Bulletin #14

From: Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>
Subject: A Venezuela Report.

15 April 2002
Grenoble, France

Dear Colleagues,

The Grenoble Center of American Institutions and Social Movements has just
received this article forwarded by Michael Albert, founder of of Z Magazine
and an associate director at our Research Center in Grenoble. The
Coup/Countrer Coup in Venezuela in the past 72 hours offers exceptional
insights into power politics and US foreign policy. Gregory Wilpert's
report from Venezuela should be read with the famous maxim of Otto von
Bismark in mind : "All powers are tarveling on the stream of Time, which
they can neither create nor direct, but upon which they can steer with more
or less skill and expertice...."

What, we may ask, did Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security
adviser, mean yesterday when she warned the the Venezuelan President of his
"second chance" : ``We do hope that Chavez recognizes that the whole world
is watching and that he takes advantage of this opportunity to right his
own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for quite
a long time."

Venezuela, the No. 3 supplier of oil to the United States and the world's
fourth biggest exporter must learn to respect the rules of democracy,
according to President Bush. And the world is watching as these lessons are
being taught to these Latin Americans.

Beyond the post-modern rhetoric, what options really exist to keep
Venezuela in line with the other oil-producing countries, now that the
Kyoto Protocol is behind us?

Yours truly,

F. Feeley

Venezuela: Not a Banana-Oil Republic after All
by Gregory Wilpert

The Counter-Coup
It looks like Venezuela is not just another banana-oil republic after
all. Many here feared that with the April 11 coup attempt against
President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela was being degraded to being just
another country that is forced to bend to the powerful will of the
United States. The successful counter-coup of April 14, though, which
reinstated Chavez, proved that Venezuela is a tougher cookie than the
coup planners thought.

The coup leaders against President Chavez made two fundamental
miscalculations. First, they started having delusions of grandeur,
believing that the support for their coup was so complete that they
could simply ignore the other members of their coup coalition and place
only their own in the new government. The labor union federation CTV,
which saw itself as one of the main actors of the opposition movement to
President Chavez, and nearly all moderate opposition parties were
excluded from the new "democratic unity" cabinet. The new transition
cabinet ended up including only the most conservative elements of
Venezuelan society. They then proceeded to dissolve the legislature, the
Supreme Court, the attorney general's office, the national electoral
commission, and the state governorships, among others. Next, they
decreed that the 1999 constitution, which had been written by a
constitutional assembly and ratified by vote, following the procedures
outlined in the pervious constitution, was to be suspended. The new
transition president would thus rule by decree until next year, when new
elections would be called. Generally, this type of regime fits the
textbook definition of dictatorship.

This first miscalculation led to several generals' protest against the
new regime, perhaps under pressure from the excluded sectors of the
opposition, or perhaps out of a genuine sense of remorse, and resulted
in their call for changes to the sweeping "democratic transition"
decree, lest they withdraw their support from the new government.
Transition President Pedro Carmona, the chair of Venezuela's largest
chamber of commerce, immediately agreed to reinstate the Assembly and to
the rest of the generals' demands.

The second miscalculation was the belief that Chavez was hopelessly
unpopular in the population and among the military and that no one
except Cuba and Colombia's guerilla, the FARC, would regret Chavez'
departure. Following the initial shock and demoralization which the coup
caused among Chavez-supporters, this second miscalculation led to major
upheavals and riots in Caracas' sprawling slums, which make up nearly
half of the city. In practically all of the "barrios" of Caracas
spontaneous demonstrations and "cacerolazos" (pot-banging) broke out on
April 13 and 14. The police immediately rushed-in to suppress these
expressions of discontent and somewhere between 10 and 40 people were
killed in these clashes with the police. Then, in the early afternoon,
purely by word-of-mouth and the use of cell phones (Venezuela has one of
the highest per capita rates of cell phone use in the world), a
demonstration in support of Chavez was called at the Miraflores
presidential palace. By 6 PM about 100,000 people had gathered in the
streets surrounding the presidential palace. At approximately the same
time, the paratrooper battalion, to which Chavez used to belong, decided
to remain loyal to Chavez and took over the presidential palace. Next,
as the awareness of the extent of Chavez' support spread, major
battalions in the interior of Venezuela began siding with Chavez.

Eventually the support for the transition regime evaporated among the
military, so that transition president Carmona resigned in the name of
preventing bloodshed. As the boldness of Chavez-supporters grew, they
began taking over several television stations, which had not reported a
single word about the uprisings and the demonstrations. Finally, late at
night, around midnight of April 14, it was announced that Chavez was set
free and that he would take over as president again. The crowds outside
of Miraflores were ecstatic. No one believed that the coup could or
would be reversed so rapidly. When Chavez appeared on national TV around
4 AM, he too joked that he knew he would be back, but he never imagined
it would happen so fast. He did not even have time to rest and write
some poetry, as he had hoped to do.

So how could this be? How could such an impeccably planned and smoothly
executed coup fall apart in almost exactly 48 hours? Aside from the two
miscalculations mentioned above, it appears that the military's hearts
were not fully into the coup project. Once it became obvious that the
coup was being hijacked by the extreme right and that Chavez enjoyed
much more support than was imagined, large parts of the military decided
to reject the coup, which then had a snowball-effect of changing
military allegiances. Also, by announcing that one of the main reasons
for the coup was to avoid bloodshed and by stating that the Venezuelan
military would never turn its weapons against its own people, Chavez
supporters became more courageous to go out and to protest against the
coup without fear of reprisals.

Very important, though, was that the coup planners seem to have believed
their own propaganda: that Chavez was an extremely unpopular leader.
What they seem to have forgotten is that Chavez was not a fluke, a
phenomenon that appeared in Venezuela as a result of political chaos, as
some analysts seem to believe. Rather, Chavez' movement has its roots in
a long history of Venezuelan community and leftist organizing. Also, it
seems quite likely that although many people were unhappy with Chavez'
lack of rapid progress in implementing the reforms he promised, he was
still the most popular politician in the country.

The media and the opposition movement tried to create the impression
that Chavez was completely isolated and that no one supported him any
longer. They did this by organizing massive demonstrations, with the
extensive help of the television stations, which regularly broadcast
reports of the anti-Chavez protests, but consistently ignored the
pro-Chavez protests, which, by all fair accounts, tended to be just as
large. The television channels claimed that they did not cover
pro-Chavez demonstrations because protestors threatened their lives.
While this seems unlikely since the demonstrators usually unequivocally
want their demonstrations covered by the media, they could have gotten
protection, if they had cared to.

The Media
Nearly the entire media is owned and operated by Venezuela's oligarchy.
There is only one neutral newspaper, which is not an explicitly
anti-Chavez newspaper and one state-run television station. During the
coup, the state-run station was taken off the air completely and all of
the other media kept repeating the coup organizer's lies without
question. These lies included the claim that Chavez had resigned and had
dismissed his cabinet, that all of the demonstration's dead were
"martyrs of civil society" (i.e., of the opposition, since the media
does not consider Chavez supporters as part of civil society), and that
Chavez had ordered his supporters to shoot into the unarmed crowd of
anti-Chavez demonstrators.

The media never addressed the repeated doubts that members of Chavez'
cabinet raised about his resignation. Also, the media did not release
the names of those who were shot, probably because this would have shown
that most of the dead were pro-Chavez demonstrators. Finally, the media
edited the video footage of the shootings in such a way as to avoid
showing where the Chavez supporters were shooting-namely, as
eyewitnesses reported, at police and individuals who were shooting back
while hidden in doorways. Also, they did not show the pro-Chavez crowd
repeatedly pointing at the snipers who were firing at them from the
rooftop of a nearby building.

These media distortions in the aftermath of the coup drove home the
point just how powerful the media is at creating an alternate reality.
Those Chavez supporters who were at the demonstration and witnessed the
events realized more than ever that power needs a medium and that those
who control the media have much more power than they let on. This is why
the television stations became a key target in the hours leading up to
Chavez' reinstatement. The take-over of four of the eight stations was
essential to Chavez' comeback because it showed the rest of the military
and the rest of Venezuela that Chavez still had strong support among the
population and that if the people really wanted to, they could fight for
what was right and win.

Quo Vadis Chavez?
An aspect of the rise of Chavez to power that is often forgotten in
Venezuela is that as far as Venezuelan presidents are concerned, Chavez
has actually been among the least dictatorial. True, Chavez is a deeply
flawed president with many shortcomings, among which one of the most
important is his autocratic style. However, earlier presidencies, such
as that of Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993), the killing of demonstrators
were nearly a monthly occurrence. Also, the outright censorship of
newspapers was quite common during the Perez presidency. None of this
has happened during the Chavez presidency.

President Hugo Chavez is an individual who raises the passions of
people, pro or con, unlike anyone else. It almost seems that Venezuelans
either love him or hate him. A more balanced picture of the president,
however, would show, first, that he is someone who deeply believes in
working for social justice, for improving democracy, and believes in
international solidarity. Also, he is a gifted and charismatic speaker,
which makes him a natural choice as a leader.

However, one has to recognize that he has some very serious
shortcomings. Among the most important is that while he truly believes
in participatory democracy, as is evidenced in his efforts to
democratize the Venezuelan constitution, his instincts are that of an
autocrat. This has led to a serious neglect of his natural base, which
is the progressive and grassroots civil society. Instead, he has tried
to control this civil society by organizing "Bolivarian Circles" which
are neighborhood groups that are to help organize communities and at the
same time to defend the revolution. The opposition easily stigmatized
these circles, however, as being nothing other than a kind of SS for
Chavez' political party. Another crucial flaw has been his relatively
poor personnel choices. Many of the ministries and agencies suffer from

Finally and perhaps the most often mentioned flaw, is his tendency for
inflammatory rhetoric. Accusations that Chavez divided Venezuelan
society with his constant talk about the rich and the poor are
ridiculous, since Venezuelan society was divided along these lines long
before Chavez came to power. However, by trying to belittle his
opponents by calling them names, such as "escualidos" (squalids), he
made it virtually impossible for real dialogue to take place between
himself and his opponents. The crucial question that Chavez-supporters
and opponents alike are now asking is whether Chavez has grown through
the experience of this coup. In his initial statement after being freed
from his military captors, was, "I too have to reflect on many things.
And I have done that in these hours. . I am here and I am prepared to
rectify, wherever I have to rectify." Right now, however, it is too
early to see if he really is going to change his ways, so that he
becomes more productive in achieving the goals he has set for Venezuela.
While Chavez' many progressive achievements should not be forgotten,
neither should his failures be overlooked, most of which have important
lessons for progressives everywhere. The first lesson is to keep the
eyes on the prize. Chavez has become so bogged-down with small
day-to-day conflicts that many people are no longer sure if he remembers
his original platform, which was to abolish corruption and to make
Venezuelan society more egalitarian. While greater social equality is
extremely difficult to achieve in a capitalist society, it is fair to
say that Chavez' plans have not had enough time to bear fruit. He has a
six-year social and economic development plan for 2001-2007, of which
only a small fraction has so far been implemented. However, on the
corruption front, he has fallen seriously behind. The second lesson is
that the neglect of one's social base, which provides the cultural
underpinnings for desired changes, will provide an opening for opponents
to redefine the situation and to make policy implementation nearly
impossible. By not involving his natural base, the progressive and
grassroots civil society, Chavez allowed the conservative civil society,
the conservative unions, the business sector, the church, and the media
to determine the discourse as to what the "Bolivarian revolution" was
really all about. The third lesson is that a good program alone is not
good enough if one does not have the skillful means for implementing it.
Chavez has some terrific plans, but through his incendiary rhetoric he
manages to draw all attention away from his actual proposals and focuses
attention on how he presents them or how he cuts his critics down to
size. Finally, while it is tempting to streamline policy-implementation
by working only with individuals who will not criticize the program,
creates a dangerous ideological monoculture, which will not be able to
resist the diverse challenges even the best plans eventually have to
face. Chavez has consistently dismissed from his inner circle those who
criticized him, making his leadership base, which used to be quite
broad, smaller and smaller. Such a narrow leadership base made it much
easier for the opposition to challenge Chavez and to mount the coup.

Whether Chavez and his opposition have learned these lessons remains to
be seen. Venezuelan society is still deeply divided. One has to
recognize that, at heart, this conflict is also a class conflict. While
there certainly are many Chavez opponents who come from the lower
classes and numerous supporters from the upper classes, the division
between Chavez supporters who come from the lower light-skinned classes
and the opponents who come from the higher dark-skinned classes cannot
be denied. What Venezuela needs, if social peace is to be preserved, is
a class compromise, where social peace is maintained at the expense of a
more just distribution of Venezuela's immense wealth. However, today's
globalized world makes such a compromise increasingly difficult to
achieve because free market competition militates against local
solutions to this increasingly global problem. But perhaps Venezuela is
a special case because of its oil wealth, which might allow it to be an
exception. Such an exception, though, will only be possible if power
plays, such as the recent coup attempt, come to an end.

Gregory Wilpert lives in Caracas, is a former U.S. Fulbright scholar in
Venezuela, and is currently doing independent research on the sociology
of development. He can be reached at: Wilpert@cantv.net

Gregory Wilpert, Ph.D. Central
University of Venezuela, Caracas New School University, New York