As noted in On Making vs. Declaring War, I, one of the great
outcomes of the what some economists and historians refer to as the development
of the U.S. monopoly capitalist system and its corollary of a U.S.
developed and maintained open door, global, free market was to render moot
the Constitutional founding fathers’ original distinction between making
and declaring war. Due to the tremendous socio-economic and political
transformation that occurred after the U.S. Civil War, U.S. leaders developed
new operating principles. Impelled by those historic factors, U.S.
policy makers — especially in the Executive branch — found it cumbersome,
impractical, and unnecessary to call for a Congressional declaration of
war every time U.S. forces had to be employed in risky foreign military
operations and/or combat. Indeed, in the contemporary period, one
of the leading hallmarks of what historians have termed the "imperial presidency"
is the lack of any real need for the Executive to ask Congress for permission
to wage war. After all, given the power of the Executive branch to
hide and manipulate the military and intelligence information that is provided
to Congress and to the public, even the provisions of the 1973 War
Powers Act are of diminished importance in blocking the Executive’s power
to make war. And that has brought current U.S. policymakers to the
brink of yet another war.
Of course, the roots of this current situation stretch far back into
history. They reach back to the early uses to which the Monroe Doctrine
of 1823 were put. Then, from there, they stretch forward and outward
to a number of more contemporary events, actions, and state proclamations
or assertions that have both reflected and assisted in the U.S. transformation
from a republic into what historian William Appleman Williams was, perhaps,
the first to describe as an informal empire. By analyzing the most
significant of these events and documents in the period from 1789 to the
turn of the 20th century in this second part of On Making vs. Declaring
War, I will supply the historical details that support the overview of
the topic that was presented the first part. Then, in the third part
(and possibly fourth part) I will continue with the 20th century specificities
of events and documents that have brought us to the present. As stated
in the first essay, it is this complex combination of things that at first
blurred and, then, for all practical purposes, virtually eradicated the
founders’ Constitutional distinction between making and declaring war.
Referring, then, to my explanation of the original distinction
which the framers of the Constitution drew between making and declaring
war, I repeat the summation of that distinction made by Convention delegate
Alexander Hamilton. In the Federalist Papers that promoted the ratification
of the Constitution, Hamilton wrote: "The president is to be commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority
would be nominally the same as the king of Great Britain, but in substance
much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general
and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends
to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies — all of which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain
to the legislature." As stated, however, this pinnacle
of principle, articulated by Hamilton, had to give way before the onset
of profound U.S. socio-economic changes and historic events.
Yet, President James Monroe and future President John Quincy
Adams certainly recognized the framers’ distinction on making versus declaring
war when they co-authored (primarily Adams’s work) Monroe’s 1823 message
to Congress. As historian T.D. Allman has shown, President Monroe’s
message to Congress was regarded as neither a "doctrine" nor an instrument
for preempting the war powers of Congress by either Adams or Monroe.
Quoting another authority on the Monroe Doctrine to verify this conclusion,
Allman cites historian Dexter Perkins’s work A History of the Monroe Doctrine
to write that "‘there is no evidence that Monroe was . . . aware
that he was enunciating maximums which should govern in perpetuo . . .
the foreign policy of the United States. The language of the message,’"
Perkins continues, "‘related to a specific situation.’"
Thus, when, in 1833, Britain conquered the Malvinas Islands from Argentina,
the "United States did nothing."
And, as far as believing that the Monroe message entitled the Executive
to by-pass Congress and initiate warfare with minimal consultation with
Congress, neither Monroe nor Adams accepted that notion. So, unlike
those 20th century presidents who routinely authorized armed intervention
in Latin American nations with little or no Congressional authorization
or even oversight, Monroe told James Madison that he had informed the Colombian
Minister to the U.S. (concerned about possible French aggression against
Columbia) that the Monroe message was circumscribed by the fact that
"‘the Executive has no right to compromit the nation in any question of
war.’" And Adams confirmed that principle in his reply to the
same 1823 Colombian inquiry by stating: "‘You understand that by
the Constitution of the United States, the ultimate decision of this question
belongs to the Legislative Department of the Government.’"
So, contrary to the claims of the U.S. interventionists in and around the
Ronald Reagan and George Bush I Administrations, the Monroe message certainly
did not empower U.S. presidents to intervene and make war in Latin American
countries.
Indeed, Monroe and Adams had prudently stated that while the U.S. recognized
Russia’s "‘rights and interests’" in Alaska, they also assured the other
European colonial powers that the U.S. would respect their colonial claims.
Monroe pledged "‘With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.’" Monroe’s
main claim, as Allman observes, was the "‘principle’" that "‘the American
Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed
and maintain are hence forth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European Power.’" Moreover, this non-interventionist
policy, as Allman points out, applied to U.S. military interference in
Latin America regimes as well. For, as Allman explains, both Monroe
and Adams were ardent "anti-colonialists" and this "‘principle’"
that they were asserting neither justified nor ordained "U.S. military
intervention in Latin America." Indeed, Adams’s much repeated
but seldom heeded admonition that America should not go abroad "‘seeking
monsters to slay,’" for she, then, "‘might become the dictatress of the
world [but] would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit’" is a
powerful reflection of his strong aversion to U.S. military interventionism
abroad. So, as Allman notes, "Monroe and Adams adamantly opposed
foreign adventurism, including U.S. military intervention, as a matter
of principle." In fact, as Allman continues, "they were determined
to avoid U.S. involvement in the quarrels of both Europe and Latin America."
In sum, the "‘purpose’" of the Monroe message, according to Adams, "was
to avow American principles ‘while disclaiming all intention of attempting
to proprogate them by force.’"
Now, of course, that early 19th century policy of U.S. military non-interventionism
was in keeping with the views of non-interventionism and non-alignment
that had been best articulated in President George Washington’s Farewell
Address. But it was also a reflection of the lack of any U.S. industrial
capacity to, as yet, field, or need to field, an interventionist military
force. Such a capacity, however, was growing, and, as it developed,
the old doctrines of non-alignment and non-interventionism would start
crumbling and different interpretations of Monroe’s famous message would
be asserted.
Already, by the mid-19th century, President James Knox Polk (the
conqueror of Mexico) is seizing upon the Monroe message of 1823, and proclaiming
that he was anxious to "‘reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe and
to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy.’"
In which case, Polk maintained that its "‘principle’" of disallowing "‘future
colonization by any European powers’" in the "‘American continents’" applied
to both the British claims to the Oregon territory and to "sinister" British
plots against the Mexican government’s sovereignty over California.
And in remarking to Senator Thomas Hart Benton, Polk — apparently for the
first time in U.S. presidential history — explicitly referred to Monroe’s
message as a "‘doctrine’" when he told Benton that he was reasserting "‘Mr.
Monroe’s doctrine against permitting foreign colonization, and that in
doing this he had [Mexico-held] California . . . as much in view as [British-held]
Oregon.’" In short, Polk, as his private conversations and
his personal diaries make clear, "wanted not just [Oregon and] Texas, but
California and everything between the two."
The problem, however, was that Britain was strong while Mexico was
weak, and Polk wanted the territories held by each. He, therefore,
hit upon a stratagem that some other like-minded presidents after him have
adopted. That stratagem combines accomodationism with the strong
and a bullying stance toward the weak. So, faced with the prospect
of a two-front war with mighty England over the Oregon territory and with
weak Mexico over Texas and its New Mexico and California territories, Polk
dropped his previous belligerent presidential campaign slogan ("Fifty-four
forty or fight"). He, then, quickly struck a 1846 deal with Britain
to give up what was a more legitimate and stronger U.S. claim that the
U.S. had on the Oregon territory while he prepared to assert the "totally
fraudulent claims [he] had manufactured to justify the war against [weak]
Mexico."
After that, in a fashion that becomes something of a model for some
future presidents, Polk proceeded to manufacture the pretext for a casus
belli with Mexico. But, Polk had a problem because the Mexican regime
refused to play its appointed role and act the part of the aggressor.
And "what does one do with an aggressor who refuses to attack?"
Well, Polk provided the answer for all those who would follow his example.
After writing his speech calling on Congress to declare war on Mexico,
due more to Mexico’s "‘breach of faith’" with the U.S. than her aggressive
offenses against the U.S., Polk maneuvered the largely hapless Mexicans
into an act of alleged aggression against U.S. forces which he and his
advisors did their best to stage manage. In the perceptive words
that some Baghdad-bound, young soldiers in today’s U.S. military might
acknowledge, Ulysses S. Grant contended: "‘We were sent to provoke
a fight, but it was essential that Mexico commence it.’"
The appropriate provocation was accomplished by goading the Mexicans
into attacking the U.S. forces by having U.S. forces undertake a couple
of hostile actions. Polk, first, had U.S. naval forces blockade the
mouth of the Rio Grande river in Mexican-claimed territory and, then, sent
U.S. troops into the disputed Mexican-claimed territory between the Nueces
and Rio Grande rivers. Allman points out that the blockade
constituted an internationally recognized act of war while the U.S. incursion
into the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers represented
a deliberate disregard of legitimate Mexican rights to that territory.
After noting that the "southern boundary of Texas had been the Nueces River
under both Spanish and Mexican rule," Allman writes, "Nothing in Spanish,
Mexican, U.S., or international law suggested that the territory between
the Nueces and Rio Grande was a part of Texas, let alone a part of the
United States."
And, just as Polk had expected, there was a clash of U.S. and Mexican
troops north of the Rio Grande. Then, with eleven U.S. troopers killed
and five wounded, Polk adjusted his pre-existing message calling for a
declaration of war by adding their bloodshed to the alleged aggression
of Mexico and got Congress to pass a declaration of war against Mexico
on May 13, 1846. Interestingly, such sentiments as his in that day
are still echoing in the comparable presidential outrage of today and of
the recently past 20th century. "‘After,’" Polk declared to Congress,
"‘reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary and shed American
blood on American soil.’" In other words, Polk not only maintained
that his largely reluctant adversary had sorely tried his patience, but
that his adversary had finally provided the cause (or is that pretext?)
for war.
From that distant past to the current period, various U.S. presidential
Administrations have manipulated the public and Congress about matters
of war and peace. In words that are perhaps more powerfully relevant
today than they were when he wrote them, Allman offered this searing indictment
of the practice of presidential machinations and deceit that Polk may have
inaugurated: "Like a number of our later presidents, James Knox Polk
must stand acquitted of any charge he committed naked aggression.
By the time he finally attacked Mexico, his aggression was fully cloaked
in a whole wardrobe of lies, half-truths, misrepresentations, and outright
fabrications — all designed to convince Congress and American public opinion
that the United States was only defending itself against the Mexican peril."
Is it at all possible to substitute George Walker Bush for James Knox Polk,
and Iraq for Mexico in this interpretation to grasp the relevance of Allman’s
conclusion?
At any rate, we see the shadowy beginning of the Executive’s
usurpation of Congressional war powers when Polk asserts — less than six
months prior to declaring war on Mexico — that the "‘principle’" articulated
in Monroe’s 1823 message to Congress is the basis for a U.S. defense against
an alleged British conspiracy to seize California from Mexico.
And, so, after concocting a war with Mexico to presumably defend U.S. rights
in the recently annexed Texas, Polk utilizes the war begun in Texas to
invade Mexico and to fulfill his ambition for the conquest of half of Mexico’s
territory. After all, "what better way to save California from the
British than to conquer it" for the U.S.? And with Polk’s
claim that he was merely following the "‘principle’" of hemisphere
defense laid down by Monroe, Polk not only began the process of eroding
Congressional war powers, but he provided a more powerful rationale for
actual U.S. military intervention into Latin American countries than Monroe
and Adams had ever dreamt. In that sense, Polk might be called our
first "deconstructionist" president as well as our first imperial one.
For by asserting that the Monroe "‘doctrine,’" as he termed it, gave him
the right to conduct a defensive war and to take the land of another nation,
Polk — despite the Congressional declaration of war which he manipulated
out of Congress — was actually setting a precedent for the Executive’s
right to make war.
Many of his contemporaries understood that result very well,
and they challenge it. Two of Polk’s most capable political critics were
actually poles apart on virtually every other important issue in their
day, but they were as one in recognizing the real portent of Polk’s deceptions
and war-making claims based on the 1823 Monroe message. These two
men were Abraham Lincoln and John C. Calhoun. Both of them, especially
as the facts behind Polk’s imperial actions were exposed, were fully aware
that Polk, as Allman described it, "had committed aggression against the
[U.S.] Constitution not just Mexico."
Lincoln, in fact, was so outraged by Polk’s deceptions, fabrications,
and manipulations that, as a freshman Congressman (1847-1849), he boldly
introduced the first of his famous "spot resolutions" (Dec. 22, 1847).
That resolution called on Polk to identify the exact spot on which U.S.
blood was shed. Lincoln, of course, strongly suspected that Polk
would have to confess that it was on Mexican, not U.S., soil. Later
(Jan. 3, 1848), Lincoln joined some of his colleagues in amending a resolution
of thanks to the victorious U.S. General Zachary Taylor. The amendment
noted that Taylor’s victories came "‘in a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally
begun by the President of the Untied States.’" And, still later
(Jan. 12, 1848), in a long speech that asserted that Polk had never proven
that the war had begun on American soil, Lincoln dramatically described
the war as such a war of blatant conquest that Polk must feel "the blood
of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to Heaven against him that
he ordered General Taylor into to the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement,
purposely to bring on war."
Still, Lincoln’s fullest treatment of the Constitutional meaning of
Polk’s manipulation of Congressional war powers was expressed in a letter
to his law partner, William H. Herndon. Herndon had defended Polk’s
claims for going to war against Mexico, and Lincoln’s critical response
deserves to be quoted at length. Its logic and understanding of Constitutional
principles regarding Executive and Congressional war powers are unsurpassed.
So, in an analysis that is not only prescient in its anticipation of some
of today’s specific presidential actions, but, also, of the meaning underlying
the preemptive war doctrine that is being asserted by the Bush II Administration,
Lincoln writes Herndon:
"Let me first state what I understand to be your position. It
is that if it shall become necessary, to repel invasion, the President
may, without violation of the Constitution, cross the line, and invade
the territory of another country; and that whether such necessity exists
in any given case, the President is to be the sole judge. . . .
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall
deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever
he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose — and you allow
him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit
to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose.
If, to-day, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada,
to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him?
You may say to him, ‘I see no probability of the British invading us’ but
he will say to you ‘be silent; I see it, if you don’t . . .’"
Applied to the present, Lincoln’s remarks are appropriately critical of
a similar sort of argument that is being made by some of the Bush II policy
makers today.
More importantly, as Lincoln’s next passage explains, if Polk’s position
is accepted by congress, there is a great danger of congress abdicating
its war powers to the presidency. And this, he argues, would reduced
the high estate in which our great republic once stood to the rubble of
a kingship. Indeed, given the tax cuts that disproportionately benefit
the richest ten or twenty percent of U.S. families that Bush II and Congress
have enacted in the last two years, the soaring deficit (projected to be
at least $1.08 trillion over the next five years), the prodigious
defense budget (already projected, before Congressional "add-ons" and all
the costs related to the upcoming Iraq war, at $2.495 trillion in the next
six years, FY 2002-2007), and the massive cuts in social service
that are sure to follow these enormous expenditures and tax cuts, Lincoln’s
words are more pertinent today than in 1848. Lincoln concludes:
"The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power
to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons.
Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars,
pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the
object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive
of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution
that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon
us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President
where kings have always stood." As one who was not only steeped
in the "republican ideal" but as one who articulated it more superbly than
anyone else, Lincoln, today, would be most unlikely to condon anything
resembling an imperial presidency.
Likewise, Senator John C. Calhoun, Lincoln’s ideological opposite
in most respects, vehemently rejected Polk’s contention that the "‘principle’"
of Monroe’s "‘doctrine’" empowered the Executive to use armed intervention
as one of the Executive’s free-wheeling, foreign policy prerogatives.
For example, shortly after Polk had seized California from Mexico, Polk
claimed that Monroe’s 1823 declaration permitted him to send U.S. forces
to intervene in the Yucatan of Central America because he suspected that
some "foreign conspiracy" threatened that territory. To this
Executive assertion, Calhoun retorted, "‘Declarations are not policy and
cannot become settled policy.’" More importantly, he added
that decisions of war and peace in the Republic "‘belong to us — the Congress,’"
and besides, nothing in Monroe’s statement authorized U.S. military intervention.
As Calhoun explained, "‘here is nothing said of it [i.e., military
intervention]; and with great propriety it was omitted.’" Calhoun,
as Allman notes, realized, as had Adams, Monroe, and Lincoln, that the
"real danger of a Monroe Doctrine approach" was that "it allowed the president
to turn U.S. policy from a matter of constitutional deliberation into a
matter of executive privilege." And this switch, Calhoun perceptively
predicted, would allow presidents like Polk "‘to make us a party to all
their wars.’" "‘Hence,’" he stated in his rejection of
Polk’s novel assertion of Executive war powers, "‘if this broad interpretation
[of the Monroe statement] be given to these declarations, we shall forever
be involved in wars.’"
Coming from his pro-slavery, pro-states rights perspective, Calhoun
was naturally sensitive to the growing power of the Northern industrial
machine and its potential to be employed by hostile, anti-slavery, Executive
policy makers. So, it seems to be one of those splendid ironies in
history and politics that his name is sympathetically linked to Lincoln
— "the great emancipator" — on the issue of Constitutional war powers.
But even more ironic, in this saga of 19th century developments and documents,
is the fact that, in 1848, John Quincy Adams — the principal author of
Monroe’s famous 1823 message to Congress — keeled over and dropped dead
on the floor of the House of Representatives after protesting against the
very war which Polk had wrongly claimed was justified by the "‘principle
avowed by Mr. Monroe.’"
Since then, it is likely that few, if any, of Adams’s successors in
either the White House or the Congress have even read Monroe’s message.
Why should they? Its original content and meaning, in the U.S. context
of late 19th century rapid industrialization, large-scale business consolidation,
and corporate expansion, had become obsolete. And, so Polk is not
only the first president to have ignored the message’s original content
and meaning, but he also is a sort of presidential harbinger of things
to come. Still, those succeeding expansion-minded presidents of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries were vastly more impelled than had been
Polk to adopt new operating principles which were suitable for the needs
of an economy that was generating ever more goods and ever more demands
for more raw materials and foreign markets.
One such president was William McKinley, a guy who writer Gore
Vidal has termed our first "imperial president." When McKinley entered
the White House in 1897, he began presiding over a national economy that
had just entered its embryonic stage of monopoly capitalism. Already,
such famous capitalists as John P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, James Hill,
John Astor, Henry Clay Frick, Andrew Carnegie, Gustavus Swift, James Duke,
James Pillsbury, and Aaron M. Montgomery had consolidated or were in the
process of consolidating, interlocking, and monopolizing whole sections
of the U.S. economy such as banking, transportation, precious minerals,
steel, oil, coal, railroads, tobacco, meat packing, merchandising, and
manufacturing. The raw statistics almost tell the story, for between
1897 and 1904, some 5,300 industrial firms were consolidated into just
318 firms, and they "controlled 40% of the U.S. manufacturing" capacity.
In fact, no one less than John D. Rockefeller candidly explained the economic
import and future of oligopolistic and monopoly enterprises in his memoirs.
He wrote that the "combinations of capital are bound to continue and to
grow. . . . The day of individual competition in large affairs is past
and gone. . . . It is too late to argue about advantages of industrial
combinations. They are a necessity."
So, with vital sectors of the U.S. economy slipping under the oligopolistic
and oligarchic control of just a few men who came to dominated the investment,
production, and distribution in crucial sectors of the economy, it was
inevitable that government policies would be geared to their needs and
interests. After all, even at that early stage of industrial and
financial consolidation and control, the large-scale production system
had a far greater capacity to produce far more goods than the huge majority
of poorly paid workers in the domestic market could afford to absorb.
Thus, as historian Howard Zinn reports, as early as 1898 — the year of
the Spanish-Cuban-American War — a crucial "10 percent" of U.S. products
were being sold abroad. Now, 10 percent might not sound like
any great shakes, but it was. As early as 1893, the U.S. volume of
foreign trade had surpassed every country but England. More
importantly, the concentrated economic and political clout behind a significant
part of that foreign trade was disproportionately greater than the 10 percent
figure alone might indicate. For instance, Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil Company not only contributed huge exports of kerosene (90% of the U.S.
total) to that important 10 percent in the 1880s and 1890s, but, also,
his company controlled "in the 80 percent range" of the domestic and "70
percent of the world market." In Rockefeller’s own words, his
company "sold. . . more than half of all the product that the company makes
. . . outside of the United States." As for foreign investment,
as early as 1891, "Rockefeller pushed the [Standard Oil] company toward
. . . buying up a large number of [domestic] producing products [i.e.,
25%], and by 1920 — 29 years later — president Walter Teagle of Standard
Oil was blunt in recognizing the global strategic objective to which Rockefeller’s
virtual oil monopoly had carried the company: "‘The present policy
of the Standard Oil Company is to be interested in every producing area
no matter in what country it is situated.’" This sort of market
discovery and export need in those sorts of private profit-making hands
demanded that the organized force of government be at its service.
Consequently, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, powerful
U.S. businessmen and institutions began to require that there be created
a foreign market that was adjusted to the economic imperatives of the large-scale,
corporate-dominated and interlocked production system that they were so
rapidly developing. One of the most significant reflections of this
requirement, as historian Thomas J. McCormick points out, was the emergence
of the economic theory of "generalized overproduction" that developed in
the period between 1873 and 1893. Unlike the preceding "scarcity
of money" theory which had predominated in U.S. economic thinking in the
period 1865-1873, the generalized overproduction theory ascribed the basic
cause of commercial and industrial depressions to "growing stocks [of commodities]
and stagnant demand." As one who accepted that theory and its
conclusions, Andrew Carnegie developed, as early as 1889, what Charles
Schwab later termed "Carnegie’s Law of Surplus." According
to Carnegie, the solution to the problem of generalized overproduction
in the era of large-scale production units was to keep running the production
lines "‘full’" while disposing, "‘even at low foreign prices,’" the surplus
product in foreign markets. In the era of large scale production
units, Carnegie pointed out that Adam Smith’s classical economic theory
(i.e., a manufacturer would stop production when supply exceeded demand)
no longer applied. When "‘manufacturing,’" Carnegie said, "‘is carried
on . . . in enormous establishments . . . it cost the manufacturer much
less to run at a loss for ton or yard than to check his production’" for
that "‘stoppage would be serious indeed.’" But, running "‘full,’"
maintaining market area, and continuing to make a profit in "good" as well
as "hard times" required more consolidation at home and more market penetration
abroad. "‘The result of all this,’" Carnegie predicted, "‘is that
we will be able to sell our surplus abroad, run our works full all the
time, and get the best practice [including profit] and costs in this way.’"
As for the capitalist state’s part in helping to secure those foreign markets
that the young monopoly economy needed, J.D. Rockefeller, heaped these
telling words of praise on the U.S. government’s actions: "One of
our greatest helpers has been the State Department in Washington.
Our ambassadors and ministers and consuls have aided to push our way into
new markets to the utmost corners of the world."
All of which brings us to one of the ghost of President George Bush
II’s past — President William McKinley. Now, when in 1898, McKinley
launched his "splendid little war" (John Hay coined the phrase) against
Spain — presumably to liberate the Cuban people from under the yoke of
Spanish imperialism — he was not only fully aware of the needs and dictates
of the U.S. economic system and its leaders in his day, but he also was
completely in tune with the powerful U.S. intellectual, military, and political
opinion that favored U.S. expansionism. In sum, as the path-breaking
U.S. historian William Appleman Williams details in his seminal work The
Contours of American History, the voice of McKinley himself was a forceful
part of the whole U.S. "business consensus" that was pushing for the "absolute
necessity of overseas expansion." Blending his pre-presidential
efforts with those institutions and groups that were driving for U.S. overseas
market expansion, McKinley told the 1895 organizational meeting of
the pro-export National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) businessmen:
"‘It is a mighty problem to keep the whole of industry in motion . . .
[and it] cannot be kept in motion without markets.’" Then,
acknowledging, like his NAM exporter supporters, the "axiom" that the only
"‘relief’" for the "now perpetual existence of vast surpluses" was overseas
economic expansion, McKinley stated: "‘We want our own markets for
our manufacturers and agricultural products . . . we want a foreign market
for our surplus products.’" Later, as president McKinley told
the businessmen at the 1897 meeting of the pro-expansionist, Philadelphia
Commercial Museum that "‘No worthier cause [than] the expansion of trade
. . . can engage our energies at this hour.’"
With such beliefs and economic imperatives animating him, it is not
surprising that, even before declaring war on Spain, President McKinley
is found in U.S. strategy sessions regarding a Pacific campaign to secure
a U.S. base in the Spanish-held Philippines. Such a base would allow
U.S. businesses to better penetrate those Far Eastern markets.
McKinley, after all, was fully aware that a war against Spain in the Caribbean
had to have its counterpart in the Pacific if the U.S. were to achieve
global objectives. Indeed, as McCormick notes in his fine study China
Market, "seven months before hostilities with Spain [U.S. policy formulators
in the Navy Department — chiefly Assistant Navy Secretary Theodore Roosevelt
— had proposed that] the [U.S.] Asiatic Squadron should blockade, and if
possible take Manila." McCormick concluded that, even before
the hostilities commenced, "the McKinley administration intended to retain
a foothold in the Philippines as an ‘American Hong Kong.’"
So, a half month before the U.S. battleship Maine was mysteriously blown
up (or accidentally blew up) in the Havana harbor, McKinley was explaining
to yet another NAM meeting of businessmen that American naval power in
the Philippines would protect future U.S. interests in the Far East.
And, more importantly, Republican President McKinley, like Democratic President
Glover Cleveland before him, was "intimately familiar with the requests
from corporate leaders for ‘energetic’ action ‘for the preservation and
protection of [our] important commercial interests in that [Chinese] Empire.’"
Thus, throughout the Spring and Summer of 1897, "American foreign policy,"
Williams notes, "was largely taken up with an expansionistic drive directed
toward Asia."
And, so, after discovering the necessary pretexts for a casus belli,
the war came. But it came — no more in that time than today
— not because the U.S. "enemy" was cruel, aggressive, and inhumane (always
a given), or because of any U.S. policy maker’s desire to save the Cuban
people. Like all wars of choice rather than necessity — the
War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Banana Wars, World War I, the
U.S.-Vietnam War, the impending U.S.-Iraq War, etc. — the Spanish-Cuban-American
War came because of "the definition of America’s needs made by its own
leaders." So, by the fall of 1897, McKinley, along with "many
large corporate leaders," had decided, according to Williams, that the
"situation [in Cuba] had to be stabilized so that [U.S.] domestic recovery
[from one of five severe economic depressions between 1873-1915] and overseas
expansion could proceed without further delay and interruption."
With words that might suggest a comparison between what is happening
today with what happened in 1897 and 1898, Williams details what McKinley
and his policy makers did when they maneuvered to go to war with Spain.
Once again, we might be tempted to substitute a few places and people to
see history repeat itself — but never exactly. In noting that the
McKinley Administration had demanded that the Spanish occupiers of
Cuba establish "stability" but, then, demanded that the methods — determined
and ruthless military actions — used to bring it about be halted, Williams
observes that "America had thus irresponsibly demanded results while denying
Spain the right to use [the] effective means [to create the results demanded].
Thus, "as early as November 20, 1897, [the McKinley Administration declared]
that ‘peace in Cuba is necessary to the welfare of the people of the United
States.’ [And] having defined the problem in those terms, McKinley,
on December 6, 1897, graciously gave Spain ‘a reasonable chance’ to do
what he told it. But [having deprived Spain of the chance to comply
or, alternatively, having condemned their compliance, McKinley] . . . impatient
of further delay, and cavalierly depreciating Spain’s continued efforts
to meet his demands . . . went to war to remove the distraction, establish
firm control of the Caribbean, and proceed with expansion into Asia."
Historian, social critic, and humorist Oscar Ameringer once repeated
the "old saw" — not inaccurately in this case — that one can tell
what a war is really about by observing what the victor takes when the
war is over. And, when the Spanish-Cuban-American war ended, Ameringer
noted that the U.S. had secured Hawaii, taken over the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and gotten a first hand economic "mortgage on Cuba."
In fact, once the 1901 "Platt Amendment" to a U.S. military appropriations
bill had hurled the 1898 "Teller Amendment" further into the proverbial
dustbin of history than Satan had been hurled out of heaven, Cuba was to
become the first of many informal U.S. tributaries. It would be subjected
to U.S. economic domination through the "open door" doctrine that was proclaimed
by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay in 1899.
But, before turning to the full scope of the strategic and imperial
meaning of U.S. open door policies, there are two very interesting facts
about the Teller Amendment that need to be mentioned. They seldom
are. Together these two facts reveal the little known real meaning
of the, presumably, anti-imperialist Teller Amendment. Thus, first,
while the Teller Amendment disclaimed any U.S. policy intention to physically
acquire Cuban territory, (i.e., the traditional imperialism of physical
conquest and domination of others’ territories.), it did not outlaw the
much more subtle control imposed by the U.S. open door policy (i.e., economic
conquest and domination of other societies’ socio-economic systems through
the superior productivity of the dominant exporting country coupled with
a lack of import restrictions in the dominated importing country).
In words clearly explaining this latter form of indirect and informal control,
McCormick wrote, "Instead of closed doors, [it’s] open markets; instead
of [direct] political domination, [it’s] economic hegemony; instead of
large-scale colonialism, [it’s] informal empires." And, by
opposing traditional imperialism, the beauty of informal and open door
domination is that it effectively conceals itself. In other words,
as McCormick noted, it is the imperialism of anti-imperialism. Perceiving
the underlying reality in all this, however, Williams noted that "Teller
and [other] leaders . . . agreed in early 1894 [i.e., four years before
the Spanish-Cuban-American War] that nothing should be allowed to weaken
or disrupt America’s economic control of Cuba." "Teller," in
short, as Williams wrote, "was an eloquent advocate of the free marketplace
expansionism."
Now, the second fact related to the expansionist thinking underlying
the Teller Amendment is even more important than the first because it reveals
that Senator Teller — like growing numbers of U.S. leaders and policy makers
in his day — had reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine in the expansionist
tradition of President James K. Polk. Animated by the needs and dictates
of the embryonic monopoly capitalist system, Teller and his fellow U.S.
policy makers twisted the original meaning and application of Monroe’s
message into a new operating principle. Their purpose in doing this
was to justify more frequent U.S. military interventions in Latin America
in order to back-up U.S. economic interests. Hence, Teller asserted,
"‘The Monroe Doctrine . . . [provides] a right to intervene . . . [because
where] commerce is destroyed and lives are wasted’ America had the power
and the right to ‘say to those people, "Now you have . . . disturbed the
commercial world. You are destroying your civilization, and it is
time for your to come to a halt. . . . [And if that cannot be done peacefully],’"
Teller went on to warn, with a type of rhetoric that resembles that which
is delivered by some U.S. neoconservatives today, "‘does anybody deny the
right of this Government, in the interest of humanity, in the interest
of the business of the world and the race, to say, ‘You must put an end
to this condition, or we shall compel you to do so’?"
President Glover Cleveland, certainly concurred with this new operating
principle. And following Cleveland’s lead, virtually all successive
presidents took this interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as an article
of faith, so the "doctrine" was turned into dogma. The result:
Between 1898 and 1995, there have been 38 U.S. military interventions in
Latin American countries, excluding Mexico. At least one outspoken
U.S. officer who had engaged in several of these military interventions
("Banana Wars") was candid enough to describe exactly what interests he
and his fellow troopers had served as they risked their lives under banana
trees and the U.S. flag. In 1935, two time Medal of Honor winner
and U.S. Marine Corps Major General Smedley D. Butler put it bluntly:
"‘I spent 33 years and four months in active service . . . And during that
period I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business.
. . . Thus I helped make Mexico . . . safe for American oil interests
in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National
City Bank to collect revenues in. . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the
international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909 to 1912. I
brought light to the Dominican Republic for Amerian sugar interests in
1916. I helped make Honduras ‘right’ for American fruit companies
in 1903.’"
At any rate, Cuba and China were the first societies after the
Spanish-Cuban-American War to be subjected to the U.S. open door strategy.
But China, of course, was the initial target of the famous U.S. open door
notes. For, after all, the turn-of-the-century American businessmen
and policy makers were faced with a tremendous problem when they started
dreaming of entering that seemingly boundless Chinese market. The
problem was that many of the leading imperialist powers on earth — Germany,
Japan, France, England — had already pounced on China and carved it up
into spheres of influence. So, it seems that everyone was eating
at the Chinese bowl but the Chinese and the Americans. And, by using
the open door policy — proclaimed in their open door notes — U.S. policy
makers wanted to make sure that the U.S., if not the Chinese, were included.
Therefore, it should not be surprising to learn that the 1899, U.S., open
door notes were sent to every government with spheres of influence in China,
but they were not sent to the Chinese government. The Chinese, after
all, were seen as simply objects, not people, by U.S. policy makers.
Thus, China, as historian McCormick has written, was regarded by U.S. policy
makers as "a passive and somewhat static entity . . . something to be acted
upon."
Anyway, the purpose of the U.S. open door policy was not to protect
or create any real sovereignty of the Chinese people over their country.
The open door notes did not call for the abandonment of imperialist spheres
of influence in China. In fact, they explicitly accepted them.
The notes only called for the U.S. right to trade and invest in those spheres
of influence. And, for all this, as McCormick has observed, the U.S.
policy makers defined Chinese sovereignty in terms only of "preserving
her territory intact" [and of] maintaining the external symbols of her
sovereignty." But, more importantly, "the American definition
denied to China either the right or capacity to modify or close the open
door." So, as McCormick summarized the results of his study
into subsequent U.S. policies and actions in China, "the United States
[in its "Protocol negotiations" is "found"] vigorously befriending and
protecting China in all things political and territorial, while it sought
to limit her internal, economic development so as to expand her value as
a market" for U.S. trade and investment. In short, U.S. policy
makers and business interests fostered policies and practices, in the China
that existed from 1900 to 1949, which attempted to keep that land deindustrialized
and open to U.S. market penetration. And all this prefigured U.S.
foreign policy for the whole 20th century and beyond if the events of the
last three years are any guide. As McCormick succinctly explained,
"The open door policy . . . represent[s] America’s basic response to the
. . . question of how to expand. . . . [A] most interesting hybrid
of anti-colonialism and economic imperialism."
And Cuba, more effectively under U.S. control than China, was
the first guinea pig to truly experience what the open door strategy of
economic conquest really meant. Once the Platt Amendment had tossed
the few anti-imperialist features of the Teller Amendment into oblivion,
Cuba’s "independence" became, at best, a bad joke. By the terms of
the Platt Amendment — incorporated into the Cuban Constitution by U.S.
force of arms — Cuba could not make any treaties with third powers
and had to allow the U.S. "‘the right to intervene for the preservation
of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property, and individual liberty.’" Cuba,
also, was required to surrender parts of its territory for U.S. coaling
and naval stations and the U.S. took control of Cuba’s imports and exports.
In fact, U.S. capitalists took control of the vast bulk of Cuba’s sugar,
timber, railroads, mines, tobacco, and oil refineries; they controlled
pretty much the whole island.
And, so, just as the Mexican-American War and President Polk had pointed
the way for future presidents who hoped to manipulate the U.S. population
into supporting wars of expansion, the Spanish-Cuban-American War was a
prelude to the open door expansion of U.S. business interests throughout
the world. But, at least, in the cases of the Mexican-American War
and the Spanish-Cuban-American War, U.S. presidents still bothered to ask
Congress to declare war. Between 1898 and today, however, the increasingly
frequent need for U.S. military action and interventionism has made the
old principles, policies, and practices more and more obsolete. And
this has required not only new interpretations of old doctrines but the
creation of new doctrines as well.
So, as early as 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt had codified the
right of U.S. military intervention in Latin America with what became know
as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. Using the same
aggrandizing logic that had once been employed by Polk, Roosevelt maintained
that, since the Monroe Doctrine prohibited European intervention in the
Caribbean and South America, then the U.S. itself could preemptively intervene
in Latin American nations on the pretext of warding off some intervention
by other nations. In Roosevelt’s words, "‘[A]dherence of the United
States to the Monroe Doctrine [gave the U.S. the right to] "‘the exercise
of an international police power’" in its sphere of influence. Indeed,
in a similar vein of self-righteousness exhibited by some of today’s U.S.
policy makers — some of whom might see themselves as reincarnated "Teddies"
— Roosevelt argued that "America’s commitment to ‘civilization’ . . . gave
it the special right to intervene in countries guilty of ‘wrongdoing or
impotence.’"
And, now, once again, the new operating principle of making rather
than declaring war has enabled a few U.S. policy makers to carry us to
the brink of a war that will endanger thousands of people. And if
that war occurs and if it kills tens of thousands or more of innocent civilians
in a U.S. strategy designed to create "shock and awe" by using massive,
concentrated firepower, it will stain and shame the U.S. people for generations.
So, asks U.S. political scientist Bertell Ollman, what are we to do?
And he answered his own question by advising us to join the non-violent,
peace campaign against the impending war. Citing the recent conclusions
of a University of Sussex study, Ollman pointed out that the study "showed
that demonstrating for a cause in which you believe is not only good for
your conscience, it’s good for your health." So, as Ollman
says, demonstrations for peace are "in the interest of good health — your’s,
[mine], the Iraqi’s, our troops’ and the world’s." Paix. (E)
PAGE 16
PAGE 17
Notes to On Making vs. Declaring War, II
The description and explanation of that stage in the development
of a free market economy known as monopoly capitalism can be found in many
works by, among others, such historians and economists as Eric Hobsbawn,
Thomas McCormick, Philip Foner, Ernest Mandel, Paul M. Sweezy, and Douglas
Dowd. Of these authors, the latest work by Dowd (Capitalism and It’s
Economics: A Critical History, 2002) is, perhaps, the most readable
and thorough in its treatment of the subject. Dowd breaks monopoly
capitalism into the phases of monopoly capitalism I and II.
Writing for the conservative and respected think tank of Cato
Institute, defense analyst Robert Higgs acknowledged this point in these
candid words: "Manipulation of information is [not only] central
to what modern governing elites do, [but] on defense-related and foreign
policy matters, the scope for information management and opinion leadership
by the national security elite is much wider." See Robert Higgs,
"U.S. Military Spending in the Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign
Crisis, and Domestic Constraints," Policy Analyses no.
114 (November 30, 1998): 14. HYPERLINK "http://www.cato.org.pubs/pa114.html"
www.cato.org.pubs/pa114.html .
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist
Papers, No. 69, New York: Mentor Books, [1787-1788], 1961, 417-418.
Hamilton’s emphasis.
T.D. Allman, "The Doctrine that Never Was," Harper’s, January
1984, 20.
Ibid.
John J. Abt, Who Has the Right to Make War?: The Constitutional
Crisis, New York: International Pub., 1970, 18.
Abt, 19. John J. Abt cited similar responses on this issue by
mid-19th century, U.S. policy makers. Three of his examples are fully
quoted below.
"In 1851, Secretary of State Daniel Webster rejected an Hawaiian request
for armed aid against France, stating: ‘In the first place, I have to say
that the war-making power in this Government rests entirely with Congress;
and that the President can authorize belligerent operations only in the
cases expressly provided for by the Constitution and the laws. By
these no power is given to the Executive to oppose an attack by one independent
nation on the possessions of another.’
In 1857, Secretary of State Cass in the Buchanan administration, gave
a similar reply to a request that the United States join an Anglo-French
expedition against China: ‘This proposition, looking to a participation
by the United States in the existing hostilities against China, makes it
proper to remind your lordship that, under the Constitution of the United
States, the executive branch of this Government is not the war-making power.
The exercise of that great attribute of sovereignty is vested in Congress,
and the President has no authority to order aggressive hostilities to be
undertaken.’
In 1859, President Buchanan sent a message to Congress requesting authority
to use armed force for the protection of transit across the Isthmus of
Panama. In explaining the need for Congressional authorization, he
said: ‘The executive government of this country in its intercourse
with foreign nations is limited to the employment of diplomacy alone.
When this fails it can proceed no further. It cannot legitimately
resort to force without the direct authority of Congress, except in resisting
and repelling hostile attacks. It would have no authority to enter
the territories of Nicaragua even to prevent the destruction of the transit
and to protect the lives and property of our own citizens on their passage.’"
See Abt, 19-20.
Allman, "Doctrine," 18.
Ibid.
Ibid., 18-19.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 20.
T.D. Allman, Unmanifest Destiny, Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1983, 160.
Allman, "Doctrine," 20.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Allman, Unmanifest, 286.
Ibid., 285, 286.
Ibid., 286. My emphasis.
Ibid., 300.
Ibid., 279.
Ibid., 284.
Ibid., 285.
George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative
History, Brief Fifth Edition, Vol. I, New York: W.W. Norton, 2000,
456.
Allman, Unmanifest, 285, 284.
Ibid., 284.
Ibid., 285.
Ibid.
Ibid., 285-286.
Ibid., 286.
Allman, "Doctrine," 22.
Mark E. Neely, Jr. Abraham Lincoln Encyclopedia, New York: Da
Capo, 1982, 209.
Abraham Lincoln, "Speech in United States House of Representatives:
The War with Mexico," Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, editor Roy P.
Basler, et al, Vol. I, 439. Along with these highly critical words
and actions, Congressman Lincoln proudly claimed that he must have voted
for abolitionist Representative David Wilmot’s "Proviso" to exclude slavery
and involuntary servitude in all the territories taken from Mexico "‘at
least forty times.’" Lincoln may have done as he claimed, but less
than a quarter of such votes have so far been verified by researchers.
See Neely, 338.
Lincoln to William H. Herndon, February 15, 1848, Letter in Collected
Works, Vol. I, 451. Lincoln’s emphasis.
"Passing down debt, a disservice to young," Atlanta Journal Constitution,
9 February 2003, F10.
Center for Defense Information (CDI), "Fiscal Year 2003 Pentagon
Defense Budget Request, Budget Authority," Feb. 4, 2002, 1,
HYPERLINK "http://www.cdi.org/issues/budget/FY03topline-pr.cfm"
www.cdi.org/issues/budget/FY03topline-pr.cfm .
Lincoln to William H. Herndon, February 15, 1848, Letter in Collected
Works, Vol. I, 451-452. Lincoln’s emphasis.
Some of my own arguments and explanations of Lincoln’s adherence
to and projection of the republican ideal are found in "Abraham Lincoln
on Labor and Capital," Civil War History, 38 (September, 1992): 197-209;
"Lincoln vs. Douglas Over the Republican Ideal," American Studies, 35 (Spring,
1994): 63-89; "The Founding Fathers’ Republican ideal nourished Abraham
Lincoln’s belief in Freedom for All," America’s Civil War, 7 (November,
1994): 8, 87-90, 92-94.
Allman, "Doctrine," 22.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Allman, Unmanifest, 256-257.
Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 1492-Present,
New York: Harper, 1995, 343. For a readily available and a
splendid treatment of this remarkable era from 1865-1914, read Zinn’s analysis
and synthesis of scores of studies in his three chapters entitled "Robber
Barons and Rebels," "The Empire and the People," and "The Socialist Challenge"
(pages 247-349). Zinn’s account masterfully covers the economic,
social, and political history of elites and ordinary people by coherently
incorporating the vital statistics related to capital and working class
conditions with the laboring people’s struggles for survival, justice,
and social progress. He points out, for example, that Morgan and
Rockefeller (at their peak of power) sat on a combined total of 85 separate
boards of directors. Morgan, alone, controlled more than 50% of U.S.
railroads by 1900, and Rockefeller controlled the largest oil refining
capacity in the world as early as 1879. Meanwhile, 22,000 railroad
workers were killed or injured on the job in 1889; 27,000 workers in manufacturing,
transportation, and agriculture were killed at work in 1904; and 35,000
were killed in industrial accidents in 1914. Today, an estimated
14,000 American are annually killed on the job, but those numbers probably
go much, much higher when job-related deaths are calculated on the basis
of workers who have died after contracting long-term, lethal, health problems
in their workplaces.
John D. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events,
New York: Arno Press, [1908] 1973, 65, 67.
Zinn, A People’s, 293.
Ibid.
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money,
and Power, New York: Touchstone, 1991, 51; Zinn, 294.
Rockefeller, 64.
Yergin, 53, 199.
Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal
Empire, 1893-1901, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990, 26.
Ibid.
Ibid, 28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, 28-29.
Rockefeller, 63.
McKinley was a believer in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s naval expansion
and insular imperialism theories (Atlantic and Pacific island coaling outposts);
he called for a larger navy and merchant marine; he advocated the annexation
of Hawaii and even said that it was part of U.S. Manifest Destiny; he tried
to buy Cuba; he moved to create a canal across the isthmus of Central America;
he refused to sell arms to the Cuban revolutionaries fighting Spain or
to recognize their claim to sovereignty or to grant them U.S. recognition
as belligerents because he was far more interested in exercising U.S. influence
over Cuba than to favor their independence. See Philip S. Foner,
The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, Vol. I, 308, 307-308;
also Zinn, 297.
William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History,
Chicago: Quadrangle, [1961] 1966, 363.
These included the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
flour millers, wool manufacturers, the National Live Stock Exchange, the
Committee on American Interests in China, and business journals like Scientific
America, Engineering Magazine, and Iron Age.
Williams, Contours, 363.
Ibid.
Ibid. Foner also cites these quotations by McKinley.
See Foner, vol. I, 308.
Foner, vol. I, 309-310.
McCormick, China, 107.
Ibid.
Foner, vol. I, 309, 310.
Williams, Contours, 366.
Ibid.
Three causes or pretexts that are commonly cited as justifications
for the U.S. war against Spain are: Spanish "pacification" strategies
which included forcing thousands of Cubans into disease-ridden interment
camps (i.e., reconcentracion) in order to deprive the Cuban resistance
fighters of the support of the Cuban rural population. Likewise,
the derogatory remarks about McKinley that the Spanish Minister to the
U.S., Depuy de Lome, made in a letter that was purloined and published
were said to have offended American honor. And, of course, the mysterious
sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine and the loss of 266 U.S. servicemen
in Havana harbor was taken as the strongest evidence of Spanish hostility
and criminality against the U.S.
In outlining the chronology of the U.S.-Spanish diplomatic actions
leading to declarations of war by each nation, historians George Brown
Tindall and David Emory Shi offer this telling sequence of dates and events
in 1898: March 27, the U.S. issues an ultimatum to Spain demanding
an end to reconcentracion, an immediate armistice, and Spain’s consent
to a U.S. mediation of the conflict; April 9, the Spanish government
accepted the armistice; April 10, the Spanish minister to Washington
gave the U.S. State Department a note which amounted to Spain’s capitulation
to U.S. demands; April 11, McKinley ignores these concessions and
asks Congress for an authorization to use force to protect U.S. trade and
property; April 22, McKinley ordered a blockade of Cuban ports (i.e.,
an act of war under international law); April 24, Spain declared
war on the U.S.; April 25, U.S. declared war on Spain but made it
retroactive to April 21, 1898. See Tindall, Vol., 804.
Williams, Contours, 366.
Ibid, 367. Foner and Zinn, likewise, point out that it
was only two days after McKinley received a telegram (February 25, 1898)
from one of his White House advisors in the field that he asked Congress
for an "authorization to use force" against Spain (February 27, 1898).
The telegram read: "‘Big corporations here now believe we will have
war. Believe all would welcome it as relief to suspense.’" See Zinn,
298, and Foner, vol. I, 307.
In part, this demand also may have been conditioned by the fact
that, by 1893, U.S. business interests had $50 million of investments in
Cuba, and U.S. trade with Cuba stood at $103 million per year. See
Zinn, 295.
Williams, Contours, 367.
Oscar Ameringer, Life and Deeds of Uncle Sam: A Little
History for Big Children, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: American Guardian,
1938, 55.
Sponsored by Senator Orville Platt.
Sponsored by Senator Henry M. Teller.
McCormick, China, 128.
William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire,
New York: Vintage, 1969, 377.
Ibid.
Ibid., 377-378.
In the 1894-1896 boundary dispute between British Guinea and
Venezuela, Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine against British pressure
on Venezuela and grandiosely declared that the Doctrine "‘is essential
to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance
of our distinctive form of government.’" See Ibid., 379.
"Keeping the Backyard Safe," The Sojourner’s, April 1980.
See also Zinn, 399, and David W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine:
A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999, 12-13. Dent’s
reference work lists a total of 111 "incidents" of U.S. military interventions
in Latin America since 1823. With the exception of General Poncho
Villa’s raid on Columbus, Texas, I cannot think of any other Latin American
military incursion or intervention in the U.S.
"Keeping."
McCormick, China, 155.
Ibid., 179.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 128..
Zinn, 303. Zinn notes that the U.S. forces under General
Leonard Wood remained in Cuba until a reluctant assembly of Cuban delegates
to their Constitutional Convention agreed to incorporate the terms of the
Platt Amendment into the Cuban Constitution. And, after that had
been accomplished, General Wood candidly wrote to Theodore Roosevelt stating:
"‘There is, of course, little or no independence left in Cuba under the
Platt Amendment.’" See Zinn, 304, 305.
Zinn, 303.
Zinn, 303. Zinn points out that while American lumber interests
took 10,000,000 acres of virgin forest, the U.S. railroad, mine, and sugar
properties invested "$30 million of American capital" to dominate those
industries, and United Fruit company bought 1,900,000 acres of land at
about twenty cents an acre. Meanwhile, by 1901, "80 percent of the
export of Cuba’s minerals were in American hands, mostly Bethlehem Steel."
See Zinn, 303.
More humorously than anyone, political scientist Michael Parenti has
summarized what the U.S. open door policy and Platt Amendment meant for
Cuba when he noted that "we turned to the Cubans and said, ‘We stole you
fair and square from the Spaniards, but we are a republic, and it doesn’t
look good if we have a colony. So, we are going to give you your
independence. You will have your own flag and it’s going to be red,
white, and blue. You are going to have only one star on it since
you are just a little island. You get your own presidente, and you
get your own currency. You don’t have to put George Washington on
it. You can put Jose Marti or any other Cuban we find acceptable.
You have your own guardia civile and they will keep; your people in line.
We will train them and give them guns, and we will give them nice uniforms
and all that sort of thing. You will be independent, and all we will
have is that we will own your tobacco industry, your sugar industry, your
nickel mines, and your oil refineries, and we will control all your imports
and exports. You won’t be allowed to make any treaties with third
countries. You have to deal with us. Other than that, you are
independent.’ That is neo-colonialism, where you give them the bills
and the overhead costs, and you skim the cream." See Michael Parenti,
"The Cost of Empire at Home and Abroad," November 1994, Seattle, Washington:
People’s Video (Audio tape), sound cassette.
Allman, "Doctrine," 21.
Ibid.
Bertell Ollman, "Why War with Iraq? Why Now? Phantom
Reasons and Real Ones," 14 February 2003, Center for the Advance
Study of American Institutions and Social Movements, Grenoble, France,
email of 2/14/03.