turns realism on its head. The nature of regimes becomes the most important factor in what he sees as a battle of rival civilizations jockeying for advantage. But in the end, Huntington himself succumbs to the flaws of the grand theory. For in his attempt to refurbish traditional, conservative realism with culture, Huntington has produced a profoundly illiberal book.

DECLINE, DECLINE, DECLINE

One of the main themes of The Clash of Civilizations is that Western arrogance has blinded the West to the true nature of world politics. While American politicians indulge the naive fantasy of a coming liberal universalism, Asian countries are girding themselves to fight off American intrusions into their spheres of influence.

There may be something to this. But the way Huntington describes it, Asia is set to dispense with the United States as an economic, cultural, and military power. In fact, Huntington's views of Asia turn out to be only a slightly more restrained version of the Japanese parliamentarian Shintaro Ishihara's warnings a few years ago: "There is no hope for the United States," said Ishihara. "Right now, the modern civilization built by whites is coming close to its practical end." Huntington approvingly quotes Tommy Koh, Singapore's ambassador to the United States, who observed in 1993 that a "cultural renaissance is sweeping across Asia." Asians, said Koh, "no longer regard everything Western or American as necessarily the best." Huntington agrees; he even goes so far as to argue that the Confucian work ethic is responsible for the economic progress of Asia.

But is this really true? One of the problems with seeking the roots of Asia's economic success in something as vague as Confucianism is that Confucianism might just as plausibly be used to explain Asia's current economic crisis. This is one of the pitfalls of reading broad cultural and civilizational conclusions into momentary economic trends. Confucianism is deeply rooted in the Asian cultural tradition. But its effects on Asia's current economic climate are complex and ambivalent-hurting in some respects and helping in others. And in any case, avarice, foolishness, and luck probably play at least as great a role in charting Asia's economic future.

What's more, Huntington likely has it exactly backward when it comes to Asian self-assertion. Economic failure, rather than success, seems far more likely to spark an anti-American backlash. Some Indonesians and South Koreans are already beginning to view the International Monetary Fund as a tool of the United States intended to upend their countries' economies. To write off Asia as an economic power, as some are now doing, would be absurd. But if we are looking for the roots of tensions between Asian

nations and the United States, the source is less American arrogance than America's inability to absorb ever greater productive capacity from Asia.

When it comes to the Islamic world, Huntington would seem to be on firmer ground. Radical states like Syria, Iran, and Iraq clearly view the United States as an interloper, and even America's relations with more moderate states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are plagued with religious and cultural tensions. But it would be wrong to assume that American dealings with any Islamic nation are fated to be hostile. Turkey, after all, enjoys a cordial and long-standing relationship with the United States. And even in Iran, the revolution appears to have burned out, leaving behind an apathetic youth eager to enjoy the trappings of American culture, despite the Ayatollahs' adjurations.

Viewing Asia and the Middle East as monolithic civilizations is also misleading because it masks the fact that many of the conflicts in these regions are conflicts within civilizations. It is no accident that Saudi Arabia and Egypt respond differently to the United States than Iran and Iraq do; their regimes perceive their interests as best served by friendly ties with the U.S. Similarly, if the West constituted a single bloc, as Huntington seems to believe, then it would be united in confronting the "Islamic peril." But as the collapse of the Gulf War coalition indicates, the West is divided over how to respond to Saddam Hussein's depredations. France and Germany would like to deal with Saddam as well as Teheran, while the United States vainly insists on isolating both countries. And the Middle East as a region corresponds rather closely to traditional realism. Middle Eastern countries are all jockeying for advantage against one another; the dream of Pan-Arab unity, which Nasser attempted to fulfill, has sputtered out, leaving behind a region united only in suspicion and fear.

Huntington's focus on culture becomes particularly far-fetched when he turns to Bosnia. Here he seems intent on ramming every possible event into his framework to supply it with desperately needed evidence. In Huntington's view, "the intensification of religious identity produced by war and ethnic cleansing, the preferences of its leaders, and the support and pressure from other Muslim states were slowly but clearly transforming Bosnia from the Switzerland of the Balkans into the Iran of the Balkans." But this is simply not true. While some Bosnians have gravitated toward Muslim fundamentalism, there is no evidence of anything like a massive upsurge of religious fervor. Rather than acknowledge that most Bosnians are thankful that the fighting has ended, Huntington repeats Serb propaganda. The ethnic differences between the Bosnians and Serbs were, in any case, largely the invention of Serbian nationalists motivated by territorial conquest and racial extermination. But Huntington declares that "the war in Bosnia was a war of civilizations," endowing the Bosnian conflict with a grandeur that it does not deserve. The Serbs were petty tyrants intent on rubbing out an inconvenient and despised neighbor. There is more here of the banality of evil than some grand clash of civilizations.

Huntington's theory runs into similar difficulties in trying to pit the West against another civilization. Since some European countries such as France and Britain were sympathetic

to the Serbs, while the United States was pushing to help the Bosnians, Huntington starts to waffle. Why did the U.S. help the Bosnians, he wonders? He considers and rejects the notion that the Clinton administration was attempting to placate the Arab states. He then attacks the United States for having seen in Bosnia a peaceful example of multiculturalism⌐: "American idealism, moralism, humanitarian instincts, naivete and ignorance concerning the Balkans thus led [the U.S.] to be pro-Bosnian and anti-Serb."

In other words, the American government failed to realize that civilizational demands dictated that it should have stood by while the Serbs rolled over the Bosnians. That seems a rather uncivilized outlook. There is more: "By refusing to recognize the war for what it was, the American government alienated its allies, prolonged the fighting, and helped to create in the Balkans a Muslim state heavily influenced by Iran.... The Spanish Civil War was a prelude to World War II. The Bosnian War is one more bloody episode in an ongoing clash of civilizations." But the United States did not alienate its allies. It did not prolong the fighting. And it certainly did not help create a Muslim state influenced by Iran. On the contrary, the war ended only when America belatedly launched a few strikes against the Serbs. The Balkans have now become a de facto American sphere of influence, while the allies have happily sent their troops to ensure that renewed warfare does not break out. Where are the Iranians?

BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME

The final chapter of The Clash makes it clear where Huntington has been heading: American national identity itself is under siege, Other countries may fear American cultural imperialism; but Huntington fears their influence on us. No longer is Huntington sanguine about the American national creed that he extolled in American Politics. He believes that multiculturalism⌐ is destroying the United States. According to Huntington, Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe.... It is also manifest, in lesser degree, among Hispanics in the United States.

What Hispanics could Huntington possibly mean? If anything, Hispanics tend to be among the most patriotic of Americans. And Huntington goes on to declare that "historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American creed. . ." If the United States is "de-Westernized," he warns, the West could be reduced to Europe and "a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries."

Essentially, Huntington wants the United States to renounce universalism abroad and at home. A multi-civilizational United States, he says, "will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations." But will it? The United States has always contained different ethnicities; the only difference in very recent history is that new groups are sharing power

with the Anglo-Saxon elite. Even the succession of ethnic groups into the American elite is by now an old story. Bill Richardson, the ambassador to the United Nations, may be the first Mexican American to hold a high-level foreign policy appointment in the United States government. But his story is really no different from that of the Jews and Catholics who made their way into the foreign policy elite in the early Cold War era.

What Huntington seems to fear is the rise of ethnicity in the United States itself. In his 1997 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington warned that ethnic lobbies have hijacked foreign policy. A unified national interest, he says, no longer exists. Multiculturalism has taken over. The only option for the United States is retreat. But this grossly exaggerates the perils and influence of multiculturalism. There is little reason to believe that multicultural activists have taken over the nation's foreign policy. Huntington's alarms about multiculturalism in the United States are as excessive as his claims that Bosnia has become an Iranian beachhead in Europe.

Above all, these musings suggest how disaffected American conservatives have become with the country itself. At the very moment when the U.S. is finally attempting to fulfill its promise of a color-blind society, Huntington is lashing out against fringe multicultural movements and depicting immigrants, in tired and sloppy language, as a menace to the Republic. Huntington is by no means the only conservative to bewail the state of the United States. Alexander Haig, who heads the SingaporeAmerica Council, told me a year ago: "Here in our society we're not a good example." Singapore, according to Haig, is in better shape. Under Lee Kuan Yew's direction, "Singapore has made great progress . . . but in a model best suited to Singapore in his own judgment." Other conservatives who have hailed "Asian values" against American sloth include William F. Buckley, Jr., Henry Kissinger, and Patrick Buchanan. After the flogging of young American Michael Fay in Singapore, Buchanan wrote, "It is our moral elite's distance from reality . . . which induces a moral paralysis when it comes to punishing domestic enemies." Blaming America first has become the new code among conservatives.

In the end, Huntington's apprehensions about immigration and civilizational strife prompt him to suggest that the United States should retreat to a spheres-of-influence foreign policy. But why go through all these cultural and civilizational contortions just to arrive at this old conclusion? Huntington believes that the Anglo-Saxon world-Britain and the United States, with perhaps a few continental countries along for the ride-should form an imperium against the Asian, Islamic, and African hordes. But to confine America's role to such a rearguard action hardly corresponds with the country's traditional conception of foreign policy. The truth is that America, far from being an isolationist power, has steadily expanded its power abroad. Already in 1840, American lithographs depicted an eagle with a banner in its beak heralding: "Westward The March of Empire Takes Its Flight." The United States has moved from conquering the West to dominating the Caribbean to occupying Western Europe to, most recently, assuming responsibility for the Balkans and the Middle East.

There is a potential middle ground that Huntington ignores, one between the naive internationalism now embraced by a portion of the American elite and the dark isolationism that Huntington now apparently embraces. Had Huntington considered the work of Adam Watson, a prominent British theorist of international relations, he might have pondered the notion of a society of states. Watson has written what is probably one of the most brilliant texts on international politics, The Evolution of International Society. Like Hedley Bull and other English political scientists, Watson realized that it is absurd to project balance-of-power or other procrustean systems theories onto world politics. The norm, as Watson suggests, has been for one power-whether the Assyrian, the Roman, or the British Empire-to dominate over the rest. There is no reason to assume that the United States is not following in that path. Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once mused that the United States was playing the upstart Rome to Britain's tired Greece. And there was something to that. The United States may not be attempting to create military rule over its client states and allies, but it does seek to create a new and peaceful system based on American democracy. Relations between states have historically been based not on anarchy but on organized rules of the game established and enforced by a single great power [see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "A Multicultural Nationalism?" TAP, January-February 1998].

Whether or not the United States is able to create such a system depends not on civilizational forces but on its resources, skill, luck, and readiness to promote democracy. That is something that Huntington I seemed to understand even if Huntington II has repudiated it. "Other nations may fundamentally change their political systems and continue their existence as nations," wrote Huntington in The Third Wave.

"The U.S. does not have that option. Hence Americans have a special interest in the development of a global environment congenial to democracy." The United States is unlikely to engage in reckless crusades, but it might forget that defending human rights abroad is what helps to define its national identity at home. There is no multicultural clash, no uniquely Asian democracy, and no grand clash of civilizations. But there are two Huntingtons. And the real clash is between them. Will the real Samuel P. Huntington please stand up?

TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH

American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?

In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one of the world's most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women -no accurate count is possible- were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.

In the looting that followed the regime's collapse, last April, the huge prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the prisoners, however by the fall there were several thousand, including women and teen-agers were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of "crimes against the coalition"; and a small number of suspected "high-value" leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.

Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system. Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling prisoners.

General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job. In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg *Times*, she said that, for many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, "living conditions now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn't want to leave."

A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended, and a major investigation into the Army's prison system, authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by *The New Yorker*, written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to Karpinski's brigade headquarters.) Taguba's report listed some of the wrongdoing:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added "detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence." Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their "extremely sensitive nature."

The photographs -several of which were broadcast on CBS's "60 Minutes 2" last week- show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to assume humiliating poses. Six suspects Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner; Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivitsare now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.

The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.

Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. "Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each otherit's all a form of torture," Haykel said.

Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an empty room, splattered with blood.

The 372nd's abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine -a fact of Army life that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called "hard site" at Abu Ghraib seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:

SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.

When he returned later, Wisdom testified:

I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn't think it was right . . . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, "Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds." I heard PFC England shout out, "He's getting hard."

Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that "the issue was taken care of." He said, "I just didn't want to be part of anything that looked criminal."

The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby, an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court, according to an abridged transcript made available to me, "The investigation started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across pictures of naked detainees." Bobeck said that Darby had "initially put an anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong."

Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any "training guidelines" that he was aware of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003, the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of Corrections. Bobeck explained:

What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things were supposed to be run.

Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion, "had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went into cardiac arrest."

At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys, Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of Frederick's co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away from the courtroom. "The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage witnesses and discover facts," Gary Myers told me. "We ended up with a c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine." After the hearing, the presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convene a court-martial against Frederick.

Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client's defense will be that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions of military intelligence. He said, "Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?"

In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private

defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:

I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell and the answer I got was, "This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done." . . . . MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.

The military-intelligence officers have "encouraged and told us, 'Great job,' they were now getting positive results and information," Frederick wrote. "CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI's request." At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. "His reply was 'Don't worry about it.'"

In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called "O.G.A.," or other government agencies -that is, the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees- was brought to his unit for questioning. "They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away." The dead Iraqi was never entered into the prison's inmate-control system, Frederick recounted, "and therefore never had a number."

Frederick's defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army reports -Taguba's and one by the Army's chief law-enforcement officer, Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.

Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder's report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.

There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said, that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to "set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews" -a euphemism for breaking the will of prisoners. "Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state." General Karpinski's brigade, Ryder reported, "has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations." Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to "define the role of military police soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel." The officers running the war in Iraq were put on notice.

Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found "no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a cover-up.

Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. "Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder's] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation," he wrote. "In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment." The report continued, "Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to 'set the conditions' for MI interrogations." Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private contractors "actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses."

Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s, testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis. She stated, "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk."

Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told C.I.D. investigators, "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . . being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were told that they had different rules." Taguba wrote, "Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: 'Loosen this guy up for us.' 'Make sure he has a bad night.' 'Make sure he gets the treatment.'" Military intelligence made these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. "The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like, 'Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They're giving out good information.'"

When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant Davis answered, "Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing" -where the abuse took place"- belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse."

Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing, said, "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to do this "they needed to give me paperwork.") Taguba also cited an interview with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian contractor. He told of one night when a "bunch of people from MI" watched as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner and Frederick.

General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen "who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by 'setting conditions' which were neither authorized" nor in accordance with Army regulations. "He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse," Taguba wrote. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had "received no formal communication" from the Army about the matter.)

"I suspect," Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel "were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib," and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.

The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. During Karpinski's seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes, attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of "lessons learned" inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, "cases of abuse may have been prevented."

General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources. "This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses," he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said, between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were wrongly being detained -indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be released. Karpinski's defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers "routinely" rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such prisoners.

Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some that he considered "without precedent in my military career." The soldiers, he added, were "poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission."

General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he described as extremely emotional: "What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers."

Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.

After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.

As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. Taguba's report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management

of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. "They'll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth," Rowell said. "'You can flog me until I tell you what I know you want me to say.' You don't get righteous information."

Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who pose an "imperative" security threat, but it must establish a regular procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect, another Guantánamo.

As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and for the United States' reputation in the world.

Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick's military attorney, closed his defense at the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was "attempting to have these six soldiers atone for its sins." Similarly, Gary Myers, Frederick's civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client. "I'm going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian contractor I can find into court," he said. "Do you really believe the Army relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance."

Guerrilla of the Week

by Jenn Bleyer

Greg Palast is back with an updated, expanded edition of the bestseller that won't die, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*. GNN's Jenn Bleyer caught up with America's most prolific muckraker at a recent New York event. Palast was in rare form, pulling no punches as he explained how we're headed for another election debacle, the connection between Iraq and America's African-American community, and why Michael Moore is allowed to get away with what he does.

GNN: What's new in this edition of your book?
Palast: Well, there's nothing new in the sense that it's the same old thieving shits that have been walking away with everything in our nation that isn't bolted down, plus hunks of Mesopotamia. That ain't new. What's new is the information that I have on exactly how they do it. What's new on the election story? It's grim. Our president has signed the Help America Vote Act. When George W. Bush is going to help me vote, I'm concerned.

They're pushing it to go digital, and I think a lot of people are getting distracted worrying about the hacking. The real game is what the Civil Rights Commission calls the "no count," which is machines that don't work, power failures, machines that lock up. Hey, you have a laptop, right? Your presidency is hanging on it. This isn't about whether the machines work or not-they work perfectly. That's where I investigated. I went into Broward County's white precinct where touch screen voting works just wonderful, like a coconut oil massage. Real smooth. And you go into the black precincts and it's like plantation whips brought out in digital form. Precincts were shut down for hours while they told people, come back tomorrow. Power failures. You name it. In the black community, thousands of votes were lost in Broward County with the touch screen vote.

In the new edition of the book, I am revealing something that was discovered by the Civil Rights Commission in their raw data. 1.9 million votes were cast and never counted in the last election. Thrown in the friggin' garbage cans. Half of those were cast by African-Americans. And it's state after state after state, with all kinds of different machines. The biggest game they play is saying "blacks don't have education, they can't figure out the ballot." That's a wonderful little racist out. If you give black people the same machines, they have the same vote count as white people. Election supervisors told me they told the Jebster about it beforehand. You can't find this stuff in mainstream newspapers. Ted Koppel runs this story and it's, "blacks is too dumb to figure out how to vote." Dig: You're one thousand times more likely to lose your vote if you're black than if you're white.

GNN: Have you seen concrete evidence of this happening in other black counties in the country?
Sure. Chicago, Illinois is the worst place in the country. I watched as the machine totals on the back of the lever machines were simply read off differently in the black precincts. Chicago has the worst spoilage rate-that's what they call it, the "spoilage rate." That's because the Daly machine can't allow a black majority of the Democratic Party to take back their party from the white folks who maintain the political plantation in Chicago. Basically it's like political cotton pickin' out there. That's an old one.

GNN: So what's the solution?

Palast: Kill the white people, we know that. But since that's not going to happen, we have to say that we know. And we have to say we're not buying this jive ass bullshit they're doing with the Help America Vote Act.

GNN: Has there been any mainstream coverage of this story?

Palast: Absolutely none. The L.A. Times ran this big story about Greg Palast, one of the world's greatest investigative reporters. Big story. Whoa, I can send that to my mom! But then I go to the editor and say, if I'm such a great investigative reporter, why don't you run my story? "Well, what story?" A million black votes missing. "Oh, we've run that story." You've run that story? What, in the invisible ink edition? See, when you defend black people, you suddenly became an invisible man, like black people are. You're invisible. You're behind the glass.

That's not unrelated to what I found on Iraq. What I found on Iraq was a document that's the Iraq strategy, post-conflict plan for the economy. These little weasels had been working on it, as far as I can tell, since before they returned the rented tuxes from the inaugural. This is why we're there. Why are kids there getting their asses shot off? Saddam's gone. What the fuck are we still doing there? That's a simple question and nobody's answering it. The Left is still arguing about whether we should have gone in. Forget all that bullshit. The reason we're still there is to "sell off all the state assets, especially in the oil industry"- that's a quote. They don't want you to know that when your kid comes home in a box, it's because of Appendix B, which says we need 360 days to grab their oil. Big problem. In those 360 days, there's a lot of angry Iraqis. We can call them old Baathists. We can call them Al Qaeda agents. But I'd call them Vietnamese. It's coming.

GNN: If Iraq really does devolve into a modern Vietnam, how will they maintain popular support for it?

Palast: They don't give a shit about popular support. Bush is running on fear. He's the fear candidate. He's the "you better get scared cuz those guys with the towels on their heads, they're coming to git you" candidate. People have to understand what the game is: pump the fear. His daddy created Osama bin Laden, who came back for us. His daddy created Saddam. And now he's creating Musharraf and all the other crazy bastards, and it's going to be a very fucking dangerous world. They're going to make it so goddamn dangerous that then they'll turn around and say, see, you need us. They're selling fear. That's their commodity.

GNN: You seem pretty convinced that this administration is coming back for a sequel.

Palast: No. The way I read it is that Bush is running unopposed. The only hope for regime change is that Kerry is acceptable to the elite. I've been talking to the oil guys behind the plans to take over Iraq, and they're not unhappy with Kerry at all. Obviously, Bush is their guy. He lets them drill in the Oval Office. Right now we've established a puppet government in Iraq, and the Saudis have established a puppet government here. That's what we're talking about. But the puppets have started playing with their own strings, and that's a problem. That's why Jim Baker moved his office right into the White House. And now they're worried that Bush is creating too many problems. The big fear of the oil companies is not Iraqis. It's that the neo cons are going to try to undercut OPEC. So they have to control George.

GNN: And you think they have the same likelihood of controlling Kerry's puppet strings?

Palast: Kerry says we should have more troops there, and we should stay there until it's stabilized. Well. Iraq hasn't been stabilized since 1911. I have one question for Kerry. What the hell do you mean by "stabilized?" Is California stabilized? Think about this: Timothy McVeigh was our homegrown terrorist. And where did we train him? Gulf War I. He was part of the troops that buried Iraqi soldiers alive when they tried to surrender in their trenches in the Gulf. So he learned

that you can murder unarmed people-the Iraqis were surrendering, they were unarmed-you can murder unarmed people if your cause is just. And he took that home from the Gulf War. People would say, how could a Gulf War hero with all these medals kill innocent people? Excuse me, how could a man who killed all these innocent people, kill more innocent people?? So those guys that were having Iraqis rape each other, they're going to come back, and they're going to be your cops on the south side of Los Angeles. Welcome home! The war will come back home. Forget the terrorists, we're creating our own.

GNN: So what's a lefty or progressive or just a mildly skeptical person to do?
Palast: Dance all night. I think the Left is too fucking stiff. The Left hasn't had an erection in years. We are not approaching people in a normal manner. I mean, these weird words like "imperialism." You go to the corner bodega, the average asshole in America isn't an "imperialist." They're just scared like everyone else, or they don't give a shit. In America we run between falling asleep, going to Disneyworld, and fear.

GNN: Can you tell yet which are the next Enrons and Global Crossings coming up the pike?
Palast: Well, people look in terms of collapse. What I look at is who's ripping off the public, who's stealing the public blind. Unfortunately, there was too much weeping over the Enron stockholders, who certainly didn't mind when the casino was running hot. I don't give a shit about people who lost money on Enron stock. Who are the next ones? The rip-off industry is coming back. We have Reliance Energy. The Koch Brothers-I'm deeply concerned about their little scams. Bass brothers. These are the barbeque billionaires who Bush hangs out with. I would look to Wackenhut Corporation, which is going from Prisons-R-Us to Spy-for-Hire. They're all dangerous. Plus, when they're not dangerous, they are, as Jello Biafra says, clownocrats. They're complete fuck-ups. It's like Castro and the exploding cigar.

GNN: What has Michael Moore's impact been on disseminating your work?
Palast: He's wonderful. He takes my stuff and he turns it into something that he can get past the censors, because he's a clown. If I can't get it into The New York Times, give it to the fat man in the chicken suit and you get it through as a joke. Which is fine, as long as it's done right. We don't have many choices. I don't mind doing skywriting. I have a dance track out, Silence of the Lambs. We're got a CD out with Jello Biafra. We've got DVD's. Larry Flynt is putting us in between the beaver shots. This weekend I was doing gospel with Jesse Jackson and the choir. Whatever we can do to get the word out.

GNN: Your detractors seem to go after you with pretty low-blow character attacks. Do they ever challenge the actual substance of your work?
Palast: Well, I must say I've been accused of being bald, and there's some substance to that. They never go after the substance. It's these whisper campaigns. I had that in England a lot-even worse in England. Everything from my sex life, or lack thereof, to that I'm twisted and maniacal, as Katherine Harris said. And the IMF said that I'm the master of misinformation. I like it cuz it's like, zing! The arrow hit. If anyone has information to counter what I've said, I'm going to publish it. I'll be the first guy to take back a story and correct it. I correct stories all the time. I have to work on the information that I've got. We're not talking papal infallibility here-we're talking journalism. Shit, it ain't the Magna Carta. On the other hand, most of the people who complain are whiners, bellyachers, and guilty as charged.
http://www.guerrillanews.com/corporate_crime/doc4455.html

THE CRUISE MISSILE LEFT (Part 5):
SAMANTHA POWER AND THE GENOCIDE GAMBIT
by Edward S. Herman

Establishment politicians, media, and intellectuals use the word genocide with great abandon, but with a hugely politicized selectivity. It is an invidious word, like terrorism, so that attaching it to an enemy and target is helpful in demonizing, thereby setting up the target for bombing and invasion, and establishing a case for pursuit of its leaders via assassination squads or tribunals. Genocide was used often to describe the killing fields of Pol Pot, but not the killing fields of Vietnam where the United States ravaged the country, killed many more people than did Pol Pot, and left a destroyed country and chemical warfare heritage of hundreds of thousands of children with birth defects. The word was never used in the U.S. mainstream to describe Indonesian operations in East Timor, where the invasion of 1975 and murderous occupation killed off between a quarter and a third of the population, a larger fraction than in Cambodia and not attributable, at least in part, to a prior war and its after-effects (as in Cambodia). But in the one mention of the word genocide in reference to East Timor in the *New York Times* (February 15, 1981), veteran reporter Henry Kamm explained that this was unwarranted hyperbole --that the situation was complex and there were multiple causes of all those deaths (presumably in contrast with Cambodia, where Kamm and the Times never found any complexity or causes other than Pol Pot s policies).

The word genocide is rarely if ever applied to Turkish ethnic cleansing and massacres of its Kurds, and in fact Turkey was mobilized to participate in the 78-day NATO (de facto U.S.) bombing war against Yugoslavia in 1999, supposedly to terminate genocide in Kosovo, although Turkey s attacks on its local Kurds were far more deadly than any pre-bombing-war Yugoslav violence against the Kosovo Albanians. The obvious explanation of the varying word usage is that Turkey was a U.S. ally, and its ethnic cleansing and killings were facilitated by greatly increased U.S. (Clinton administration) military aid, just as Indonesia s violence in East Timor was greatly helped by greater U.S. (Carter administration) aid to the killer state. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was a U.S. target. Amusingly, as Noam Chomsky points out in *Hegemony or Survival*, when Turkey failed to cooperate in the invasion-occupation of Iraq, suddenly the U.S. media began to report on Turkey s ghastly record of torturing, killing, and disappearing Turkish Kurds that had previously been kept under the rug, although they continued to keep under the rug the fact of massive Clinton administration aid facilitating that ghastly record. .

The word genocide has been used often by establishment politicos, media and intellectuals to describe Saddam Hussein s behavior in the 1980s, notably his resort to chemical warfare to kill Iraqi Kurds; but it is never used in the mainstream to describe the sanctions of mass destruction that are credibly estimated to have killed over a million Iraqis. The establishment institutions have avoided all but passing mention of the numbers dead, and they suppress even more completely the evidence that the killings were a consequence of deliberate actions, including the U.S. and British use of the sanctions system to block the import of medicines and equipment to repair water and sanitation systems that were destroyed with full recognition of the disease-threatening consequences.

Genocide was applied frequently to describe Serb actions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, actions supposedly the basis of humanitarian intervention and a major tribunal operation to bring Serbs to book. The link here between Western target, invidious word usage, focus of attention of the cruise missile left and mainstream news and commentary, and dedicated, long-lasting and

expensive tribunal pursuit of the chosen villains, is dramatic. The intellectual apologists for Western imperialism have pretended that the Yugoslavia Tribunal is not fully politicized, but is rather pursuing justice, as they skirt by the facts that nothing happened to Tudjman, Izetbegovic, or any other non-Serb high officials guilty of war crimes in the Balkans. (These would properly include Clinton, Blair and their top associates, guilty of aggression, and whose bombing tactics even Human Rights Watch, a notorious apologist for NATO policies in the Balkans, condemned as violations of international humanitarian law). The apologists claimed that the global reach of justice was approaching institutionalization in the 1990s that human rights has taken hold not just as a rhetorical but as an operating principle in all the major Western capitals (David Rieff)-- pointing beyond the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the Spanish effort to bring Pinochet to book, the Belgian case brought against Ariel Sharon, and the installation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). They slighted the facts that nothing happened to Pinochet, that the case against Sharon was ended by a change in Belgian law (under U.S. pressure), that no tribunal was organized to deal with triple genocidist Suharto, and that the ICJ is repudiated by the United States despite groveling and compromising efforts to accommodate U.S. demands for assured exemption from ICJ jurisdiction.

So it remains a power-out-of-the-gun truth that only a U.S. target can commit genocide or even engage in ethnic cleansing, while the United States can commit blatant aggression with only slightly delayed UN accommodation, and it and its clients don t aggress, ethnically cleanse, or commit genocide. (In ratifying the Genocide Convention, with a 40-year time lag, the U.S. Senate wrote in a U.S. exemption to its application; the U.S. insistence on an above-the-law status is long-standing.)

It is truly Orwellian to see the Yugoslavia Tribunal struggling to pin the genocide label on Milosevic, and to have done that already against Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic. In Milosevic s case, the prosecutor, sensing that only 4-5,000 bodies from all causes and on all sides--having been found in Kosovo after a bloody war, would not sustain a charge of genocide, decided to try to make him responsible for all Bosnian Serb killings in Bosnia, something the Tribunal had forgotten to do over the five previous years. This effort has been a notorious failure.

 In the Krstic case, the genocide charge was based on the Srebrenica events of July 1995, where some substantial but uncertain number of Bosnian Muslims were killed, some in fighting and some executed. Here again the number of bodies in the discovered grave sites in the Srebrenica area is under 5,000, and certainly includes large numbers killed in the fighting during July. The Tribunal court claimed a Bosnian Serb plan and intent to kill all military age Srebrenica males, although no document or credible witness statement was found sustaining this charge, although thousands of Bosnian Muslim soldiers were allowed passage to safety, although many wounded Bosnian Muslims were allowed repatriation, and although the Bosnian Serbs made a number of actual deals and broader proposals for a prisoner exchange.

The alternative view, that there was no such plan, only a vengeance motive and an intent to locate and execute the Bosnian Muslim cadres responsible for the killing of several thousand Serbs in the Srebrenica vicinity over the prior three years, was quickly dismissed by the Tribunal court. Vengeance as a motive is only acceptable for Western-backed killers (and David Rieff and company have relied on this to explain away the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo under NATO auspices). It is also well-known and conceded by the court that all the Bosnian Muslim women and children in Srebrenica were helped to safety in Bosnian Muslim territory, strange behavior with a genocidal intent. The Tribunal reasoning is that in a patriarchal society, the removal of males is especially important for making community survival difficult. Of course, the idea of genocide in one small town is also a path-breaking idea, perhaps to be followed by

genocide in one household. But for such a noble enterprise as putting the Serbs in their place, and making humanitarian intervention palatable, creative thought is useful.

The contrast between the treatment of Yugoslavia and Israel-Palestine remains truly dramatic. For one thing, Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the promised land has been going on for half a century, and it is clear that the steady expropriations, demolitions, and killings of the Palestinians is for the benefit of Jewish settlements, not for security. So this is as pure an illustration of ethnic cleansing as can be found on the face of the earth; Israeli historian Benny Morris, in his recent acknowledgement of this ethnic purification, complained only that it hadn t gone far enough. By contrast, the Serb attacks on Kosovo Albanians before and during the 1999 bombing war were never to provide room for Serb settlements, they were a feature of an ongoing civil war (stoked by outsiders), so that this wasn t true ethnic cleansing at all. There was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia, but it was carried out by all parties, struggling to establish land control in an externally encouraged civil war. Nevertheless, the phrase ethnic cleansing was used lavishly to describe Serb actions in Kosovo, as well as Bosnia, but it is rarely applied to Israeli behavior.

In the Genocide Convention of 1948, the word genocide was defined loosely, as any act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. Genocidal acts included causing serious mental harm or inflicting conditions of life aimed at such destruction. Can anything be clearer than that the Sharon government is trying to destroy the Palestinians as a national group by creating intolerable conditions of life ? Under Operation Defensive Shield Israel carried out a systematic process of demolition of Palestinian public and private property, and mass expropriation of Palestinian land on behalf of settlers (Appeal by 153 Israeli academics); the Israeli army deliberately trashed the inside of every Palestinian institution that it did not entirely destroy schools, charities, health organizations, banks, radio and TV stations, even a puppet theatre (Gila Svirsky). As Rania Awwad has said, Sharon s solution is to depopulate as much as possible the Occupied Palestinian Territories by making life for its citizens unbearable. And what could be more unbearable than watching your children cry themselves to sleep from hunger, night after night? The Israeli leadership is not trying to exterminate all Palestinians, but they are prepared to kill them freely, take away their land, and make life so harsh that they will die off or leave. That this is a genocidal process is sometimes suggested in the Israeli media, but not in the Free Press.

The cruise missile left also adheres closely to the party line on genocide, which is why its members thrive in the *New York Times* and other establishment vehicles. This is true of Paul Berman, Michael Ignatieff and David Rieff, but I will focus here on Samantha Power, whose large volume on genocide, *A Problem From Hell : America and the Age of Genocide* won a Pulitzer prize, and who is currently the expert of choice on the subject in the mainstream media (and even in *The Nation* and on the Bill Moyers show).

Power never departs from the selectivity dictated by the establishment party line. That requires, first and foremost, simply ignoring cases of direct U.S. or U.S.-sponsored (or otherwise approved) genocide. Thus the Vietnam war, in which millions were directly killed by U.S. forces, does not show up in Power s index or text. Guatemala, where there was a mass killing of as many as 100,000 Mayan Indians between 1978 and 1985, in what Amnesty International called A Government Program of Political Murder, but by a government installed and supported by the United States, also does not show up in Power s index. Cambodia is of course included, but only for the second phase of the genocide the first phase, from 1969-1975, in which the United States dropped some 500,000 tons of bombs on the Cambodian countryside and killed vast numbers, she fails to mention. On the Khmer Rouge genocide, Power says they killed 2 million, a figure

widely cited after Jean Lacouture gave that number; his subsequent admission that this number was invented had no effect on its use, and it suits Power s purpose.

A major U.S.-encouraged and supported genocide occurred in Indonesia in 1965-66 in which over 700,000 people were murdered. This genocide is not mentioned by Samantha Power and the names Indonesia and Suharto do not appear in her index. She also fails to mention West Papua, where Indonesia s 40 years of murderous occupation would constitute genocide under her criteria, if carried out under different auspices. Power does refer to East Timor, with extreme brevity, saying that In 1975, when its ally, the oil-producing, anti-Communist Indonesia, invaded East Timor, killing between 100,000 and 200,000 civilians, the United States looked away (146-7). That exhausts her treatment of the subject, although the killings in East Timor involved a larger fraction of the population than in Cambodia, and the numbers killed were probably larger than the grand total for Bosnia and Kosovo, to which she devotes a large fraction of her book. She also misrepresents the U.S. role it did not look away, it gave its approval, protected the aggression from any effective UN response (in his autobiography, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan bragged about his effectiveness in protecting Indonesia from any UN action), and greatly increased its arms aid to Indonesia, thereby facilitating the genocide.

Power engages in a similar suppression and failure to recognize the U.S. role in her treatment of genocide in Iraq. She attends carefully and at length to Saddam Hussein s use of chemical warfare and killing of Kurds at Halabja and elsewhere, and she does discuss the U.S. failure to oppose and take any action against Saddam Hussein at this juncture. But she does not mention the diplomatic rapproachement with Saddam in the midst of his war with Iran in 1983, the active U.S. logistical support of Saddam during that war, and the U.S. approval of sales and transfers of chemical and biological weapons during the period in which he was using chemical weapons against the Kurds. She also doesn t mention the active efforts by the United States and Britain to block UN actions that might have obstructed Saddam s killings.

The killing of over a million Iraqis via the sanctions of mass destruction, more than were killed by all the weapons of mass destruction in history, according to John and Karl Mueller (Sanctions of Mass Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999), was one of major genocides of the post-World War 2 era. It is unmentioned by Samantha Power. Again, the correlation between exclusion, U.S. responsibility, and the view that such killings were, in Madeleine Albright s words, worth it from the standpoint of U.S. interests, is clear. There is a similar political basis for Power s failure to include Israel s low-intensity genocide of the Palestinians and South Africa s destructive engagement with the frontline states in the 1980s, the latter with a death toll greatly exceeding all the deaths in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Neither Israel nor South Africa, both constructively engaged by the United States, show up in Power s index.

Samantha Power s conclusion is that the U.S. policy toward genocide has been very imperfect and needs reorientation, less opportunism, and greater vigor. For Power, the United States is the solution, not the problem. These conclusions and policy recommendations rest heavily on her spectacular bias in case selection: She simply bypasses those that are ideologically inconvenient, where the United States has arguably committed genocide (Vietnam, Cambodia 1969-75, Iraq 1991-2003), or has given genocidal processes positive support (Indonesia, West Papua, East Timor, Guatemala, Israel, and South Africa). Incorporating them into an analysis would lead to sharply different conclusions and policy agendas, such as calling upon the United States to simply stop doing it, or urging stronger global opposition to U.S. aggression and support of genocide, and proposing a much needed revolutionary change within the United States to remove the roots of its imperialistic and genocidal thrust. But the actual huge bias, nicely leavened by admissions of imperfections and need for improvement in U.S. policy, readily explains why Samantha

Power is loved by the *New York Times* and won a Pulitzer prize for her masterpiece of evasion and apologetics for our genocides and call for a more aggressive pursuit of theirs.

The crisis in NATO: A geopolitical earthquake?

Introduction by Margo Kingston

February 21, 2003

NATO is just one of the world's power blocs under enormous strain over war on Iraq. Webdiary's international relations expert Scott Burchill has just received an analysis of the NATO crisis his friend Gabriel Kolko, Professor Emeritus at York University, Toronto. "He is arguably the world's most distinguished war historian, author most recently of *Another Century of War?* (The New Press, New York 2002) and a leading political analyst of NATO and US foreign policy," Scott says. Just yesterday, Tony Blair warned France and Germany that undermining the transatlantic alliance was the most dangerous game of all in world politics. John Howard, in hiding from the quality media, told talk-back radio: "If the world walks away from this, the damage to the authority of the United Nations will be incalculable, the damage to the United States will be huge."

Professor Kolko's piece was written just before NATO papered over the cracks and backed preparations to defend Turkey, and Turkey - faced with almost 100 percent opposition to war from its people - demanded more aid money in return for allowing a US attack on Iraq from Turkey. The wild swings in this 'game' never end. Turkey wants NATO to defend it from retaliation from Iraq, NATO says no, then yes, then Turkey says maybe no to the US! What is happening here? Over to Professor Kolko.

The crisis in NATO: A geopolitical earthquake?
by Gabriel Kolko

The next weeks [after February 2003] should reveal whether we are experiencing the equivalent of a geopolitical earthquake.

Washington intended that NATO, from its very inception, serve as its instrument for maintaining its political hegemony over Western Europe, forestalling the emergence of a bloc that could play an independent role in world affairs. Charles DeGaulle, Winston Churchill, and many influential politicians envisioned such an alliance less as a means of confronting the Soviet army than as a way of containing a resurgent Germany as well as balancing American power.

Publicly, the reason for creating NATO in 1949 was the alleged Soviet military menace, but the US always planned to employ strategic nuclear weapons to defeat the USSR - for which it did not need an alliance. But no one in Washington believed a war with Russia was imminent or even likely, a view that prevailed most of the time until the USSR finally disappeared.

There was also the justification of preventing the Western Europeans from being obsessed with fear at reconstructing Germany's economy, and American military planners were concerned with internal subversion.

When the Soviet Union capsized over a decade ago, NATO's nominal rationale for existence died with it. But the principal reason for its creation - to forestall European autonomy - remains.

For Washington, the problem of NATO is linked to the future of Germany, which since 1990 has been undecided about the extent to which it wishes to work through that organization or, more importantly, to conform to US' initiatives in East Europe. Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia in December 1991 was crucial in triggering the war in Bosnia and revealed its potentially dangerous and destabilizing capacity for autonomous action. Its power over the European

Monetary Union and European Union understandably causes other Europeans to fear the revival of German domination.

But for the US, the issue of Germany is also a question of the extent to which it can constrain America's ability to play the same decisive role in Europe in the future as it has in the past. Such grand geopolitical questions have been brewing for over a decade.

NATO provided a peacekeeping force in Bosnia to enforce the agreement that ended the internecine civil war in that part of Yugoslavia, but in 1999 it ceased being a purely defensive alliance and entered the war against the Serbs on behalf of the Albanians in Kosovo. The US employed about half the aircraft it assigns for a full regional war but found the entire experience very frustrating. Targets had to be approved by all 19 members, any one of which could veto American proposals. The Pentagon's after-action report of October 1999 conceded that America needed the cooperation of NATO countries, but "gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise."

But Wesley Clark, the American who was NATO's supreme commander, regarded the whole experience as a nightmare - both in his relations with the Pentagon and NATO's members. "[W]orking within the NATO alliance," American generals complained, "unduly constrained U.S. military forces from getting the job done quickly and effectively." A war expected to last a few days instead took 78-days. The Yugoslav war taught the Americans a grave lesson. .

Long before September 11, 2001, Washington was determined to avoid the serious constraints that NATO could impose. The only question was of timing and how the United States would escape NATO's clear obligations while maintaining its hegemony over its members. It wanted to preserve NATO for the very reason it had created it; to keep Europe from developing an independent political as well as military organization.

Coordinating NATO's command structure with that of any all-European military organization that may be created impinges directly on America's power over Europe's actions and reflects its deep ambiguity. Some of its members wanted NATO to reach a partial accord with Russia, a relationship on which Washington often shifted, but Moscow remains highly suspicious of its plans to extend its membership to Russia's very borders.

When the new administration came to power in January 2001, NATO's fundamental role was already being reconsidered. President Bush is strongly unilateralist, and he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, opposes further restrictions on nuclear weapons tests or land mines, and is against a host of other existing and projected accords. He also greatly accelerated the development of Anti-Ballistic Missile system, which will ostensibly give the U.S. a first-strike capacity and which China and Russia justifiably regard as destabilizing - thereby threatening to renew the nuclear arms race.

Downgrading the United Nations, needless to say, was axiomatic.
The war in Afghanistan was fought without NATO but on the US' terms by a "floating" coalition "of the willing," a model for future conflicts "that will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and circumstances of the country". It accepted the small German, French, Italian, and other contingents that were offered only after it became clear that the war, and especially its aftermath, would take considerably longer than the Pentagon expected. But it did not consult them on military matters or crucial political questions.

Washington has decided that its allies must now accept its objectives and work solely on its terms, and it has no intention whatsoever of discussing the merits of its actions in NATO conferences. This applies, above all, to the imminent war against Iraq - a war of choice.

This de facto abandonment of NATO as a military organization was made explicit during 2002 when Washington proposed a simultaneous enlargement of its membership to include the Baltic states and to allow Russia to have a voice, but no veto, on important matters. The nations along Russia's borders regard NATO purely as protection against Russia, and are therefore eager to please the US - which wants no constraints on its potential military actions.

The crisis in NATO was both overdue and inevitable, the result of a decisive American reorientation, and the time and ostensible reason for it was far less important than the underlying reason it occurred: The US' growing realization after the early 1990s that while the organization was militarily a growing liability it remained a political asset.

That the United Nations and Security Council are today also being strained in ways too early to estimate is far less important because the U.S. never assigned the UN the same crucial role as it did its alliance in Europe.

Today, NATO's original *raison d'être* of imposing American hegemony is now the core of the controversy that is now raging. Washington cannot sustain this grandiose objective because a reunited Germany is far too powerful to be treated as it was a half-century ago, and Germany has its own interests in the Middle East and Asia to protect.

Germany and France's independence is reinforced by inept American propaganda on the relationship of Iraq to Al-Qaeda (from which the CIA and British MI6 have openly distanced themselves), overwhelming antiwar public opinion in many nations, and a great deal of opposition within the US establishment and many senior military men to a war with Iraq.

The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace is only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for many years.

The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point has been made: Some NATO members refuse to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy, whatever it may be.

Turkey's problem is simple: The US is pressuring it, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion, to allow American troops to invade Iraq from Turkey and to enter the war on its side. The US wants NATO to aid Turkey in order to strengthen the Ankara government's resolve to ignore overwhelmingly antiwar domestic opinion, for the arms it is to receive are superfluous.

But the Turks are far more concerned with Kurdish separatism in Iraq rekindling the civil war that Kurds have fought in Turkey for much of the past decade, and the conditions they are demanding on these issues have put Washington in a very difficult position from which - as of this writing - it has not extricated itself. Turkey's best - and most obvious - defense is to stay out of the war, which the vast majority of Turks want. It may end up doing so.

America still desires to regain the mastery over Europe it had during the peak of the Cold War but it is also determined not to be bound by European desires - r indeed by the overwhelming European public opposition to a war with Iraq. Genuine dialogue or consultation with its NATO allies is out of the question. The Bush Administration, even more than its predecessors, simply does not believe in it - nor will it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division on Turkey has nothing to do with it.

Washington cannot have it both ways. Its commitment to aggressive unilateralism is the antithesis of an alliance system that involves real consultation. France and Germany are now far too powerful to be treated as obsequious dependents. They also believe in sovereignty, as does every nation which is strong enough to exercise it, and they are now able to insist that the United States both listen to and take their views seriously. It was precisely this danger that the U.S. sought to forestall when it created NATO over 50 years ago.

The controversy over NATO's future has been exacerbated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's attacks on "Old Europe" and the disdain for Germany and France that he and his adviser, Richard Perle, have repeated, but these are but a reflection of the underlying problems that have been smoldering for years.

Together, the nations that oppose a preemptive American war in Iraq and the Middle East - an open-ended, destabilizing adventure that is likely to last years - can influence Europe's future development and role in the world profoundly. If Russia cooperates with them, even only occasionally, they will be much more powerful, and President Putin's support for their position on the war makes that a real possibility.

Eastern European nations may say what Washington wishes today, but economically they are far more dependent on Germany and those allied with it. When the 15 nations in European Union met on February 17 their statement on Iraq was far closer to the German-French position than the American, reflecting the antiwar nations' economic clout as well as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive antiwar demonstrations that took place the preceding weekend in Italy, Spain, Britain and the rest of Europe.

There is every likelihood that the U.S. will emerge from this crisis in NATO more belligerent, and more isolated and detested, than ever. NATO will then go the way of SEATO and all of the other defunct American alliances.

The reality is that the world is increasingly multipolar, economically and technologically, and that the US' desire to maintain absolute military superiority over the world is a chimera. Russia remains a military superpower, China is becoming one, and the proliferation of destructive weaponry should have been confronted and stopped 20 years ago.

The US has no alternative but to accept the world as it is, or prepare for doomsday. The conflict in NATO, essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of American hegemony, which remains far more a dream than a reality.

Corporate fronts, astroturf groups and co-opted social movements

Taking the risk out of civil society - part 1 of 4

by Michael Barker; September 17, 2006

Challenging power is crucial to the stability of democracy, without dissent there would be few checks on unbridled power. The overwhelming power of dissent and popular democracy to effect social change is widely acknowledged by corporate and governmental elites and in the 1970s, an influential Trilateral Commission report came to the astonishing conclusions that there was a "crisis of democracy" because there was simply too much democracy. (1) Just prior to this, the underground and illegal mechanisations of the controversial CONTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) program came to light. (2) It seemed that the era of covert CIA operations was eventually backfiring on the US government, which in turn was suffering from its own crisis of legitimacy with the public. However, the lessons that the US government appeared to learn, were that covert operations were not bad per se, but instead that power politics, played out through covert manoeuvres, did not play well in the public sphere. In a sense this change in strategy, "forced" the US government to consider more public (relations) friendly tactics to achieve the same political objectives. This did not mean that the government cut back on covert operations, it just meant that it realised the potential benefits of carrying out some of their work overtly. Subsequently, this led to the development of various projects, which aimed to undertake "democracy promotion" activities abroad. These were launched in 1981 with "Project Democracy", which later led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983.

As previously noted, the worldwide rise of mass protests in the 1960s caused a lot of concern for ruling elites; as for the most part, such popular protests were out of the government's control. But what if governments could control protests or at least manipulate them to their advantage? What if they could help determine which social movements or even revolutions succeeded and which failed? What would happen if powerful governments and corporate elites decided that the promotion of dissent was a cost effective way of maintaining their own power? These are some of the questions that this article will explore by investigating the assortment of ways in which corporations and governments interact with social movements. The study will attempt to provide a global overview of these relationships and as will become more obvious (in later parts of this article), the activities of democratic countries to promote democracy overseas will provide relevant examples of how elite groups are already working closely with social movements to "promote democracy" (or rather polyarchy) instead of more participatory forms of democracy. Initially, this work will briefly outline the development of corporate front groups and astroturf groups in democratic countries and will then introduce the less examined parallel expansion of government regulated or engineered dissent – a process that has been referred to as the promotion of polyarchy. (3)

Corporate fronts, astroturf groups and co-opted social movements
Even prior to 1984, we were living in a world in which surveillance has been increasingly important to the smooth functioning of the status quo. The sheer power and magnitude of modern surveillance techniques means that those in control of sensitive surveillance information can manipulate and control citizens effectively without their consent. (4) This fast tracking of what Aeron Davis referred to as Public Relations Democracy undermines democratic principles because it focuses on methods for "manufacturing consent", rather than seeking

ways by which to engage the public and invite their participation in decision making processes. (5) Precursors to this state of affairs were evident in the 1970s, when both businesses and governments recognised the utility of corporate funded think tanks to undermine popular democracy. Indeed it has been noted that:

"The twentieth century has been characterised by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy." (Alex Carey, 1995, Taking the risk out of democracy, p. 18)

Corporate propaganda (often referred to as PR) blossomed in the twentieth-century with the rise of neo-liberalism and stimulated the evolution of corporate front groups (alongside corporate funded think tanks) to covertly distribute pro-business PR from organisations with inconspicuous sounding names (a well know example was the Global Climate Coalition). Corporate front groups are certainly a powerful tool for influencing public opinion, but it is widely recognised that grassroots movements tend to have more credibility with the public and politicians. However, the effectiveness of grassroots groups' political outreach is severely restrained by both their general lack of financial resources and the adversarial or partisan nature of the corporate media. (6) Any group that can overcome these barriers has a distinct advantage in building wider public and political support for their objectives. Accordingly the groups most likely to overcome these hurdles are those whose campaigns are aligned with corporate interests. These may be genuine groups, arising to fill a niche in civil society or impostor "astroturf" groups, financed by businesses to promote corporate interests. Astroturf groups are so-called because they represent fake grassroots movements, whose corporate financed founders are paid for every citizen they can mobilise to support a specific cause. (7) Although the mass media pays scant attention to their position in the public sphere, astroturf activities are by no means marginal and have been acknowledged to be "the most popular political strategy [used] in the 1990s." (8) With high levels of

funding these groups can utilise the comprehensive demographic resources provided by database management companies, which allow them to efficiently target individuals who will be most easily persuaded by their sales pitches. Astroturf initiatives are expanding all the time and as there is often no shortage of funding they tend to be only restrained by their instigators' creativity. (9)

One of the problems resulting from the colonisation of the public sphere by corporations, is the increasing difficultly citizens have in determining which organisations in civil society are genuine and which have been either co-opted or created by elite groups to manipulate public opinion. Financial support through the government or a specific corporation does not necessarily imply executive control by that agency over all issues the group is involved in. However, in an increasingly globalised and privatised world, in which many groups compete (domestically or internationally) for a limited pot of money, discriminatory funding will certainly effect which groups prosper and which fade away. Under these circumstances it is evident that the selective backing of certain social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the exclusion of others can be used as a powerful political tool. (10)

What would happen if countries were able to bypass state sovereignty and support their favoured civil society groups overseas? Despite the relatively low profile of this subject, it does happen (on an increasingly regular basis) under the guise of "promoting democracy." Therefore substantial democracy promoting programs are being undertaken by a number of democratic countries. The best financed programs to "enlarge democracy" are currently being funded by the US, consequently the following section will examine this

"new" form of political intervention using examples from the US and conclude by discussing the relevance of these practices in supporting civil society groups in nominally democratic countries.

The global manufacture of dissent
 "The operation – engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience – is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people's elections." (Ian Traynor, 2004, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1360236,00.html US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev])

The United States have a long history of political interference overseas and from 1945 onwards it has led them to attempt "to overthrow more than 40 foreign governments" and "crush more than 30 populist-nationalist movements struggling against intolerable regimes." (11) During the 1970s public revelations of some of the government's unsavoury covert operations conducted overseas, led to a general reappraisal of the implementation of US foreign policy. Apparently this did not lead to fundamental changes in the implementation of US policy, but instead merely led to a discussion of the necessity for a change in tactics of intervention, which led to the "replacement of coercive means of social control with consensual ones." (12) This tactical change was marked by the creation of "Project Democracy" in 1980 on the basis of the understanding that it was easier to maintain popular support for intrusive foreign policies when they were carried out overtly under the guise of "promoting democracy." (13) In 1983 President Reagan, with bipartisan support, created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), whose stated objective was to "foster the infrastructure of democracy – the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities." (14) The crucial question that remains is: what type of democracy is being promoted?

Allen Weinstein, the NEDs first acting president, may be able to help answer this question, as he notes that "A lot of what we [the NED] do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA." (15) The New York Times made a similar point, observing that the NED's work "resembles the aid given by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1950s, 60s and 70s to bolster pro-American political groups." (16) Among the NED's most ardent supporters is the rightwing think tank, the Heritage Foundation, who has described the NED as "a cost-effective way to encourage captive nations to liberate themselves without committing the US to a prohibitively risky and costly military crusade to free them from communism." (17) Since the NED's creation promoting democracy has become a growth industry and in 1999 the US reported spending US$622.9 million on democracy assistance through the US Information Agency (USIA) and US Agency for International Development (USAID). (18) The NED itself (which receives most of its funding from congress) only receives a relatively small budget; which was approximately US$30 million per year during the 1990s, rising to US$80 million in 2005. However, the NED plays an integral role in setting up and coordinating most of the US's democracy promotion programs, as its nongovernmental status enables it to bypass legal and political restrictions, which traditional government agencies providing overseas aid have to face.

It is worth noting that the US had already obtained considerable experience of "promoting democracy" overseas, ironically through the CIA's intimate relations with the American labour movement. (19) Similar 'democratic' programs have also been undertaken by USAID and American philanthropists, most notably the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. (20)

In stark opposition to the democratic rhetoric emanating from the United States in the decade prior to the NED's existence, the US military and CIA had

undermined democratic processes in the following countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Bolivia, Cuba, East Timor, El Salvador, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Seychelles, Suriname, and Zaire. A classic example, of a country in which the full spectrum of finely tuned destabilisation tactics were used is Chile. Coincidentally the US's intervention in Chile culminated in the elimination of Salvador Allende's democratically elected government, ten years before the launch of the NED. The following review of the Chilean case study will highlight some commonly used destabilisation strategies that are often deployed to "promote democracy." (21)

Shortly after Chile's closely contested 1958 election in which Allende's (Marxist) party came close to winning, the CIA decided to ensure that this increasingly popular leader was kept out of government. The CIA proceeded to provide millions of dollars and professional guidance to a centrist presidential candidate and numerous grassroots organisations, which together were able to successfully block Allende's election hopes in 1964. This strategy was also supported by "a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign" waged on the streets and in the media. (22) US support of anti-leftist groups continued, as did the CIA's ongoing work to subvert unions and in 1969 the CIA started supporting a splinter socialist party in an endeavour to weaken Allende's hand in the congressional election. However, despite the CIA's best efforts Allende was elected president in 1970. In the following years, the CIA honed the art of destabilisation (or "promoting democracy") through a war of attrition, which amongst other things involved supporting the ("independent") media – which was already mostly owned by the opposition – in their frequent calls for civil war. To enhance the effects of their internal destabilisation tactics, harsh economic sanctions denied the Allende government (much needed) international development assistance (previously Chile had been the highest per capita aid recipient in the hemisphere); the US even pressured the Interamerican Development Bank to withhold emergency earthquake loans. Development aid may have been cut off, but as part of a strategy to get the military onside the US provided the Chilean military with US$47 million of arms aid between 1970 and 1973 (this "aid" package included fighter jets, that were later used to attack the presidential palace during the coup). (23) In September 1973, with full knowledge (and support) of the militaries' plan to oust Allende, the US stood by the sidelines as General Pinochet led a brutal military coup – which succeeded in "removing" Allende by killing him – facilitating Chile's transition from a US "unfriendly" socialist democracy to a US "friendly" dictatorship. The following year President Ford publicly recalled that all the United States had wanted to do "was to help assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve the opposition political parties." Alarmingly this is the same type of rhetoric presently being used by world leaders today to justify the "promotion of democracy."

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
Strategic Interests

by **J. Peter Pham**, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist

Getting AFRICOM Right

Last week President George W. Bush created a new military command for Africa:

> "I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified
> Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S.
> Africa Command by the end of fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our
> security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our
> partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to
> the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education,
> democracy, and economic growth in Africa."

This development is welcome news, being long overdue, as I have repeatedly argued (including in
this column last year), given the continent's strategic importance to key U.S. interests. While
Sub-Saharan Africa currently supplies the U.S. with nearly 20 percent of its petroleum needs – a
figure that the National Intelligence Council expects to jump to more than 25 percent within the
decade – that resource is also particularly vulnerable to both transnational terrorist threats like
al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist group which have set their sights on the region and local groups
whose fights, with outside support, can and have impacted production, as I have documented
extensively in this space. Beyond the security and resource concerns, Africa is also an arena for
intense diplomatic competition with other states with global ambitions, like China, as I noted just last
week.

Also to consider, as General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in his testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the same day the president made his
announcement, is the fact that "political and humanitarian challenges in Africa are myriad." The
specific challenges the Marine officer singled out included growing instability, genocide, and civil war,
and *de facto* safe havens for criminal elements.

Given all of this, it made no sense to parcel out responsibility for Africa to three different regional
commands – the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM), and the
Pacific Command (PACOM) – each of which is already overtaxed with its own strategic command
priorities, thus oftentimes leaving African concerns insufficiently address if not entirely ignored until
long-summering challenges turn into full-blown crises.

However, reorganizations, like other transformations in the military, are not ends onto themselves;
their sole value lies in the strategic effect they advance. In the case of the new AFRICOM, the
strategic effect was announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates as he explained the
administration's proposed Pentagon budget for 2008 on Capitol Hill: "This command will enable us to
have a more effective and integrated approach…to oversee security cooperation, building
partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and, if directed, military operations
on the African continent."

In rising to the challenge of this mission objective, AFRICOM must first overcome four hurdles:

First, there is the question of perception, especially but not exclusively in Africa. New Jersey
Representative Donald Payne, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa is put it succinctly
when he told a Voice of America interviewer: "I think there'll be a lot of skepticism, because there

has been so little attention given to Africa…All of a sudden to have a special military command, I think the typical person would wonder why now and really what is the end game?"

The answer to the congressman (and others) is found in the much-maligned 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* which declared that "weak states…can pose a great danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." In Africa, the document went on to assert: "Promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity."

Furthermore, while the heyday of the type of pan-Africanism dreamed by African independence leaders like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah has come and gone, a continental perspective nonetheless does resonate with African states which do tend to see themselves, at least in interactions with non-African powers, as African. Consequently, it behooves U.S. foreign policy to engage those same countries on the basis of that collective identity. The case needs to be consistently made by both the political leaders and military personnel that a unified command focused on the entire continent will be better positioned to coherently address uniquely African challenges and support local efforts to bolster the operational capacities of African states, including those of the African Union and subregional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Second, if the Africa Command get down to doing its job of advancing U.S. interests abroad it must get the support to do so from home. It is one thing to create a skeletal structure – a 60-member transition planning team is already being assembled at Kelley Barracks, a EUCOM installation outside Stuttgart, Germany – and quite another to give it flesh between now and the full stand-up of the command, mandated to occur before September 30, 2008.

In a period when the many within the Congressional majority are not exactly defense hawks, the Bush administration needs to concertedly reach out to the rather eclectic group of Africa advocates on the Hill, some of whom – to put it mildly – are usually not counted as members of the president's

fan club. For example, in an interview with an African news service last week, Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, a fierce critic of the war in Iraq, declared his support for AFRICOM, characterizing it as "vital to strengthening our relationships with African nations." Thus ironically in the same week when the U.S. Senate was introducing conflicting resolutions on the president's troop surge in Iraq, AFRICOM presents a unique opportunity for executive-legislative cooperation in the great American tradition of partisan divisions stopping at the water's edge.

Third, securing Congressional appropriations is not the only domestic hurdle that AFRICOM will need to clear. Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, executive director of the new command's implementation planning team, and his colleagues will have to do battle within the Pentagon for scarce resources, personnel as well as material. Aside from the 60 planners who will report to Admiral Moeller, the only other manpower that the command has are the approximately 1,700 troops in the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which since late 2002, has been carrying out training, humanitarian assistance, and counterterrorism missions in that region, most recently launching air strikes aimed at the three al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia who were responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as coordinated 2002 attacks on Israeli tourists in Kenya. Even if cooperative endeavors with partners in its 52-nation area of responsibility (AOR) – for sound geopolitical and strategic reasons, Egypt will continue to fall within CENTCOM's AOR – are done in a rotational basis, AFRICOM will certainly need a larger standing force as well as headquarters staff. The question, of course, is where that manpower will come from, considering that it is now admitted by all that the U.S. military is indeed short of its ideal personnel strength.

In addition, the new command requires considerable start-up physical resources, beginning with bases and other capital infrastructure. While it was announced last month that CJTF-HOA's 97-acre base, Camp Lemonier, will be expanded to some 500 acres, the relatively isolated, sweltering abandoned French Foreign Legion outpost is hardly ideal as the headquarters for an Africa-wide

command. Moroccan officials have been quick to step forward to offer AFRICOM a possible home, but it is likely that one or more sites will have to be acquired and constructed in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Fourth, the mission of the Africa Command will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies. The challenges that the new command will confront will be quite different from those its homologues face in other theatres. Briefing reporters, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry correctly emphasized the comprehensive nature of the mandate which circumstances in Africa will require AFRICOM to assume: "This command, then, will focus on some efforts to reduce conflict, to improve the security environment, to defeat or preclude the development of terrorist networks, and then support in crisis response, whether they be humanitarian or disaster response. We want to help develop a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved."

Fulfilling such a broad mandate would, however, necessitate that the command's theatre-wide engagement be a spectrum array which embraces, in addition to "hard power" options, diplomatic, developmental assistance, humanitarian relief, and other proactive "soft power" missions which some in the military have been hesitate to engage in and which others in the policy community – I can think of certain high officials and career officers at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as a the anti-military "usual suspects" – will be none too eager to see the uniformed services undertake. Likewise, closer in-theatre coordination will be needed between the members of intelligence community whose work is more directly coordinated by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), their counterparts in the Defense Department's intelligence bodies, and AFRICOM's commanders – and effect that last week's Senate confirmation of a career military intelligence officer, retired Vice Admiral Mike McConnell, as DNI will hopefully facilitate.

In any event, the reality is that in today's geostrategic environment, perhaps no one else can leverage the focus and resources that the Pentagon can, as long as it recognizes the limits of its own capabilities. To this end, building on the precedent of some military commands having political advisors as well as the wide behind-the-scenes consultations they have already held, the architects of AFRICOM would do well to incorporate qualified non-military Africa experts into the eventual command, many of whom – especially those not in career bureaucratic positions with other federal agencies – have the "outside-the-box" perspectives that the new mission will require.

The announcement of AFRICOM is an important step towards achieving more active U.S. engagement in an important strategic space that can neither continue to be relegated to tertiary status in the strategic calculations of our national security, political, and economic interests nor be parceled out to several combatant commands in a dysfunctional arrangement which Dr. Gates himself characterized as "outdated." However, we have to do more than just create the new command; we now have a narrow window – barely eighteen months – to get its stand-up right.

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Conform or Reform?

Conform or Reform? Social Movements and the Mass Media

by Michael Barker   February 07, 2007

Abstract: The mass media is an important outlet for social movements, where the quality and nature of media coverage strongly influences how they are perceived in the public eye. This paper examines the complex interface existing between the mass media and social movements, and considers what collective actions social movements may need to undertake, if they are to improve their media coverage in the future. The paper discusses the relationship between social movements (as outsiders) and the mass media in both a historical and contemporary context and argues that media reform is required to enable dissident voices to be democratically heard.

Keywords: Social Movements, Protest, Demonstration, Participatory Democracy, Global Justice, Reform.

Introduction

The mass media is a vital resource for most political actors, and it may be even more important for social movements, whose transitional and adversarial nature weakens their ability to secure public legitimacy (Kielbowicz & Scherer, 1986; Gamson, 1995: 85). Their outsider status, along with their usual resource-poor nature, means that traditional avenues of publicity are not easily accessible and forces them to rely on alternative methods to obtain media access. Traditionally, this involves some form of public spectacle - like a protest - to attract media attention. These activities have become accepted as mechanisms by which social problems are communicated in the public sphere, alongside public opinion polls and elections (Herbst 1993) and they act as vital means by which citizens can signal their discontent.

One of the first detailed examinations of a social movement protest in the media (both press and television) focused on a mass demonstration held against the Vietnam war in Britain (Halloran et al., 1970). The demonstration involved approximately 60,000 protesters, most of who marched peacefully through the streets of London (with an insignificant number of protestors involved in violent actions). However, despite the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of the march, the media concentrated most of its coverage on the issue of violence (Halloran et al., 1970: 237). Although Halloran et al., (1970: 301) noted that there were differences between media outlets in their coverage, they were all united by the overall focus on 'the same limited aspect - the issue of violence.' The misrepresentation of this massive political rally, and the totality of the negative coverage across all media outlets led the investigators to conclude that such reporting poses extreme problems for democracy, which may only be remedied by 'some form of institutional rearrangement' (Halloran et al., 1970: 318). These are serious charges, and the authors acknowledged that further studies needed to be carried out to determine how systemic these problems were. Since then, many researchers have followed up on this investigation, examining how various social movements interact with media systems. Drawing upon this body of work, this paper will analyse the importance of the role of the mass media for social movements. This will include a review of the literature and recommendations on how such groups may best address their relationships with the mass media. To begin with, a brief discussion of some of the external forces beside the media, which effect the development of social movements and their ensuing relations with the mass media, will be presented.

Foundations of Change

The inherent conflict between corporate driven capitalism and democracy has always caused

ruling elites to have their work cut out dissipating the ebb and flow of popular dissent. This contradiction is best exemplified by Crozier et al.'s (1975) classic study, The Crisis of Democracy, which controversially diagnosed the need for 'a greater degree of moderation in democracy.' The first political theorist to accurately document this 'management' dilemma was Antonio Gramsci, who described how elites were able to successfully maintain hegemony over the masses through the use of consensual rather than coercive institutional arrangements. Theobald (2006: 26) notes that the 'central importance' of Gramsci's view to radical mass media criticism is 'that current bourgeois control of society, while certainly manifest in material modes of production, is culturally embedded and naturalised in the minds of the people via its hegemony over discourse.'

One vital but overlooked organ of hegemony, that Gramsci was unable to include in his work, are philanthropic foundations, whose rising influence on the contours of civil society only became visible some decades after Gramsci's death (Roelofs, 2003; Faber & McCarthy, 2005). The hegemonic power of foundations, however, is arguably even greater than other hegemonic elements, like the mass media, precisely because their influence has been downplayed (or in many cases simply omitted) by academia. This is especially the case with liberal foundations, which have actively influenced progressive social change by directly co-opting organisations or channelling their activists towards less radical activities (Arnove, 1980; Fisher, 1983; Jenkins, 1998; Roelofs, 2003).

Historically, the work of philanthropic foundations has been most influential in the US, but now similar foundations operate all over the world, and with the resurgence of corporate social responsibility, corporations are also becoming prominent philanthropists. For example, during the 2000 election cycle in the US, 'the corporate outlay on political philanthropy... was probably a minimum of $1-2 billion' dwarfing combined PAC and soft money contributions (Sims 2003: 166-167). Some academics have begun to address the urgent task of proposing solutions to counteract the anti-democratic nature of such subtle yet pervasive social engineering (see Faber & McCarthy, 2005), because it is clear that manipulation of civil society (by foundations or governments) through selective support of non-governmental organisations raises questions that reach to the heart of all democracies. Furthermore, a growing body of work suggests that similar 'democracy promoting' practices now serve as an integral foreign policy tool to help 'promote polyarchy' (Dahl, 1971) over more substantive and participatory forms of democracy (Robinson, 1996: Barker, 2006a). Likewise, other research has begun to examine how selective support of 'independent' media organisations in geo-strategically important countries has helped facilitate revolutions (e.g., the coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe) to further the polyarchal interests of trans-national capitalism (Barker, 2006b; Barker, Submitted a). Referring to the Orange

Revolution, Herman (2006) observed 'that the civil society uprising in the Ukraine in 2004-2005, [which was] funded heavily by U.S. government agencies and friendly NGOs, was given much more lavish news treatment than domestic [US] protests, along with editorial support.' Indeed, elite patronage - either by governments or philanthropic foundations - confers a degree of 'legitimacy' upon social activists, which in turn may be accompanied by more favourable media coverage. In the light of these findings, Robinson's (1996) promoting polyarchy thesis predicts that individuals or groups vigorously challenging the status quo and/or trans-national capitalist elites would be most likely to be marginalised by the mass media.

Struggling for Praise
The hostile media playing field

For any social movement to draw beneficial attention to its activities in the mass media, the first barrier it must overcome is the structural constraints of the medium itself. According to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) Propaganda Model, there are five filters through which all news must pass, that actively shape the media's content. These are (1) the size, ownership and profit orientation of the media, (2) advertising, (3) sourcing, (4) flak (criticism) and (5) anti-communist ideology, which can be interpreted as keeping the discourse within the boundaries of elite interests. (For a critical review of the Propaganda Model see Klaehn 2002; and for a review of its significance to domestic and foreign policy making processes see Barker 2005). The fact that the Propaganda Model itself is marginalised from most media scholarship is consistent with the model's predictions (Herring & Robinson, 2003). Yet there are still a small number of critical scholars who have been able to illustrate the applicability of the Propaganda Model to countries other than the US (where the model was first developed), e.g., in Australia (Linder 1994, 1998; Cryle & Hillier, 2005), Canada (Babe, 2005; Eglin, 2005; Klaehn, 2005; Winter & Klaehn, 2005), and the UK (Cromwell 2001, Chapter 3; Carvalho, 2005; Doherty, 2005; McKiggan, 2005; Edwards & Cromwell, 2006).

In this way, news values filter what appears in the media - and more importantly what doesn't - not in any prescribed way, but more as a result of a sort of tacit professional consensus which usually acts to 'reinforce conventional opinions and established authority' (Seaton, 1997: 277). Meyer (2002: 30-31) suggests that news must also pass through another filter, which he calls 'the rules of stage-managing', which selects news based on its style of presentation and ability to attract an audience's attention.

Most protestors are not the focus of regular news beats and so tend to rely on protest events to broadcast their news, however, most of these are ignored in the mainstream media (McCarthy et al., 1996a: 494). In addition, social movements have to contend with representative democracy, which leads governments to emphasise that dissent should take place in ballot boxes and not on the streets: a point of view endorsed by the mass media (McChesney, 1999). In spite of this, the mass media's influence is not monolithic and some social movements and interest groups are able to maintain moderately useful media relations, publicising their activities in a predominantly positive light - something that will be discussed later in more detail. The overall inadequacy, or inequality, of coverage of protestors and social movements compared to other better placed insider groups has caused some authors to lament that the only way for social movements to obtain positive coverage is through the adoption of public relations techniques (Shoemaker, 1989: 215). This has led to the development of various media handbooks, which explore how social movements may better exploit the mass media (Monbiot, 2002). At this stage, it is worth considering that it is not only social movements that complain about adversarial media coverage. Both governments and corporations also convey the same general attitude (to the public at least), regarding their negative treatment by the mythical left wing media (Edwards & Cromwell, 2006). However, the big difference between insider groups and most social movements is that the former can mobilise huge political and financial resources to publicise their positive activities, and still spend fifty per cent or more of their public relations resources on preventing media attention to their more secretive 'closed door' activities (Davis, 2002: 179).

Arguably the largest, most credentialed and well-resourced social organisation prior to the 1980s was the labour movement, but research has shown that despite these advantages, the British labour movement has been systematically treated with hostility by the media (Philo & Glasgow University Media Group, 1982). In 1990, US media watchdog Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) published a report entitled 'Lost in the margins: labor and the media' which concluded that 'the lives of 100 million working people are being routinely ignored, marginalised or inaccurately portrayed in the media' (FAIR 1990). Current research from the US also shows how the labour movement is still systematically misrepresented in

the media, despite its financial strength, application of professional public relations techniques and fundamentally democratic ideals (Martin, 2004 and www.projectcensored.org).

Ignoring campaigners

Other social movements in less influential political positions than the labour movement suffer even more under the strain to publicise their activities, especially when their activities confront the status quo. The US civil rights movement (1954 to 1968) took years of organising and massive public support (and increased militancy) before the media started regularly covering and supporting the protests in the 1960s (Solomon, 1995; Flournoy, 2003). Few people know the names of the thousands of heroic leaders and ordinary citizens who gave their lives struggling for freedom. Instead, the media focused their positive coverage on the star like qualities of the movement's more moderate leaders, like Martin Luther King, while demonising and marginalising the more radical elements of the movement (Gitlin, 1980: 212, 284; Rhodes, 1999). Two characteristics that strongly influence a social movement's media treatment are the degree to which they are perceived to be 'extreme' (that is, challenging the status quo) and 'militant' (in their tactics); whereby, the more extreme and militant a group, the more critical the media coverage (McLeod & Hertog, 1999). Thus, although Martin Luther King benefited from his relative moderation in both these regards for most of his life (McAdam, 1996), this changed just prior to his assassination (Paletz & Entman, 1981: 129-130). It is then that he began to link the civil rights movement to basic human rights and economic rights, which subsequently led him to oppose the Vietnam War in 1967 and start building the Poor People's Campaign in the last few months of his life. These events were widely dismissed by the media at the time, and even today few Americans are familiar with them, due to an effective media blackout in media reviews of his life (Solomon, 1995). This highlights how central the media's representations of social movements are for generating and sustaining public support. In addition, the elevation of movement leaders to the media's centre stage, to the exclusion of

ordinary movement participants, may have the effect of discouraging 'normal' citizens from identifying with the movement, which can prevent their active involvement. Tunstall (1996: 200) points out how most labour stories during the Thatcher years in the UK focused on the movements leaders, dismissing the grassroots base of ordinary workers. This served to dramatically weaken the labour movement's bargaining position in the media when the Thatcher government decided to phase out much of their communication with the trade union leaders after 1979.

One major difference between earlier popular social movements and the current global justice movement is that the latter tend not to rely on distinct leaders or top-down hierarchal structures to drive their activities. So, in some respects, the media's apparent 'confusion about the protestors' political goals is understandable' (Klein 2002: 3). Unfortunately, this equitable trait of the global justice movement has supplied the media with even more ammunition to undermine the protestors' ideals by portraying them as 'lost' and 'leaderless'. However, it should be recognised that the global justice movements' strong emphasis on grassroots participation and consensus decision-making - which admittedly is sometimes messy (or democratic) is their very strength in countering the domineering corporate power structures evident in society today.

Us and them

Chan and Lee (1984) first described the 'protest paradigm' to illustrate how the mass media tended to focus on limited features of social protests to portray protestors as the 'other'. Characteristics of this reporting paradigm, which separates protestors (them) from non-protesting audiences (us, or some of us), include a reliance on official sources to frame the event, a focus on police confrontation, and an analysis of the protestors' activities (and appearances) rather than their objectives. This somewhat internalised selection process serves to filter which protests are reported, and which are ignored.

The media's exploitation of broad unsubstantiated statements concerning the public's negative opinion of protestors is used to naturalise the status quo, a practice often supported by the utilisation of unfavourable eyewitness comments (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Media depictions of hostile bystander reactions act as a powerful form of social control, and serve to undermine the protestors' opinions, as passers-by who are

sympathetic to the protestors are often considered to be part of the protest, so tend not to be interviewed (Hertog & McLeod, 1995). Research has also shown how the media often fail to report the protestors' official opponents, and instead tend to replace them with the police, thus reducing the chance of any meaningful dialogue or debate between the protestors and the targets of their protests (McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Hertog & McLeod, 1995; Boyle et al., 2004). Another factor that sometimes acts against demonstrators is the media's focus on their social demographics, especially when protests involve high numbers of young adults and students. Under these circumstances, the media may simply dismiss their views as unrepresentative of society, and not worth listening too. In addition, when protest participants are not visibly representative of societal norms, it makes it even easier for the media to label them derogatively as 'outsiders' or 'freaks' (Gitlin 1980; McLeod & Hertog 1992; Coen 2000).

That the media makes systematic use of derogatory stereotypes and negative frames to marginalise outsider groups was born out in Bowie's (1999) examination of the depiction of indigenous American's in three US magazines, Time, Newsweek and US News & World Report from 1968 to 1979. Furthermore, Baylor (1996) undertook a similar assessment of NBC's evening news over the same time period and showed how 'the issue of militancy overshadow[ed] any presentation of the real grievances and issues behind Indian protest' with '98% of the news segments us[ing] either the stereotype or militant frames' (245-246). The US media has made some progress since the nineteenth century - when in 1871 the popular press actually encouraged and justified the massacre of a hundred Indians, mostly women and children (Blankenburg, 1968) - but unfortunately the exact level of progress is still debateable.

Contrary to the needs of democracy - especially any forms of participatory democracy - citizens who hold politicians and/or corporations directly accountable by protesting in the streets are often labelled by the mass media as 'deviant outsiders' whose activities are directed towards disrupting the status quo for the compliant majority. Hertog and McLeod's (1995) media coverage of anarchist groups in Minneapolis-St. Paul from 1986 to 1988 demonstrated that by systematically defining protestors as abnormal, the media are able to unfairly prejudice their audience against the issues and ideas raised by protestors. They also showed that, depending on the version of protest coverage audiences watched, people

showed big differences in opinion on the way they viewed both the issues raised and the protestors themselves. Other research has also shown how media coverage of protests can act to increase public hostility towards the protestors' cause (McLeod, 1995; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Shoemaker, 1982). This has important implications for social movements because, if a single report can determine how sympathetic the public is to their goals, consistently antagonistic media treatment is likely to have very negative repercussions regarding public support of protests themselves.

Public empathy towards the activities of social movements changes continuously (Hertog & McLeod, 1995), but the degree to which society accepts protests may give an indication of the strength of their societies democratic values. This is because protests provide a discernible sign that 'that the marketplace of ideas is free and diverse', providing more possibilities for innovative social change (McLeod, 2000: 31). Therefore, in societies where even peaceful activists are depicted as deviants - a tactic exploited by President Nixon in 1970, whose election campaign focused on combating 'the 'anarchy' of the anti-war protest' (Hallin, 1986: 194) - it is not surprising that the general public often has reservations about the necessity of protest. These worries are compounded by the withdrawal of some of the larger social movements from more 'radical' forms of protest in favour of more 'legitimate' partnerships with corporations and governments: which, in the end, may work to change the boundaries for what the public considers acceptable dissent, strengthening the dividing line between us and them.

Framing protestors into obscurity

Analysis of the global justice movements' 2001 May Day protests in London showed how most UK press coverage framed the protests in terms of (1) law and order, and the problem of policing the protest, fifty nine per cent; (2) economics, and the financial 'cost' of protests to the wider public, nine per cent; or (3) irrationality and spectacle, seven per cent (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003). The remaining coverage (eighteen per cent) identified with the protestors' concerns, but 'with a few notable exceptions, discourses of recognition appeared either in the editorial page columns, leaders, or letters to the editor' (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003: 143). The little positive news that was generated was clearly isolated from the serious hard news sections of the papers, letting the readers know what the media really thought of the protests.

In the same vein, Martin (2004) identified five dominant news frames for how the mass

media view labour news in the US: they are (1) 'the consumer is king' - which encourages an individual based (not collective) form of consumer democracy; (2) 'the process of production is none of the public's business' - whereby citizen consumers should only busy their minds with making product choices; (3) 'the economy is driven by great business leaders and entrepreneurs' - whose efforts can be emulated by anyone with the requisite passion, regardless of background; (4) 'the workplace is a meritocracy' - self advancement is always possible, and the employer bears no responsibility for an individual's problems (of course unions are excluded from this frame); and (5) 'collective economic action is bad' (Martin, 2004: 8-11). Understanding how such frames are continually utilised to negatively categorise social movement issues is crucial to comprehending why subsequent actions taken by activist groups - like protests - are also portrayed in an overwhelmingly bad light. There are frames that are not slanted against protestors, but mainstream media rarely uses them. Instead, the most regularly used frames are those that serve to marginalise protestors, these include the violent crime or property crime story, the carnival frame, the freak show, the Romper Room (or immaturity) frame, the riot frame, the storm watch (warning of potential actions), and lastly the moral decay story (McLeod & Hertog, 1999: 312-313).

What about the citizens who aren't protesting?

On May 1st 1973, London witnessed one of the largest trade union protests seen for years, when nearly two million people joined together to oppose the Conservative Party's Industrial Relations Act. In a similar manner to the coverage of the 2001 May Day protest (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003) the media downplayed the protest, representing what was 'a sizable manifestation of political class conflict rare in British history' as 'a predicable act of May Day madness' (Young & Crutchley 1978: 31). Typical of the media framing employed surrounding this event, the Daily Telegraph's headline read 'Millions ignore T.U.C. day of protest' (cited in Young & Crutchley 1978: 30). This narrative was eerily echoed some thirty years later by Newsnight (the BBCs flagship news programme) when political correspondent, David Grossman, 'reporting' on the biggest anti-war march ever seen in Britain (held in London on February 15th 2003) said: 'The people have spoken, or have

they? What about the millions who didn't march? Was going to the DIY store or watching the football on Saturday a demonstration of support for the government?' (Medialens, 2004).

Similarly, in Washington DC (US) on April 25th 2004, what might have been the capital's biggest protest ever took place, when an estimated 500,000 to 1,150,000 people took to the streets to march for womens' reproductive rights. However, as in the previous examples, this only seemed to encourage the media to 'downplay the size and significance of the event' and 'largely ignore the issues that marchers attempted to bring back into the public discourse' (Hollar, 2004). Likewise, after the September 11th attacks, a study of the New York Times showed that it had consistently 'downplayed and distorted peace rallies and demonstrations against a military response' (FAIR, 2001). The media messages emitting from the reporting of these protests to the public is unambiguous: don't waste your time with those deviant protestors they're not important! On the other hand, the options for the social movements involved in such demonstrations are not so obvious. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the mass media (and educational systems) should strengthen democratic principles and actively draw social movements into the wider public sphere, not isolate them at its margins.

Violence in the media and social movements

Violence tends to materialise in either personal or group conflicts, and has long been highlighted as a desirable news value in the mass media. Under normal circumstances, policymaking processes do not lend themselves to this particular media frame, as for the most part they are carried out through consensual decision making. But when individuals do choose to come into conflict verbally (or physically), this form of 'policymaking violence' tends to rate highly in the media. The crucial difference between the media's focus on institutional and protestor violence is that for institutional actors the decision to illustrate their conflict through violence, is for the most part a personal choice, while the same is not usually true for peaceful protestors. This is because citizens who feel excluded from political processes often participate in mass activities like protests, and so their representation in the media may be tarred by just a few unrepresentative individuals who choose violent methods of expression over peaceful ones. Thus, Winter and Klaehn (2005: 184) describe how press coverage served to discipline protestors at the Organisation of American State meeting in 2000 (Windsor, Canada) by depicting 'a "crisis of democracy" in the violent, misguided and indoctrinated embodiment of the protestors, who must be eradicated, so that normalcy: peace, order and "good government" may return.' Likewise, Bennett et al's. (2004: 452) study of protests targeting the World Economic Forum (between 2001 and 2003 in the New York Times) concluded that 'the news actively constructed the grassroots globalisation critics as marginal, largely nameless scruffians who threatened civil order with violence, even though actually little disorder actually occurred.'

It is not likely that protestor violence will endear its participants (and their associated social movements) to the public, especially when this becomes (as it nearly always does) the focal point for media coverage. In fact, it seems most likely that media attention obtained through violence will lead to social isolation. However, disturbingly (for democracy), some suggest that the practice of 'engaging in what is seen as spectacular, irrational, coercive, violent, and antisocial behaviour is the most reliable way to introduce [into the media] new rationalities that may have transformative consequences' (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003: 144; also see Owen and Palmer 2003). The use of violence is clearly a contestable, and in many people's view, an undesirable solution to resolving the problem of the nexus between social movements' and the media, but it proves how desperately outsider groups fight to get their message heard. Indeed, in some regards, the media encourages such behaviour, because if there are few differences between two protest groups, it is the more conflictual or violent event that obtains the most media coverage (McLeod & Hertog, 1999; Oliver and Myers, 1999). Fortunately, though, most people still believe in the power of non-violent protests (as evidenced by the majority of peaceful activists present at most mass protests) even if, as is often the case, their peaceful pleas remain unheard in the mass media (for a summary of the argument against violence see Edwards 2001).

Another problem of the media's fixation on protestor violence is that it often means that the media overlook the role of police violence. For example, environmental protestors had occupied US Congressional Republican Representative Frank Riggs office in California October 1997 and were confronted by police who used pepper spray to restrain them. Throughout this confrontation - which was filmed - one of the protestors managed to calmly articulate her group's reasons for protesting; however, that segment was edited out from the television news report (Opel, 2003: 58). As well as demonstrating how activists can be silenced in the media (or have their agendas distorted), this type of reporting serves to

normalise police violence against protestors, which is dangerous for all involved in peaceful protest (see FAIR, 2003).

Playing the Media Game
Highly visible activists: winners of the 'media game'

Despite the extremely negative picture painted in the previous section, there are still some winners in the 'media game'. So while losers, like the largest protest ever held in Washington, DC (see previous description of the women's march in 2004) received just a single story on page three in USA Today the day after the march, and a 'handful of march-related stories over a few days' in the New York Times and The Washington Post, 'others ignored the event almost completely' (Hollar, 2004). A 1997 march organised by the Promise Keepers 'an evangelical men's organization with an anti-feminist and anti-gay theology' end up as winners of the media game. Again, the Promise Keepers march took place in Washington DC and although it was approximately half the size of the women's march (estimated attendance of 480,000-750,000 demonstrators) it received far more media coverage. USA Today ran four stories before the event and four afterwards, while the broadcast networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) ran 'more than three times the coverage the networks devoted to the women's march' (Hollar, 2004). Furthermore, the only study examining media coverage of the Promise Keepers in US newspapers - from 1991 (their founding year) through to April 1996 - concluded that their coverage was 'overwhelmingly positive' (Claussen, 1998), making the Promise Keepers true winners of the media game.

Another 'winner' was a brand new social movement (formed in Belgium in the wake of the controversy surrounding the arrest of murderer Marc Dutroux in 1996), which mobilised Belgium's largest ever demonstration - the White March. A study examining the media coverage surrounding this protest determined that the primary reason for its overwhelming success was because the media 'undertook large-scale and unconcealed motivational framing efforts' to mobilise the public in support of the protest (Walgrave and Manssens, 2005: 132). This is a perfect example of a social movement that is an impressive winner of the media game, and a crucial question to ask is why was this the case? Walgrave and Manssens (2005: 135-136) outlined a number of specific contextual factors that might have encouraged the media to support the protest. Sadly, many of these factors were met when Howard Sattler, the host of a popular Australian talkback radio program, stirred up racist sentiments amongst his listeners, promoting a 'Rally for Justice' which drew thirty thousand angry protestors on to the streets (Mickler, 1998: 64). The protests were even able to

pressure the government to introduce racist laws that contravened international human rights legislation (Stockwell, 1992: 279).

Winners are losers?

Even when progressive activist groups 'win' in the media game, obtaining positive media coverage supportive of their objectives; they may still be losing in other respects, as the following discussion of the (US) anti-sweatshop movement illustrates. After a long history of labour abuse in sweatshops worldwide, it was only in the mid 1990s that the issue started receiving serious attention in the US mass media (coinciding with a couple of high profile sweatshop investigations). Contrary to 'normal' social movement coverage, analysis of this coverage showed that sweatshop activists actually 'achieved a position of definitional prominence' over corporate interests, a position typically reserved for powerful institutional actors (Greenberg & Knight, 2004: 169). This was a remarkable achievement, however, this success was undermined by the media's dominant focus on micro-level issues, such as individual sweatshops, and their aversion to the discussion of the systemic structural inequalities supporting the use of sweatshops (Greenberg & Knight, 2004: 170). Media coverage also located the root of the problem in western consumer shopping activities, not at the doorstep of the businesses profiting from the use of sweatshops, which served to cloud the issue of responsibility. Therefore, although the anti-sweatshop movement may have successfully campaigned for limited labour reforms (i.e., by Nike) - some of which have now become institutionalised - paradoxically, this success may render their long-term goal of eradicating sweatshops inoperable. Businesses successfully avoided regulation by promoting self-regulation, and even though the use of sweatshops is still common practice, media coverage of sweatshops has been far less visible since 2000, reducing the anti-sweatshop movement's ability to maintain public support and awareness for their campaigns. Furthermore, current estimates suggest that there are still about 250,000 sweatshop workers employed in the US alone (Ross, 2004).

Some social movements obtain their desired media coverage by adopting tactics that focus on mobilising short-term public support. One commonly used tactic - that may work against

longer-term mobilisation of social movement supporters - is emotional management. Such tactics, rely upon manipulating audiences by pushing emotional hot buttons, stimulating reactive responses from targets, but not necessarily well thought out responses that might lead on to long term commitments. The use of emotive images in the media to generate support for the victims of the famine in Niger 2005 is a good example of this type of campaigning. The politics of symbols and their manipulation may be successful in the short term, but social movements engaged in such practices need to consider whether they are weakening the ability of other progressive social movements to recruit people committed to long term social change. Lasting commitments to social movements are built on the basis of trusting relationships, which are most effectively developed through one on one communications, not through the media (Gamson 1995: 106). Social movements need to encourage their participants to be critical of manipulative practices because it is the results of activities that discourage activism in the first place.

Competing for coverage

Taking a historical approach to understanding differences in movement-media relations, Rucht (2004) suggests that new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s gradually moved away from more confrontational approaches to the mass media, and increasingly utilised 'adaptation strategies' (44-52). This in turn, has led social movements to a greater reliance on the mainstream media, with less emphasis on maintaining their inwardly focused alternative media. The rise of trans-national social movements in the 1990s saw this trend extend, and increasingly, social movements have adopted professionalised public relations techniques to market their causes.

Davis (2002) recognised that various UK campaigning groups have been able to acquire positive media profiles by relying on professional public relations techniques, rather than the creation of dramatic mediagenic images. This seems to have enabled increasing numbers of outsider interest groups greater opportunities to obtain positive media coverage (Davis, 2002: 176). However, in order to gain a ticket to this exclusive media club, there is an unwritten price that must be paid because as Gamson (1995: 99) pointed out 'the media may offer occasional models of collective action that make a difference, but they are highly selective ones.' Reformist movements are far more likely to survive the ravages of media distortion than more revolutionary ones, whose public relations messages can be overwhelmed by disparaging media frames. Gitlin (1980: 284) describes how more reformist campaigns, like those led by Ralph Nader in the 1960s (which fought for consumer

rights), were rewarded with acceptance by the mainstream media and promoted to the status of 'regular news makers.' This is particularly important, as one study comparing press and television coverage of protests in Washington DC (between 1982 and 1991), showed that overall coverage had decreased while the number of protests had increased massively (McCarthy et al., 1998). Furthermore, the ongoing corporatisation of social movements encourages the larger non-governmental organisations to view their success through an economic lens, which leads them to focus predominantly on maintaining and expanding membership/funding (Roelofs, 2003). The rational result of this economic orientation, is that they often 'deliberately design their actions and broader campaigns to attract media attention and positive coverage' (Rucht, 2004: 49). Therefore, social movements may water down their demands - to appear less challenging to the status quo - leaving them more vulnerable to cooption by political and economic elites (Paletz & Entman, 1981: 130). In such cases, social movement may even start to consider the development of positive relationships with the media as more important than mobilising activists or influencing policy decisions.

Playing by corporate rules

The general mainstreaming of media tactics has also been accompanied by the general dilution of radical media critiques (to 'safer' moderate criticisms) which only superficially confront the status quo: arguably strengthening media organisations hegemonic position in society. The future may appear to look rosy for some social movements, but if they just sit by and watch the more radical (media compromised) groups fall by the wayside, how long will it take before they themselves rank among the most 'radical' groups. Maybe then, such groups will have to re-evaluate their media-centric tactics in the light of their newfound 'radical' status.

Unions are a good example of a group that through access to significant financial resources, have been able to adapt their tactics to become more media friendly. This can be seen by their tactical focus on 'the needs of 'the public' and/or attack[s on] 'greedy' and 'incompetent' corporate and government elites' (Davis, 2002: 177). However, in utilising such strategies unions are now 'less likely to argue about jobs and money' and have 'dilut[ed] some of their long-term political objectives' (ibid.). Their media-centric approach, serves to fragment and isolate their successful actions from one another, encouraging media coverage in an episodic, instead of thematic manner (Bennett, 1988: 24). Similarly, in the 1960s and 1970s the National Organization for Women, adopted a position of media pragmatism, and although they succeeded in becoming a key feminist source for the media in the US, their 'leader[s] were very sensitive to questions and debate on sexuality...opt[ing] out of an important part of the domain of personal politics that ha[d] been the hallmark of the feminist movement' (Barker-Plummer, 1995: 315). As Tuchman (1978: 152) concluded: 'Ironically, yet logically, the successful institutionalization of the women's movement limited its ability to carry forth radical issues.' Social movements may improve their media visibility, but paradoxically by making tactical concessions to obtain media coverage, they may render their longer-term objectives invisible to their audience.

McCarthy et al. (1998) studied which factors contributed towards media coverage of demonstrations in Washington DC and concluded that other than the estimated size of the protest, one of the best predictors of coverage is it's conformity with current media issue attention cycles. Other research has also shown that if protests are not tied to legislative issues, they have a much harder time achieving media coverage, especially if they occurred in a '31-day period in which many other local public message events were also occurring' (Oliver & Maney, 2000: 496-97). These findings portend dire consequences for recruitment of future activists through the media, and for sustainable activism in general, as they place severe limitations on a movement's ability to receive thematic coverage of their protest activities. This is because: 'If media issue attention cycles come to play a more significant role than do the form, context, substance, or size of citizen protests in determining which demonstrations are selected for media coverage, then protest in modern democracies will have become mediated to a greater extent' than ever supposed (McCarthy et al., 1998: 497).

Invisible activists: losers of the 'media game'

Research in the US has shown that protests or social movements that challenge the legitimacy of the governments foreign policies, are less likely to be covered by the mass media (Smith et al., 2001; Shaw 2004) or more likely to be heavily 'denigrated and delegitimised' (Carragee, 1991). A prominent example of this was the discussions

surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Goss (2001) examined the New York Times' coverage of NAFTA and found that it served as an effective mouthpiece for the government and corporate interests, downplaying the significance of the agreement and limiting the terms of the debate to elite interests. In this way, the labour movement, who totally opposed the terms of the agreement, were almost completely ignored in the media coverage. In direct response to the disastrous consequences of NAFTA, thousands of people came together in Seattle in 1999 to campaign for more equitable global trade rules. Previously, the mass media were able to easily bury the activist case, but in Seattle this was not so simple due to the physical presence of 50,000 concerned citizens. This placed the media in a fix, because if they were to honestly discuss the issues being raised by the protest they would have had to question the validity of the entire economic system (Martin, 2004: 179-180). So instead, the media made full use of the adversarial tactics and frames (outlined previously) to systematically misrepresent and delegitimise the protestors' opinions (Ackerman, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xiii; Goeddertz & Kraidy, 2003; Herman, 2006).

The same principle of marginalisation normally holds true for groups challenging domestic policy making issues where there is elite consensus. The US anti-nuclear energy movement is a good example, and their actions were rendered next-to-invisible by the media. In spite of this, through determined grassroots education and organising, the anti-nuclear energy movement slowly grew, until public opinion polls in 1975 showed that between twenty to thirty per cent of the public opposed nuclear energy (Moyer, 2001). However, even with increasing public support, the mass arrest of 177 demonstrators the following year went unreported in the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, while receiving just two paragraphs on page 32 of the New York Times (Gitlin, 1980: 287). This illustrates the enormity of the media barriers facing social movements, as this occurred to a movement that had a sizable proportion of public support. Not surprisingly, the movement against nuclear weapons was treated with even more disdain by the media, so that 'during the biggest demonstrations, in late April and early May 1978, the New York Times ran a small notice on page 14' and the 'Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times ran nothing' (Gitlin, 1980: 291-292). Similarly, the environmental movement has also found itself regularly marginalised from the media (for a full account, see Barker, Submitted b).

Smaller social movements, targeting local issues, will be more likely to receive positive coverage than larger groups calling for more systemic and challenging reforms: as it tends to be the social movements that are most vigorously pushing the boundaries for dissent in society that are most marginalised from the mainstream media (McLeod & Hertog, 1999). This may be true, but that does not necessarily mean that reformist groups will obtain glowing media coverage. In fact, a recent survey of newspaper coverage of social protest in Wisconsin, US, from 1960 to 1999 concluded that even moderate reform groups tend to receive marginalising media coverage, and only 'protest groups seeking to support the status quo can expect more favourable treatment' (Boyle et al., 2004: 57).

All the examples in this section have shown how social movements are routinely marginalised or disappeared by the mainstream media. This may set in motion (or perpetuate) a 'spiral of silence', as media audiences sympathetic to social movement ideas, may feel less likely to speak out if they perceive the activists to be part of an small (invisible) minority in society, an idea forcefully communicated by the media (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). This of course has knock-on effects for a social movement's recruitment and long-term viability. Unfortunately, despite receiving consistently negative coverage some social movements still struggle to obtain further poor coverage: so is bad publicity actually worse than no publicity? This is not an easy question to answer, as poor publicity may still result in the recruitment of new members (see Owen and Palmer, 2003). However, maybe the question need not even be asked, as surely good publicity is better than either poor publicity or none at all. Instead, perhaps social movements should be questioning the mass media's portrayal of 'reality' not just their own promotional activities - with a view to changing and reforming the mass media itself.

Necessary Reforms for Social Justice

Cromwell (2001: 80) argues 'that campaigners are often unwilling to contemplate the notion that there is an inherent media resistance to their message.' Furthermore, he suggests that even activists who are familiar with radical mass media critiques, like Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, often hold the 'false impression that "big companies try to control the news in their favour"' which 'is the "conspiracy" charge that Herman and Chomsky cogently refuted from day one' (Cromwell 2001: 80). Therefore, listening to activists, and working out how they relate to the media, should be the first step for any activists working towards developing the case for media reform.

Difficult choices: institutional or global support?

Social movements have a limited number of outlets for their stories: internally distributed news, which typically reaches few people (especially those outside of the social movements immediate activities), and externally distributed news whose distribution relies on the mainstream media. Rising use of the internet has strengthened many social movements ability to distribute their news more widely via alternative media, but most progress has been made in developing effective internal communications. Unfortunately, most people lie outside of activist communication networks, and the wealth of information produced by social movements passes them by unnoticed. A single daily newspaper already provides a vast amount of information to digest. So considering that most people do not read newspapers cover to cover, it may be reasonable to suggest that few people feel the need to actively search for additional information to supplement their daily news intake.

Social movements who wish to reach out to a mass audience must (at present) primarily rely on the mass media to publicise their cause. However, the relationship between the two is fundamentally asymmetrical, which leaves social movements vulnerable to the media's beck and call - placing social movements in a catch 22 situation. Should they make the best of their media-given lot, good or bad? Or should they attempt to reform the media, and risk biting (or at least nibbling) the hand that feeds them?

With the advent of trans-national social movements and improved international communications, new doors have opened, which may help make such questions a little easier to answer. In recent years, in minority countries, participation in social movements has risen substantially, but it is in the majority countries where growth in social movements has advanced most rapidly. This is despite the fact that protesting is a genuinely dangerous form of political expression in countries where governments routinely utilise repressive forms of social control to clamp down on dissidents (Podobnik, 2005: 55). In the face of this oppression, millions of people from the majority world are joining together to protest against the multitude of exploitative economic reforms being imposed on them by corporate driven globalisation (Podobnik, 2005: 56). However, '[i]ronically... the era of globalisation has coincided with an increasingly parochial focus by the Western media... Meanwhile coverage of the South, where it existed at all, has diminished, allowing a limited and distorted view of the developing world' (Miller, 2003: 116).

In minority countries, global justice movements are working hard to expose the gross bankruptcy of the current form of globalisation, and are sometimes able to permeate the public's consciousness through the mass media. However, while they struggle to be heard, there are already signs in majority countries of massive mobilisations of citizens who oppose corporate hegemony (Walton and Seddon, 1994). Yet, these millions of protestors remain hidden away from most Western eyes (Palast, 2000), by the very same media that social movements in the minority countries cooperate with. Western media portray the global justice movement at home as either 'violent troublemakers' or 'middle-class do-gooders' and marginalise the bulk of protestors in majority countries who are campaigning against the same neo-liberalism by simply not reporting their activities (Podobnik, 2005: 57). To compound this problem, on the rare occasion when the media does delve into majority world issues, audiences were misinformed, due to the low level of explanations and context given, and generally hold majority world citizens in low regard (although it has been shown that such opinions could be radically changed by the quality of information received) (Glasgow University Media Group, 2001).

What then would happen if the media covered these popular uprisings in the majority world in a sympathetic way? Obviously, a lot however, it is unlikely that this will happen in the near future, as the media do not even report positively on the global justice movement in their own countries. Instead, it might be more interesting for activists to consider which of the two they should be allying themselves with: media institutions or the majority of the global citizenry? Choosing the latter does not mean neglecting all media outlets in favour of interpersonal communication. Far from it: by choosing to side wholeheartedly with the public, social movements would need to make substantial investments in alternative media (in minority and majority countries alike) to publicise their activities globally, while also concentrating on the urgent task of publicising the need for media reform. The global justice movement might then be able to stop wasting precious resources in their uphill struggle to coax the mass media to support them, which counts upon the media acting against its own - profit orientated - interests.

Democratising the messenger

If the media continues to encourage apathy through the use of 'neutral frames', non-coverage, or over-coverage with limited solutions, social movements need to consider how beneficial it is to seek such disempowering media coverage. Furthermore, there is the possibility that even positive coverage may ultimately work to undermine their (or other movements) long-term objectives (that is to strengthen democratic processes). Most people are aware that numerous catastrophic problems are challenging human existence, but if they learn about these issues in an episodic manner that leaves them feeling helpless, where the only consistent solution offered by the media is changing their personal consumption patterns, can social movements really expect to build a mass movement for global justice in the minority world?

The media systems we currently have are not up to this task, so social movement activists need to begin seriously thinking about how they might change the mass media. To a limited extent some social movements (especially in the US) are already undertaking some actions to create a more democratic media environment, but more needs to be done to build these actions into a truly global project, to counter the global reach of media corporations. However, to date, progressive social movements have generally rejected media democratisation as a political issue. The rationale for this un-decision may be numerous (see Hackett and Carroll, 2004), but ultimately, the desertion of media democratisation has worked against many progressive social movements, who continue to suffer within the confines of the increasingly conservative mass media.

Conclusions

Key to any social movement's eventual success in reforming the current world order is its ability to garner majority support, which is severely restricted by the mass media. Global justice movements profess to want to mobilise entire communities worldwide to enable truly participative decision-making. However, if this is really the case, they need to consider whether the same media system that serves to naturalise and legitimise elite decision-making, can really encourage its antithesis, collective grassroots decision-making. It seems an anathema to even consider that by working on the terms set by the mass

media, social movements are actually legitimising and tightening its hegemonic power over society, even while it simultaneously acts to de-legitimise or ignore the global justice movement.

Therefore, it is time for social movements to take collective action. To start with 'democratic media reform needs to be recast as an end in itself - a public good - not simply a means by which each movement can get its message out' (Hackett & Carroll, 2004). In this way, a media reform project can be linked to the wider array of social movements calling for a more equitable and participatory democracy.

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