Bulletin N° 1019
Subject: Lessons from the
liquidation of social classes.
Grenoble, France
January 11, 2022
Dear Colleagues and Friends of
CEIMSA,
We proceed to present Barrington Moore Jr’s study, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the making of the Modern World (1966), with an analysis of Chinese history, where we left off last year. The Kuomintang, the political party founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1911, became dominant in China from 1928 until 1949 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. It was a nationalist party, constituting a coalition of ideologies, including the conservative anti-communist faction under Chaing Kai-shek and off-and-on cooperation with the Chinese Communists under Mao Tsu-tung.
The Kuomintang Interlude and its Meaning.
Three features stand out in this brief
review of Kuomintang doctrine as formulated by Chiang Kai-shek. The first
is the almost complete absence of any social and economic program to cope with
China’s problems, and indeed a very marked ritual avoidance of the realities of
these problems. The talk about ‘political tutelage’ and preparation for
democracy was mainly rhetoric. Actual policy was to disturb existing social
relationships as little as possible. Such a policy did not exclude blackmail
and forced contributions from any sector of the population that provided a
convenient target. Gangsters do the same thing in American cities, without any
real attempt to upset the existing social order, upon which they actually
depend. The second feature, one may call the concealment of the lack of specific political and social
objectives through somewhat grotesque efforts to revive traditional ideals in a
situation that had for a long time increasingly undermined the social basis of
these ideals. Since Professor Mary C. Wright has argued this point cogently and
with abundant concrete evidence in The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, we
need only remind ourselves here that this distorted patriotic idealization of
the past is one of the main stigmata of Western fascism. The third and
last feature is the Kuomintang’s effort to resolve its problems through
military force, again a major characteristic of European fascism. (p.200)
By the 1920s,
commercial and industrial interests had become a significant factor in Chinese
political and social life, though their continuing dependence upon both the
foreigner and their subordination to agrarian interests force them to play a
very different role from their Western European counterpart. In the meantime,
as will appear in more detail shortly, a numerically small but politically
significant sector of the landlords near the port cities had begun to
amalgamate with this class and turn into rentiers. The urban workers too
had made their appearance on the historical stage in a stormy and violent
fashion.
It was in this
situation that the Kuomintang became active. The story of its rise to power has
been told too often to bear detailed repetition here. Though still somewhat
clouded in controversy, the essential points for our proposes appear to be the
following ones.
With important native
Communists and Soviet assistance, the Kuomintang by late 1927 had won control
of a substantial part of China, working out from its base in the south. Up to
this moment, its success had been mainly due to its ability to harness and ride
the tides of discontent among the peasants and the workers. Thus the
Kuomintang’s social program distinguished it from the warlords and gave it an
advantage over them. For a time, hopes ran high that the Kuomintang’s military
force might overcome the warlords and unify China on the basis of a
revolutionary program.
Such was not to be the
case, though formal unification did occur. The Kuomintang’s partial success
brought to the surface latent conflicts among the disparate elements that a
program of nationalist unification had temporarily brought together. The landed
upper classes, who provided officers for the military force, became
increasingly nervous lest the peasants might get out of hand. Ironically enough
the Chinese Communists, under some prodding from Moscow, supported the
successors to the gentry at this juncture on the ground that the national
revolution took precedence over the social one. The role of the urban merchants
and financiers is less clear. But they could scarcely have been any happier
than the gentry about the prospect of
the Kuomintang victory with a left-wing program.
In these circumstances,
Chiang Kai-shek, who had firm control over an important section of the military
forces, managed to disassociate himself from the revolution, amid a welter of
intrigue and by a series of military coups. Toward the end of this
disengagement Chiang turned upon the workers in the classic pattern of
agrarian-bourgeois alliance. On April 12, 1927, his agents, together with
others on the spot, including French, British, and Japanese police and military
forces, carried out a mass slaughter of workers, intellectuals, and others
accused of sympathizing with the Communists. Chiang and his military machine
were not, however, a mere passive instrument of this alliance. He also turned
on the capitalist elements themselves, subjecting them to confiscation and
compulsory loans, amid threats of prison and execution.
Chiang’s victory
inaugurated a new phase in Chinese politics. Both in word and deed, the
Kuomintang gave priority to national unification as something that had to
precede political and agrarian reform. In reality this meant the search for a
solution to the agrarian problem though military’ force, that is, the
suppression of banditry and communism. It is too much to assert that this
prospect was hopeless from the start. Modernization did take place under
reactionary auspices and with a substantial dose of repression in Japan as well
as in Germany, the later a country that also faced the task of national
unification. Nevertheless the problems facing China were vastly more difficult.
To specify the agrarian
aspects in any detail soon runes into gaps in the data, especially the almost
complete absence of dependable statistics, lacunae far wider in the case of
China than the other counties studied in this book. Nevertheless the main
outlines of the problem are quite clear. The first point that deserves to be
made is a negative one. Except perhaps in some areas, China, after the First
World War, was not a country where a class of aristocratic owners of huge latifundia
exploited a mass of poor peasants and landless laborers. To emphasize this
fact, however, would seriously distort the image of what was actually taking
place. Under the impact of advancing commerce and industry, China was steadily
moving toward a system of absentee ownership and increasing differences in
wealth. This change was most marked in the coastal areas, especially near large
cities. In many parts of the interior, too, tenancy problems were acute, though
there they seem rather the legacy of former practices than the consequences of
new forces. That Chinese agriculture involved tremendous amounts of human labor
and very little in the way of expensive implements or livestock – a few rich
families in the wheat-growing North did have horses – is a fact so well known
as scarcely to bear repeating. As usual, Tawney puts the point in its political
and social context, in rolling classical prose. The distinctive note of Chinese
agriculture, he observes, was ‘economy of space, economy of materials, economy
of implements, economy of fodder, economy of fuel, economy of waste products,
economy of everything except forests, which have been plundered, with prodigal
recklessness, to the ruin of the soil, and of the labor of human beings, whom
social habits have made abundant and abundance cheap.
In the absence of a
tradition of privileged feudal estates, the relationship between landlord and
tenant contained strong elements of a business contract. But it was still a
preindustrial business contract heavily flavored by local custom. Thus the
statistical category of tenancy covered a wide variety of situations. Some
landlords who had overburdened themselves with debt in buying land might be
worse off than many tenants. On the other hand, those who rented land might be
either well-to-do persons with spare cash and implements, or else poor peasants
with little or no land, whose least misfortune might put them under conditions
approaching slavery. Considerations such as these show the difficulty of
connecting the specific terms landlord and peasant to any general notion of
social classes. Still one must not fall victim to the opposite illusion: that
one cannot speak of social classes because the statistical data fail to bring
them out clearly. The extent to which there was an explosive class struggle in
the countryside is a more complicated problem to which we shall come in due
course.
. . .
Thus the map tell a familiar historical story, that of a society
in which commercial influences were eating away at the peasant proprietorship
and concentrating wealth in the hands of a new social formation, a fusion
between parts of the old ruling class and new elements rising in the cities.
As this fusion formed
the main social basis of the Kuomintang, its agrarian policy was one of trying
to maintain or restore the status quo.
In addition, the presence of the Communist rival with de facto
independence tended to polarize the situation and make Kuomintang policy more
reactionary and oppressive. An American scholar sympathetic to the Kuomintang
offers this general characterization; ‘The communists act as the inheritors to
temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions: the National Government and the
Kuomintang to ascendant mandarinates.’ Certainly not the whole story, the
appraisal is nevertheless an accurate one. Elsewhere the same scholar writes on
the basis of direct observation:
‘Since [the Kuomintang] . . . does not promote rural class
warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue. The Party and the
Government have sought, not always efficiently or faithfully to the nth
degree to carry out the programs of land reforms . . .. The Kuomintang
has tolerated widespread sharecropping, and destruction, usury, and rural
despotism – because it found these in existence, and was preoccupied with
building a national government, a modern army, adequate finance, and with
eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium, bandits, and communists . .
. .’
In this passage the author accepts at face value the Kuomintang
statements about the reasons for their policy. Nevertheless the passage is
important testimony from a witness friendly to the Kuomintang to the effect
that their policy was one or maintaining the status quo in the
countryside, in itself a form of class warfare.
. . .
The point that emerges
most clearly from both friendly and hostile testimony is that the Kuomintang’s
reforms were window dressing inasmuch as they stopped short of altering the
élites’ control of local life.(pp.187-193)
According to Professor Moore, the power of the absentee landlords grew in
the Kuomintang period and manifested itself during the war with Japan.
Still more evidence on
the survival of the former landed upper classes and their continuing political
importance comes from the strategic policies of the Kuomintang prior and during
the war with Japan. It is known that commercial and industrial interests failed
to register significant advances under the Kuomintang. At first glance, this
fact might seem attributable to the Japanese blockade and occupation. But this
can scarcely be the whole story since the blockade began only in 1937. A
significant factor appears to have been the continuing agrarian opposition to
China’s transformation into an industrial power. A military historian without
the remotest Marxist sympathies notes that, before the war began, China
preferred to import whatever equipment seemed indispensable rather to build up
a native industrial base. Tactics on the battlefield likewise reflected China’s
social structure, though Liu does not draw this fairly obvious conclusion. In
the absence of superior weapons, China simply used masses of peasant manpower,
urging her soldiers to be brave in the defense of the country. This
‘death-stand’ attitude resulted in enormous casualties. The battles of 1940
alone are said to have cost the Chinese 28 percent of their forces. The same
source estimates that an average of 23 percent of all the able-bodied men
drafted in the 8 years of war were casualties. One might object that any
preindustrial state caught in the same situation would have suffered approximately
the same experience. This objection, I think, misses the main point: China
remained preindustrial largely because the successors to the gentry retained
the substance of political control.
Let us now change our focus and
look at the Kuomintang regime from the standpoint of comparative institutional
history. As we step back from the details (though we would like to have may
more accurate ones than we do), the two decades of Kuomintang rule take on some
of the essential characteristics of the reactionary phase of the European
response to industrialism, including important totalitarian features. The main
social basis of the Kuomintang, as we have already seen, was a coalition, or
perhaps better, a form of antagonistic cooperation between the successors to
the gentry and urban commercial, financial, and industrial interests. The
Kuomintang, through its control of the means of violence, served as the link
that held the coalition together. At the same time its control of violence
enabled it to blackmail the urban capitalist sector and to operate the
machinery of government both directly and indirectly. In both these respects
the Kuomintang resembled Hitler’s NSDAP.
There are, however,
important differences in both the social bases and the historical circumstances
that distinguish the Kuomintang from its European counterparts. These
differences help to account for the relatively feeble character of the Chinese
reactionary phase. An obvious one is the absence of a strong industrial base in
China. Correspondingly, the capitalist element was very much weaker. It is a
safer guess that the Japanese occupation of the coastal cities reduced the
influence of this group even further. Finally, the Japanese invasion, though it
provided a direct target for nationalist sentiment, effectively prevented
China’s reactionary phase from becoming one of foreign expansion, such as took
place under German, Italian, and Japanese fascism. For these reasons, the
Chinese reactionary and protofascist phase resembles that of
Franco’s Spain, where an
agrarian élite also managed to stay on top but could not execute an aggressive
foreign policy, more than it does corresponding phases in Germany or Italy.
It is in the area of
doctrines, where realistic considerations are somewhat less pressing, that one
may observe the most striking resemblances between the Chinese reactionary
period and its European counterparts. During its revolutionary phase prior to
attaining power, the Kuomintang had identified itself with the Taiping Rebellion.
After obtaining power and with Chiang Kai-shek’s emergence as the real leader,
the party did an about-face, identifying itself with the Imperial system and
its apparent success during the Restoration of 1862-1874, a switch that recalls
the early behavior of Italian fascism. After victory, the doctrine became a
curious amalgam of Confucian elements and scraps taken from Western liberal
thinking. The latter, as is well known, had entered through the influence of
Sun Yat-sen, who remained as the most revered ancestor of the movement. The
analogies to European fascism arise mainly from the pattern and shadings of
emphasis that Chiang Kai-shek, or those who wrote his doctrinal pronouncements,
placed upon these disparate elements.
The main diagnosis of
China’s problems was couched in semi-Confucian moral and philosophical
platitudes to the effect that matters went wrong after the 1911 revolution
because the Chinese people did not think correctly. Chiang asserted in1943 that
the Chinese in general had failed to understand the true wisdom of Sun Yat-sen’s deep philosophical statement
that ‘to understand is difficult; to act is easy’ and still thought that ‘to
understand is easy; to act s difficult.’ There is practically no discussion of
the social and economic factors that had brought China to her current plight.
To bring these out in the open in any candid fashion would have run the serious
risk of alienating upper class support. Thus in its lack of any realistic
analysis and in some of the reasons for its absence, Kuomintang doctrine
recalls European fascism.
The same is true of
Kuomintang proposals for future action. There are occasional remarks scattered
through Chiang’s semi-official book about the importance of the People’s
Livelihood, a term that served in part as a euphemism for the agrarian question.
But as we have already noted, very little was actually done, or even proposed,
in order to solve the question. There was also a ten-year plan for
industrialization, again mainly a matter of putting marks on paper. Instead the
stress was on moral and psychological reforms from above, but without social
content. Both the diagnosis and the plan of action are summed up in these
sentences by Chiang Kai-shek:
‘From what has been said we know that the key to the success of
national reconstruction is to be found in a change of our social life, and the
change of our social life in turn depends upon those who have vision, will
power, moral conviction and a sense of responsibility, and who, through their
wisdom and efforts, lead the people in a town, a district, a province or
throughout the country, to a new way until they grow accustomed to it unawares.
As I have also pointed out, national and social reconstruction could be easily
accomplished, provided the youth throughout the nation resolve to perform what
others dare not perform, to endure what other cannot endure. . ..’
Here the Confucian theory of a benevolent élite has, under the
pressure of circumstances, taken on a martial and ‘heroic’ character. The
combination is already familiar to the West in fascism.
The resemblance becomes stronger as we see the
organizational form that this heroic élitism is supposed to take, namely the
Kuomintang itself.
. . .
The
avowed purpose of this moral and psychological reform and its ostensible
organizational embodiment was of course military power. In turn, military power
was to achieve national defense and national unification. Over and over again,
Chiang put military unification first as the prerequisite for any other reform.
Chiang’s main justification for this point of view has a definite totalitarian
ring. He cites Sun Yat-sen’s judgment that Rousseau and the French Revolution could not serve as
models for China because the Europeans at that time did not have liberty
while the Chinese at present had too
much. The Chinese, according to a favorite metaphor of both Chiang and Sun,
resembled a heap of loose sand, ready victims of foreign imperialism. ‘ In
order to resist foreign oppression,’ Chiang continues in direct quotation from
Sun, ‘we must free ourselves from the idea of ‘individual liberty’ and unite
ourselves into a strong cohesive body, like a solid mass formed by the mixing
of cement with sand.’(pp.195-200)
The author concludes his analysis of this period of Chinese history with the following qualifications:
To
stress these three traits- [the absence
of any social and economic program, the revival of traditional ideals to
hide the lack of specific political and social objectives, and the readiness to
resolve problems through military force] – is not to say that the Kuomintang
was identical with European fascism or earlier reactionary movements. Identity
never occurs in history and is not the issue here. Our point is that these
similarities constitute a related whole that is significant not only for understanding
China but for the dynamics of totalitarian movements in general. In other
words, we do not have here a loose collection of accidental resemblances in
which certain minor Chinese traits happen to recall major European ones. As a
single complex unit, they dominated for a time the political, social, and
intellectual climate of both Europe and China.
The Kuomintang’s effort to push China along
the reactionary road to the modern state did end in complete failure. So had a
similar and more promising attempt failed in Russia. In both countries this
failure was the immediate cause and forerunner of Communist victories. In
Russia Communists have succeeded in creating a first-class industrial power; in
China the issue is still somewhat in doubt. Again in both cases, peasant
insurrection and rebellion made a decisive contribution toward pushing these
countries toward the communist path of modernization instead of the reactionary
or democratic variants of capitalism. In China this contribution was even more
important than in Russia. Clearly it is high time to examine more carefully the
peasants’ part in these huge transformations. (p.202)
Rebellion, Revolution, and the Peasants.
The frequency of peasant rebellions in
China is well known. Fitzgerald lists six major ones in China’s long history
prior to 1900. There were many other local and abortive ones. Here I shall try
to indicate some of the main reasons why premodern Chinese society was prone to
peasant rebellions, limiting the discussion mainly to the latter phase of the
Manchu dynasty, though it is probable that several of the factors to be
discussed operated during earlier dynasties as well, a point that lies outside
the scope of this work and indeed the author’s competence. We may nevertheless
take judicial notice of the fact that these were rebellions, not revolutions,
that is they did not alter the basic structure of the society. Secondly, I
shall endeavor to show how this original structural weakness facilitated a real
revolution under the impact of new strains created by the impact of commerce
and industry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The whole story
constitutes a most instructive contrast with India where peasant rebellions in
the premodern period were relatively rare and completely ineffective and where
modernization impoverished the peasants at least as much as in China and over
as long a period of time. The contrast with Japan is also illuminating even if
less striking. There the rulers were able to keep in check impulses toward
peasant rebellion generated in the course of modernization partly because
Japanese peasant society was organized on principles differing form those in
China. Their success in turn enabled Japan to follow a reactionary pattern of modernization that, like Germany’s
culminated in fascism.
Before
discussing the peasantry of China, it is well to recall that the political
structure of China during the nineteenth century displayed certain serious
weaknesses that have only a very indirect connection with the peasantry and may
be more properly regarded as due to the character and organization of the
ruling stratum of landlords and officials. I have already suggested certain
reasons why this segment of Chinese society generally failed to adapt to the
modern world of commerce and industry. There are also reasonably clear
indications of a defect in the political mechanism of traditional China. In
their local habitat and as landlords, the gentry needed an Imperial system
strong enough to enforce their authority over the peasants. At the same time,
actions that were necessary to make the imperial system strong ran counter to
the short-run interests of the local gentry. They were very reluctant to pay
their share of the taxes and generally wanted local affairs run in their own way.
About this situation there was not much the district magistrate could do. As
corruption mounted and the usefulness of the central government became less
obvious, so did centrifugal pulls increase, creating a vicious circle.
From the standpoint of our immediate
problem; the most important structural defects were a series of weaknesses in
the links binding the peasantry to the upper classes and to the prevailing
regime. As indicted above, members of the gentry do not appear to have played
any role in the agricultural cycle, not even a supervisory one, that would give
them a legitimate status as leaders of the peasant community. Indeed one of the
main distinctions between a landed gentleman in China and a mere rich landlord
seems to have been that the gentleman avoided any taint of manual labor and
devoted himself to scholarship and the arts. The gentry did bargain with the
government in order to improve irrigation. Though the results were certainly
visible to the peasants, and we may be sure that the gentry did their best to
impress on the peasants what they had done for them, by its very nature his
could not be a continuous or frequently repeated activity. In any one area it
is possible to get only so many irrigation ditches. Furthermore as the resources
available to the central government and even a good many local ones declined,
it became harder to keep old projects in working order and impossible to get
new ones.
The gentry’s well-known control of
astronomic lore, necessary for determining the time at which to perform the
various tasks of the agricultural cycle, comes to mind as one casts about for
possible economic contributions that would have legitimated their status.
Though the point would bear further
examination – in general we need more and firmer information about the
relation between the peasants and the gentry – there are several reasons for
doubting that this monopoly was important
at all in the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, peasants generally out of their own practical experience,
always develop a rich lore about every aspect of the agricultural cycle: the
best time and location for planting each type of crop, for harvesting it, and
so forth. Indeed, this lore is so firmly imbedded by experience and the risks
of deviation from it are so great for
most peasants, that modern governments have a great deal of difficulty in
persuading peasants to very their routines. Hence it seems rather likely that
the astronomers adapted whatever knowledge they had to what the peasants
already did, rather than the other way around, and that they did not do
anything in modern times that struck the peasant as indispensible.
What then did the government do for the
peasant? Modern Western sociologists are perhaps too prone to dismiss at
impossible the answer that it did practically noting, which I suspect is the
correct one. They reason that any institution which lasts a long time cannot be
altogether harmful to those who live under it (which seems to me to fly in the
face of huge masses of both historical and contemporary experience) and
therefore undertake a rather desperate search for some ‘function’ that the
institution in question must perform. This is not the palace to argue about
methods or the way in which conscious and unconscious assumptions determine the
questions raised in any scientific inquiry. Nevertheless it seems more
realistic to assume that large masses of people , and especially peasants,
simply accept the social system under which they live without concern about any
balance of benefits and pains, certainly without the least thought of whether a
better one might be possible, unless and until something happens to threaten
and destroy their daily routine. Hence it is quite possible for them to accept
a society of whose working they are no more than victims.
One might object that the Imperial
bureaucracy, when it was working well, as it did in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, maintained law and order, enforcing an objective standard
of justice well in advazn ce of that prevailing in most parts of contemporary
Eruope. That is ture enough. But the administration of justice and the
enforcement of law and order had very little effect on the peasants.
. . .
The
peasants in the family and the clan had their own arrangements for keeping
order and administrating justice according to their own lights. They had no
need for the Imperial apparatus except to keep marauders and bandits away from
their corps. But banditry on a large
enough scale to be a serious menace to the peasants was in itself very largely
the consequence of exploitative officialdom. During the nineteenth century the
Imperial bureaucracy became less and less able to keep even a minimum of order
over wide areas of China as its own policies help to generate peasant outbreaks.
To sum up the discussion so far, the
evidence points strongly toward the conclusion that the government and the
upper classes performed no function that the peasants regarded as essential for
their way of life. Hence the link between rulers and ruled was weak and largely
artificial, liable to snap under any severe strain.
There were three ways in which the
Imperial regime tried to compensate for the artificial character of his link.
One was the system of granaries; local and Imperial storage depots for grain
that could be distributed to the population in times of shortage. The rulers
recognized very clearly the connection between hunger and peasant rebellion,
though hunger was not the only cause of rebellion, as we shall see clearly enough
in due course. However, the system of public granaries broke down and was
largely abandoned in the nineteenth century, when it was most needed. Probably
the main reason was the absence of any short-run profit for the gentry and
prosperous landlords in selling grain to the government or in turning it over
free. Also periods of shortage were times when those who had grain could make a
killing. A second arrangement was the famous pao-chia system of mutual
surveillance, which resembles and long antedates modern totalitarian
procedures. Ten households were grouped into a pao, with a chief
responsible for reporting the conduct of its members. A number of these paos
(the number varied at different times) were put into a similar group with
similar responsibilities, and so on upward in an ascending hierarchy. It was an
attempt to extend the government’s power of observation and supervision below
the district magistrate. Modern students of China judge the pao system
to have been quite ineffective. Mutual surveillance became tangled up with the
collection of taxes, which would scarcely endear it to the peasantry. Any such
arrangement depends on its effectiveness on a substantial scattering of
ordinary individuals who have both a sufficient stake in the system to make it
possible for force them to play the unenviable role of talebearers and enough
respect among the population so that they will learn what is going on. These
conditions, one may infer, were not widely met in Manchu China. The third
arrangement also recalls modern totalitarian practices, the hsiang-yüeh
system of periodically lecturing the population on Confucian ethics. Apparently
the practice began in the seventeenth century. Several emperors took it quite
seriously. There is abundant evidence that the population did not and even
regard the lecturers as unctuous nonsense. Though it lasted as late as 1865,
the lecture system degenerated into empty formalism, taken seriously neither by
the officials who had to give them nor by the people who had to listen to them.
The whole combination of welfare policies,
police surveillance, and popular indoctrination constitutes a revealing
precursor of modern totalitarian practices. To my mind, they demonstrate
conclusively that the key features of the totalitarian complex existed in the
premodern world. But, in agrarian societies before modern technology made
totalitarian instruments vastly more effective and created new forms of
receptiveness to its appeals, the totalitarian complex was little more than an
ineffectual embryo.
A forth link between the peasants and the
upper class was the clan, which seems to have been rather more effective in tying
the peasants to the prevailing order. The clan, as the reader may recall, was a
group of people claiming descent from a common ancestor. Though clan affairs
were run by its gentry members, the clan included a large number of peasants. It
had rules of conduct that were repeated orally at the colorful ceremonies when all
members gathered and visibly reasserted their membership in a collective unit.
. . .
[T]he
clan was no more than an enlarged version of the patrilineal and patriarchal
lineage with strong patriarchal features which was widespread among the upper
classes. Therefore it seems safe to a assume that in the other parts of China
where clans were not prominent there were numerous smaller lineages that
included both gentry and peasant households and that also served the same
purpose: to bind rulers and ruled.
By and large then, the clan and patrilineal
lineage emerge as the only important link between the upper and lower strata in
Chinese society. As such their importance should not be underestimated, though,
as will appear in due course, the clan was double edged: it could also serve as
the key mechanism holding rebellious groups together. The general weakness of
the link between rulers and ruled, in comparison with other societies, except
Russia which was equally subject to peasant insurrection, seems reasonably well
established at least for the Manchu era and, I would suggest, accounts in
considerable measure for the fact that peasant rebellion was endemic in Chinese
society. Were there, however, also structural aspects of the peasant community
as such, that might explain this noticeable characteristic of Chinese politics?
. . .
The Chinese village, the basic cell of
rural society in China as elsewhere, evidently lacked cohesiveness in
comparison with those of India, Japan, and even many parts of Europe. There
were far fewer occasions on which numerous members of the village cooperated in
a common task in a way that creates the habits and sentiments of solidarity. It
was closer to a residential agglomeration of numerous peasant households than
to a live and functioning community, though less atomized than, for example,
the modern South Italian village where life seems to have been a pacific
struggle of all against all. Still there is more than political rhetoric behind
the frequent statements of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek that Chinese society
was like a heap of sand.
. . .
Some cooperation did exist, and the brief
comments on it in the sources suggest an exhalation of why there was not more.
Rice culture, to be most efficient, requires large amounts of labor at the time
when the young seedlings are transplanted and again at harvest time. In due
course we shall see the very effective organization that the Japanese village
reached to meet this problem and the very inefficient one that prevails still
in large parts of India. The Chinese met this need in several ways. They might
exchange labor among themselves, staggering the dates of planting so that corps
would not reach the same stage of maturity simultaneously and hence allow time
to help out one’s kin. Exchanges of labor within kinship groupings were
considered most desirable. If the kin would not supply enough labor at crucial
points in the agricultural cycle, extra hands were hired. Surplus labor came
from three sources. One was from local peasants, who had too little land to
support their families. The existence of this group made it possible for those
with enough land to compel the others to work for them within the framework of
the prevailing social and political system. A second source of labor came from
those without any land and a third from men who could not eke out a living from
insufficient land in the poorer, distant area. As late as the mid-1930s, many
migrant workers were of different ethnic origin (‘wandering souls,’ ‘boat
people’), drifters who would accept very low pay, keeping local wage rates
down. At times a few landless Chinese from another district might settle in the
village but, without clan membership and access to a plot of land, they lived
alone, outside the stream of village life.
As long as labor was abundant and surplus
because of the situation just described, it is not surprising that economic
cooperation among any set of individuals in the Chinese village lacked
permanence or the institutional basis that still exists in India under the cast
system and in Japan in a different form. In premodern China, arrangements for
the exchange or hiring of extra labor were fluid, temporary, and unhurried
affairs. This was true in the north as well as in the rice-growing south. Even
among close kin, exchanges of labor were discussed and arranged anew each year,
and, at peak periods of work, landowners could afford to wait until the last
moment to hire extra workers at lowest wages.
The only frequently recurring activity
that demanded cooperation was the management of the water supply. This was more
a question of sharing a scarce resource than of working together on a common
task and often resulted in fights within the village or among several villages.
In sharp contrast again with Japan and also premodern Europe, the main
decisions in the agricultural cycle were made by the individual household.
There is no trace of anything remotely resembling Flurzwang: the
practice under which the European village community decided when all its member
fields should become pasture for the winter – common land available to all –
and when the separate strips should retune to private responsibility for
ploughing and seeding. Chinese property too was held in strips scattered
throughout the territory in the village. But the rarity of animals and the
intense pressure on the land ruled out this European practice, even in the
northern wheat-growing areas. (pp.201-211)
By way of conclusion, Moore explains the Chinese propensity for revolt sans revolution as follows:
The
system of sharecropping and the devotion of the upper class to stylized
leisure, with its need for a labor force that it did not have to supervise
directly, all point toward arrangements roughly similar to those just sketched
here. Thus the political needs of the
upper classes combined with agricultural practices to generate a combination of
peasant individualism and surplus labor, leading to a relatively atomistic
peasant society.
. . .
[W]e
encounter another basic principle of Chinese society: possession of land was
absolutely necessary if one were to be a full-fledged member of the village. We
have already noticed how land provided the basis for the activities of the
clan. The same is true on a smaller scale of the family. Since the family was
the chief unit of economic production, occupation on the soil was uniquely
conducive to strong and stable kinship ties. The whole Confucian ethic of
filial respect was impossible without property and was very much weaker among
the poor peasants. Indeed, family life itself was often impossible for them. In
contrast with the situation that prevailed for a long time in Western society,
the poorer peasants in China had fewer children and of course fewer of them
survived to maturity. Many could not marry at all. Modern Chinese villages had
a number of ‘bare sticks,’ bachelors too
poor to marry. ‘They were objects of pity and ridicule in the eyes of the
villagers, whose life centered on the family.’ And, of course, it was the poor
who sold their children, mainly girls but occasionally also boys, because it
was impossible to bring them up.
In a word, no property: no family, no
religion. That is a bit too extreme. There was a place, if only a small and
precarious one, for the landless agricultural laborer in the Chinese village,
though the situation that prevailed more
widely was for land-short peasants to eke out their resources by working
for their wealthier neighbors. Nevertheless the older conception among scholars
of the patriarchal ethic uniting Chinese society through millions of peasant families is largely
nonsense. The patriarchal image was an aristocratic costly ideal beyond the
reach of most peasants. To the extent that it existed among the peasants, it
did little more than provide a rational for the petty despotism within the peasant
family, made necessary by a brutally cramped existence. The Chinese peasant
family had built into it a highly explosive potential to which the Communists
in due course were to set the spark.
. . .
In China the structure of peasant society,
together with the weakness of the links that bound the peasantry and the upper
classes, helps to explain why China was especially subject to peasant
insurrection as well as some of the obstacles and limitations to these
insurrections. It indicates the lines of fracture in Chinese society that would
become increasingly evident during the nineteenth century and on into the
twentieth as poverty pressed harder and harder on may sections of the country. Then the bonds would snap.
Peasants would break with their homes, wander off, and become bandits. Later
they would become recruits for warlord armies. Chinese society was such as to
make possible the creation of huge masses of human debris, tinder easily
ignited by an insurrectionary spark. On the other hand, rebellion requires more
than the destruction of prevailing social bonds; it also requires the forging
of new forms of solidarity and loyalty. This was difficult in China since the
peasants were not used to cooperating with each other beyond the limits of the
family or clan. The task is even more difficult in the case of a revolution
that attempts to introduce a new kind of society. Had not certain fortuitous
circumstances intervened, fortuitous in the sense that they did not derive from
anything taking place in China itself, the Communists might never have solved
the problem. An examination of the concrete forms that violence took, in late
Imperial times and subsequently, will help to give greater meaning to these
necessarily general observations.(pp.211-214)
He goes on to emphasize that it was a combination of several developments – political, economic, and social – that led to the success of the Communist revolution in China.
Even in ‘normal’ times the inadequacy of
the Imperial system for maintaining peace and security in the countryside left
the inhabitants easy victims to what for lack of a better word we can call
simply gangsterism, the use of violence to prey on the population
indiscriminately without the slightest interest in altering the political system,
not even in substituting a new set of rulers for an old one. It is necessary to
beware of romanticizing the robber as a friend of the poor, just as much as of
accepting the official image. Characteristically the local inhabitants would
bargain with the bandits in order to be left in peace. Quite often local gentry
leaders were on cordial terms with bandits. Professional and hereditary bandits
existed. As such, there is noting remarkable here. Gangsterism is likely to
crop up wherever the forces of law and order are weak. European feudalism was
mainly gangsterism that had become society itself and acquired respectability
through the notions of chivalry. As the rise of feudalism out of the decay of
the Roman administrative system shows, this form of self-help which victimizes
others is in principle opposed to the workings of a sound bureaucratic system.
Bureaucracy to survive must obtain a monopoly on the making of victims and do
it according to the rational principle which was supplied in China by Confucianism.
As the Imperial system decayed into warlord satrapies, feebly and temporarily
united under the Kuomintang, the entire system took on more and more gangster
attributes and became increasingly unpopular.
. . .
Here we encounter some of the limitations of rebellion under the
traditional system, which the Communists were to overcome, though not without
difficulty. Gentry participation and leadership limited the possibility of any
real change. Furthermore, the Nien system [in the peasant rebellion of
1853-1868] was itself essentially predatory, gaining food supplies by raids on
other areas, which it therefore antagonized. This was self-defeating. Hence it
is easy to understand why not all local groups identified themselves with the
rebels. Some sought ‘neutral self-defense’; others even fought on the Imperial
side. Somewhat similar factors appear to have been at work in the case of the
Taiping [rebellion of the 1850s]. At first the inhabitants in many areas regarded
them as better than their Imperial rulers. Later, as the rebels proved unable
to bring about real improvement, and perhaps as their exactions became harsher
in the struggle against the government, they lost much popular support.
. . .
Only when the impact of the modern world had
eaten away the superstructure in ways indicated earlier, did a real
revolutionary attempt become possible. Let us now try to understand what the
coming of the modern world did to the peasant, the base of this structure.
During the nineteenth century there appeared scattered but unmistakable
signs of decline in the peasant’s economic situation: abandonment of tillage,
deterioration of irrigation systems, increasing agricultural unemployment.
Though signs of the peasant’s plight were to be found in practically every part
of the empire, perhaps more in the northern provinces than elsewhere, the
regional diversity of China produces exceptions to any generalization. Some
provinces continued to enjoy prosperity and abundance, while others suffered
famine and near famine conditions. Peasant handicrafts, an important supplement
to the peasant’s meager resources and a way of using surplus labor power during
the slack times of the agricultural cycle, suffered severe blows at the hands
of cheap Western textiles. Standard accounts until quite recent times have
emphasized and possibly overemphasized this fact. It is conceivable that the
peasants in time found other employment: anthropological accounts of modern
villages frequently stress the importance of artisan occupations as a small but
vital addition to the substance of the peasants. In any event, the impact was
undoubtedly severe for a time in many areas. The spread of opium, encouraged at
first by the West and at a later date by the Japanese, spread further
demoralization as well as reluctance to seek improvement.
. . .
As the peasants fell into debt, they had to borrow, often at very high
rates. When they could not repay, they had to transfer title to the land to a
landlord, remaining on the soil to work it more or less indefinitely. All these
processes had their heaviest impact in the coastal provinces. There too sprang
up the peasants’ rebellion o f 1927, the greatest since the days of the
long-haired Taipings, according to its historian, Harold Isaacs.
In the light of the connection between property and social cohesion,
perhaps the most important aspect of the changes under discussion was the
growth of a mass of marginal peasants at the bottom of the social hierarchy in
the village. Local modern studies indicate that they amounted to about half or
more of the inhabitants. How much of an increase, if any, this may represent
over the nineteenth century, we have no way of knowing yet. That they
represented potentially explosive material is, on the other hand, reasonably
clear. They were marginal, not only in the physical sense of living close to
the edge of starvation, but also in the sociological sense that the reduction
of the property meant that the ties connecting
them to the prevailing order had worn thinner and thinner.
. . .
Thus the mass basis of the revolution that
began in 1927 and culminated in the
Communist victory of 1949 was a land-short peasantry. Neither in China nor in
Russia was there a huge agricultural proletariat working on modern capitalist latifundia,
the source of much rural upheaval in Spain , Cuba, and possibly elsewhere. It
was differ too from the situation in France in 1789, where there were many
landless peasants, but where the revolution in the countryside came from the
upper stratum of the peasantry, who put the brakes on the revolution when it
showed signs of passing beyond the confirmation of property rights and the
elimination of feudal vestiges.
Massive poverty and exploitation in and by themselves are not enough to
provide a revolutionary situation. There must also be felt injustice built into
the social structure, that is, either new demands on the victims or some reason
for the victims to feel that old demands are no longer justifiable. The decay
of the upper classes in China provided this indispensable ingredient. The
gentry had lost their raison d’être and turned into landlord-usurers
pure and simple. The end of the examination system spelled the end of their
legitimacy and the Confucian system that had supported it. How much of this the
peasants had ever actually accepted is somewhat doubtful. As Max Weber has
pointed out, the religion of the masses was mainly a combination of Taoism and
magic, more suited to their own needs. Still some Confucian ideas did penetrate
through the clan. In any case the
self-respect had largely evaporated that had given the old ruling classes
assurance in the presence of the peasants. All kinds of shady élites,
racketeers, gangsters, and the like arose to fill the vacuum left by the
collapse of the former ruling stratum. In the absence of a strong central
power, private violence became rampant and essential in order for the landlords
to continue their squeeze on the peasantry. Many landlords moved to the city
where they enjoyed greater protections Those remaining in the countryside
turned their residences into fortresses and collected their debts and rents at
the point of a gun. Naturally not all
landlords were like this. Quite possibly only a small minority behaved this
way, although to judge from anthropological accounts, those who did were likely
to be the most powerful and influential figures in the area. Patriarchal
relationships continued to exist alongside naked and brutal exploitation. This
was widespread enough to help turn many parts of China into a potentially
explosive situation that would give the Communists their chance. It is worth
noticing that no comparable deterioration of the upper classes has so far taken
place in India.
To say that a revolutionary situation existed does not mean that the
conflagration was about to ignite of its own accord. The Conservative
half-truth that ‘outside agitators’ make riots and revolutions – a half-turth
that becomes a lie because it ignores the conditions that make agitators
effective – finds strong support from Chinese data. In numerous accounts of
village life, I have come upon no indication that the peasants were about to
organize effectively or do anything about their problems of their own accord.
The notion that peasant villages were in open revolt before the Communists
appeared on the scene does not correspond with a large body of evidence form
anthropological field studies.
. . .
Just as in Manchu times, the peasants needed
outside leadership before they would turn actively against the existing social
structure. As far as the village itself is concerned, the situation almost
certainly could have gone on deteriorating until most of the inhabitant simply
died in the next famine. That is exactly what happened many times over.
These observations do not in the least imply that the Chinese peasabnts
were innately stupid or lacked initiative and courage. The behavior of the
revolutionary armies, even after the subtraction for propaganda and
revolutionary heroics, demonstrates quite the contrary. The meaning is merely
that, up to the last moment in may areas, the tentacles of the old order
wrapped themselves around the individual with sufficient power to prevent him
from acting as an isolated unit or, quite often, even thinking about such
action . The lack of cohesiveness of the Chinese village discussed earlier in
another connection, may have helped the Communists by enabling a steady stream
of recruits to slip away to Communist areas. It also probably made their task
of breaking down and altering the old village structure easier. More precise
information is necessary for any firm appraisal. Rickety as it was, the old
order would not disappear through spontaneous action in the village as such.
That, of course, has been the case in all the major modern revolutions.
Even the entry of the Chinese Communist Party upon this scene of
widespread distress and decay was not sufficient in and by itself to produce a
fundamental change. The Party was
founded in 1921. Thirteen years later, the Communists had to abandon their main
territorial foothold in Kiangsi and embarked on the famous Long March to remote
Yenan. Their fortunes, in the judgment of some historianqs, were then at their
lowest ebb. About all they had demonstated was q tough capqcity to survive.
Chiang’s fice major military offienszcives between 1930 and 1933 had failed to
root them out. But they hac not been able to extend their territorial bgase or
to gain significant influence outside of the areas they immediately controlled.
To some extent the Communists’ failure up to this point is explicable in
terms of heir mistaken strategy. Not until 1926 did they begin to display any
serious interest in using the peasantry as the base of a revolutionary
movement. After the break with Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, the Party still tried
to win power through proletarian rising in the cities with disastrous and
bloody consequences. Though the abandonment of this piece of Marxist orthodoxy
and the adoption of Mao’s strategy of reliance on the peasantry were
indispensable, more was necessary to bring success. For one thing it was
necessary to adopt a milder attitude toward the well-to-do peasants, a policy
not adopted until 1942, though there were adumbrations much earlier. Important
though all these changes were, it is unlikely that by themselves they would
have enabled the Chinese Communists to win a revolutionary victory. The
decisive ingredient was the Japanese conquest and the occupation policies of
the foreign conqueror.
In reaction to the Japanese occupation, Kuomintang officials and
landlords moved out of the countryside and into the towns, leaving the peasants
to their own devices. Secondly, the Japanese army’s intermittent mopping up and
extermination campaigns welded the peasants into a solidary mass. Thus the
Japanese performed two essential revolutionary tasks for the Communists, the
elimination of the old élites and the forging of solidarity among the
oppressed. Negative evidence strongly supports this superficially paradoxical
conclusion. Where the Japanese or their puppet regime gave peasants some
security, guerilla organizations made no headway. Indeed, the Communists were
unable to establish guerilla bases in regions that had no direct experience of
the Japanese army.(pp.214-222)
Moore concludes his study of the Chinese peasant revolution by describing further the revolutionary tactics adopted by the Chinese Communist Party to accommodate the needs of the peasantry.
Once started, the process proceeded rapidly of destroying the old order
and taking preliminary steps toward the creation of a new one, all by
government direction. Essentially it amounted to taking land away from the
wealthy and giving it to the poor. ‘The general strategy was to unite the poor
peasants, agricultural laborers, and the middle peasants and to neutralize the
stand of the rich peasants so as to isolate the landlords. The effect was
rather different. Though the Communists used categories that corresponded
reasonably well with the social realities of the village, the main consequence
was general uncertainty, even among the poor peasants who were the chief
immediate beneficiaries but who seem to have been as uncertain as the others
about how long all this was to last. Formerly there had been suppressed hatred
between the two extremes: a rich, exploitative, and cruel landlord and his
tenants. Under the new system the entire village was methodically partitioned
into compartments, each set against the other.
One aspect deserves special mention because
of the light it sheds backward on the workings of the pre-Communists era, as
well as on Communist tactics. Land was redistributed not to the family as a
whole, but to each member on an equal-share basis, regardless of age and sex.
Thus the Communists broke the village apart at its base, obliterating the
connection between landed property and kinship. By destroying the economic
basis for kinship bonds, or at least greatly weakening them, the Communists
released powerful antagonisms across class lines as well as those of age and
sex. Not until they had done this, did the struggle of peasant against
landlords, tenants against rent collectors, victims against local bullies
become open and bitter. The last to bring charges were the young against the
old. Even here bitterness came to the surface.
The Communist regime forged a new link between the village and the
national government. It became evident to every peasant that his daily life
depended on a national political power. Through this new link the Communists
pumped out of the village, C.K. Yang estimates, even more than the landlord rentier
and the Kuomintang had taken before. At the same time the new and larger burden
was much more equally distributed than had previously been the case. All these
changes were temporary transitional. To destroy the old order, to forge new
links with the government, to extract more resources from the peasants could
only be preliminary to solving the basic problem of increasing economic output
all around in the world of competing armed giants. That part of the story falls
outside the scope of this book. In China, even more than in Russia, the
peasants provided the dynamite that finally exploded the old order. Once again
they furnished the main driving force behind the victory of a party dedicated
to achieving through relentless terror a supposedly inevitable phase of history
in which the peasantry would cease to exist.(pp.226- 227)
The 16 + items below reflect the uncertain times we have now entered. As the ancient Chinese proverb goes: “May the gods save us from interesting times.”
Sincerely,
Francis McCollum Feeley
--
Professeur
honoraire de l'Université Grenoble-Alpes
Ancien Directeur des Researches
Université de Paris-Nanterre
Director of The Center for the Advanced Study
of American Institutions and Social Movements
(CEIMSA-in-Exile)
The University of California-San Diego
http://www.ceimsa.org
a.
This fog of fear and uncertainty is the everlasting present.
by William Rivers Pitt
+
FBI is Recklessly Misusing Trump-Era Espionage Policy to Create
"Climate of Fear" Among Scientists—
Terrorizing Families and Ruthlessly Destroying Careers
by Jeremy Kuzmarov
+
Federal Judge Blocks DOD from Disciplining Navy SEALS Who Sued
over Vaccine Mandate
by Michael Nevradakis
+
The Lesson of Covid: When People Are Anxious, Isolated and
Hopeless, They're Less Ready To Think Critically
by Jonathan Cook
+
The Numbers Killed by these Vaccines is Much Worse than What We
Thought
by Dr.
Sucharit Bhakdi, Dr. Mike Yeadon
(16:37)
+
What if the Largest Experiment on Human Beings in History is
a Failure? ‘Surge in All Cause
Mortality’
by Dr. Robert Malone
A report from an Indiana life insurance
company raises serious concerns.
+
COVID, Mandatory
Vaccinations and the University System
https://www.globalresearch.ca/covid-mandatory-vaccinations-university-system/5766439
+
Diamond Mine of Data? Insurance Companies Report
40% Increase in Premature Non-COVID Deaths
+
From: Cat McGuire
[mailto:cat@catmcguire.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2022
Subject: HUGE ANTI-MANDATES NATIONAL MARCH ON WASHINGTON, JANUARY 23
Hey everyone, now is the time to make every
effort to attend the National March on Washington to Defeat the Mandates,
Sunday, January 23. If not now, when?!
For those in the New York area, we will be
providing buses to DC. Info coming soon.
Please send this email far and wide.
Thanks, Cat
www.defeatthemandatesdc.com
https://www.instagram.com/defeatthemandates/
https://www.facebook.com/groups/279771097456215
https://twitter.com/hashtag/DefeatTheMandates
https://rumble.com/c/c-1268063
https://t.me/defeatthemandatesdc
===========
b.
Xi'an Authorities Block All ‘Negative’
Posts On Social Media As Lockdown Backlash Grows
by Tyler Durden
+
Sputnik V is a scam
https://edwardslavsquat.substack.com/p/sputnik-v-is-a-scam
by Riley Waggaman
“A
socioeconomic experiment on the Russian population.”
+
‘Shrink the World’s Population’: Secret 2009
Meeting of Billionaires “Good Club”
by Prof Michel
Chossudovsky
Is
Worldwide Depopulation Part of the Billionaire's ‘Great Reset’
+
Lawsuit Filed against CDC for
Hiding COVID Vaccine Safety Data. “V Safe” Smartphone Application
https://www.globalresearch.ca/cdc-sued-hiding-covid-vaccine-safety-data/5766295
by Mary Villareal
+
J’Accuse! The Gene-based ‘Vaccines’ Are Killing People. Governments Worldwide Are Lying to You the People, to the Populations
They Purportedly Serve
===========
c.
‘What's Going On’ Athlete Cardiac Arrest compilation
by J Wilderness
https://www.bitchute.com/video/OmbjNAVTVtcz/
by Ryan Cristian
(5:00)
+
Covid transmission
among vaxxed rising
with Trinity Chavez
(10:34)
+
EU: Number of
Infections and COVID Deaths Hugely Manipulated
https://www.globalresearch.ca/eu-number-infections-covid-deaths-hugely-manipulated/5766299
===========
d.
From: News from Underground
[mailto:nobody@simplelists.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2022
Subject: Daily digest for nfu@simplelists.com
1)
Link
to the COMPLETE 2nd episode of "The Propaganda Police" by Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan 2022 20:17 EST)
Reply to
list
For some reason our conversation was cut off in mid-sentence
40 minutes in. This will take you to the full hour-and-20-minute audio.
https://the-propaganda-police.simplecast.com/episodes/episode-2
2) Joe
Rogan does what "our free press" should do, so everybody watches him
(while no one watches CNN) by Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan
2022 20:21 EST)
Reply to
list
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original
Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Tuesday, January 4th, 2022 at 8:08 PM, Colleen McGuire
<colleen@yescolleen.com> wrote:
Colleen
Visualize World Peace and Bodily Autonomy
3) What
those propaganda buzzwords mean in English by Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan
2022 20:24 EST)
Reply to
list
4) LINK
to "Joe Rogan does what 'our free press' should do, so everybody watches
him," etc. by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 10:13 EST)
Reply to
list
https://twitter.com/jordanbpeterson/status/1478191963207704577
5) What's
the difference between propaganda and (real) journalism? by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan
2022 11:54 EST)
Reply to
list
6) Dr.
Oz is giving up his show to run for senator in Pennsylvania, to make Fauci
accountable! by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan
2022 11:58 EST)
Reply to
list
https://media.mercola.com/ImageServer/Public/2021/December/PDF/dr-oz-takes-aim-at-dr-fauci-pdf.pdf
7) MCM
and Dr. Zelenko talk about the madness, and the Great Evil driving it by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:07 EST)
Reply to
list
https://rumble.com/vrxm33-january-4-2022.html
8) NZ
doctor exposes "perverse" monetary incentives to
"vaccinate," and "hush money" to victims' families by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:13 EST)
Reply to
list
NZ DOCTOR EXPOSES ‘PERVERSE’ MONETARY INCENTIVES TO
VACCINATE AND ‘HUSH MONEY’ AID TO VICTIMS’ FAMILIES
December 22,
2021 Admin Comments 22 Comments
René de Monchy was once a doctor to me in Lower Hutt and
until recently, lived down the street.
EXPOSED: Doctors Receive ‘Perverse’ Monetary Incentives to
Vaccinate,’Hush Money’ Paid to Victims’ Families
9) Biden/China
partnering AGAIN, in new hunt for rodent coronaviruses; T-Mobile erasing links
to Gateway Pundit articles (!); United Airlines replacing US staff fired for
refusing "vaccination" with UK staff who need NOT be
"vaccinated"; and much more from CLG by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:29 EST)
Reply to
list
News Updates From CLG
4 January 2022
All links are here:
Previous edition: Indiana life insurance CEO says deaths are
up 40% among people ages 18-64
Biden and
China Are Partners in a New Wuhan Lab, EcoHealth Hunt for 'Recombinant' Rodent
Coronaviruses | 31 Dec 2021 | Researchers from the COVID-19-linked Wuhan
Institute of Virology and disgraced researcher Peter Daszak's EcoHealth
Alliance have carried out new research on "recombinant" coronaviruses
in rodents, a recently published paper reveals. The paper lists the Chinese
government as well as Joe Biden's U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) as funders and supporters of the dangerous work... The new paper, which
counts researchers from seven
Chinese state-run scientific institutions including one person affiliated with
the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Laboratory of Special Pathogens and
Biosafety, is authored by three EcoHealth Alliance researchers including
President Peter Daszak. Among the paper's fin-ncial supporters are several Chinese
Communist Party-run scientific bodies, including those with ties to the
regime's military. Biden's USAID also funded the field animal sampling portion
of the study.
Insane in the membrane: United
Airlines Outsources Work to Potentially Unvaccinated London Flight Attendants
to Replace Fired Unvaxxed Americans | 2 Jan 2022 | United Airlines is
allegedly allowing potentially unvaccinated London-based flight attendants to
work alongside vaccinated American staff as it grapples with staffing
shortages, cofounder of Airline
Employees 4 Health Freedom Captain Sherry Walker exclusively told Breitbart News on
Thursday. United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby has placed roughly 2,000 unvaccinated
U.S.-based employees who obtained religious and medical accommodations on
unpaid leave in the name of "safety." That number includes
approximately 900 flight attendants, according to Walker, who said her
organization is currently undergoing an audit to confirm the exact numbers of United
employees placed on unpaid leave and their positions. Breitbart News was able
to obtain several schedule logs showing London-based flight attendants
scheduled to fly with Newark-based crew in late December and early January.
London-based United Airlines employees are not subject to Kirby's vaccine
mandate, meaning some could potentially be unvaccinated against coronavirus.
T-Mobile Is
Erasing Links to Gateway Pundit Articles Via Text Message | 2 Jan
2022 | On the last day of 2021, The Gateway Pundit and Jim Hoft were banned
from PayPal without warning. Now, we learned the tech giants are using a
frightening new method to censor and control what you are able to see, read and
discuss online... T-Mobile is disappearing our links. You cannot send our links
through T-mobile. They will disappear them. Your friends will not even know
that you sent them a Gateway Pundit article. If only there was an opposition
party in America to confront this madness. [Truer words never spoken.]
Facebook
Blacklists Reps. Marjorie Taylor Greene Following Twitter Ban | 3 Jan
2022 | Facebook has suspended the page of Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA),
an action that came fast on the heels of Twitter permanently banning the
Republican congresswoman's account.nRep. Greene decried Facebook's actions in a
post on Gab dot com, the free speech friendly social network, accusing them of
censoring her for critical commentary on the V-ccine Averse Reactions System,
the official system for reporting negative vaccine side effects to the government.
"Who appointed Twitter and Facebook to be the authorities of information
and misinformation? When Big Tech decides what political speech of elected
Members is accepted and what’s not then they are working against our government
and against the interest of our people."
YouTube
removes viral Joe Rogan interview with Dr. Robert Malone | 2 Jan
2022 | Youtube has removed the now-viral episode of "The Joe Rogan
Experience" podcast, featuring guest Dr. Robert Malone, from its
video-sharing platform. During the interview, Malone, who claims to be part of
a collaboration that reportedly created the mRNA technology widely used in the
COVID-19 vaccines, talked about vaccines, mandates, amongst other
pandemic-related topics. At one point in the conversation, Malone drew
parallels between current American society and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s,
when the Nazis came into power, saying American society is developing a
"mass formation psychosis.”
U.S. judge
blocks Pentagon from punishing Navy SEALs who refused COVID-19 vaccine | 4 Jan
2022 | A federal judge on Monday barred the U.S. Department of Defense from
punishing a group of Navy SEALs and other special forces members who refused
COVID-19 vaccines on religious grounds. U.S. District Judge Reed O'Connor,
acting in response to a lawsuit filed on behalf of 35 special forces service
members, issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Navy and Defense
Department from enforcing the mandate. Reed, who was appointed to the federal
bench in Texas by George W. Bush, said the Navy had not granted a single
religious exemption to the vaccine rule. "The Navy servicemembers in this
case seek to vindicate the very freedoms they have sacrificed so much to
protect. The COVID-19 pandemic provides the government no license to abrogate
those freedoms," the judge wrote in a 26-page decision.
Omicron
Spreads Faster Than Delta Within Vaccinated Individuals - Danish Study | 4 Jan
2022 | A Danish study of nearly 12,000 households has discovered that Omicron
spreads faster than Delta among those who are fully vaccinated, and even higher
between those who have received booster shots, demonstrating strong evidence of
the variant's immune evasiveness. The Omicron variant was found to evade the
immunity of vaccinated individuals at a much faster pace compared to Delta, and
at a higher rate than the unvaccinated, according to the study conducted by
researchers at the University of Copenhagen, Statistics Denmark, and Statens
Serum Institut. "Comparing households infected with the Omicron to Delta
VOC, we found an 1.17 times higher SAR for unvaccinated, 2.61 times higher for
fully vaccinated and 3.66 times higher for booster-vaccinated individuals,
demonstrating strong evidence of immune evasiveness of the Omicron VOC,"
said the preprint of the study. SAR refers to secondary attack rate.
Healthy
57-Year-Old Nashville Doctor Dies Shortly After Receiving Pfizer Vaccine -
Media Blames Death on Covid-19 | 3 Jan 2022 | A longtime Nashville
doctor died a few days after receiving the Pfizer vaccine and the media is
blaming his death on Covid-19. Dr. Dimitri Ndina was a loving father, husband,
grandfather and doctor at Tennessee Oncology. Dr. Ndina, who was reportedly in
excellent health, tragically passed away after be started to clot in the days
after he received his Pfizer vaccine. He was only 57... Despite the family
confirming Dr. Ndina got blood clots after taking the Pfizer vax, the media is
claiming he died from Covid-19.
Fully
vaccinated and boosted Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick tests positive for COVID | 3 Jan
2022 | Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick (R) is on the mend after testing positive for
COVID-19 despite being vaccinated and receiving a booster shot. "His
symptoms were mild, and no one else in the household was infected,"
Patrick senior adviser Allen Blakemore said in a statement Monday, noting that
the lieutenant governor has since tested negative. "He continues working
from home and will return to a public schedule by the end of the week."
Fully
vaccinated and boosted Democratic congressman announces he has tested positive
for COVID-19| 30 Dec 2021 | Congressman Bill Pascrell Jr (D-NJ)
announced on Twitter Thursday that he has tested positive for the coronavirus.
"Today I tested positive for covid," the 84-year-old New Jersey Democrat
tweeted. Pascrell's announcement comes a week after three Senate Democrats
revealed positive coronavirus tests as the omicron variant of the virus
continues to spread across the country. Delaware Senator Chris Coons,
Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker all tested
positive for the virus in the course of a few days. Both Warren and Booker said
that they were fully vaccinated.
Los Angeles
Public Schools Delayed Implementing Vaccine Mandate After 30,000 Kids Did Not
Comply
| 2 Jan 2022 | Los Angeles Unified Schools were planning to implement an
extreme vaccine mandate for students but had to cancel it when 30,000 kids were
not in compliance. In September, the school board for the second-largest school
district in the United States voted to mandate that students 12 and older be
vaccinated by Jan. 10. The district has pushed their mandate back until fall
2022 because many did not comply.
L.A. schools
tried to mandate vaccines. Then they faced having to send 30,000 students home | 28 Dec
2021 | Los Angeles Unified was supposed to show other school districts how to
roll out an expansive Covid-19 vaccine mandate for students, but has done an
about-face... In September, the nation's second-largest school district imposed
strict vaccine requirements on children 12 and older, with almost no
exemptions. The district blinked at the last minute, however, as community
activists and Gov. Gavin Newsom questioned the idea of moving more than 30,000
unvaccinated students back into distance learning. Other U.S. districts in blue
states are scaling back previous student mandate ideas, too. School leaders in
Portland, Ore., tabled discussion this fall amid vigorous pushback, while New
York and Chicago have taken a wait-and-see approach.
Manhattan DA
closes probe into nursing home deaths without charging Cuomo - attorney --Cuomo had
directed nursing homes to accept patients who tested positive for or were
suspected of having COVID-19 [until he was pressured to stop] | 3 Jan 2022 |
The Manhattan district attorney's office is closing its investigation into
former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo's handling of nursing home COVID-19 deaths
without bringing charges against Cuomo, according to the former governor's
attorney. "I was contacted today by the head of the Elder Care Unit from
the Manhattan District Attorney's Office who informed me they have closed its
investigation involving the Executive Chamber and nursing homes," Elkan
Abramowitz, a former federal prosecutor who had been hired to represent Cuomo,
said Monday. The investigation was opened after a report last year by New York
Attorney General Letitia James revealed that the state's Department of Health underreported
COVID-19 deaths in nursing homes by as much as 50%.
US sets
COVID record with more than one million daily cases | 4 Jan
2022 | The [highly vaccinated and boosted] US recorded more than one million
COVID-19 new cases Monday -- a daily record for any country since the pandemic
began. The 1,082,549 COVID-19 cases reported by Johns Hopkins University comes
as the highly contagious Omicron variant rages across the country. The
startling figure is the largest single-day tally of any nation ever reported
and nearly double the previous US record of 590,000 cases set just four days
ago, Bloomberg News reported.
French
rebels massively destroy 5G networks | 31 Dec 2021 | Rebels in France
have declared war on the infrastructure of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. An
ever-expanding resistance movement has been sabotaging the widely despised 5G
network. A three-part report on the Reporterre website noted: "Relay
antennae are being torched, fibre-optic cables cut, pylons unbolted. During the
night, people burn construction machinery, attack masts with disc cutters or
destroy electrical equipment with sledgehammers." Vehicles belonging to
telecommunications businesses have also been set on fire in at least 140
attacks since the start of the Covid [mandates].
Hundreds
stranded overnight on Virginia highway in freezing temperatures | 4 Jan
2022 | Hundreds of motorists were stranded all night in snow and freezing
temperatures along a 50-mile stretch of Interstate 95 after a crash involving
six tractor-trailers in Virginia, where authorities were struggling Tuesday to
reach them. The Virginia Department of Transportation confirmed both directions
of I-95 remained shut down between Ruther Glen, Virginia, in Caroline County
and exit 152 in Dumfries, Prince William County. "Crews will start taking
people off at any available interchange to get them," VDOT tweeted at 5:20
a.m. Tuesday.
Mystery
family from Connecticut hands out Florida oranges to snowbound travelers
stranded on I-95 in Virginia | 4 Jan 2022 | An unknown
Connecticut family provided solace to snowbound travelers stranded Tuesday
night by offering oranges to motorists stopped for hours on I-95. U.S. Sen. Tim
Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia and one-time presidential candidate,
was one of the grateful beneficiaries. "A CT family returning in a packed
car from Florida walked by in the middle of the night handing out oranges as we
were stopped for hours on I-95. Bless them," Kaine tweeted Tuesday
morning. Kaine had set out for the two-hour drive from Richmond to Washington,
D.C., on Monday, only to spend the next 21 hours gridlocked by a snowstorm.
Thousands of
flights canceled, delayed at start of workweek ---A winter
storm is expected to bring as much as 10 inches (25 centimeters) of snow for
the District of Columbia, northern Virginia and central Maryland through Monday
afternoon. | 3 Jan 2022 | A winter storm moving into the mid-Atlantic combined
with the pandemic [and vaccine mandates] to continue frustrating air travelers
whose return flights home from the holidays were canceled or delayed in the
first few days of the new year. More than 1,900 U.S. flights and more than
3,300 worldwide were grounded as of early Monday, according to tracking service
FlightAware. That follows Sunday's cancellations of more than 2,700 U.S.
flights, and more than 4,400 worldwide. And on Saturday, there were also more
than 2,700 U.S. flights cancelled and more than 4,700 worldwide.
*****
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10) ALERT!
In the 4th quarter of 2019, Fed spent $4.5 TRILLION to bail out the big banks by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 13:18 EST)
Reply to
list
More evidence that (a) the COVID lunacy
is not about our health, but about Their wealth; and (b) "the
left" press isn't left at all, or it would be reporting this, but it's too
busy shilling for Big Pharma and the Great Reset.
(The link to Pam and Russ Martens' piece on this shocker,
included in the piece below, isn't working, at least for me.)
MCM
CENSORED: $4.5 TRILLION Bank Bailout 4th Quarter 2019 Months
Before COVID Exceeded 2008 Bailouts
Total Views : 208
The Occupy Wall Street movement began in September of 2011
and spread worldwide.
“We’re looking at a form of corporate tyranny previously
unseen in America.”
Pam Martens, Wall Street on Parade.
by Brian Shilhavy
Editor, Health Impact News
Pam and Russ Martens of Wall Street on Parade have reported on the huge bank bailouts during the 4th quarter of
2019, months before COVID was declared to be a “pandemic” giving further
evidence from a series of events at the end of 2019 that the “war on the virus”
that has enslaved the entire world, was all planned long in advance by the
Globalists.
Not reported in the media, either corporate news media nor
anywhere else in the Alternative Media that I have seen, the Martens have
exposed the fact that the bailouts of the biggest banks in New York far
exceeded the bailouts during the 2008 financial crises, which of course was
headline news back then.
This bailout of Wall Street in 2008 was the fuel that gave
rise to the “Occupy Wall Street” movement that started in September of 2011,
and spread around the world.
Unfortunately, the movement failed to create any lasting
solutions, primarily because the Globalists and their corporate media painted
it as a Liberal, Democratic movement, keeping most Conservative, Republicans on
the sidelines.
Click for more.
11) Revolution
in Kazakhstan! People beat back soldiers, seize military equipment, government
shuts down Internet by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 14:37 EST)
Reply to
list
Is this uprising a mass response to the "COVID
measures" there? The total silence on what's happening there suggests it
is.
Also, as "Tim Truth" reminds us here, shutdown of
the Internet was "hypothetically" proposed during Bill Gates' Event
201, as yet another way to keep us "safe."
12) Nobody
watched Dr. Fauci's "COVID-19 Response Team" press briefing today,
because only a deranged minority believes a word he says by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 15:44 EST)
Reply to
list
593 people watched it, and they were probably NIAID staffers,
and members of his family.
(He looks exhausted, no? He should come clean, and
maybe would, if he were not fully possessed.)
13) Brazilian
TV star got 3rd jab on Dec. 28, collapsed right on TV that day by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 18:45 EST)
Reply to
list
He had five cardiac arrests.
If this were funny, it would be
like Idiocracy, where the planes keep crashing, because pilots have
become too stupid to fly right.
https://twitter.com/hugotalks1/status/1478859202273685504
---
Support News from Underground: https://bit.ly/NFUSupport
Visit News from Underground: https://markcrispinmiller.com
For archives, please go to: https://archives.simplelists.com/nfu
===========
e.
“Lack Of Covid Treatments
DELIBERATE”
with Joe
Rogan and Dr. Peter McCullough
(10:43)
+
Selected Articles: Pfizer 6 Month Data Shows COVID Shots May
‘Cause More Illness than They Prevent’
by Arjun Walia
+
Analysis of Batch-Specific Toxicity of COVID-19 Vaccine Products
Using VAERS Data
by Ontario Civil Liberties
Association
+
The COVID Crisis and America’s Democratic and Republican Governors:
The 2022 Ballot
https://www.globalresearch.ca/covid-governors/5766305
by Renee Parsons
+
Children Are Dying from COVID, Lockdowns and Overdoses
https://www.globalresearch.ca/children-dying-covid-lockdowns-overdoses/5766400
by Dr. Joseph Mercola
+
FAA Warned by Doctors in Letter Describing Vaccine Hazard, Health,
FAA Violations
by Suzanne Downing
===========
f.
NBC News Uses Ex-FBI Official Frank Figliuzzi to Urge Assange’s
Extradition, Hiding His Key Role
by Glenn Greenwald
+
After 1,000 Days in Belmarsh Prison, Campaigners Demand Freedom
for Julian Assange
by Brett
Wilkins
+
Maxwell Trial,
Assange Extradition & ‘Vaccine Equity’
https://www.bitchute.com/video/nPVTnUIWGgqf/
with Ryan Cristian and Whitney Webb
(1:10:07)
+
Ghislaine Maxwell Convicted
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56951.htm
by Philip Giraldi
===========
g.
NATO gangs up on Russia; Federation Launches
Hypersonic Warning
with Michael
Maloof
(6:26)
+
Clouds on the horizon
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56953.htm
by The Saker
+
China backs Russia in NATO dispute
with George
Galloway
(25:56)
+
Putin and Xi
Plot Their SWIFT Escape
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56955.htm
by Pepe Escobar
+
China’s Hypersonic Missile A Game Changer
with Trinity Chavez
(25:59)
+
Americans Still Don’t Want War, Despite the Military-Industrial
Complex’s Best Efforts
by Branko Marcetic
+
The War on Terror Is a Success — for Terror
https://scheerpost.com/2022/01/04/the-war-on-terror-is-a-success-for-terror/
by Nick Turse
+
‘No Military Solution’ to
Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Say Expert Voices
by Brett Wilkins
+
Protecting the Nazis:
The Extraordinary Vote of Ukraine
and the USA
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56947.htm
by Craig Murray
+
What is behind
the protests rocking Kazakhstan?
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/5/explainer-what-is-behind-the-protests-rocking-kazakhstan
by Agnieszka
Pikulicka-Wilczewska
+
Dangerous Crossroads: The World on the Brink of War.
The New Cold
War Goes Hot?
https://www.globalresearch.ca/world-brink-war/5766186
by Wolfgang Effenberger
+
US War Lobby
Fuels Conflict in Russia, Ukraine, and Syria
with Aaron Maté
and Col. Douglas Macgregor
(37:11)
+
Bases Housing US
Troops in Iraq and Syria Come Under Fire
https://news.antiwar.com/2022/01/05/bases-housing-us-troops-in-iraq-and-syria-come-under-fire/
by David DeCamp
+
Leaked files expose Syria psyops veteran astroturfing BreadTube star
to counter Covid
restriction critics
https://thegrayzone.com/2021/12/24/leaked-files-syria-psyops-astroturfing-breadtube-covid/
by Kit
Klarenberg and Max Blumenthal
===========
h.
Palestine in
Pictures: December 2021
https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestine-pictures-december-2021/34551
by The Electronic Intifada
+
Photo-Shopped History: Editing Out Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s
Support for Palestine
by Clinton Nzala
+
2021 was the deadliest year for Palestinians since 2014, says
Israeli human rights group
by Jessica Corbett
+
Qassem Soleimani’s Assassination
Has Backfired on the US and Israel
https://www.globalresearch.ca/qassem-soleimani-assassination-backfired-us-israel/5766253
by Marco Carnelos
+
Israel Weighs A New Attack On Gaza, Allowing Hisham Abu Hawash To
Die On Hunger Strike
by Robert Inlakesh
+
Israel Talks Scared and Tough on Iran: It Has Little Reason to be
Either
https://www.mintpressnews.com/war-between-israel-and-iran-israel-talks-tough-iran-threat/279370/
by Miko Peled
+
A More Aggressive Israel Lobby Is Coming in 2022
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56948.htm
byPhilip Giraldi
+
'Jihadis You Pay For' - Western State-Sponsored Terrorism And The
BBC Coverup
with Ryan Cristián
(1:15:50)
+
UK pivots to Israel in post-Brexit scramble
https://electronicintifada.net/content/uk-pivots-israel-post-brexit-scramble/34526
by Omar Karmi
+
Victory for hunger striker after 141 days
https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/tamara-nassar/victory-hunger-striker-after-141-days
by Tamara Nassar
===========
i.
Probing the Depths of the CIA’s Misdeeds in Africa
https://www.globalresearch.ca/probing-depths-cia-misdeeds-africa/5766416
by Alex
Park
+
Narrative and
Reality of the Libyan Crisis
https://www.globalresearch.ca/narrative-reality-libyan-crisis/5766363
by Manlio Dinucci
+
Neocolonialism Haunts Horn of Africa
https://www.globalresearch.ca/neocolonialism-haunts-horn-africa/5766418
by M. K.
Bhadrakumar
+
Using and Abusing Djibouti: How the US Transformed
a Tiny African state
Into a Hub of Imperial Aggression
by T.J. Coles
+
What is driving the growing instability in the East African region?
with George
Galloway
(52:13)
===========
j.
America’s Foreign Policy Death
Spiral
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56945.htm
by Walter L. Hixson
+
Attack Against Haiti’s De Facto Prime Minister on Independence Day
- http://www.blackagendareport.com/attack-against-haitis-de-facto-prime-minister-independence-day-core-group
by José Manuel Blanco Diaz
+
Marxism and Black Liberation w/Frank Chapman
http://www.blackagendareport.com/marxism-and-black-liberation-wfrank-chapman
with Danny Haiphong and Margaret Kimberley
(1:00:02)
+
131 Years Ago Today, the U.S. Army Massacred Native Sioux
at Wounded Knee
by Richard S. Dunn
+
2021 Latin America and the Caribbean in Review: The Pink Tide
Rises Again
http://www.blackagendareport.com/2021-latin-america-and-caribbean-review-pink-tide-rises-again
byRoger Harris
+
Edward Bernays: Propaganda and the U.S.-Backed 1954 Guatemalan
Coup
by Robert Skvarla
+
Cuba Defeats Covid-19 with Learning, Science, and Unity
http://www.blackagendareport.com/cuba-defeats-covid-19-learning-science-and-unity
by W.T. Whitney
+
‘Historically large win’:
Chile votes for socialism over fascism
https://therealnews.com/historically-large-win-chile-votes-for-socialism-over-fascism
by Common Dreams Staff
+
‘History is ours’: Chile
avenges Allende
https://therealnews.com/history-is-ours-chile-avenges-allende
by Salvador Allende and Yoshie Furuhashi
===========
k.
We Must Have Accountability for Corporate Crime
https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/01/06/we-must-have-accountability-for-corporate-crime/
by Thom Hartmann
+
Radioactive Contamination: Japan Plans to Dump Water from
Fukushima Plant into the Pacific Ocean
by Mong Palatino and Nevin Thompson
+
Living in Epoch-Defining Times: Food, Agriculture and the New
World Order
https://www.globalresearch.ca/living-epoch-defining-times-food-agriculture-new-world-order/5766442
by Colin Todhunter
+
Corporations are making millions of dollars from US prison labor
https://therealnews.com/corporations-are-making-millions-of-dollars-from-us-prison-labor
by Michael Sainato
Freedom of Information Act request shines a
light on how much private corporations and government agencies have been
exploiting prison labor during the COVID-19 pandemic.
+
Why US prisons
don’t want prisoners to read
https://therealnews.com/why-us-prisons-dont-want-prisoners-to-read
with Eddie Conway
(15:38)
===========
l.
2022: The Year
the US achieves Collapse
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56954.htm
by Dmitry Orlov
+
The American polity is cracked, and might collapse.
Canada must prepare
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56957.htm
by Thomas Homer-Dixon
The U.S. is becoming increasingly
ungovernable, and some experts believe it could descend into civil war. What
should Canada do then?
+
America's 'Suez
moment': Another strategic mistake would be its last
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56949.htm
by David Hearst
+
US as primary
source of terrorism
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56962.htm
by Viktor Mikhin
+
Deep State
Exists, And LIBERALS Are Doing Its Bidding
with Matt
Taibbi
(11:27)
+
There Is a Direct
Link Between JFK, 9/11 and COVID-19
https://www.globalresearch.ca/edward-curtin-there-direct-link-between-jfk-911-covid-19/5761244
by Edward
Curtin and Geopolitics and Empire
===========
m.
Choking the
Afghan People to Death
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56961.htm
by Daniel Larison
+
Afghanistan War Was For Money Laundering & Drug Trafficking,
NOT Freedom & Women’s Rights"
with Tariq Ali
(20:12)
===========
n.
Civilian Casualty Files Reveal U.S. Hid Thousands of Deaths
in Middle East
Air War
with Azmat
Khan
(18 :41)
+
Biden’s Four
Biggest Mideast Challenges in 2022
https://scheerpost.com/2022/01/05/bidens-four-biggest-mideast-challenges-in-2022%ef%bf%bc/
by Juan
Cole
+
Why is Biden
Pushing Putin
on Ukraine?
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/56950.htm
with Larry
Wilkerson
(27:11)
+
George Galloway sheds light on Maxwell family
and its links to Jeffrey Epstein
with George
Galloway
(5:50)
===========
o.
Macron slammed
for saying he wants to ‘p*** off’ unvaccinated
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/5/macron-slammed-for-saying-he-wants-to-ps-off-unvaccinated
by Aljazeera
French president has been accused of overstepping the line by using a
phrase considered vulgar in France.
+
Stigmatizing the Unvaxxed and Unboosted
“Mass Formation Psychosis: ‘You’re a Criminal Because You’re
Unvaccinated’.”
https://www.globalresearch.ca/stigmatizing-unvaxxed-unboosted/5766302
+
End mass jabs and
live with Covid, says ex-head of vaccine taskforce
by James
Tapper, Michael Savage and Robin McKie
===========
p.
They’re Doing
WHAT To The Weather?!!”
Isn’t This
SCIENCE FICTION?!
with Russell Brand
(11:53)
+
Jab 4-6 Here To Fight "Delmicron" "Flurona", 4th Jab Wanes
After 2 Months
& Climate Authoritarianism
with Ryan Cristián
(3:26:35)
+
Many people who can become pregnant are already living
in a post-"Roe" world
+
Phew : The
Corbett Report
https://www.corbettreport.com/episode-399-phew/
with James
Corbett
(26:15)