Peter Marcuse
(©Monthly Review, July-August 2000)
 

                                                  The Language of Globalization
                                                                      by Peter Marcuse
 

                              The language of globalization deserves some explicit attention. To
                              begin with, the word globalization itself is a nonconcept in most uses:
                              a simple catalogue of everything that seems different since, say, 1970,
                              whether advances in information technology, widespread use of air
                              freight, speculation in currencies, increased capital flows across
                              borders, Disneyfication of culture, mass marketing, global warming,
                              genetic engineering, multinational corporate power, new international
                              division of labor, international mobility of labor, reduced power of
                              nation-states, postmodernism, or post-Fordism. The issue is more than
                              one of careless use of words: intellectually, such muddy use of the term
                              fogs any effort to separate cause from effect, to analyze what is being
                              done, by whom, to whom, for what, and with what effect. Politically,
                              leaving the term vague and ghostly permits its conversion to something
                              with a life of its own, making it a force, fetishizing it as something that
                              has an existence independent of the will of human beings, inevitable and
                              irresistible. This lack of clarity in usage afflicts other elements of the
                              discussion of globalization as well, with both analytic and political
                              consequences. Let me outline some problem areas, and suggest some
                              important differentiations.

                              First, the concept of globalization itself: it hardly needs reiteration in
                              these pages that globalization is not something new under the sun, but is
                              a particular form of capitalism, an expansion of capitalist relationships
                              both in breadth (geographically) and in depth (penetrating
                              ever-increasing aspects of human life). But there are two distinct
                              aspects to the development of capitalist relations since 1970 that are
                              often lumped together under the rubric of globalization: developments
                              in technology and developments in the concentration of power.
                              Separating advances in technology from the global concentration of
                              economic power, and seeing how their combination has changed class
                              relations, is critical both for analysis and for political strategy.

                              The link between advances in technology and the concentration of
                              economic power is not an inevitable one. Computerization, the speed
                              of communications made possible by advances in information
                              technology, the ability to expand the span of control from one center
                              across continents, the increased speed and efficiency of transportation
                              (both for people and for goods), facilitating the flexibilization of
                              production, and the automation of routine tasks are all indeed essential
                              for the substantial increase in the concentration of economic power we
                              are witnessing. But these advances in technology could be used in quite
                              different ways (although it may be that, if their intended use were
                              different, they would in fact be quite different). Advances in technology
                              could mean either that the same quantity of useful goods and services
                              could be produced with less effort or that, with the same effort, more
                              could be produced. Either way, everyone would be better off, either
                              working less or having more. That is not the way things are going, not
                              because technology could not go that way, but because it is directed
                              and harnessed by the power-holders to increase and concentrate their
                              power. It has been used to change the balance of power between
                              classes. Attention needs to be focused on this, not on the technology
                              itself.

                              The distinction between technological globalization and the
                              globalization of power is critical—not only analytically but also
                              politically. It raises the question, "What might the other possibilities be
                              if the two were separated?" We should speak of the existing
                              combination of technological globalization and the globalization of
                              power as really existing globalization; that would highlight the
                              possibilities of an alternative globalization. Opponents of the
                              damaging consequences of really existing globalization, from left as well
                              as from liberal perspectives, are divided on the appropriate response
                              to it. The slogan from Seattle in regard to the World Trade
                              Organization (WTO)—"fix it or nix it"—and the equivalent suggested in
                              the Washington demonstrations in April as to the World Bank and
                              International Monetary Fund (IMF)—"shrink it or sink it"—and the
                              related questions about whether we want a seat at the table or a
                              different table or no table at all show an ambivalence about goals. The
                              issues are difficult indeed. But the realization that an alternative
                              globalization can at least be conceived of should be an important part
                              of the debate on goals; speaking of what we now have as really
                              existing globalization may help to keep the broader possibilities open.

                              By the same token, frequent references to the diminished or vanished
                              power of nation-states to control globalization need some conceptual
                              and linguistic clarity. The myth of the powerless state is a concept
                              that clouds intelligent analysis of what is actually going on. The
                              importance of state action in enabling the capitalist system of the
                              industrialized world to function is increased, not reduced, as that
                              system spreads internationally. If states do not control the movement of
                              capital or of goods, it is not because they cannot but because they will
                              not—it is an abdication of state power, not a lack of that power. The
                              very importance attached by international business interests to the
                              WTO, tariff agreements, the government enforcement of contractual
                              rights and the protection of intellectual property interests attest to the
                              continuing if not growing importance of the national state.

                              Furthermore, a strong element of fetishization often creeps into the very
                              use of the term "state," with a very distinct political bias. It might be
                              called the fallacy of the homogenous state and it appears in such
                              formulations as those that speak of "the competitive state" (or, in my
                              own field, the constant call for the "competitiveness of cities") or of
                              benefits or harms to the "states" of the North or of the South. States
                              and cities are internally divided; what is good for one group, class, or
                              other interest within a state or city may have very different
                              consequences for others. Governments indeed have a certain
                              autonomy and, in this limited sense, one may speak of states or cities
                              as actors with interests of their own, meaning their specific political
                              leaders and bureaucracies—or, more broadly, the regime in power;
                              but it is even more true that governments are responsive to multiple
                              interests and that particular interests regularly dominate the actions of
                              most. To speak of a "national interest" usually conceals some very
                              particular interests; to speak of states as if they represented all those
                              living within them obscures reality.

                              In that sense, to speak of "U.S." domination of international
                              affairs—important in one sense—requires a clear distinction between
                              those who, in turn, dominate U.S. policy and those who are excluded
                              from its formation. The same is true of other countries, as was clear in
                              some of the discussions in Seattle, in which individuals from countries
                              of the South took positions strongly divergent from those of their
                              governments. If this distinction between a state and its people is
                              important in terms of the political and formal actions of the state, it is
                              even more important in terms of economic representation. Those who
                              represent states in international economic negotiations are not
                              representing any homogeneous set of national economic interests; the
                              homogeneity may be better considered a characteristic of the interests
                              at the bargaining table, that is to say, clusters of businesses and
                              financial interests perhaps diverging on a sectoral basis but similar in
                              their class character. The key divisions are not among states, but
                              among classes; the homogeneity is not within states, but within classes.

                              Other language in discussions of globalization, while emanating from its
                              proponents, frequently slips into use by its critics and obscures what is
                              actually happening. "Human capital," for instance, is a twisting of
                              meanings: calling it "labor skills" puts it in its proper context.
                              "Governance" is a euphemism for diminished government and should
                              be recognized as such. "Investment" may mean an expansion of
                              productive capacity, or it may be pure speculation. "Free" markets are
                              hardly costless, as in free public education; the true term is "private
                              markets," and they limit, rather than expand, most notions of human
                              freedom. "Reform," of course, means privatization in its media use.
                              "Producer services," indiscriminately used, strips the term "producer" of
                              its social meaning. Printing stock reports should not be called
                              "producer services:" printers are workers who operate machines, not
                              "service providers," and stockbrokers should not be called producers if
                              the word is to retain any real content.

                              These issues are not merely issues of terminology. No clear consensus
                              has yet emerged among the various groups attempting to confront the
                              ills produced by really existing globalization. The most moderate goals
                              simply call for participation and transparency; the stronger liberal view
                              asks for restructuring of the system of global institutions and
                              regulations; radical views include both calls for eliminating global
                              institutions entirely or replacing them with a completely different system
                              of relations, both economic and political, within nation-states and
                              among them. Discussions after Seattle have not yet widely coalesced
                              around specific programmatic demands at the national level, such as
                              actions demanded of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. trade representative,
                              its United Nations delegate, or its representatives on various
                              international agencies and bodies. A number of groups and many
                              individuals are wrestling with the difficult problems of formulating goals,
                              platforms, and specific demands for action. Demands consistent with
                              one view are not necessarily inconsistent with other views; both
                              commonalities of goals and differences among them, and both strategy
                              and tactics, need further thought and clarification. Fuzziness of language
                              may facilitate coalition formation in the short run, but more solid and
                              long-term alliances are based on full mutual understanding. Being
                              careful about the difference between technological globalization and the
                              globalization of power, keeping the concept of alternative globalization
                              on the table, dispensing with the myth of the powerless state and
                              avoiding the fallacy of the homogenous state, and watching the traps of
                              the Orwellian language of globalization, may all help in coming to a
                              common agreement as to both long-term goals and next steps.
 

(*) PETER MARCUSE teaches in the Division of Urban Planning in the School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation at Columbia University. He is co-editor of Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order? (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).