Bulletin N° 1019
Subject: Lessons from the liquidation of social classes.
January 11, 2022
Dear Colleagues and Friends of CEIMSA,
We proceed to present Barrington Moore Jr’s study, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the making of the Modern World (1966), with an analysis of Chinese history, where we left off last year. The Kuomintang, the political party founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1911, became dominant in China from 1928 until 1949 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. It was a nationalist party, constituting a coalition of ideologies, including the conservative anti-communist faction under Chaing Kai-shek and off-and-on cooperation with the Chinese Communists under Mao Tsu-tung.
The Kuomintang Interlude and its Meaning.
Three features stand out in this brief review of Kuomintang doctrine as formulated by Chiang Kai-shek. The first is the almost complete absence of any social and economic program to cope with China’s problems, and indeed a very marked ritual avoidance of the realities of these problems. The talk about ‘political tutelage’ and preparation for democracy was mainly rhetoric. Actual policy was to disturb existing social relationships as little as possible. Such a policy did not exclude blackmail and forced contributions from any sector of the population that provided a convenient target. Gangsters do the same thing in American cities, without any real attempt to upset the existing social order, upon which they actually depend. The second feature, one may call the concealment of the lack of specific political and social objectives through somewhat grotesque efforts to revive traditional ideals in a situation that had for a long time increasingly undermined the social basis of these ideals. Since Professor Mary C. Wright has argued this point cogently and with abundant concrete evidence in The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, we need only remind ourselves here that this distorted patriotic idealization of the past is one of the main stigmata of Western fascism. The third and last feature is the Kuomintang’s effort to resolve its problems through military force, again a major characteristic of European fascism. (p.200)
By the 1920s, commercial and industrial interests had become a significant factor in Chinese political and social life, though their continuing dependence upon both the foreigner and their subordination to agrarian interests force them to play a very different role from their Western European counterpart. In the meantime, as will appear in more detail shortly, a numerically small but politically significant sector of the landlords near the port cities had begun to amalgamate with this class and turn into rentiers. The urban workers too had made their appearance on the historical stage in a stormy and violent fashion.
It was in this situation that the Kuomintang became active. The story of its rise to power has been told too often to bear detailed repetition here. Though still somewhat clouded in controversy, the essential points for our proposes appear to be the following ones.
With important native Communists and Soviet assistance, the Kuomintang by late 1927 had won control of a substantial part of China, working out from its base in the south. Up to this moment, its success had been mainly due to its ability to harness and ride the tides of discontent among the peasants and the workers. Thus the Kuomintang’s social program distinguished it from the warlords and gave it an advantage over them. For a time, hopes ran high that the Kuomintang’s military force might overcome the warlords and unify China on the basis of a revolutionary program.
Such was not to be the case, though formal unification did occur. The Kuomintang’s partial success brought to the surface latent conflicts among the disparate elements that a program of nationalist unification had temporarily brought together. The landed upper classes, who provided officers for the military force, became increasingly nervous lest the peasants might get out of hand. Ironically enough the Chinese Communists, under some prodding from Moscow, supported the successors to the gentry at this juncture on the ground that the national revolution took precedence over the social one. The role of the urban merchants and financiers is less clear. But they could scarcely have been any happier than the gentry about the prospect of the Kuomintang victory with a left-wing program.
In these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek, who had firm control over an important section of the military forces, managed to disassociate himself from the revolution, amid a welter of intrigue and by a series of military coups. Toward the end of this disengagement Chiang turned upon the workers in the classic pattern of agrarian-bourgeois alliance. On April 12, 1927, his agents, together with others on the spot, including French, British, and Japanese police and military forces, carried out a mass slaughter of workers, intellectuals, and others accused of sympathizing with the Communists. Chiang and his military machine were not, however, a mere passive instrument of this alliance. He also turned on the capitalist elements themselves, subjecting them to confiscation and compulsory loans, amid threats of prison and execution.
Chiang’s victory inaugurated a new phase in Chinese politics. Both in word and deed, the Kuomintang gave priority to national unification as something that had to precede political and agrarian reform. In reality this meant the search for a solution to the agrarian problem though military’ force, that is, the suppression of banditry and communism. It is too much to assert that this prospect was hopeless from the start. Modernization did take place under reactionary auspices and with a substantial dose of repression in Japan as well as in Germany, the later a country that also faced the task of national unification. Nevertheless the problems facing China were vastly more difficult.
To specify the agrarian aspects in any detail soon runes into gaps in the data, especially the almost complete absence of dependable statistics, lacunae far wider in the case of China than the other counties studied in this book. Nevertheless the main outlines of the problem are quite clear. The first point that deserves to be made is a negative one. Except perhaps in some areas, China, after the First World War, was not a country where a class of aristocratic owners of huge latifundia exploited a mass of poor peasants and landless laborers. To emphasize this fact, however, would seriously distort the image of what was actually taking place. Under the impact of advancing commerce and industry, China was steadily moving toward a system of absentee ownership and increasing differences in wealth. This change was most marked in the coastal areas, especially near large cities. In many parts of the interior, too, tenancy problems were acute, though there they seem rather the legacy of former practices than the consequences of new forces. That Chinese agriculture involved tremendous amounts of human labor and very little in the way of expensive implements or livestock – a few rich families in the wheat-growing North did have horses – is a fact so well known as scarcely to bear repeating. As usual, Tawney puts the point in its political and social context, in rolling classical prose. The distinctive note of Chinese agriculture, he observes, was ‘economy of space, economy of materials, economy of implements, economy of fodder, economy of fuel, economy of waste products, economy of everything except forests, which have been plundered, with prodigal recklessness, to the ruin of the soil, and of the labor of human beings, whom social habits have made abundant and abundance cheap.
In the absence of a tradition of privileged feudal estates, the relationship between landlord and tenant contained strong elements of a business contract. But it was still a preindustrial business contract heavily flavored by local custom. Thus the statistical category of tenancy covered a wide variety of situations. Some landlords who had overburdened themselves with debt in buying land might be worse off than many tenants. On the other hand, those who rented land might be either well-to-do persons with spare cash and implements, or else poor peasants with little or no land, whose least misfortune might put them under conditions approaching slavery. Considerations such as these show the difficulty of connecting the specific terms landlord and peasant to any general notion of social classes. Still one must not fall victim to the opposite illusion: that one cannot speak of social classes because the statistical data fail to bring them out clearly. The extent to which there was an explosive class struggle in the countryside is a more complicated problem to which we shall come in due course.
. . .
Thus the map tell a familiar historical story, that of a society in which commercial influences were eating away at the peasant proprietorship and concentrating wealth in the hands of a new social formation, a fusion between parts of the old ruling class and new elements rising in the cities.
As this fusion formed the main social basis of the Kuomintang, its agrarian policy was one of trying to maintain or restore the status quo. In addition, the presence of the Communist rival with de facto independence tended to polarize the situation and make Kuomintang policy more reactionary and oppressive. An American scholar sympathetic to the Kuomintang offers this general characterization; ‘The communists act as the inheritors to temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions: the National Government and the Kuomintang to ascendant mandarinates.’ Certainly not the whole story, the appraisal is nevertheless an accurate one. Elsewhere the same scholar writes on the basis of direct observation:
‘Since [the Kuomintang] . . . does not promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue. The Party and the Government have sought, not always efficiently or faithfully to the nth degree to carry out the programs of land reforms . . .. The Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, and destruction, usury, and rural despotism – because it found these in existence, and was preoccupied with building a national government, a modern army, adequate finance, and with eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium, bandits, and communists . . . .’
In this passage the author accepts at face value the Kuomintang statements about the reasons for their policy. Nevertheless the passage is important testimony from a witness friendly to the Kuomintang to the effect that their policy was one or maintaining the status quo in the countryside, in itself a form of class warfare.
. . .
The point that emerges most clearly from both friendly and hostile testimony is that the Kuomintang’s reforms were window dressing inasmuch as they stopped short of altering the élites’ control of local life.(pp.187-193)
According to Professor Moore, the power of the absentee landlords grew in the Kuomintang period and manifested itself during the war with Japan.
Still more evidence on the survival of the former landed upper classes and their continuing political importance comes from the strategic policies of the Kuomintang prior and during the war with Japan. It is known that commercial and industrial interests failed to register significant advances under the Kuomintang. At first glance, this fact might seem attributable to the Japanese blockade and occupation. But this can scarcely be the whole story since the blockade began only in 1937. A significant factor appears to have been the continuing agrarian opposition to China’s transformation into an industrial power. A military historian without the remotest Marxist sympathies notes that, before the war began, China preferred to import whatever equipment seemed indispensable rather to build up a native industrial base. Tactics on the battlefield likewise reflected China’s social structure, though Liu does not draw this fairly obvious conclusion. In the absence of superior weapons, China simply used masses of peasant manpower, urging her soldiers to be brave in the defense of the country. This ‘death-stand’ attitude resulted in enormous casualties. The battles of 1940 alone are said to have cost the Chinese 28 percent of their forces. The same source estimates that an average of 23 percent of all the able-bodied men drafted in the 8 years of war were casualties. One might object that any preindustrial state caught in the same situation would have suffered approximately the same experience. This objection, I think, misses the main point: China remained preindustrial largely because the successors to the gentry retained the substance of political control.
Let us now change our focus and look at the Kuomintang regime from the standpoint of comparative institutional history. As we step back from the details (though we would like to have may more accurate ones than we do), the two decades of Kuomintang rule take on some of the essential characteristics of the reactionary phase of the European response to industrialism, including important totalitarian features. The main social basis of the Kuomintang, as we have already seen, was a coalition, or perhaps better, a form of antagonistic cooperation between the successors to the gentry and urban commercial, financial, and industrial interests. The Kuomintang, through its control of the means of violence, served as the link that held the coalition together. At the same time its control of violence enabled it to blackmail the urban capitalist sector and to operate the machinery of government both directly and indirectly. In both these respects the Kuomintang resembled Hitler’s NSDAP.
There are, however, important differences in both the social bases and the historical circumstances that distinguish the Kuomintang from its European counterparts. These differences help to account for the relatively feeble character of the Chinese reactionary phase. An obvious one is the absence of a strong industrial base in China. Correspondingly, the capitalist element was very much weaker. It is a safer guess that the Japanese occupation of the coastal cities reduced the influence of this group even further. Finally, the Japanese invasion, though it provided a direct target for nationalist sentiment, effectively prevented China’s reactionary phase from becoming one of foreign expansion, such as took place under German, Italian, and Japanese fascism. For these reasons, the Chinese reactionary and protofascist phase resembles that of
Franco’s Spain, where an agrarian élite also managed to stay on top but could not execute an aggressive foreign policy, more than it does corresponding phases in Germany or Italy.
It is in the area of doctrines, where realistic considerations are somewhat less pressing, that one may observe the most striking resemblances between the Chinese reactionary period and its European counterparts. During its revolutionary phase prior to attaining power, the Kuomintang had identified itself with the Taiping Rebellion. After obtaining power and with Chiang Kai-shek’s emergence as the real leader, the party did an about-face, identifying itself with the Imperial system and its apparent success during the Restoration of 1862-1874, a switch that recalls the early behavior of Italian fascism. After victory, the doctrine became a curious amalgam of Confucian elements and scraps taken from Western liberal thinking. The latter, as is well known, had entered through the influence of Sun Yat-sen, who remained as the most revered ancestor of the movement. The analogies to European fascism arise mainly from the pattern and shadings of emphasis that Chiang Kai-shek, or those who wrote his doctrinal pronouncements, placed upon these disparate elements.
The main diagnosis of China’s problems was couched in semi-Confucian moral and philosophical platitudes to the effect that matters went wrong after the 1911 revolution because the Chinese people did not think correctly. Chiang asserted in1943 that the Chinese in general had failed to understand the true wisdom of Sun Yat-sen’s deep philosophical statement that ‘to understand is difficult; to act is easy’ and still thought that ‘to understand is easy; to act s difficult.’ There is practically no discussion of the social and economic factors that had brought China to her current plight. To bring these out in the open in any candid fashion would have run the serious risk of alienating upper class support. Thus in its lack of any realistic analysis and in some of the reasons for its absence, Kuomintang doctrine recalls European fascism.
The same is true of Kuomintang proposals for future action. There are occasional remarks scattered through Chiang’s semi-official book about the importance of the People’s Livelihood, a term that served in part as a euphemism for the agrarian question. But as we have already noted, very little was actually done, or even proposed, in order to solve the question. There was also a ten-year plan for industrialization, again mainly a matter of putting marks on paper. Instead the stress was on moral and psychological reforms from above, but without social content. Both the diagnosis and the plan of action are summed up in these sentences by Chiang Kai-shek:
‘From what has been said we know that the key to the success of national reconstruction is to be found in a change of our social life, and the change of our social life in turn depends upon those who have vision, will power, moral conviction and a sense of responsibility, and who, through their wisdom and efforts, lead the people in a town, a district, a province or throughout the country, to a new way until they grow accustomed to it unawares. As I have also pointed out, national and social reconstruction could be easily accomplished, provided the youth throughout the nation resolve to perform what others dare not perform, to endure what other cannot endure. . ..’
Here the Confucian theory of a benevolent élite has, under the pressure of circumstances, taken on a martial and ‘heroic’ character. The combination is already familiar to the West in fascism.
The resemblance becomes stronger as we see the organizational form that this heroic élitism is supposed to take, namely the Kuomintang itself.
. . .
The avowed purpose of this moral and psychological reform and its ostensible organizational embodiment was of course military power. In turn, military power was to achieve national defense and national unification. Over and over again, Chiang put military unification first as the prerequisite for any other reform. Chiang’s main justification for this point of view has a definite totalitarian ring. He cites Sun Yat-sen’s judgment that Rousseau and the French Revolution could not serve as models for China because the Europeans at that time did not have liberty while the Chinese at present had too much. The Chinese, according to a favorite metaphor of both Chiang and Sun, resembled a heap of loose sand, ready victims of foreign imperialism. ‘ In order to resist foreign oppression,’ Chiang continues in direct quotation from Sun, ‘we must free ourselves from the idea of ‘individual liberty’ and unite ourselves into a strong cohesive body, like a solid mass formed by the mixing of cement with sand.’(pp.195-200)
The author concludes his analysis of this period of Chinese history with the following qualifications:
To stress these three traits- [the absence of any social and economic program, the revival of traditional ideals to hide the lack of specific political and social objectives, and the readiness to resolve problems through military force] – is not to say that the Kuomintang was identical with European fascism or earlier reactionary movements. Identity never occurs in history and is not the issue here. Our point is that these similarities constitute a related whole that is significant not only for understanding China but for the dynamics of totalitarian movements in general. In other words, we do not have here a loose collection of accidental resemblances in which certain minor Chinese traits happen to recall major European ones. As a single complex unit, they dominated for a time the political, social, and intellectual climate of both Europe and China.
The Kuomintang’s effort to push China along the reactionary road to the modern state did end in complete failure. So had a similar and more promising attempt failed in Russia. In both countries this failure was the immediate cause and forerunner of Communist victories. In Russia Communists have succeeded in creating a first-class industrial power; in China the issue is still somewhat in doubt. Again in both cases, peasant insurrection and rebellion made a decisive contribution toward pushing these countries toward the communist path of modernization instead of the reactionary or democratic variants of capitalism. In China this contribution was even more important than in Russia. Clearly it is high time to examine more carefully the peasants’ part in these huge transformations. (p.202)
Rebellion, Revolution, and the Peasants.
The frequency of peasant rebellions in China is well known. Fitzgerald lists six major ones in China’s long history prior to 1900. There were many other local and abortive ones. Here I shall try to indicate some of the main reasons why premodern Chinese society was prone to peasant rebellions, limiting the discussion mainly to the latter phase of the Manchu dynasty, though it is probable that several of the factors to be discussed operated during earlier dynasties as well, a point that lies outside the scope of this work and indeed the author’s competence. We may nevertheless take judicial notice of the fact that these were rebellions, not revolutions, that is they did not alter the basic structure of the society. Secondly, I shall endeavor to show how this original structural weakness facilitated a real revolution under the impact of new strains created by the impact of commerce and industry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The whole story constitutes a most instructive contrast with India where peasant rebellions in the premodern period were relatively rare and completely ineffective and where modernization impoverished the peasants at least as much as in China and over as long a period of time. The contrast with Japan is also illuminating even if less striking. There the rulers were able to keep in check impulses toward peasant rebellion generated in the course of modernization partly because Japanese peasant society was organized on principles differing form those in China. Their success in turn enabled Japan to follow a reactionary pattern of modernization that, like Germany’s culminated in fascism.
Before discussing the peasantry of China, it is well to recall that the political structure of China during the nineteenth century displayed certain serious weaknesses that have only a very indirect connection with the peasantry and may be more properly regarded as due to the character and organization of the ruling stratum of landlords and officials. I have already suggested certain reasons why this segment of Chinese society generally failed to adapt to the modern world of commerce and industry. There are also reasonably clear indications of a defect in the political mechanism of traditional China. In their local habitat and as landlords, the gentry needed an Imperial system strong enough to enforce their authority over the peasants. At the same time, actions that were necessary to make the imperial system strong ran counter to the short-run interests of the local gentry. They were very reluctant to pay their share of the taxes and generally wanted local affairs run in their own way. About this situation there was not much the district magistrate could do. As corruption mounted and the usefulness of the central government became less obvious, so did centrifugal pulls increase, creating a vicious circle.
From the standpoint of our immediate problem; the most important structural defects were a series of weaknesses in the links binding the peasantry to the upper classes and to the prevailing regime. As indicted above, members of the gentry do not appear to have played any role in the agricultural cycle, not even a supervisory one, that would give them a legitimate status as leaders of the peasant community. Indeed one of the main distinctions between a landed gentleman in China and a mere rich landlord seems to have been that the gentleman avoided any taint of manual labor and devoted himself to scholarship and the arts. The gentry did bargain with the government in order to improve irrigation. Though the results were certainly visible to the peasants, and we may be sure that the gentry did their best to impress on the peasants what they had done for them, by its very nature his could not be a continuous or frequently repeated activity. In any one area it is possible to get only so many irrigation ditches. Furthermore as the resources available to the central government and even a good many local ones declined, it became harder to keep old projects in working order and impossible to get new ones.
The gentry’s well-known control of astronomic lore, necessary for determining the time at which to perform the various tasks of the agricultural cycle, comes to mind as one casts about for possible economic contributions that would have legitimated their status. Though the point would bear further examination – in general we need more and firmer information about the relation between the peasants and the gentry – there are several reasons for doubting that this monopoly was important at all in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, peasants generally out of their own practical experience, always develop a rich lore about every aspect of the agricultural cycle: the best time and location for planting each type of crop, for harvesting it, and so forth. Indeed, this lore is so firmly imbedded by experience and the risks of deviation from it are so great for most peasants, that modern governments have a great deal of difficulty in persuading peasants to very their routines. Hence it seems rather likely that the astronomers adapted whatever knowledge they had to what the peasants already did, rather than the other way around, and that they did not do anything in modern times that struck the peasant as indispensible.
What then did the government do for the peasant? Modern Western sociologists are perhaps too prone to dismiss at impossible the answer that it did practically noting, which I suspect is the correct one. They reason that any institution which lasts a long time cannot be altogether harmful to those who live under it (which seems to me to fly in the face of huge masses of both historical and contemporary experience) and therefore undertake a rather desperate search for some ‘function’ that the institution in question must perform. This is not the palace to argue about methods or the way in which conscious and unconscious assumptions determine the questions raised in any scientific inquiry. Nevertheless it seems more realistic to assume that large masses of people , and especially peasants, simply accept the social system under which they live without concern about any balance of benefits and pains, certainly without the least thought of whether a better one might be possible, unless and until something happens to threaten and destroy their daily routine. Hence it is quite possible for them to accept a society of whose working they are no more than victims.
One might object that the Imperial bureaucracy, when it was working well, as it did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maintained law and order, enforcing an objective standard of justice well in advazn ce of that prevailing in most parts of contemporary Eruope. That is ture enough. But the administration of justice and the enforcement of law and order had very little effect on the peasants.
. . .
The peasants in the family and the clan had their own arrangements for keeping order and administrating justice according to their own lights. They had no need for the Imperial apparatus except to keep marauders and bandits away from their corps. But banditry on a large enough scale to be a serious menace to the peasants was in itself very largely the consequence of exploitative officialdom. During the nineteenth century the Imperial bureaucracy became less and less able to keep even a minimum of order over wide areas of China as its own policies help to generate peasant outbreaks.
To sum up the discussion so far, the evidence points strongly toward the conclusion that the government and the upper classes performed no function that the peasants regarded as essential for their way of life. Hence the link between rulers and ruled was weak and largely artificial, liable to snap under any severe strain.
There were three ways in which the Imperial regime tried to compensate for the artificial character of his link. One was the system of granaries; local and Imperial storage depots for grain that could be distributed to the population in times of shortage. The rulers recognized very clearly the connection between hunger and peasant rebellion, though hunger was not the only cause of rebellion, as we shall see clearly enough in due course. However, the system of public granaries broke down and was largely abandoned in the nineteenth century, when it was most needed. Probably the main reason was the absence of any short-run profit for the gentry and prosperous landlords in selling grain to the government or in turning it over free. Also periods of shortage were times when those who had grain could make a killing. A second arrangement was the famous pao-chia system of mutual surveillance, which resembles and long antedates modern totalitarian procedures. Ten households were grouped into a pao, with a chief responsible for reporting the conduct of its members. A number of these paos (the number varied at different times) were put into a similar group with similar responsibilities, and so on upward in an ascending hierarchy. It was an attempt to extend the government’s power of observation and supervision below the district magistrate. Modern students of China judge the pao system to have been quite ineffective. Mutual surveillance became tangled up with the collection of taxes, which would scarcely endear it to the peasantry. Any such arrangement depends on its effectiveness on a substantial scattering of ordinary individuals who have both a sufficient stake in the system to make it possible for force them to play the unenviable role of talebearers and enough respect among the population so that they will learn what is going on. These conditions, one may infer, were not widely met in Manchu China. The third arrangement also recalls modern totalitarian practices, the hsiang-yüeh system of periodically lecturing the population on Confucian ethics. Apparently the practice began in the seventeenth century. Several emperors took it quite seriously. There is abundant evidence that the population did not and even regard the lecturers as unctuous nonsense. Though it lasted as late as 1865, the lecture system degenerated into empty formalism, taken seriously neither by the officials who had to give them nor by the people who had to listen to them.
The whole combination of welfare policies, police surveillance, and popular indoctrination constitutes a revealing precursor of modern totalitarian practices. To my mind, they demonstrate conclusively that the key features of the totalitarian complex existed in the premodern world. But, in agrarian societies before modern technology made totalitarian instruments vastly more effective and created new forms of receptiveness to its appeals, the totalitarian complex was little more than an ineffectual embryo.
A forth link between the peasants and the upper class was the clan, which seems to have been rather more effective in tying the peasants to the prevailing order. The clan, as the reader may recall, was a group of people claiming descent from a common ancestor. Though clan affairs were run by its gentry members, the clan included a large number of peasants. It had rules of conduct that were repeated orally at the colorful ceremonies when all members gathered and visibly reasserted their membership in a collective unit.
. . .
[T]he clan was no more than an enlarged version of the patrilineal and patriarchal lineage with strong patriarchal features which was widespread among the upper classes. Therefore it seems safe to a assume that in the other parts of China where clans were not prominent there were numerous smaller lineages that included both gentry and peasant households and that also served the same purpose: to bind rulers and ruled.
By and large then, the clan and patrilineal lineage emerge as the only important link between the upper and lower strata in Chinese society. As such their importance should not be underestimated, though, as will appear in due course, the clan was double edged: it could also serve as the key mechanism holding rebellious groups together. The general weakness of the link between rulers and ruled, in comparison with other societies, except Russia which was equally subject to peasant insurrection, seems reasonably well established at least for the Manchu era and, I would suggest, accounts in considerable measure for the fact that peasant rebellion was endemic in Chinese society. Were there, however, also structural aspects of the peasant community as such, that might explain this noticeable characteristic of Chinese politics?
. . .
The Chinese village, the basic cell of rural society in China as elsewhere, evidently lacked cohesiveness in comparison with those of India, Japan, and even many parts of Europe. There were far fewer occasions on which numerous members of the village cooperated in a common task in a way that creates the habits and sentiments of solidarity. It was closer to a residential agglomeration of numerous peasant households than to a live and functioning community, though less atomized than, for example, the modern South Italian village where life seems to have been a pacific struggle of all against all. Still there is more than political rhetoric behind the frequent statements of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek that Chinese society was like a heap of sand.
. . .
Some cooperation did exist, and the brief comments on it in the sources suggest an exhalation of why there was not more. Rice culture, to be most efficient, requires large amounts of labor at the time when the young seedlings are transplanted and again at harvest time. In due course we shall see the very effective organization that the Japanese village reached to meet this problem and the very inefficient one that prevails still in large parts of India. The Chinese met this need in several ways. They might exchange labor among themselves, staggering the dates of planting so that corps would not reach the same stage of maturity simultaneously and hence allow time to help out one’s kin. Exchanges of labor within kinship groupings were considered most desirable. If the kin would not supply enough labor at crucial points in the agricultural cycle, extra hands were hired. Surplus labor came from three sources. One was from local peasants, who had too little land to support their families. The existence of this group made it possible for those with enough land to compel the others to work for them within the framework of the prevailing social and political system. A second source of labor came from those without any land and a third from men who could not eke out a living from insufficient land in the poorer, distant area. As late as the mid-1930s, many migrant workers were of different ethnic origin (‘wandering souls,’ ‘boat people’), drifters who would accept very low pay, keeping local wage rates down. At times a few landless Chinese from another district might settle in the village but, without clan membership and access to a plot of land, they lived alone, outside the stream of village life.
As long as labor was abundant and surplus because of the situation just described, it is not surprising that economic cooperation among any set of individuals in the Chinese village lacked permanence or the institutional basis that still exists in India under the cast system and in Japan in a different form. In premodern China, arrangements for the exchange or hiring of extra labor were fluid, temporary, and unhurried affairs. This was true in the north as well as in the rice-growing south. Even among close kin, exchanges of labor were discussed and arranged anew each year, and, at peak periods of work, landowners could afford to wait until the last moment to hire extra workers at lowest wages.
The only frequently recurring activity that demanded cooperation was the management of the water supply. This was more a question of sharing a scarce resource than of working together on a common task and often resulted in fights within the village or among several villages. In sharp contrast again with Japan and also premodern Europe, the main decisions in the agricultural cycle were made by the individual household. There is no trace of anything remotely resembling Flurzwang: the practice under which the European village community decided when all its member fields should become pasture for the winter – common land available to all – and when the separate strips should retune to private responsibility for ploughing and seeding. Chinese property too was held in strips scattered throughout the territory in the village. But the rarity of animals and the intense pressure on the land ruled out this European practice, even in the northern wheat-growing areas. (pp.201-211)
By way of conclusion, Moore explains the Chinese propensity for revolt sans revolution as follows:
The system of sharecropping and the devotion of the upper class to stylized leisure, with its need for a labor force that it did not have to supervise directly, all point toward arrangements roughly similar to those just sketched here. Thus the political needs of the upper classes combined with agricultural practices to generate a combination of peasant individualism and surplus labor, leading to a relatively atomistic peasant society.
. . .
[W]e encounter another basic principle of Chinese society: possession of land was absolutely necessary if one were to be a full-fledged member of the village. We have already noticed how land provided the basis for the activities of the clan. The same is true on a smaller scale of the family. Since the family was the chief unit of economic production, occupation on the soil was uniquely conducive to strong and stable kinship ties. The whole Confucian ethic of filial respect was impossible without property and was very much weaker among the poor peasants. Indeed, family life itself was often impossible for them. In contrast with the situation that prevailed for a long time in Western society, the poorer peasants in China had fewer children and of course fewer of them survived to maturity. Many could not marry at all. Modern Chinese villages had a number of ‘bare sticks,’ bachelors too poor to marry. ‘They were objects of pity and ridicule in the eyes of the villagers, whose life centered on the family.’ And, of course, it was the poor who sold their children, mainly girls but occasionally also boys, because it was impossible to bring them up.
In a word, no property: no family, no religion. That is a bit too extreme. There was a place, if only a small and precarious one, for the landless agricultural laborer in the Chinese village, though the situation that prevailed more widely was for land-short peasants to eke out their resources by working for their wealthier neighbors. Nevertheless the older conception among scholars of the patriarchal ethic uniting Chinese society through millions of peasant families is largely nonsense. The patriarchal image was an aristocratic costly ideal beyond the reach of most peasants. To the extent that it existed among the peasants, it did little more than provide a rational for the petty despotism within the peasant family, made necessary by a brutally cramped existence. The Chinese peasant family had built into it a highly explosive potential to which the Communists in due course were to set the spark.
. . .
In China the structure of peasant society, together with the weakness of the links that bound the peasantry and the upper classes, helps to explain why China was especially subject to peasant insurrection as well as some of the obstacles and limitations to these insurrections. It indicates the lines of fracture in Chinese society that would become increasingly evident during the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth as poverty pressed harder and harder on may sections of the country. Then the bonds would snap. Peasants would break with their homes, wander off, and become bandits. Later they would become recruits for warlord armies. Chinese society was such as to make possible the creation of huge masses of human debris, tinder easily ignited by an insurrectionary spark. On the other hand, rebellion requires more than the destruction of prevailing social bonds; it also requires the forging of new forms of solidarity and loyalty. This was difficult in China since the peasants were not used to cooperating with each other beyond the limits of the family or clan. The task is even more difficult in the case of a revolution that attempts to introduce a new kind of society. Had not certain fortuitous circumstances intervened, fortuitous in the sense that they did not derive from anything taking place in China itself, the Communists might never have solved the problem. An examination of the concrete forms that violence took, in late Imperial times and subsequently, will help to give greater meaning to these necessarily general observations.(pp.211-214)
He goes on to emphasize that it was a combination of several developments – political, economic, and social – that led to the success of the Communist revolution in China.
Even in ‘normal’ times the inadequacy of the Imperial system for maintaining peace and security in the countryside left the inhabitants easy victims to what for lack of a better word we can call simply gangsterism, the use of violence to prey on the population indiscriminately without the slightest interest in altering the political system, not even in substituting a new set of rulers for an old one. It is necessary to beware of romanticizing the robber as a friend of the poor, just as much as of accepting the official image. Characteristically the local inhabitants would bargain with the bandits in order to be left in peace. Quite often local gentry leaders were on cordial terms with bandits. Professional and hereditary bandits existed. As such, there is noting remarkable here. Gangsterism is likely to crop up wherever the forces of law and order are weak. European feudalism was mainly gangsterism that had become society itself and acquired respectability through the notions of chivalry. As the rise of feudalism out of the decay of the Roman administrative system shows, this form of self-help which victimizes others is in principle opposed to the workings of a sound bureaucratic system. Bureaucracy to survive must obtain a monopoly on the making of victims and do it according to the rational principle which was supplied in China by Confucianism. As the Imperial system decayed into warlord satrapies, feebly and temporarily united under the Kuomintang, the entire system took on more and more gangster attributes and became increasingly unpopular.
. . .
Here we encounter some of the limitations of rebellion under the traditional system, which the Communists were to overcome, though not without difficulty. Gentry participation and leadership limited the possibility of any real change. Furthermore, the Nien system [in the peasant rebellion of 1853-1868] was itself essentially predatory, gaining food supplies by raids on other areas, which it therefore antagonized. This was self-defeating. Hence it is easy to understand why not all local groups identified themselves with the rebels. Some sought ‘neutral self-defense’; others even fought on the Imperial side. Somewhat similar factors appear to have been at work in the case of the Taiping [rebellion of the 1850s]. At first the inhabitants in many areas regarded them as better than their Imperial rulers. Later, as the rebels proved unable to bring about real improvement, and perhaps as their exactions became harsher in the struggle against the government, they lost much popular support.
. . .
Only when the impact of the modern world had eaten away the superstructure in ways indicated earlier, did a real revolutionary attempt become possible. Let us now try to understand what the coming of the modern world did to the peasant, the base of this structure.
During the nineteenth century there appeared scattered but unmistakable signs of decline in the peasant’s economic situation: abandonment of tillage, deterioration of irrigation systems, increasing agricultural unemployment. Though signs of the peasant’s plight were to be found in practically every part of the empire, perhaps more in the northern provinces than elsewhere, the regional diversity of China produces exceptions to any generalization. Some provinces continued to enjoy prosperity and abundance, while others suffered famine and near famine conditions. Peasant handicrafts, an important supplement to the peasant’s meager resources and a way of using surplus labor power during the slack times of the agricultural cycle, suffered severe blows at the hands of cheap Western textiles. Standard accounts until quite recent times have emphasized and possibly overemphasized this fact. It is conceivable that the peasants in time found other employment: anthropological accounts of modern villages frequently stress the importance of artisan occupations as a small but vital addition to the substance of the peasants. In any event, the impact was undoubtedly severe for a time in many areas. The spread of opium, encouraged at first by the West and at a later date by the Japanese, spread further demoralization as well as reluctance to seek improvement.
. . .
As the peasants fell into debt, they had to borrow, often at very high rates. When they could not repay, they had to transfer title to the land to a landlord, remaining on the soil to work it more or less indefinitely. All these processes had their heaviest impact in the coastal provinces. There too sprang up the peasants’ rebellion o f 1927, the greatest since the days of the long-haired Taipings, according to its historian, Harold Isaacs.
In the light of the connection between property and social cohesion, perhaps the most important aspect of the changes under discussion was the growth of a mass of marginal peasants at the bottom of the social hierarchy in the village. Local modern studies indicate that they amounted to about half or more of the inhabitants. How much of an increase, if any, this may represent over the nineteenth century, we have no way of knowing yet. That they represented potentially explosive material is, on the other hand, reasonably clear. They were marginal, not only in the physical sense of living close to the edge of starvation, but also in the sociological sense that the reduction of the property meant that the ties connecting them to the prevailing order had worn thinner and thinner.
. . .
Thus the mass basis of the revolution that began in 1927 and culminated in the Communist victory of 1949 was a land-short peasantry. Neither in China nor in Russia was there a huge agricultural proletariat working on modern capitalist latifundia, the source of much rural upheaval in Spain , Cuba, and possibly elsewhere. It was differ too from the situation in France in 1789, where there were many landless peasants, but where the revolution in the countryside came from the upper stratum of the peasantry, who put the brakes on the revolution when it showed signs of passing beyond the confirmation of property rights and the elimination of feudal vestiges.
Massive poverty and exploitation in and by themselves are not enough to provide a revolutionary situation. There must also be felt injustice built into the social structure, that is, either new demands on the victims or some reason for the victims to feel that old demands are no longer justifiable. The decay of the upper classes in China provided this indispensable ingredient. The gentry had lost their raison d’être and turned into landlord-usurers pure and simple. The end of the examination system spelled the end of their legitimacy and the Confucian system that had supported it. How much of this the peasants had ever actually accepted is somewhat doubtful. As Max Weber has pointed out, the religion of the masses was mainly a combination of Taoism and magic, more suited to their own needs. Still some Confucian ideas did penetrate through the clan. In any case the self-respect had largely evaporated that had given the old ruling classes assurance in the presence of the peasants. All kinds of shady élites, racketeers, gangsters, and the like arose to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the former ruling stratum. In the absence of a strong central power, private violence became rampant and essential in order for the landlords to continue their squeeze on the peasantry. Many landlords moved to the city where they enjoyed greater protections Those remaining in the countryside turned their residences into fortresses and collected their debts and rents at the point of a gun. Naturally not all landlords were like this. Quite possibly only a small minority behaved this way, although to judge from anthropological accounts, those who did were likely to be the most powerful and influential figures in the area. Patriarchal relationships continued to exist alongside naked and brutal exploitation. This was widespread enough to help turn many parts of China into a potentially explosive situation that would give the Communists their chance. It is worth noticing that no comparable deterioration of the upper classes has so far taken place in India.
To say that a revolutionary situation existed does not mean that the conflagration was about to ignite of its own accord. The Conservative half-truth that ‘outside agitators’ make riots and revolutions – a half-turth that becomes a lie because it ignores the conditions that make agitators effective – finds strong support from Chinese data. In numerous accounts of village life, I have come upon no indication that the peasants were about to organize effectively or do anything about their problems of their own accord. The notion that peasant villages were in open revolt before the Communists appeared on the scene does not correspond with a large body of evidence form anthropological field studies.
. . .
Just as in Manchu times, the peasants needed outside leadership before they would turn actively against the existing social structure. As far as the village itself is concerned, the situation almost certainly could have gone on deteriorating until most of the inhabitant simply died in the next famine. That is exactly what happened many times over.
These observations do not in the least imply that the Chinese peasabnts were innately stupid or lacked initiative and courage. The behavior of the revolutionary armies, even after the subtraction for propaganda and revolutionary heroics, demonstrates quite the contrary. The meaning is merely that, up to the last moment in may areas, the tentacles of the old order wrapped themselves around the individual with sufficient power to prevent him from acting as an isolated unit or, quite often, even thinking about such action . The lack of cohesiveness of the Chinese village discussed earlier in another connection, may have helped the Communists by enabling a steady stream of recruits to slip away to Communist areas. It also probably made their task of breaking down and altering the old village structure easier. More precise information is necessary for any firm appraisal. Rickety as it was, the old order would not disappear through spontaneous action in the village as such. That, of course, has been the case in all the major modern revolutions.
Even the entry of the Chinese Communist Party upon this scene of widespread distress and decay was not sufficient in and by itself to produce a fundamental change. The Party was founded in 1921. Thirteen years later, the Communists had to abandon their main territorial foothold in Kiangsi and embarked on the famous Long March to remote Yenan. Their fortunes, in the judgment of some historianqs, were then at their lowest ebb. About all they had demonstated was q tough capqcity to survive. Chiang’s fice major military offienszcives between 1930 and 1933 had failed to root them out. But they hac not been able to extend their territorial bgase or to gain significant influence outside of the areas they immediately controlled.
To some extent the Communists’ failure up to this point is explicable in terms of heir mistaken strategy. Not until 1926 did they begin to display any serious interest in using the peasantry as the base of a revolutionary movement. After the break with Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, the Party still tried to win power through proletarian rising in the cities with disastrous and bloody consequences. Though the abandonment of this piece of Marxist orthodoxy and the adoption of Mao’s strategy of reliance on the peasantry were indispensable, more was necessary to bring success. For one thing it was necessary to adopt a milder attitude toward the well-to-do peasants, a policy not adopted until 1942, though there were adumbrations much earlier. Important though all these changes were, it is unlikely that by themselves they would have enabled the Chinese Communists to win a revolutionary victory. The decisive ingredient was the Japanese conquest and the occupation policies of the foreign conqueror.
In reaction to the Japanese occupation, Kuomintang officials and landlords moved out of the countryside and into the towns, leaving the peasants to their own devices. Secondly, the Japanese army’s intermittent mopping up and extermination campaigns welded the peasants into a solidary mass. Thus the Japanese performed two essential revolutionary tasks for the Communists, the elimination of the old élites and the forging of solidarity among the oppressed. Negative evidence strongly supports this superficially paradoxical conclusion. Where the Japanese or their puppet regime gave peasants some security, guerilla organizations made no headway. Indeed, the Communists were unable to establish guerilla bases in regions that had no direct experience of the Japanese army.(pp.214-222)
Moore concludes his study of the Chinese peasant revolution by describing further the revolutionary tactics adopted by the Chinese Communist Party to accommodate the needs of the peasantry.
Once started, the process proceeded rapidly of destroying the old order and taking preliminary steps toward the creation of a new one, all by government direction. Essentially it amounted to taking land away from the wealthy and giving it to the poor. ‘The general strategy was to unite the poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and the middle peasants and to neutralize the stand of the rich peasants so as to isolate the landlords. The effect was rather different. Though the Communists used categories that corresponded reasonably well with the social realities of the village, the main consequence was general uncertainty, even among the poor peasants who were the chief immediate beneficiaries but who seem to have been as uncertain as the others about how long all this was to last. Formerly there had been suppressed hatred between the two extremes: a rich, exploitative, and cruel landlord and his tenants. Under the new system the entire village was methodically partitioned into compartments, each set against the other.
One aspect deserves special mention because of the light it sheds backward on the workings of the pre-Communists era, as well as on Communist tactics. Land was redistributed not to the family as a whole, but to each member on an equal-share basis, regardless of age and sex. Thus the Communists broke the village apart at its base, obliterating the connection between landed property and kinship. By destroying the economic basis for kinship bonds, or at least greatly weakening them, the Communists released powerful antagonisms across class lines as well as those of age and sex. Not until they had done this, did the struggle of peasant against landlords, tenants against rent collectors, victims against local bullies become open and bitter. The last to bring charges were the young against the old. Even here bitterness came to the surface.
The Communist regime forged a new link between the village and the national government. It became evident to every peasant that his daily life depended on a national political power. Through this new link the Communists pumped out of the village, C.K. Yang estimates, even more than the landlord rentier and the Kuomintang had taken before. At the same time the new and larger burden was much more equally distributed than had previously been the case. All these changes were temporary transitional. To destroy the old order, to forge new links with the government, to extract more resources from the peasants could only be preliminary to solving the basic problem of increasing economic output all around in the world of competing armed giants. That part of the story falls outside the scope of this book. In China, even more than in Russia, the peasants provided the dynamite that finally exploded the old order. Once again they furnished the main driving force behind the victory of a party dedicated to achieving through relentless terror a supposedly inevitable phase of history in which the peasantry would cease to exist.(pp.226- 227)
The 16 + items below reflect the uncertain times we have now entered. As the ancient Chinese proverb goes: “May the gods save us from interesting times.”
Francis McCollum Feeley
honoraire de l'Université Grenoble-Alpes
Ancien Directeur des Researches
Université de Paris-Nanterre
Director of The Center for the Advanced Study
of American Institutions and Social Movements
The University of California-San Diego
This fog of fear and uncertainty is the everlasting present.
by William Rivers Pitt
FBI is Recklessly Misusing Trump-Era Espionage Policy to Create "Climate of Fear" Among Scientists—
Terrorizing Families and Ruthlessly Destroying Careers
by Jeremy Kuzmarov
Federal Judge Blocks DOD from Disciplining Navy SEALS Who Sued over Vaccine Mandate
by Michael Nevradakis
The Lesson of Covid: When People Are Anxious, Isolated and Hopeless, They're Less Ready To Think Critically
by Jonathan Cook
The Numbers Killed by these Vaccines is Much Worse than What We Thought
by Dr. Sucharit Bhakdi, Dr. Mike Yeadon
What if the Largest Experiment on Human Beings in History is
a Failure? ‘Surge in All Cause Mortality’
by Dr. Robert Malone
A report from an Indiana life insurance company raises serious concerns.
COVID, Mandatory Vaccinations and the University System
Diamond Mine of Data? Insurance Companies Report
40% Increase in Premature Non-COVID Deaths
From: Cat McGuire
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2022
Subject: HUGE ANTI-MANDATES NATIONAL MARCH ON WASHINGTON, JANUARY 23
Hey everyone, now is the time to make every effort to attend the National March on Washington to Defeat the Mandates, Sunday, January 23. If not now, when?!
For those in the New York area, we will be providing buses to DC. Info coming soon.
Please send this email far and wide. Thanks, Cat
Xi'an Authorities Block All ‘Negative’ Posts On Social Media As Lockdown Backlash Grows
by Tyler Durden
Sputnik V is a scam
by Riley Waggaman
“A socioeconomic experiment on the Russian population.”
‘Shrink the World’s Population’: Secret 2009 Meeting of Billionaires “Good Club”
by Prof Michel Chossudovsky
Is Worldwide Depopulation Part of the Billionaire's ‘Great Reset’
Lawsuit Filed against CDC for Hiding COVID Vaccine Safety Data. “V Safe” Smartphone Application
by Mary Villareal
J’Accuse! The Gene-based ‘Vaccines’ Are Killing People. Governments Worldwide Are Lying to You the People, to the Populations
They Purportedly Serve
‘What's Going On’ Athlete Cardiac Arrest compilation
by J Wilderness
by Ryan Cristian
Covid transmission among vaxxed rising
with Trinity Chavez
EU: Number of Infections and COVID Deaths Hugely Manipulated
From: News from Underground
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2022
Subject: Daily digest for email@example.com
1) Link to the COMPLETE 2nd episode of "The Propaganda Police" - Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan 2022 20:17 EST)
2) Joe Rogan does what "our free press" should do, so everybody watches him (while no one watches CNN) - Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan 2022 20:21 EST)
3) What those propaganda buzzwords mean in English - Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan 2022 20:24 EST)
4) LINK to "Joe Rogan does what 'our free press' should do, so everybody watches him," etc. - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 10:13 EST)
5) What's the difference between propaganda and (real) journalism? - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 11:54 EST)
6) Dr. Oz is giving up his show to run for senator in Pennsylvania, to make Fauci accountable! - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 11:58 EST)
7) MCM and Dr. Zelenko talk about the madness, and the Great Evil driving it - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:07 EST)
8) NZ doctor exposes "perverse" monetary incentives to "vaccinate," and "hush money" to victims' families - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:13 EST)
9) Biden/China partnering AGAIN, in new hunt for rodent coronaviruses; T-Mobile erasing links to Gateway Pundit articles (!); United Airlines replacing US staff fired for refusing "vaccination" with UK staff who need NOT be "vaccinated"; and much more from CLG - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:29 EST)
10) ALERT! In the 4th quarter of 2019, Fed spent $4.5 TRILLION to bail out the big banks - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 13:18 EST)
11) Revolution in Kazakhstan! People beat back soldiers, seize military equipment, government shuts down Internet - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 14:37 EST)
12) Nobody watched Dr. Fauci's "COVID-19 Response Team" press briefing today, because only a deranged minority believes a word he says - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 15:44 EST)
13) Brazilian TV star got 3rd jab on Dec. 28, collapsed right on TV that day - Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 18:45 EST)
to the COMPLETE 2nd episode of "The Propaganda Police" by Mark Crispin Miller (04 Jan 2022 20:17 EST)
Reply to list
For some reason our conversation was cut off in mid-sentence 40 minutes in. This will take you to the full hour-and-20-minute audio.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Tuesday, January 4th, 2022 at 8:08 PM, Colleen McGuire <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
Visualize World Peace and Bodily Autonomy
the difference between propaganda and (real) journalism? by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan
2022 11:54 EST)
Reply to list
and Dr. Zelenko talk about the madness, and the Great Evil driving it by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:07 EST)
Reply to list
NZ DOCTOR EXPOSES ‘PERVERSE’ MONETARY INCENTIVES TO VACCINATE AND ‘HUSH MONEY’ AID TO VICTIMS’ FAMILIES
René de Monchy was once a doctor to me in Lower Hutt and until recently, lived down the street.
EXPOSED: Doctors Receive ‘Perverse’ Monetary Incentives to Vaccinate,’Hush Money’ Paid to Victims’ Families
partnering AGAIN, in new hunt for rodent coronaviruses; T-Mobile erasing links
to Gateway Pundit articles (!); United Airlines replacing US staff fired for
refusing "vaccination" with UK staff who need NOT be
"vaccinated"; and much more from CLG by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 12:29 EST)
Reply to list
News Updates From CLG
4 January 2022
All links are here:
Previous edition: Indiana life insurance CEO says deaths are up 40% among people ages 18-64
Biden and China Are Partners in a New Wuhan Lab, EcoHealth Hunt for 'Recombinant' Rodent Coronaviruses | 31 Dec 2021 | Researchers from the COVID-19-linked Wuhan Institute of Virology and disgraced researcher Peter Daszak's EcoHealth Alliance have carried out new research on "recombinant" coronaviruses in rodents, a recently published paper reveals. The paper lists the Chinese government as well as Joe Biden's U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as funders and supporters of the dangerous work... The new paper, which counts researchers from seven Chinese state-run scientific institutions including one person affiliated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology's Laboratory of Special Pathogens and Biosafety, is authored by three EcoHealth Alliance researchers including President Peter Daszak. Among the paper's fin-ncial supporters are several Chinese Communist Party-run scientific bodies, including those with ties to the regime's military. Biden's USAID also funded the field animal sampling portion of the study.
Insane in the membrane: United Airlines Outsources Work to Potentially Unvaccinated London Flight Attendants to Replace Fired Unvaxxed Americans | 2 Jan 2022 | United Airlines is allegedly allowing potentially unvaccinated London-based flight attendants to work alongside vaccinated American staff as it grapples with staffing shortages, cofounder of Airline Employees 4 Health Freedom Captain Sherry Walker exclusively told Breitbart News on Thursday. United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby has placed roughly 2,000 unvaccinated U.S.-based employees who obtained religious and medical accommodations on unpaid leave in the name of "safety." That number includes approximately 900 flight attendants, according to Walker, who said her organization is currently undergoing an audit to confirm the exact numbers of United employees placed on unpaid leave and their positions. Breitbart News was able to obtain several schedule logs showing London-based flight attendants scheduled to fly with Newark-based crew in late December and early January. London-based United Airlines employees are not subject to Kirby's vaccine mandate, meaning some could potentially be unvaccinated against coronavirus.
T-Mobile Is Erasing Links to Gateway Pundit Articles Via Text Message | 2 Jan 2022 | On the last day of 2021, The Gateway Pundit and Jim Hoft were banned from PayPal without warning. Now, we learned the tech giants are using a frightening new method to censor and control what you are able to see, read and discuss online... T-Mobile is disappearing our links. You cannot send our links through T-mobile. They will disappear them. Your friends will not even know that you sent them a Gateway Pundit article. If only there was an opposition party in America to confront this madness. [Truer words never spoken.]
Facebook Blacklists Reps. Marjorie Taylor Greene Following Twitter Ban | 3 Jan 2022 | Facebook has suspended the page of Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA), an action that came fast on the heels of Twitter permanently banning the Republican congresswoman's account.nRep. Greene decried Facebook's actions in a post on Gab dot com, the free speech friendly social network, accusing them of censoring her for critical commentary on the V-ccine Averse Reactions System, the official system for reporting negative vaccine side effects to the government. "Who appointed Twitter and Facebook to be the authorities of information and misinformation? When Big Tech decides what political speech of elected Members is accepted and what’s not then they are working against our government and against the interest of our people."
YouTube removes viral Joe Rogan interview with Dr. Robert Malone | 2 Jan 2022 | Youtube has removed the now-viral episode of "The Joe Rogan Experience" podcast, featuring guest Dr. Robert Malone, from its video-sharing platform. During the interview, Malone, who claims to be part of a collaboration that reportedly created the mRNA technology widely used in the COVID-19 vaccines, talked about vaccines, mandates, amongst other pandemic-related topics. At one point in the conversation, Malone drew parallels between current American society and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Nazis came into power, saying American society is developing a "mass formation psychosis.”
U.S. judge blocks Pentagon from punishing Navy SEALs who refused COVID-19 vaccine | 4 Jan 2022 | A federal judge on Monday barred the U.S. Department of Defense from punishing a group of Navy SEALs and other special forces members who refused COVID-19 vaccines on religious grounds. U.S. District Judge Reed O'Connor, acting in response to a lawsuit filed on behalf of 35 special forces service members, issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Navy and Defense Department from enforcing the mandate. Reed, who was appointed to the federal bench in Texas by George W. Bush, said the Navy had not granted a single religious exemption to the vaccine rule. "The Navy servicemembers in this case seek to vindicate the very freedoms they have sacrificed so much to protect. The COVID-19 pandemic provides the government no license to abrogate those freedoms," the judge wrote in a 26-page decision.
Omicron Spreads Faster Than Delta Within Vaccinated Individuals - Danish Study | 4 Jan 2022 | A Danish study of nearly 12,000 households has discovered that Omicron spreads faster than Delta among those who are fully vaccinated, and even higher between those who have received booster shots, demonstrating strong evidence of the variant's immune evasiveness. The Omicron variant was found to evade the immunity of vaccinated individuals at a much faster pace compared to Delta, and at a higher rate than the unvaccinated, according to the study conducted by researchers at the University of Copenhagen, Statistics Denmark, and Statens Serum Institut. "Comparing households infected with the Omicron to Delta VOC, we found an 1.17 times higher SAR for unvaccinated, 2.61 times higher for fully vaccinated and 3.66 times higher for booster-vaccinated individuals, demonstrating strong evidence of immune evasiveness of the Omicron VOC," said the preprint of the study. SAR refers to secondary attack rate.
Healthy 57-Year-Old Nashville Doctor Dies Shortly After Receiving Pfizer Vaccine - Media Blames Death on Covid-19 | 3 Jan 2022 | A longtime Nashville doctor died a few days after receiving the Pfizer vaccine and the media is blaming his death on Covid-19. Dr. Dimitri Ndina was a loving father, husband, grandfather and doctor at Tennessee Oncology. Dr. Ndina, who was reportedly in excellent health, tragically passed away after be started to clot in the days after he received his Pfizer vaccine. He was only 57... Despite the family confirming Dr. Ndina got blood clots after taking the Pfizer vax, the media is claiming he died from Covid-19.
Fully vaccinated and boosted Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick tests positive for COVID | 3 Jan 2022 | Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick (R) is on the mend after testing positive for COVID-19 despite being vaccinated and receiving a booster shot. "His symptoms were mild, and no one else in the household was infected," Patrick senior adviser Allen Blakemore said in a statement Monday, noting that the lieutenant governor has since tested negative. "He continues working from home and will return to a public schedule by the end of the week."
Fully vaccinated and boosted Democratic congressman announces he has tested positive for COVID-19| 30 Dec 2021 | Congressman Bill Pascrell Jr (D-NJ) announced on Twitter Thursday that he has tested positive for the coronavirus. "Today I tested positive for covid," the 84-year-old New Jersey Democrat tweeted. Pascrell's announcement comes a week after three Senate Democrats revealed positive coronavirus tests as the omicron variant of the virus continues to spread across the country. Delaware Senator Chris Coons, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker all tested positive for the virus in the course of a few days. Both Warren and Booker said that they were fully vaccinated.
Los Angeles Public Schools Delayed Implementing Vaccine Mandate After 30,000 Kids Did Not Comply | 2 Jan 2022 | Los Angeles Unified Schools were planning to implement an extreme vaccine mandate for students but had to cancel it when 30,000 kids were not in compliance. In September, the school board for the second-largest school district in the United States voted to mandate that students 12 and older be vaccinated by Jan. 10. The district has pushed their mandate back until fall 2022 because many did not comply.
L.A. schools tried to mandate vaccines. Then they faced having to send 30,000 students home | 28 Dec 2021 | Los Angeles Unified was supposed to show other school districts how to roll out an expansive Covid-19 vaccine mandate for students, but has done an about-face... In September, the nation's second-largest school district imposed strict vaccine requirements on children 12 and older, with almost no exemptions. The district blinked at the last minute, however, as community activists and Gov. Gavin Newsom questioned the idea of moving more than 30,000 unvaccinated students back into distance learning. Other U.S. districts in blue states are scaling back previous student mandate ideas, too. School leaders in Portland, Ore., tabled discussion this fall amid vigorous pushback, while New York and Chicago have taken a wait-and-see approach.
Manhattan DA closes probe into nursing home deaths without charging Cuomo - attorney --Cuomo had directed nursing homes to accept patients who tested positive for or were suspected of having COVID-19 [until he was pressured to stop] | 3 Jan 2022 | The Manhattan district attorney's office is closing its investigation into former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo's handling of nursing home COVID-19 deaths without bringing charges against Cuomo, according to the former governor's attorney. "I was contacted today by the head of the Elder Care Unit from the Manhattan District Attorney's Office who informed me they have closed its investigation involving the Executive Chamber and nursing homes," Elkan Abramowitz, a former federal prosecutor who had been hired to represent Cuomo, said Monday. The investigation was opened after a report last year by New York Attorney General Letitia James revealed that the state's Department of Health underreported COVID-19 deaths in nursing homes by as much as 50%.
US sets COVID record with more than one million daily cases | 4 Jan 2022 | The [highly vaccinated and boosted] US recorded more than one million COVID-19 new cases Monday -- a daily record for any country since the pandemic began. The 1,082,549 COVID-19 cases reported by Johns Hopkins University comes as the highly contagious Omicron variant rages across the country. The startling figure is the largest single-day tally of any nation ever reported and nearly double the previous US record of 590,000 cases set just four days ago, Bloomberg News reported.
French rebels massively destroy 5G networks | 31 Dec 2021 | Rebels in France have declared war on the infrastructure of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. An ever-expanding resistance movement has been sabotaging the widely despised 5G network. A three-part report on the Reporterre website noted: "Relay antennae are being torched, fibre-optic cables cut, pylons unbolted. During the night, people burn construction machinery, attack masts with disc cutters or destroy electrical equipment with sledgehammers." Vehicles belonging to telecommunications businesses have also been set on fire in at least 140 attacks since the start of the Covid [mandates].
Hundreds stranded overnight on Virginia highway in freezing temperatures | 4 Jan 2022 | Hundreds of motorists were stranded all night in snow and freezing temperatures along a 50-mile stretch of Interstate 95 after a crash involving six tractor-trailers in Virginia, where authorities were struggling Tuesday to reach them. The Virginia Department of Transportation confirmed both directions of I-95 remained shut down between Ruther Glen, Virginia, in Caroline County and exit 152 in Dumfries, Prince William County. "Crews will start taking people off at any available interchange to get them," VDOT tweeted at 5:20 a.m. Tuesday.
Mystery family from Connecticut hands out Florida oranges to snowbound travelers stranded on I-95 in Virginia | 4 Jan 2022 | An unknown Connecticut family provided solace to snowbound travelers stranded Tuesday night by offering oranges to motorists stopped for hours on I-95. U.S. Sen. Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia and one-time presidential candidate, was one of the grateful beneficiaries. "A CT family returning in a packed car from Florida walked by in the middle of the night handing out oranges as we were stopped for hours on I-95. Bless them," Kaine tweeted Tuesday morning. Kaine had set out for the two-hour drive from Richmond to Washington, D.C., on Monday, only to spend the next 21 hours gridlocked by a snowstorm.
Thousands of flights canceled, delayed at start of workweek ---A winter storm is expected to bring as much as 10 inches (25 centimeters) of snow for the District of Columbia, northern Virginia and central Maryland through Monday afternoon. | 3 Jan 2022 | A winter storm moving into the mid-Atlantic combined with the pandemic [and vaccine mandates] to continue frustrating air travelers whose return flights home from the holidays were canceled or delayed in the first few days of the new year. More than 1,900 U.S. flights and more than 3,300 worldwide were grounded as of early Monday, according to tracking service FlightAware. That follows Sunday's cancellations of more than 2,700 U.S. flights, and more than 4,400 worldwide. And on Saturday, there were also more than 2,700 U.S. flights cancelled and more than 4,700 worldwide.
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In the 4th quarter of 2019, Fed spent $4.5 TRILLION to bail out the big banks by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 13:18 EST)
Reply to list
More evidence that (a) the COVID lunacy is not about our health, but about Their wealth; and (b) "the left" press isn't left at all, or it would be reporting this, but it's too busy shilling for Big Pharma and the Great Reset.
(The link to Pam and Russ Martens' piece on this shocker, included in the piece below, isn't working, at least for me.)
CENSORED: $4.5 TRILLION Bank Bailout 4th Quarter 2019 Months Before COVID Exceeded 2008 Bailouts
Total Views : 208
The Occupy Wall Street movement began in September of 2011 and spread worldwide.
“We’re looking at a form of corporate tyranny previously unseen in America.”
Pam Martens, Wall Street on Parade.
by Brian Shilhavy
Editor, Health Impact News
Pam and Russ Martens of Wall Street on Parade have reported on the huge bank bailouts during the 4th quarter of 2019, months before COVID was declared to be a “pandemic” giving further evidence from a series of events at the end of 2019 that the “war on the virus” that has enslaved the entire world, was all planned long in advance by the Globalists.
Not reported in the media, either corporate news media nor anywhere else in the Alternative Media that I have seen, the Martens have exposed the fact that the bailouts of the biggest banks in New York far exceeded the bailouts during the 2008 financial crises, which of course was headline news back then.
This bailout of Wall Street in 2008 was the fuel that gave rise to the “Occupy Wall Street” movement that started in September of 2011, and spread around the world.
Unfortunately, the movement failed to create any lasting solutions, primarily because the Globalists and their corporate media painted it as a Liberal, Democratic movement, keeping most Conservative, Republicans on the sidelines.
Click for more.
Is this uprising a mass response to the "COVID measures" there? The total silence on what's happening there suggests it is.
Also, as "Tim Truth" reminds us here, shutdown of the Internet was "hypothetically" proposed during Bill Gates' Event 201, as yet another way to keep us "safe."
593 people watched it, and they were probably NIAID staffers, and members of his family.
(He looks exhausted, no? He should come clean, and maybe would, if he were not fully possessed.)
TV star got 3rd jab on Dec. 28, collapsed right on TV that day by Mark Crispin Miller (05 Jan 2022 18:45 EST)
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He had five cardiac arrests.
If this were funny, it would be like Idiocracy, where the planes keep crashing, because pilots have become too stupid to fly right.
“Lack Of Covid Treatments DELIBERATE”
with Joe Rogan and Dr. Peter McCullough
Selected Articles: Pfizer 6 Month Data Shows COVID Shots May ‘Cause More Illness than They Prevent’
by Arjun Walia
Analysis of Batch-Specific Toxicity of COVID-19 Vaccine Products Using VAERS Data
The COVID Crisis and America’s Democratic and Republican Governors:
The 2022 Ballot
by Renee Parsons
Children Are Dying from COVID, Lockdowns and Overdoses
by Dr. Joseph Mercola
FAA Warned by Doctors in Letter Describing Vaccine Hazard, Health, FAA Violations
by Suzanne Downing
NBC News Uses Ex-FBI Official Frank Figliuzzi to Urge Assange’s Extradition, Hiding His Key Role
by Glenn Greenwald
After 1,000 Days in Belmarsh Prison, Campaigners Demand Freedom for Julian Assange
by Brett Wilkins
Maxwell Trial, Assange Extradition & ‘Vaccine Equity’
with Ryan Cristian and Whitney Webb
Ghislaine Maxwell Convicted
by Philip Giraldi
NATO gangs up on Russia; Federation Launches
with Michael Maloof
Clouds on the horizon
by The Saker
China backs Russia in NATO dispute
with George Galloway
Putin and Xi
Plot Their SWIFT Escape
by Pepe Escobar
China’s Hypersonic Missile A Game Changer
with Trinity Chavez
Americans Still Don’t Want War, Despite the Military-Industrial Complex’s Best Efforts
by Branko Marcetic
The War on Terror Is a Success — for Terror
by Nick Turse
‘No Military Solution’ to Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Say Expert Voices
by Brett Wilkins
Protecting the Nazis:
The Extraordinary Vote of Ukraine and the USA
by Craig Murray
What is behind the protests rocking Kazakhstan?
by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska
Dangerous Crossroads: The World on the Brink of War.
The New Cold War Goes Hot?
by Wolfgang Effenberger
US War Lobby Fuels Conflict in Russia, Ukraine, and Syria
with Aaron Maté and Col. Douglas Macgregor
Bases Housing US Troops in Iraq and Syria Come Under Fire
by David DeCamp
Leaked files expose Syria psyops veteran astroturfing BreadTube star
to counter Covid restriction critics
by Kit Klarenberg and Max Blumenthal
Palestine in Pictures: December 2021
by The Electronic Intifada
Photo-Shopped History: Editing Out Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Support for Palestine
by Clinton Nzala
2021 was the deadliest year for Palestinians since 2014, says Israeli human rights group
by Jessica Corbett
Qassem Soleimani’s Assassination Has Backfired on the US and Israel
by Marco Carnelos
Israel Weighs A New Attack On Gaza, Allowing Hisham Abu Hawash To Die On Hunger Strike
by Robert Inlakesh
Israel Talks Scared and Tough on Iran: It Has Little Reason to be Either
by Miko Peled
A More Aggressive Israel Lobby Is Coming in 2022
'Jihadis You Pay For' - Western State-Sponsored Terrorism And The BBC Coverup
with Ryan Cristián
UK pivots to Israel in post-Brexit scramble
by Omar Karmi
Victory for hunger striker after 141 days
by Tamara Nassar
Probing the Depths of the CIA’s Misdeeds in Africa
by Alex Park
Narrative and Reality of the Libyan Crisis
by Manlio Dinucci
Neocolonialism Haunts Horn of Africa
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
Using and Abusing Djibouti: How the US Transformed
a Tiny African state Into a Hub of Imperial Aggression
by T.J. Coles
What is driving the growing instability in the East African region?
with George Galloway
America’s Foreign Policy Death Spiral
by Walter L. Hixson
Attack Against Haiti’s De Facto Prime Minister on Independence Day - http://www.blackagendareport.com/attack-against-haitis-de-facto-prime-minister-independence-day-core-group
by José Manuel Blanco Diaz
Marxism and Black Liberation w/Frank Chapman
with Danny Haiphong and Margaret Kimberley
131 Years Ago Today, the U.S. Army Massacred Native Sioux
at Wounded Knee
by Richard S. Dunn
2021 Latin America and the Caribbean in Review: The Pink Tide Rises Again
Edward Bernays: Propaganda and the U.S.-Backed 1954 Guatemalan Coup
by Robert Skvarla
Cuba Defeats Covid-19 with Learning, Science, and Unity
by W.T. Whitney
‘Historically large win’: Chile votes for socialism over fascism
by Common Dreams Staff
‘History is ours’: Chile avenges Allende
by Salvador Allende and Yoshie Furuhashi
We Must Have Accountability for Corporate Crime
by Thom Hartmann
Radioactive Contamination: Japan Plans to Dump Water from Fukushima Plant into the Pacific Ocean
by Mong Palatino and Nevin Thompson
Living in Epoch-Defining Times: Food, Agriculture and the New World Order
by Colin Todhunter
Corporations are making millions of dollars from US prison labor
by Michael Sainato
Freedom of Information Act request shines a light on how much private corporations and government agencies have been exploiting prison labor during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Why US prisons
don’t want prisoners to read
with Eddie Conway
2022: The Year the US achieves Collapse
by Dmitry Orlov
The American polity is cracked, and might collapse.
Canada must prepare
by Thomas Homer-Dixon
The U.S. is becoming increasingly ungovernable, and some experts believe it could descend into civil war. What should Canada do then?
America's 'Suez moment': Another strategic mistake would be its last
by David Hearst
US as primary source of terrorism
by Viktor Mikhin
Deep State Exists, And LIBERALS Are Doing Its Bidding
with Matt Taibbi
There Is a Direct Link Between JFK, 9/11 and COVID-19
by Edward Curtin and Geopolitics and Empire
Choking the Afghan People to Death
by Daniel Larison
Afghanistan War Was For Money Laundering & Drug Trafficking, NOT Freedom & Women’s Rights"
with Tariq Ali
Civilian Casualty Files Reveal U.S. Hid Thousands of Deaths
in Middle East Air War
with Azmat Khan
Biden’s Four Biggest Mideast Challenges in 2022
by Juan Cole
Why is Biden Pushing Putin
with Larry Wilkerson
George Galloway sheds light on Maxwell family
and its links to Jeffrey Epstein
with George Galloway
Macron slammed for saying he wants to ‘p*** off’ unvaccinated
French president has been accused of overstepping the line by using a phrase considered vulgar in France.
Stigmatizing the Unvaxxed and Unboosted
“Mass Formation Psychosis: ‘You’re a Criminal Because You’re
End mass jabs and live with Covid, says ex-head of vaccine taskforce
by James Tapper, Michael Savage and Robin McKie
They’re Doing WHAT To The Weather?!!”
Isn’t This SCIENCE FICTION?!
with Russell Brand
Jab 4-6 Here To Fight "Delmicron" "Flurona", 4th Jab Wanes
After 2 Months & Climate Authoritarianism
with Ryan Cristián
Many people who can become pregnant are already living
in a post-"Roe" world
Phew : The Corbett Report
with James Corbett