What Is Political
Science? What Should It Be?*
By Bertell Ollman
Abstract :
This paper examines the five myths that
govern political science: that it studies politics; that it is
scientific; that
one can study politics cut off from the other social sciences and
history; that
the state is neutral; and that the bulk of the work in the discipline
furthers
the cause of democracy. Within political science, there have been three
main
approaches to criticizing these myths: a moderate one that sees a
systemic
connection between these elements; and a Marxist one that names this
system
“Capitalism” and privileges the role of the capitalist state in
explaining both
politics and political science.
Paradoxically, most
political scientists, whose own
work embodies at least some of these myths, would probably agree with a
lot of
the criticism that is implied in characterizing their beliefs as myths.
These
colleagues simply act as if they are true, because they don't know what
else to
do and, in some cases, may be afraid not to. How else understand a poll
of 500
political scientists in l964 that showed that two out of three
"agreed" or "strongly agreed" that much scholarship in the
discipline is "superficial and trivial", and that concept formation
and development is "little more than hair splitting and jargon"?1
There is no reason to believe that the results today would be any
different.
There is a deep-going and on-going malaise among political scientists
that the
self-congradulatory tone of most surveys of our discipline cannot
succeed in
wishing away.2
After all, most of us chose this particular subject as graduate
students
because of a strong interest in politics and with certain big questions
to
which we hoped to find answers. What happened?
Well, we soon learned that political science
is not
about the real world but only about those features of the world that
can be
studied by methods deemed to be scientific. We were told—though not
necessarily
in these words—that if something can't be measured, then that's not it,
and if
an event didn't happen twice, then it didn't happen. This might be a
slight
exaggeration, but I don't think it's a caricature. With all the more
interesting questions falling outside the bounds of scientific
investigation,
political science often strikes the new graduate student as an unending
war
waged against his or her curiosity. And even as the training, with its
combination
of academic (and economic) rewards and punishments succeeds in bringing
another
wayward soul into the mainstream, the process takes a heavy human toll.
The
budding young intellectual, inquisitive and concerned, has become one
more
social scientist with a bad conscience. Did not the poet, W.H. Auden,
implore—in a lecture to Harvard undergraduates, no less—"Thou shalt not
sit with statisticians, nor commit a social science"?3
But, sadly, most of those who I am addressing here did not listen to
him.
Still, where there is life, there are contradictions, and where there
are
contradictions, there is...hope.
In what follows, I shall compare three
critical
approaches that the most dissatisfied political scientists take to the
myths of
our discipline. I call these the moderate critique, the radical
critique, and
the Marxist critique. The moderate critique is advanced by liberals as
well as
some conservatives and radicals, and is moderate only in relation to
the
radical and Marxist critiques that I will develop later. While a great
many
share the moderate critique, only a few have bothered—or dared—to write
it
down. Charles Lindblom has, and in several places, including the pages
of the A.P.S.R.
(his extraordinary Presidential Address in l98l).4
Lindblom believes our discipline has three
main
failings: first, for all the talk about politics, political science has
never
decided what exactly it should study. With its heavy emphasis on the
question,
"How to study?", on methods and techniques, the question, "What
to study?", has been terribly neglected, and usually answered in an
off-hand
manner in terms of what can be studied given the methods already in
place. The
result is that many trivial matters receive an inordinate amount of
attention
and many important ones go untreated. In short, political science seems
to have
turned around the order in which any person not trained in the
discipline would
try to answer the questions, "What should I study?" and "How
should I study it?".
Second, Lindblom takes a very dim view of
political
science's pretentions to be a science. For him, what qualifies a
discipline for
this honor is not how closely it mirrors the procedures followed in the
natural
sciences—you know the list—but what discoveries it has made using these
procedures. And here political science's hands have come up virtually
empty.
What has political science found out about the political sphere that we
didn't
know before, or that isn't abysmally trivial?
Lindblom's third major criticism of
political science
deals with the bias he finds in most studies done by political
scientists, in
their descriptions and explanations but also in what they choose—by
totally
"amateur" means (Lindblom's expression)—to study. Why, he asks, treat
government as trying to serve the common good rather than the
exploitative
interests of an elite? Or view political socialization as education
rather than
as mystification and intellectual impairment? Or treat citizen apathy
mainly as
a source of political stability rather than an opportunity for elite
manipulation of the masses? And he finds many other examples—as we we
all
can—of political science proving more useful to those wishing to retain
the status
quo than to those who want to change it.
While most of these remarks were addressed
to a
political science still smarting from the effects of the Behavioral
Revolution,
they apply just as well, if not more so, to political science in the
Era of
Rational Choice. As different as these two approaches are, both focus
on the
question, "How to study?", and give the same general answer to the
question, "What to study". That answer is—less, less than whatever it
was people in the discipline studied up until that time. In the case of
behavioralism, this meant dropping history, economics and sociology,
and their
embodiment in political institutions, and focusing instead on political
behavior, especially on its quantifiable aspects. Marc Treibwasser's
history of
textbooks in American Government from pre-World War I to recent times
provides
the ideal canvass on which to follow intellectual exactions made in the
name of
(or at least under the threat of) behavioralism.5
Rational choice carries the miniaturization
of
political science one step further by dismissing what people actually
do
politically and concentrating on their decisions to do it, on the
calculations
involved (or supposedly involved, or, for some scholars, ideally
involved) in
making choices. And if behavioralism tried to replicate the procedures
used in
the natural sciences, rational choice—without ever rejecting the
natural
science ur-model—has sought to replicate the version of the scientific
method
(mathematical models and all) that it sees at work within economics.
What is
decisive here is that in both cases the insistence on scientific
procedures (or
what passes for such in each school) has been used to mask pathetically
meager
findings. A frequent demand in Walter Mondale's campaign against Ronald
Reagan
was "Show me the beef". In their book, Pathologies of Rational
Choice Theory, Ian Shapiro and Donald Green make the same demand of
rational choice political science and come up with what the less
affluent among
us will remember as a bread sandwich.6
With so much of the conditions in which
people live
and work and engage in politics left unexamined by behaviorial and
rational
choice scholars, it is little wonder that the inequalities inscribed in
these
conditions along with their effects on politics narrowly construed are
missed.
The operating assumption, "All things being equal", with which both
schools begin their studies, makes even the worst real world
inequalities
acceptable (not worth bothering about) by rendering them irrelevant to
the task
at hand. Guess to whose benefit?
These are harsh words, but—as I said
earlier—large
numbers of political scientists would agree, or half agree, or at least
suspect
that what political science studies is trivia, that the science is
bogus, and
that the discipline is full of biases on behalf of those in power, who
are also
in best position to make use of our findings, such as they are. The
questions
that are not asked, or not asked persistently enough, however, are—How systematic
are these biases? And if they are systematic, where does the discipline
of
political science fit into the system? Who and/or what is responsible
for the
working of this system? And—what can be done about it? It is by taking
these
questions seriously that one graduates from being a moderate critic of
political science to being a radical one.
What sets the radical critique of political
science
apart from the moderate position is that it treats the numerous
instances of
political bias denounced in the latter, but viewed as phenomena that
are more
or less independent of one another, as evidence for the existence of a
system
made to work in just this way. When James Madison, for example, sets as
the
problem of the Constitutional Convention—how to avoid the dangers of
majority
rule [chiefly to property] while preserving "the spirit and form of
popular government", he is not simply revealing a personal bias or even
one shared by most of the other delegates.7
He is revealing the essential character of both the Constitution they
drafted
and the political system built upon it. And when a later president,
Herbert
Hoover, says "The sole function of government is to bring about a
condition of affairs favorable to the beneficial development of private
enterprise", this is not simply evidence of his preference or that of
his
administration but a surprising revelation concerning the character of
American
government as such.8
While virtually everyone, it seems, is
capable of the
occasional radical insight—Eisenhower, after all, warned the country
about the
inordinate power of the "military-industrial complex"—only a relative
few recognize the fuller pattern and see a system at work here.9
Once one does, radicals believe,the manifestations of this pattern are
found
practically everywhere one cares to look...if one cares to look.
Viewing society in this way, it is evident
that the
game of politics is thoroughly rigged. It's like playing poker in which
your
opponent sets all the rules, in which he gets as many cards as he wants
while
you are limited to five, in which he has a half dozen wild cards while
you have
none, in which he gets to look at the cards you draw while his cards
remain
secret. Did I mention that he also gets to deal each hand and can cheat
without
penalty? (His expensive lawyer gets him off each time with, at worse, a
minor
fine.) But perhaps his greatest advantage lies in being allowed to
label this
travesty "democracy", so that most people are misled into believing
that the straitjacket they are forced to wear has little or no affect
on their
chances of winning the game. "Government of the people, by the people,
and
for the people" is a useful definition of "democracy", but a
close look at the power of money and of those few who have a lot of it
(and not
just in election campaigns)—something that neither behavioralism or
rational choice
deign to do—makes it abundantly clear that no part of this definition
applies
to the society in which we live.
This is where political science enters the
picture,
for—with a few honorable exceptions—it presents a view of society that
either
misses, or dismisses, or at best trivializes the fact that the
political game
is rigged.10
Once economics, sociology and history are hived off from political
science,
those who do the rigging easily escape investigation. And the political
mechanisms they have created—and which have succeeded only too well in
retaining the "spirit and form of popular government" without its
content—get treated with the utmost respect. As if elections in the
The harsh truth is that political science,
like the
Constitution itself, presents us with a bourgeois fairy tale where
equal and
independent citizens partake in what appears to be a fair democratic
process to
win what appears to be a neutral state to serve their interests. The
inevitable
one-sided outcomes should have made it clear by now that what most
people
really gain/learn from electoral politics is how to be good losers, to
lower
their expectations (so that even losing—viz. Clinton, Carter,
Kennedy—can count
as winning), and, of course, to try again next time. ("Keep hope
alive")
Why do political scientists participate in
this
manipulative charade? Lindblom, who is at least partly aware of the
systematic
nature of the problem, insists that it is because they are "naive", a
characterization he repeats over and again.11
Radical critics see something more sinister at work. The rewards in
terms of
jobs, grants, and status for remaining in the mainstream are
supplemented by an
equal number of penalties for those who dare to leave it. The
combination of
unbridled ambition and realistic fear go a long way in explaining why
so many
political scientists who know (or at least suspect) better refuse to
confirm
the insight that so many uneducated people already have, to wit that
the
political game is thoroughly rigged. But something else besides
naivete,
self-interest, and fear is usually involved in this refusal, and that
is that
the nature of the system which does the rigging remains very obscure.
Faced
with this uncertainty, it is easy for the political scientist to
misinterpret
his/her self-interested silence and fear of retribution as scholarly
caution.
Radical critics typically react to this
impasse by
marshalling additional evidence of bias, inequality, and oppression, so
as to
make the patterns that emerge from them stand out even more sharply.
Perhaps
the leading practitioner of this radical approach is Noam Chomsky, in
his political
writings, who seems to believe that his relentless and immensely
valuable
effort in documenting the perfidy of our rulers will eventually bring
most
people, including many self-absorbed political scientists, around to
recognizing the systemic nature of our problem and the need, therefore,
for a
systemic solution. And sometime, especially when combined with the
polemical
skills of a Chomsky, a C. Wright Mills, a Fran Piven, or a Mark
Roelofs, it
works. I suspect that most members of the Caucus for a New Political
Science,
as indeed most progressive intellectuals throughout the American
academy, are
"radical" in the sense that I have just defined this term.12
What is missing in Chomsky and the radical
critique
generally, however, is the clear identification of this system as
capitalist,
and an adequate appreciation of the difficulty most people have in
grasping it.
Treating capitalism as the version of the whole that helps us make best
sense
of the distinctive character and development of the parts, including
the state,
politics, and even political science, is Marx's special contribution to
our
subject. It is also the point (really, more of a gradual ascent) where
a radical
critique of political science turns into a Marxist one.
A few years ago, a group of astronomers
announced the
discovery of a huge structure in the sky composed of millions of
gallaxies.
They called this cosmic structure the "Great Attractor", and claimed it
exerts a strong attraction on our solar system, and therefore on our
planet,
and therefore on us. When a reporter asked—If it is so big, why did it
take
them so long to find it?—one astronomer responded that it is just
because it is
so big that they had trouble seeing it. Capitalism is a lot like the
Great
Attractor. People have difficulty seeing it not because it is so small,
but
because it is everywhere. Yet, it is absolutely essential that we see
it if we
are to make adequate sense of the lives that go on inside it.
The best short definition of "capitalism" is
that it is a form of society in which wealth takes the form of capital,
or
self-expanding wealth (i.e. wealth used with the aim of creating still
more
wealth), and the main means of production, distribution and exchange
are
privately owned. For the owners, the capitalists, the imperative,
"Accumulate for its own sake!", takes the form of profit
maximization, or doing whatever they can and can get away with in order
to make
the largest possible profits. The chief victims of the capitalists'
drive to
amass profits are the workers (blue, white, and pink collared), whose
lack of
property in the means of production forces them to sell their labor
power to
the capitalists just in order to live. Everything else in society is
effected
directly or indirectly, whether slightly or, as is often the case,
quite
substantially, by this imperative to accumulate and the exploitative
social
relations that go along with it.
Everyone knows, of course, that capitalist
societies
have a lot in common with non-capitalist societies and also that
capitalism has
evolved in many important respects since the time that Marx wrote. This
only
needs to be said because so many of Marx's critics have made their
reputations
on belaboring the obvious. Marx abstracts from all this, however, in
order to
focus on (and to help us bring into focus) the basic relations that set
capitalism apart as a distinctive mode of production and that stay more
or less
the same for the entire capitalist epoch. He does so, because he finds
in these
basic relations the dynamic (essentially capital accumulation in
conjunction
with market exchange) that is responsible not only for capitalism's
many
impressive achievements but for its most important problems as well as
the
range of solutions that are available to deal with them. It is also
here that
one uncovers the secret of the capitalist state.
Marxist analysis is much more oriented
toward the
state than are the analyses of either the moderate or radical critics
of
political science. Marx calls the state "the active, conscious and
official expression of the present structure of society", and
elsewhere,
"the form in which individuals of a ruling class assert their common
interests".13
For Marx, the key to understanding our biased political practises is to
be
found in the nature of the state in capitalist society. The way to
approach
politics, therefore, is through a study of the state. But the state,
too, as is
evident from Marx's comments, can only be approached indirectly. One
cannot
grasp what the state is without looking at what it does, at the social
structure that frames its unique agenda, rules and behavior, and
particularly
at who benefits. "What is the state?" is really a question about the
state's role in society, which in turn is a question about capitalist
society
and what it requires in the way of political functions.
Marx's answer, very briefly, is that the
state in capitalism
has four main functions related to the society-wide needs of the
dominant
capitalist class, that is help it requires in order to reproduce its
conditions
of existence as the dominant class. These are l) repression, 2)
legitimation,
3) accumulation of capital, and 4) realization of value (selling the
finished
products). While the first two kinds of help are also required by the
dominant
class in other class societies, the latter two are peculiar to
capitalism.
Taken together, the state in capitalism can be seen as the sum of all
the
bodies, mechanisms and practises—particularly bodies—that serve the
capitalist
class in these ways and that have to serve it in these ways if it is
going to
prosper but also if it is to remain the dominant class, i.e. if
capitalism is
going to survive. To forego this focus on the state is to lose sight of
the
main means by which the ruling class rules, and further mystifies the
character
of the ruling class, especially as regards those of its requirements
that bring
it to use just these means in ruling. On this reading, what political
party and
which individuals actually occupy the seat of government is of much
less
significance than the nature of the connection that any government
which takes
capitalism as a given has with the ruling capitalist class.
Particularly in
this new era of intensified global competition, unless it is ready to
overturn
capitalism, no Government can neglect doing whatever is necessary to
make
capitalism work as well as possible, which means essentially helping
capitalists maximize their profits.
Most of what we understand as "politics",
then, flows from the efforts of the state (national, regional, and
international) to provide and secure these four services to the
capitalist
class, from the competition between factions of the capitalist class
(and their
allies) to obtain a larger than average share of the surplus that goes
to them
as a class, and from the efforts of workers and other classes in
society to
protect themselves against this onslaught on their interests in what
Marx calls
the "class struggle". Other forms of oppression in capitalism—racial,
gender, ethnic, etc.—and the struggles against them acquire their
larger
political significance (which is not identical to their moral standing
or importance
in the lives of particular individuals) when they help either to secure
or to
undermine the power of the ruling capitalist class, which is to say
when they
become part of the class struggle. All of this allows for variation,
nuancing
and even occasional exceptions on relatively minor matters and/or in
the short
run.
What, then, is the Marxist criticism of
political
science? In light of the importance that Marx attaches to capitalism
for
understanding the state and politics in capitalist society, it should
not
surprise anyone that the main criticism is directed not at what
political
science does but at what it doesn't do. It doesn't study capitalism.
Instead,
political science seeks to understand politics and the state (to the
small
degree it still concerns itself with the state) while completely
ignoring the
capitalist context that provides the biggest part of the explanation
for both.
Worse still, the partial, fragmented, static, one-sided,
methodologically
individualistic, psychologistic, caricaturally scientistic, mathematics
drenched and ideologically biased accounts it offers for the narrow
range of
political phenomena it does examine makes it much harder for students
of
political science to grasp a Marxist explanation, should they ever come
across
one.
It is the absence of capitalism from the
analyses of
political science that allows it to separate politics from economics,
sociology
and history in creating a separate political sphere and even, in
Seymour Martin
Lipset's words, a "political man", and then to break up politics into
even smaller pieces—like the act of choosing—that seem to be completely
independent of the capitalist society in which they exist/take place.14
The result is that most political science resembles a combination of
reports on
one-sided phone conversations and still photos of a bird in flight.
Essential
relations and movement (process, change, transformation) are both
missing. Here
is the source of the trivia that most political scientists end up
studying.
Except where moderate and even many radical critics of the discipline
disparage
the study of such trivia as—well—trivial, Marxists view it as very
important
for what it hides, disguises or rejects. This work has an ideological
function
that is anything but trivial.
It is the absence of capitalism from
political science
that allows it to settle for a range of methods that point researchers
in the
direction of the political bits and pieces, while increasing our
difficulty in
seeing, let alone examining, the whole. Here is the source of the
preference
for those versions of the scientific method that make everything in the
world
much smaller (having been stripped of both its spatial relations and
temporal
stages) and, therefore, less significant than it really is. What is
lost here
are not only the relations that enable us to grasp how the whole works
(and how
the aspect we are especially concerned with works as part of that) but
the
potential inherent in the whole (and only visible when a good deal of
it has
been reconstructed) for becoming something other than it is. In other
words, by
hiding capitalism, what passes for scientific method in political
science also
succeeds in hiding socialism, the possibility of socialism as well as
the broad
outline of what a socialism built on the developed foundations laid
down by
capitalism might look like. Yet, if there are realistic alternatives to
the
inequality, exploitation, alienation, ecological destruction, and other
oppressions that so disfigure present society, both as scholars and
citizens we
need to know what they are.
It is also the absence of capitalism from
political
science that leads to the ghettoization of political theory within
political
science, so that American Politics, Comparative Government,
International
Relations, etc. go on as if Aristotle, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Rousseau,
and
Burke, let alone Marx, never lived. Their common message on the
importance of
contextualization is simply too threatening to a discipline set on
avoiding the
capitalist context in which everything it studies takes place.
And most disturbing of all, it is the
absence of
capitalism from political science that allows it—despite all evidence
to the
contrary—to treat our society as a democracy made up of equal citizens
rather
than a dictatorship of the capitalist class, albeit one with democratic
trimmings. It also enables political scientists to believe that their
efforts
in support of democracy serve mainly to encourage our society to live
up to its
democratic ideals, rather than to trivialize and to hide its
non-democratic
premises and practises. Here is the chief source of the ineffectual
idealism of
so much political science that, on the personal level, appears to
moderate
critics as "naivete" and to radical critics as "bad faith".
Whatever else it does, avoiding capitalism,
it turns
out, is the main job of political science. As in the Sherlock Holmes
story,
"Silver Blaze", it is the dog that doesn't bark that furnishes the
key to the mystery.15
Whereas high school civics teachers can openly sing the praises of our
"democratic" capitalist system, political scientists—dealing with a
somewhat more sophisticated audience—serve the same legitimating
purpose by
carefully omitting the entire capitalist context, knowledge of which
would
explode all the myths of the discipline. With capitalism absent,
political
science can then present the state (or, through a culpable silence,
allow the
state to present itself) as a set of institutions independent of the
capitalist
class, and therefore more or less available to any group that organizes
itself
effectively to use it. Denying that this is so, of course, doesn't mean
that
Marxists cannot recognize a certain relative autonomy on the part of
state
institutions and actors in special circumstances; but these are
exceptions, and
it is the rule—class dictatorship—that needs to be presented first and
emphasized
most.
Few things are more important to the
legitimation of
capitalist rule than the assurance given by political science that the
dictatorship of the capitalist class in which we live is really a
democratic
state of the whole people. In a period of growing economic inequality
and its
accompanying insecurities, the capitalist class has a pressing need for
the
kind of Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval that only political science,
with
its academic credentials and pretention to objectivity and science, can
deliver. And deliver it does. Whoever it was who called economics the
"dismal science" should have another look at political science. But,
as I said earlier, where there is life, there are contradictions, and
where
there are contradictions, there is hope. In this spirit, let me
conclude by
saying that if political science really wishes to advance the cause of
democracy (as one of the myths of our discipline already has it doing),
we
should help people understand that the main barrier to democracy today
is
capitalism. This requires, of course, that we drop the loaded
assumption,
"All things being equal", with which most political science studies
begin, and replace it with an examination, however brief, of capitalism
and how
the inequalities and ideology associated with it impact on what we
intend to
study. Given the importance of the capitalist context for everything
that goes
on inside it, this is also a first step toward making our research
truly
scientific, that is capable of uncovering how the state and politics
really
work, and how—with the democratization of undemocratic capitalist
relations of
production, distribution and exchange—they might yet come to work for
everyone.
Now here is a non-trivial agenda worthy of a political science
that
aspires to advance the cause of democracy through the use of scientific
methods!