Bulletin N°415



29 August 2009
Grenoble, France

Dear Colleagues and Friends of CEIMSA,

Re-reading C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) recently, I found a reference to "sweet reason," that quality of mind that allows us to make sense of our lives and the environment we live in. His book, The Sociological Imagination (1959), brought to mind two of my favorite etchings by Francisco Goya (1746-1828) :

« El sueño de la razón produce monstruos »                        and                                       « Tu que no puedes »      Goya 1                                             Goya 2
                                         (1797-98)                                                                                                      (1797-98)

In the introduction to his book, Mills describes the collapse of modern society, as he sees it, and the failings of "social scientists" to comprehend and address these problems.

     Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps. They sense that within their
everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often quite correct:
What ordinary men are directly aware of and what they try to do are bounded by the private orbits in
which they live; their visions and their powers are limited to the close-up scenes of job, family,
neighborhood; in other milieux, they move vicariously and remain spectators. And the more aware
they become, however vaguely, of ambitions and of threats which transcend their immediate locales,
the more trapped they seem to feel.
     Underlying this sense of being trapped are seemingly impersonal changes in the very structure of
continent-wide societies. The facts of contemporary history are also facts about the success and the
failure of individual men and women. When a society is industrialized, a peasant becomes a worker;
a feudal lord is liquidated or becomes a businessman. When classes rise or fall, a man  is employed
or unemployed ; when the rate of in vestment goes up or down, a man takes new heart or goes broke.
When wars happen, an insurance salesman becomes a rocket launcher; a store clerk, a radar man; a
wife lives alone; a child grows up without a father. Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a
society can be understood without understanding both.
Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional
contradiction. The well-being they enjoy, they do not usually impute to the big ups and downs of the
societies in which they live. Seldom aware of the intricate connection between the patterns of their
own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually know what this connection
means for the kinds of men they are becoming and the kinds of history-making in which they might take
part. They do not possess the quality of mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of
biography and history, of self and world. They cannot cope with their personal troubles in such ways as
to control the structural transformations that usually lie behind them.
     Surely it is no wonder. In what period have so many men been so totally exposed at so fast a pace to
such earthquakes of change? That Americans have not known such catastrophic changes as have the
men and women of other societies is due to historical facts that are now quickly becoming 'merely history.
'The history that now affects every man is world history. Within this scene and this period, in the course of
a single generation, one sixth of mankind is transformed from all that is feudal and backward into all that is
modern, advanced, and fearful. Political colonies are freed; new and less visible forms of imperialism
installed. Revolutions occur; men feel the intimate grip of new kinds of authority. Totalitarian societies rise,
and are smashed to bits --or succeed fabulously. After two centuries of ascendancy, capitalism is shown
up as only one way to make society into an industrial apparatus. After two centuries of hope, even formal
democracy is restricted to a quite small portion of mankind. Everywhere in the underdeveloped world,
ancient ways of life are broken up and vague expectations become urgent demands. Everywhere in the
overdeveloped world, the means of authority and of violence become total in scope and bureaucratic in form.
Humanity itself now lies before us, the super-nation at either pole concentrating its most co-ordinated and
massive efforts upon the preparation of World War Three.
     The very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men to orient themselves in accordance with
cherished values. And which  values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that older ways of
feeling and thinking have collapsed and that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis.
Is it any wonder that ordinary men feel they cannot cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly
confronted? That they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own lives? That --in defense of
selfhood-- they become morally insensible, trying to remain altogether private men? Is it any wonder that they
come to be possessed by a sense of the trap?
     It is not only information that they need --in this Age of Fact, information often dominates their attention and
overwhelms their capabilities to assimilate it. It is not only the skills of reason that they need --although their
struggles to acquire these often exhaust their limited moral energy.
     What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and
to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be
happening within themselves. It is this quality, I am going to contend, that journalists and scholars, artists and
publics, scientists and editors are coming to expect of what may be called the sociological imagination.(pp.3-5)

Mills wrote these words in 1959, and yet his description rings as true as if it were written today, in the midst of "the information revolution." He goes on to propose a solution to this dilemma :
     The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its
meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account
how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions.
Within that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a
variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused
upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public  issues.
     The first fruit of this imagination --and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it-- is the idea that
the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period,
that he can know his own chances in life only by \becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances.
In many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways a magnificent one. We do not know the limits of man's capacities
for supreme effort or willing degradation, for agony or glee, for pleasurable brutality or the sweetness of reason.
But in our time we have come to know that the limits of 'human nature' are frighteningly broad. We have come to
know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography,
and that he lives it out within some historical sequence. By the fact of his living he contributes, however minutely,
to the shaping of his society and to the course of its history, even as he is made by society and by is historical push
and shove.
     The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within
society. That is its task and its promise.(pp.5-6)

In the contemporary language of Rational Choice Theory, being "smart" usually means being sensitive or responsive to the environment. (The quicker you remove your finger from a burning coal, for example, the smarter you are.) According to this economic theory, "heuristics" and "algorithms" are central to defining intelligence --learning by self-discovery (heuristic) and methodical problem-solving (algorithmic).

Human technology, most people assume, is usually a quest to make life easier --from inventing the wheel (to aid mobility) to creating the computer (to solve complicated calculations). But computers, we are told, did not come from some obscure origin in the ninth dimension. Their models are closer to home. If we look carefully, we can see a pretty explicit link between the way computers work and the way the human brain works. A computer relies on binary symbols  --1s and 0s-- because they correspond to the two states of a switch: either off or on. However, even the most dogmatic behaviorist must make allowances here: the brain/computer comparison has its limitations. No one can deny that the brain is more complex, relying as it does on "weighted" signals:  the stronger the connection between two neurons, the more influence (more weight) it has on the resulting calculation. Also, it is generally acknowledged that the brain is a bit fuzzy and signals are not necessarily "on" or "off" --there's a lot of gray area.

Computers usually do their work in precise units of measurement. The old human brain, on the other hand, works much like a parallel-processing model, despite the disadvantage of slow-speed neural circuitry. For pattern recognition --a parallel-processing speciality-- the human mind does a great job. For extensive sequential thinking, however --having that billionth thought in a row-- the poor old gray matter falls short. Easy to see why: Life is short.

By contrast, the behavior patterns of prehistoric worms as recorded in fossils, show intricate designs from a lifetime of eating through the mud. C.H. Waddington (1905-1975), author of Tools for Thought (1977), explains what can be leaned from our prehistoric predecessors :
The whole of this idea started by people trying to understand some very funny patterns of grooves on the surface
of ancient muds which have by now turned into rocks; they must be fossil tracks of feeding worms, but how did
the worms behave to produce these odd patterns?(p.153)
Scientists have used this idea of worm travel to investigate the complexities of shape and behavior which can arise from following a few very simple instructions. Step by step (n+1) these worms ate their way through the mud, creating a path as they went which are now frozen in fossil remains. The mixture of symmetry and apparent disorder was surprising to these scientists, and a number of astonishingly complex and different patterns have been discovered. "One interesting aspect" wrote Michael Beeler,
is that, if a worm has grown a large, complicated tangle of path segments, there must . . . always be a trail of
uneaten segments leading from wherever it now is back into the original starting point. For large, dense tangles,
these trails resemble a channel, like a canal for barges-- and it is intriguing to watch the worm wind itself around
and around the tangled blob, each time missing the channel until finally it happens to fall into the channel and is
then forced to follow it back to the origin and die.(p.158)

    Oldest worm trail discovered
Worm trail fossil (Science)
Fossils in rocks thought to have been deposited
1.2 billion years ago could be the oldest evidence
of animal life discovered so far.

The importance of this study, according to Waddington (whose profession was genetic science) is that computer experiments in  n+1 progressions (like that of worms)
show that the human mind simply is not, at this point in evolutionary time, set up to be of any use in foretelling what
will be the final outcome of following some quite simple program of behavior. Nor can we foresee how the overall
appearance of the system will change as its development proceeds.(p.156) . . .
The computer games that have evolved out of worm behavior, Waddington goes on to observe,
are striking warnings about the kinds of behavior we have to expect during the history of societies, or economic
systems, or men programmed by their genes; their overall configuration may change in very unexpected ways as
further and further steps in the programs become realized, even if there are no changes in the programs themselves.
One cannot expect it to be easy to foretell the result of carrying on with one and the same economic system, let alone
forecast what will happen if one introduces an alteration of the rules. And what is the sense in discussing genetically
limited differences in IQ between races and other human groups, when we have no idea whether their genetic programs
are 'terminating' ones, or never reach a final stage; and also have no way of knowing how far various people are along
the path of working out their program?(p.158)
By this logic, Waddington concludes that humankind is handicapped by mental limitations to understand the consequences of its actions. It proceeds blindly, unmindful that its behavior has been largely formatted, and unaware of the consequences of its occasional choices.
Civilization, working out successive steps in a program of power, energy, competition, builds up a tangle skein
of complexities, which always, at step n , looks as though you don't need to bother about anything but how to get
to step n + 1 --and then it hits a situation-- the atom bomb? the Revolt against Reason?-- and . . . can't stop till it's
back at Square One, the Paleolithic, but this time with all the cream, the easily exploited natural resources, already
skimmed off the milk. Perhaps these funny mathematical worms are simply putting into up-stage intellectual terms
the point William Blake (1757-1827) made:

O ROSE, thou are sick!
The invisible worm
That flies in the night,
In the howling storm,
Has found out they bed
Of crimson joy,
And his dark secret love
Does thy life destroy.(pp.158-159)

In the 7 items below we can see that like our distant relatives, the worms, we are faced with choices despite the programs that we've inherited. To turn right, to turn left, to continue straight ahead; or to reverse our course and head for our origins. Both continuity and discontinuity is likely to result in new patterns with new results, depending on our starting point and the injunctions we might receive as feedback occurs along the way. If these patterns remain largely unforeseeable to the human mind, we may nevertheless hope that in a more humane society, the n + 1 after America's military defeat in central Asia, will lead the Bush family to move to Baghdad and spend the remainder of their natural lives emptying bedpans in hospitals and doing other work to comfort the mutilated and orphaned whom they created in such large numbers during stage n of their personal histories. The ramifications of such acts of contrition would reverberate around the world, and a new complex pattern of human behavior might actually emerge, constituting  no doubt an improvement over the one which is so carefully documented in these critical articles below.

Item A. is a essay sent to us by Professor Edward S. Herman on the possible implosion of the Left in the United States today.

Item B. is an essay (versions in English and French) by Professor Gabriel Kolko on that cruel irony called "Israel," and its indispensable enemy for greater short-term profits in Gaza.

Item C. is an essay by Professor Gabriel Kolko on the folly of an idea like "the global capitalist political economic system".

Item D., sent to us by Grenoble graduate student, Marwen Rahif, is a video documentary by a Texas populist, Alex Jones, the producer of End Game, now covering popular protests against "the ruling class" in The Obama Deception addressing, among others, the Bilderberg Group, the Bohemian Grove Club, the Trilateral Commission, etc., etc. . . . Is it a "conspiracy" or simply "the rational pursuit of self-interests?"

Item E. was sent to us by another Texas populist, Jim Hightower, whose book, Ces truands qui nous gouvernent, CEIMSA translated into French in 2004, publishing it at the time of his arrival in Grenoble for our International Conference on : The Contemporary State of American Political Culture (22-23 April 2004).

Item F., sent to us by New York City Professor John Gerassi, is a film documenting racial discrimination during a protest at a town meeting in Missouri.

Item G., sent to us by Grenoble community organizer, Jo Bryant, is the announcement a new book, GAZA: 22 JOURS DE GUERRE, 22 HISTOIRES DE VIE, now available at the Centre d'Information Inter-Peuples (CIIP).

And finally, we close this CEIMSA bulletin with a particularly up-lifting Democracy Now! retrospective of The Young Lords, a U.S.-Puerto Rican revolutionary youth group patterned on the Black Panther Party, and who were active in New York City in the 1960s and 70s :


Francis McCollum Feeley
Professor of American Studies
Director of Research
Université Stendhal Grenoble 3

from Edward Herman :
Date: 25 August 2009
Subject: Moving to the right. . . .

The Responsibility to Protect, the International Criminal Court, and Foreign Policy in Focus: Subverting the UN Charter
in the Name of Human Rights
by Edward S. Herman and David Peterson


from Gabriel Kolko :
Date: 21 January 2009
Subject: A cruel irony called Israel.

How to Inflame the Entire Muslim World

Understanding Gaza

by Gabriel Kolko

How will history describe the Israeli war against the Palestinians in Gaza? Another Holocaust, this time perpetrated by the descendants of the victims? An election ploy by ambitious Israeli politicians to win votes in the February 10 elections? A test range for new American weapons? Or an effort to lock in the new Obama Administration into an anti-Iranian position? An attempt to establish its military “credibility” after its disastrous defeat in the war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006? Perhaps all of these…and more.

But one thing is certain. Israel has killed at least 100 Palestinians for each of its own claimed losses, a vast disproportion that has produced horror in much of the world, creating a new cause which has mobilized countless numbers of people ­possibly as strong as the Vietnam war movement. It has made itself a pariah nation ­save in the United States and a few other countries. Above all, it has enflamed the entire Muslim world

As Bruce Riedel, a “hawk” who has held senior posts in the CIA for nearly 30 years and is now one of President Obama’s many advisers, has just written: “…the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central all-consuming issue for al Quaeda,” and “Muslims feel a profound sense of wrong about the creation of Israel that infuses every aspect thinking and activities and has become the rallying cry used the convince the ummah of the righteousness of al Quaeda’s cause.” That was before Gaza. Much of the world now detests Israel but most it will live for many years to come with the consequences of Israel’s atrocities. Muslim extremists will now become much stronger.

Charges of war crimes are now being leveled ­and justifiably so­ at the Israelis, many of whom themselves come from families that suffered in the hands of the Nazis over 60 years ago and now claim that the Holocaust was the only tragedy ­as if the far more numerous deaths of goyim throughout the world after 1945 count for nothing. The United Nations and human rights groups are demanding that Israel be brought to justice for what now amounts to having killed over 1300 Gazans with immense firepower, many of which, like phosphorous bombs, are illegal. Israel has already prepared its senior officers to be ready to defend themselves against war crimes charges and Israeli Attorney General Menahem Mazuz several weeks ago warned the government was expecting a “wave of international lawsuits.”

It will now have to live with the geo-political consequences in the region. Israel has, perhaps irreparably, imperiled its relations with the neighboring Arab states and other Muslim nations ­Qatar and Mauritania have already suspended diplomatic relations with it­ less because the ruling classes of these nations want to penalize it but because the Arab masses demand it, imperiling their own positions as rulers.

Even more important, although the United States has loyally supported Israel for decades, deluging it with the most modern arms and giving it diplomatic protection, it is now in an economic crisis and needs Arab money, not to mention oil imports, as never before. The stability of this crucial alliance will now be tested.

Since its inception, a cult of machismo­ called self-defense­ characterized much of Zionism, and although there were idealists like A. D. Gordon, the mainstream was more and more committed to a violent response to the Arabs who surrounded them. The military was increasing glorified, including by nominal Leftists like David Ben Gurion, so that today Israel is a regional Sparta armed with the most modern military and nuclear weapons, giving it a virtual monopoly in a vast region ­one that will inevitably be challenged.

Uri Avnery, a leading Israeli anti-war activist, has just written that “… hundreds of millions of Arabs around us… will they see the Hamas fighters as the heroes of the Arab nation, but they will also see their own regimes in their nakedness: cringing, ignominious, corrupt and treacherous….In coming years it will become apparent that this war was sheer madness.”

We are living through yet another great tragedy, and tragedies have been the staple of world history for centuries. Now former victims and their descendants are the executioners.

from Gabriel Kolko :
Date: 2 August 2009
Subject: The folly of capitalist political economy.

July 31 - August 2, 2009

The Contours of Recent American Foreign Policy
Searching For Enemies

by Gabriel Kolko

War, from preparation for it through to its aftermath, has defined both the essential nature of the major capitalist nations and their relative power since at least 1914. War became the major catalyst of change for revolutionary movements in Russia, China, and Vietnam. While wars also created reactionary and fascistic parties, particularly in the case of Italy and Germany, in the longer run they brought about domestic social changes of far-reaching magnitude. The Bolshevik Revolution was the preeminent example of this ironic symbiosis of war and revolution.

Wars not only created social disorder within nations, producing revolutions on the right and left, they also reduced the ability of capitalist states to compete economically with each other. To a significant degree, the United States’ economic supremacy up to the Vietnam War was based on the economic consequences of the two World Wars for Europe. Europe made war while America produced war goods for them until it was ready to enter into war later on its own terms. After 1964, the pattern was reversed, as the US weakened itself through war while the Europeans and Japanese made consumer goods and prospered.

The policy choices made by the US and most other nations always depended on the health – or lack of it – of the economy. Economic necessities restrict the options policy-makers can consider. What a nation can afford is crucial in determining what it can do in the long run. The nature of a power structure – which individuals and classes have the most influence – in turn shapes the range of policies that decision-makers are likely to select from. The political role of the corporations with the most to gain in a nation has always been greatly disproportionate to their numbers. They have created a larger consensus among those who matter most in politics. They have provided, to a remarkable degree, the personnel and expertise essential for the evaluation and direction of foreign policy. All this may seem perfectly self-evident but it is worth reminding ourselves that – among other things but often principally – foreign policies reflect the nature of interested parties, which may be corporate (a constituency itself often very divided), or ethnic (constituencies no less divided by their conceptions of how best the US should relate to situations), or include other interest groups of every shape and variety.

Historically, the main capitalist nations maintained a consensus against all social revolutions in the Third World. This consensus, however, eroded and fell apart as national trade interests came to into play over rivalries for oil and critical raw materials, and as the desire to integrate ex-colonial nations (as artificial as many were) into spheres of influence became more pressing. As a result, there was an escalating power conflict between Western Europe, the United States, Japan, and, more recently, China. The war in Vietnam made the new assertiveness and real power of other nations possible, as the inflation- and deficit-ridden American economy saw the dollar weakened and the gold standard abandoned under Lyndon Johnson.

All that the US made certain was uncertainty itself, leading to a future marked by frequent crises in financial and foreign policy areas, depending on the interests involved. All of this seems self-evident, but is apparently not so to those who rule nations, largely because the interests at stake are always different and there are simply too many nuances to master.

Radical critics cannot draw up a timetable or predict the exact magnitude of future crises because their analytic perceptions are deficient, having lost their appeal and sounding increasingly hollow. But those who rule our political and economic institutions have the problem of resolving the challenges they inherit, and their past incapacity to do so without creating turmoil for some constituency of American society – generally the poor and underprivileged – bequeaths a dismal future to those who are likely to lose the most.

The problem of running a vast foreign and military policy, not just for the United States but also for other nations, is that all decisions on vital questions are filtered through the prism of ambition. Since men and women who aspire to attain influence and power very often give advice with a view to advancing their own careers, they are generally anything but objective assessors of options. Decisions are made to attain success; choices are rarely made with an eye on the facts. The war in Iraq was an example of this. In April 2008 the National Defense University report on the Iraq War, which called it “a major debacle,” was written by men who had originally fully supported the war in order to advance their careers, realizing later that it was essential to turn against since it was politically expedient to keep Congressional money flowing. Decisions, in short, ought to be arrived at without reference to the demands of the bureaucratic system or the calculations of individuals as to how a given decision will affect their personal future. But the current decision-making system is tainted. Errors may be made innocently, as they frequently are, by misjudging facts or being ignorant of vital information, but the system also has the problem of ambitious people. All rational expectation theories, including the schematic notions of Max Weber and the like in sociology, make very similar errors.

All of Bush’s major policies, especially his wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the grandiose neoconservative agenda to make the US the dominant world power, failed, leaving a legacy of fear and hatred in the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, while making an enemy of Russia and weakening America’s traditional alliances. These policies also made Bush the most unpopular President in American history. Rather than vindicate the Pentagon’s power and succeed in extirpating terrorist evils, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown yet again that the US cannot impose its will on nations determined to resist it. They have also gravely destabilized the Muslim world, Pakistan, and the entire South Asia region, making nuclear proliferation a greater danger than ever. As with its attempt to destroy the Vietnamese communists, the US attack on Saddam Hussein’s regime again revealed the limits of its power. Worse yet, in the Middle East Bush’s war in Iraq has – as his father feared it would – left Iran as the dominant power in the region and transformed the balance of power in favor of a nation the US chose to make its enemy. Contradictions and disasters are the leitmotif of virtually everything the second George Bush did, but there is also a crucial continuity between his own Administration and that of his father from 1989 through 1992.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 the US lacked an identifiable enemy. Now that the Cold War adversary was gone, the fear of communism had to be replaced by another mobilizing anxiety. President George H.W. Bush and most of his advisers wished to see the USSR survive in some form. “We have an interest in the stability of the Soviet Union,” Brent Scowcroft, the President’s National Security Adviser, told Bush. “Historical enemies would be less constrained by the bipolar Superpower alignments,” the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in 1991. Communism had been dangerous but predictable, and the danger now was “international deregulation.” What was essential was a new doctrine to replace fear of communism, one that would keep Congress and the American public ready to spend inordinate sums to sustain the US military as the strongest on earth.

The first President Bush assigned this definitional problem to his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, who later became Vice-President under his son. Cheney published a grandiose picture of a dominant American military power so great and omnipotent – and expensive – globally that no nation could rival it. The policy was vague as to which nation or enemy it was directed against, but it included the abandonment of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and a commitment to the use of nuclear weapons against lesser threats: weapons of mass destruction, menaces of an indefinable nature. It was never repudiated, in fact was essentially continued, by the Clinton Administration. It was later to form the basis of the neoconservative vision under the second Bush Administration. Indeed, it has not been repudiated by anyone, whether Republicans or Democrats, even to this day. When parts of Cheney’s vision were published in 1993 the Japanese and the Germans were already deemed to be, once again, potential challengers to American power. After the Gulf War of 1990, Iraq was considered an enemy but also strategically important to the US simply because Saddam Hussein – once a friend the US and recipient of billions of dollars of aid – effectively contained Iranian power. Who was the enemy? If this has remained unclear, it is today US policy that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats – abandoning deterrence for something far more amorphous in terms of its practical consequences.

The continuity between of the reigns of the two Presidents Bush is clear enough, as is the fact that the use of nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear threats, and the abandonment of deterrence, was also the policy of the Clinton Administration. They in turn were all part of a confrontation with the world that began under President Harry Truman. Cheney was scarcely an accident: he became Vice-President to fulfill a consummately ambitious doctrine committed to dangers, and although the senior Bush later regretted the way the policy was interpreted, he was also the author of what has proved the most grandiose of all efforts: articulating a mobilizing doctrine to replace the fear of communism with an indefinable enemy and threat that will justify the Pentagon’s immense and growing budget.

The United States’ problem is compounded today by the deepening disparity between its military doctrines and reality, and by much else. When we discuss US foreign policy we must differentiate between the ideology and the motives that have guided it in the Western Hemisphere, from as early as 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine excluded the colonial European powers from any further expansion and left the entire region to the US, which even then was eyeing great parts of Mexico and the Spanish empire for itself. (Even today, only 82 per cent of all Americans speak English. Most of the others speak Spanish.) The US interventions that came much later in Europe were ad hoc responses to the crises between European nations that emerged from the breakup of colonialism, or to fears of communism – sometimes real but often fictional and convenient. Many of these responses were unpredictable and involved everything from a need to ensure the “credibility” of military power – as in Vietnam – to sheer ideological fixation and a belief that firepower would solve political challenges quickly, as in the case of the present war in Iraq. Crises in the Western Hemisphere, like those that emerged elsewhere since 1947, may also have involved unpredictability, but the US role in the West has often, perhaps always, possessed a crucial geopolitical dimension that rarely, perhaps never, existed in Asia or the Middle East. Economically and strategically one must always look at crises in the Western Hemisphere through a prism that is much older – and more vital to the United States’ real interests. Less than a fifth of its petroleum today comes from the entire Persian Gulf, where it is fighting what has become a major war. Wars in the Eastern Hemisphere take the US away from its own interest and history.

But the United States seeks and finds other problems. The Korean War first revealed its inability to match a fighting and technological capacity directed against Soviet and centralized or urban targets – for which its atomic bombs and mobile armor were best suited – and the decentralized battlefields which it confronted in Korea and Vietnam, and later confronted in Iraq, to mention only the best known. The Vietnam War was a futile, expensive, and protracted effort to use high mobility and airpower – helicopters and B52s – to fight a jungle-based, highly decentralized guerilla army. There was even then growing doctrinal confusion, compounded by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and today the US suffers an even more acute doctrinal crisis. Its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been costly beyond imagination, will endure long after those who began them leave Washington, and yet will end in failure. There is a rationale for higher Defense spending because it sustains arms builders who have tremendous power in Washington, but their promises of success have proven a chimera. Indeed, military contractors often simply want to sell arms, not use them. Some of them, indeed, may even be against the wars in which their products are employed.

The disparity between military technology and reality has also affected America’s allies, such as Israel. Today this gap between what its military arm can do and political reality poses an even graver problem for America than did the wars in Korea and Vietnam. The American military cannot organize sufficiently well for its missions because they are potentially limitless – taking in Asia, South and Central America, Eastern Europe and Russia, and the entire world. It was not able to fight successfully in either Korea or Vietnam, and its foreign and military policies are often an adventure. The US never fought a communist nation in Eastern Europe though it prepared to do so. It succeeds, if at all, only in very small nations where its proxies are not venal and corrupt. But communist Cuba has existed since 1959!

The problem for the United States is that communism for practical purposes has virtually ceased to exist – what passes as communism in China, Vietnam, or North Korea is increasingly no more than a pretentious fraud. They are de facto capitalist nations or Confucian tyrannies. The US does not know who its enemies are and has the military muscle, and technology, designed to fight only communism. So long as communism was the enemy a US-led alliance could be bound together by a unifying theme. When fear of communism disappeared, more particular interests took over and nations began finding their own way while distancing themselves from American leadership. History since 1991 has become far more complicated – a fact America’s leaders in Washington realized as soon as the USSR collapsed. The world has become far more unstable and unpredictable and the so-called “globalization” of the world economy has made it more rather than less precarious.

Now nations have power without ideology in the true sense of that term, leaving the US confused as never before. The ideological era is over, for capitalists as well as those descended from the Marxist tradition. “Terrorism” is no less confusing. Is it Islamic jihadist, secular nationalist, or what? US efforts against “terrorism” are often counterproductive, as in Afghanistan and Somalia, leaving its enemies stronger than ever. American foreign policy is in crisis because the world is now in transition, emerging from 70 years of Bolshevism into an amorphous political landscape in which a coherent, identifiable adversary can no longer be found.

Worse yet for the United States, its preoccupation with one nation or region – Vietnam and Iraq are perfect examples – means that it lacks the resources to destroy often far more serious opposition elsewhere. The US adventure in Vietnam meant that Castro’s Cuba had the time and space to consolidate. The Afghan and Iraq wars have likewise allowed a slew of Leftist regimes in South America virtual freedom to consolidate, even though ultimately the Western Hemisphere is far more important to the US, strategically at least, than are the wars it loses elsewhere. In a word, the US squanders its vast but ultimately limited resources capriciously. It cannot manage its power rationally.

Above all, its martial adventures abroad cost far more than the US can now afford. Now is an inauspicious moment to be an imperial power: the prices of the commodities the US imports are rising, its current account deficit is worsening, the value of the dollar is falling, while the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have become the most expensive in American history. The US began to fight in Afghanistan in October 2001, but has failed to capture Osama Bin Laden, perpetrator of the September 11 killing of 3,000 Americans in New York. Meanwhile, the Taliban is becoming stronger and the conflict has spread into northern Pakistan, destabilizing that nation’s politics. Since Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, Washington feels there is a grave risk that Muslim extremists will acquire such a weapon and then be capable of destroying an American city, or all of Israel.

Everything is going wrong for the United States in terms of its power position globally. Russia – rich from selling gas and oil, while spending on its military less than a fifth of the US expenditure in 2006 – is still the US’s equal in terms of nuclear weapons, and outflanks the US in Central Asia, the Middle East, and much of the Islamic world. It sells sophisticated arms to many nations, has economic agreements with Arab and Muslim countries, and has become a growing obstacle to America’s influence and power. Russia is just as much a danger to the US as when Stalin ruled. Nuclear proliferation is now a grave problem, with an unpredictable but growing number of nations equipped with nuclear bombs and terrorists more and more likely to get hold of them. As for chemical and biological weapons, the US never even caught its anthrax killer soon after the September 11 attack. At the same time, the Bush Administration’s strategy on Iran is being undermined by rising oil and gas prices, which also have the effect of making the successors of the Soviet system even richer. There is a fatal, impossible contradiction between US goals – to eliminate the present Teheran regime and contain Russian power – and rising petroleum prices. American policy on Russia is a shambles.

In crucial ways, the basic approach and limits of US foreign policy are hardly unusual. The US suffers from the kind of problems that have affected many nations over the past centuries. The only difference is that the US had, and to a great degree still has, power even while undergoing a transition away from the omnipotence it enjoyed after 1945. That alone is its distinction. The existing system – whether American or not – has the fundamental problem that it cannot be run according to rational criteria, and like Marxism it has no “laws.” In every nation, in every branch of life – military, political, cultural – there are a sufficient number of adventurers, opportunists, egomaniacs, psychotics, or destructive individuals who create or accept disorder. In the case of the US, James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, jumped out of the window of a naval hospital – to which he was confined for paranoia – in May 1949, allegedly because he believed war with the USSR was imminent. Other types – sheer opportunists such as the neoconservatives crucial in the Bush Administration – wish to accumulate power alone. Ideologies are very often merely a disguise for ambition. This limit, again, exists everywhere, not just the United States, and regardless of whether the party in power calls itself “socialist,” “capitalist,” or whatever.

Cynicism is prevalent, and often the only motive of political behavior. We can see it in Russia or Great Britain today. And this is the case not simply with respect to foreign policy, but in relation to every aspect of existing society.

People, whether theorists, administrators, or whatever, cannot regulate or predict systems run by ambitious individuals, and they frequently cannot regulate systems run by perfectly sincere people either – it is simply far too difficult. There is often an immense disparity between what politicians – whatever they call themselves and no matter which nation they belong to – do and what they say. What they do, not what they say, is crucial, because in countless places they have often betrayed their followers.
Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War? and The Age of War: the US Confronts the World and After Socialism. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is World in Crisis, from which this essay has been excerpted.

from Marwen Rahif :
Date: 23 August 2009
Subject: A film critical of President Obama.

Dear Mr Feeley,
Here is a link to a very intresting documentary on Obama. It's really worth watching.
Peace and solidarity,

The Omama Deception

by Alex Jones


from Jim Hightower :
Date 25 August 2009
Subject: Compensating Wall Street's Sociopaths and more!

If you get a thrill from taking a white-knuckle ride on a loop-the-loop, you don't have to wait for the state fair ­ just hop onto thhe right-wing express, which is plunging into ludicrous levels of loopiness in an effort to kill Barack Obama's health care reform plan.

Taking Us for a Ride on Health Care

Read the rest of this column on Creators.com


Tuesday, August 18, 2009   |   Posted by Jim Hightower
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If you want to take a stomach-churning ride on a loop-the-loop, you don't have to go to the state fair - just plug-in to the loony attacks right-wingers have launched against Barack Obama's health-care reform... [read more]


Wednesday, August 19, 2009   |   Posted by Jim Hightower
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In opposing Sonia Sotomayor's Supreme Court nomination, Republican senators loudly denounced judicial activists who would use the bench to rewrite the founders' intent and invent new laws to advance a political agenda.

... [read more]


Thursday, August 20, 2009   |   Posted by Jim Hightower
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The chilling caw of the raven in Edgar Allen Poe's classic tale of horror was, "Nevermore."

In a modern update, however, a covey of greed-crested Wall Street bankers have one-upped... [read more]


Friday, August 21, 2009   |   Posted by Jim Hightower
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At last, a powerhouse competitor has challenged the market dominance of the corporate coffee colossus, Starbucks. The name of the upstart competitor? Starbucks.

Well, actually, you won't find the corporate name... [read more]


Monday, August 24, 2009   |   Posted by Jim Hightower
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Our country's corporatized health care system is so uncaring that 76 percent of Americans tell pollsters it must be "fundamentally changed" or "completely rebuilt." But Rick Scott says uh-uh - what health care needs is... [read more]

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from John Gerassi :
Date: 19 August 2009
Subject: Where's NBC, ABC, FOX on this one?

Life in Amerikkka !
Looks like in Missouri rules are different for the other side--Only CNN covered this action.


from Jo Bryant :
Date: 21 August 2009
Subject: La parole aux hommes et femmes de Gaza: un témoignage exceptionnel.

Notez bien: le Centre d'Information Inter-Peuples est dépositaire de plusieurs exemplaires d'un livre unique, terrifiant, "nu" intitulé tout simplement: "GAZA: 22 JOURS DE GUERRE, 22 HISTOIRES DE VIE", réalisé par Jean-Michel Asselin, Grenoblois quia pu aller sur place, avec des médecins de "Help doctors", une des seules organisations humanitaires qui a été sur place lors de ce massacre horrible de la population de Gaza par l'armée israélienne fin décembre 2008/début janvier 2009. Il faut lire ces témoignages... Il y a en plus un autre ouvrage, un album photos réalisé par Help Doctors: le tout pour 20€. Précision: Notre ami Jean Michel asselin renonce à tout droit et le "produit" de la vente ira intégralement à Help Doctor, qui continue d'âtre présent à Gaza...où il a encore tant à faire.
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