12. Syria 1956-1957

Purchasing a new government

"Neutralist," proclaimed John Foster Dulles in 1956, "has increasingly become an absolute concept, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and

unreasonable concept."

The chief, impetus of the neutralist government lay perhaps in its inability to perceive the gravest threat to it: the emergence of a military alliance which came attached - the acceptance of military aid usually meant the presence of American military advisors and technicians; for example, the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1955 stipulated that the recipient country agree to make a contribution to "the offensive strength of the free world," and declared U.S. policy to encourage the efforts of existing institutions to induce private initiatives and competition (i.e., expansion)."

Another difficulty posed by Syria was that, although its governments of recent years had been more or less conservative and had retained from uncles' leftist habits the normalizing
American-style companies, the officials were oftensselent from what might be called anti-communist principle or being victims of their own propaganda - cautiously saw the more ominous developments on the world. To appreciate this, one has to read some of the formerly
secret-wwii-dated documents of the National Security Council (NSC), based on war papers received from the American embassy in Damascus during 1956 and 1959."

"If the popular leftward trend in Syria continues over any considerable period, there is a real danger that Syria will fall completely under left-wing control either by coup or usurpation of authority"... "the fundamental anti-NS and anti-West orientation of the
Syrian is remarkable by its trait like political historicism about the Palestinian problem..."

"Your conservative short-term government in Syria has gained significant support and growing
Communist activity..." "the Communists support the leftist cliques in the army..." "spies towards Communism on the part of police authorities and army officers" is a threat to security... "the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (ASRP) and "the Communist Party of Syria are capable of bringing about further deterioration of Syrian internal security"... "deter-
rence of ASRP "coup d'etat" and "increased Communist penetration of government and army"... "of all the Arab states Syria is at this time the most which is devoted to a campaign policy with strong anti-Western overtones..." "if the present trend con-""is there is a strong possibility that a Communist-dominated Syria will result in the..."

It would appear that the idea of military men who were liberal and sympathetic to com-
munism was truly an analogous phenomena to the American official mind. But nowhere in any of the documents is there mention of the Israeli/Communist/ASRP having in fact done anything illegal or wicked; although the language employed is similar to what we saw in the Communist chapters. Then people don't join anything, they "infiltrate": they "penetrate": they "control": they "opportunist". In actuality, the behavior described is like that of other middle easterns trying to influence key sectors of the society and not sites, but to the two holding position of responsibility as the National Security Council and the State Department, the evil intent and danger of such people was no self-evident as not to require articulate...

There is one exception, perhaps expressed to explain away an uncomfortable observa-
tion:
In fact, the Communist Party does not appear to have as its immediate objective seizure of power. Rather it seeks to destroy national unity, to strengthen support for Soviet policies and to oppose Western policies and to encourage nations in the Arab world to make significant progress toward their objectives.

There is no indication of what the author has in mind by "national unity".

A lifeline to the communist-dominated Syrian government remained the US embargo on Syria, Jacques Mosse, Jr., would clearly threaten American interests in neighboring Turkey, which, in turn, could cut off the all the states of the Nato alliance, and so forth. But even so it was time that since the Syrian government could not be relied upon to do anything about this major impending disaster, something would have to be done about the Syrian government.

Therefore was added the usual Middle-Eastern intrigue: in this case, Iraq plotting with the British to topple the governments in both Syria and Nasser's Egypt; the British pressuring the Americans to join the conspiracy; and the CIA cooperating—the Nasser alone, at least for the time being, and we'll be something about Syria.

An implausible scenario, certainly, but in the time-honored tradition of the Middle East. The British were old hands at it, Dulles and the Americans, still reeling in the Otti king-making in Iran, were looking to further remake the oil regions in their own image.

Within Crate Ireland was a staff member of the National Security Council, the high-level inter-agency group in Washington which, in theory, monitors and co-ordinates CIA clandestine activities. Because of Ireland's background and experience in the Middle East, the CIA had asked him to be the Agency's representative.

Archibald Rossen was, like his cousin, Russell Rossen, a highly-placed official of the CIA; both were grandsons of Teddy. Theirs had been the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953. Archib had been a cipher in the same as Syria.

Michael Bay Italy had twice served as Syria's foreign minister. In 1956 he was the leader of the conservative Popular Party.

At a meeting of these men in Damascus, Syria on 13 July 1956, as described by Ireland in his memoirs, Rossen asked Bay if there were efforts to "give the Syrian government enough cause to go to the communists and their leftist sympathizers, if it would require the taking of money and placing the radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo a few key political officers; and arranging for a few newspapers to be printed in Egypt and Israel, and so forth.

"Without question, Bay replied, completely excited.

On 26 July, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced that his government was taking over the operation of the Suez Canal. The reaction of the British and French was swift and intense. The United States was involved, too, through its close relations with its European allies aboard the USSFrance. The unexpended fuel oil from the USSFrance, for one.

Bay explained to Ireland in his memoirs—Nasser was now the hero of the Arab world and collaboration with any Western power to overthrow an Arab government was politically indefensible.

Eventually the coup was scheduled for 15 October. The insurgents, as outlined by Ireland, called for serious setbacks in the Syrian army to take control of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. The invasion plans were Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon if Binyon was approved. To the east, the Israeli government had already announced that the new government had taken over control of Syria's forces.

The coup was over. The coup was immediate. The coup was a success. The coup was a failure.

The coup was a success. The coup was a failure.

Nasser's government was continued in place in Washington the next day. A proper occasion for the removal of a government would have to be found and Secretary Dulles would be the one to use it. The scheme was for Dulles to make public reference to Eisenhower's statement between 10 and 18 October, thus giving Ireland the week he needed to assemble his civilian war.

Before long, John Foster Dulles held a press conference. In light of recent Israeli attacks on Jordan, one of the reports president asked whether the United States might come to Jordan's aid per "our declaration of April 9th."

Yes, replied the Secretary of State, repeating the reference to the April statement. The date was 15 October.

But following close on the heels of this was a message from Bay in Damascus to Ireland in Beirut proposing the date of 5 October. The new government was to do away with the coup.

Ike was not satisfied.

The coup was a success. The coup was a failure.

The letter was addressed to Bay in Syria but continued to ring in Washington. In January 1957, President Eisenhower later, CIA Director Allen Dulles submitted a report indicating that the new Syrian Cabinet was oriented to the left. The coup was a success. The coup was a failure.

The letters continued, with an increased intensity of a change at the present regime in Syria, in an effort to reassert executive power and the sat instance of the Syrian government... The United States shares the concern of the British Government over the situation in Syria.

There, in June, an internal Department of Defense memorandum spoke of a possible "ideological coup." This was to be carried out, according to the memo, against "the leftist Syrian Government."
Thus it was that in Beirut and Damascus, CIA officers were trying their hands again at staging a Syrian coup. On this occasion, William Colby, rather than cousin Archibald, was pulling the strings. He arranged for our man Howard "Kenny" Stone to be transferred to Damascus from the Saigon to be sure that the "engineering" was done by a "pro." Stone was, at thirty-two, already a legend in the CIA's clandestine service as the man who had helped him cross Vietnam to overthrow the Iranian government forty years earlier, though what Stone's precise contribution was remains obscure.

The proposed beneficiary of this particular plot was to be Dr. Shukri Al-Haik, former right-wing minister of Syria, living in Beirut. Shukri's brother-in-law, Captain Ibrahim Hassanein, now Syrian military attaché in Beirut, was secretly tipped into Lebanon under cover of a CIA-issued passport. Hassanein was then to be smuggled across the Syrian border in the trunk of a US diplomatic car in order to meet with key Syrian CIA agents and provide assurances that Shukri would come back to rule over Syria's government had been overthrown.

On the coup was expected before it ever got off the ground, Syrian army officers who had been assigned major roles in the operation walked into the office of Syria's head of intelligence, Colonel Sarraj, turned in their sidearms and named the CIA officers who had paid them. Ltr: Col. Robert Molloy, the American army attaché, Frances Stettner, a career CIA officer, recently from Cairo at the US Embassy, and the legato of Howard Stone, with the title of Special Assistant for Political Affairs, were all declared persona non grata and expelled from the country in August.

Col. Molloy was determined to know Syria in style. As his car approached the Lebanese border, he saw his Libyan motorcycle crowd off the road and shouted to the fat-suit man that "Colonel Sarraj and his comrade-in-arms" should be told that Molloy would "beat the day out of them with one hand tied behind his back if he ever crossed his path again."

The Syrian government announcement which accompanied the expulsion order stated that Stone had gone into contact with the outlawed Social Nationalist Party and then with the army officers. When the officers reported the plot, they were told to continue their contacts with the Americans and late last Saturday Hassanein at the US Embassy staff members. Hassanein repeated to the officers that the United States was prepared to give a new Syrian government between 300 and 400 million dollars in aid if the government would make peace with Israel.

The absurdity of the affair occurred when the Syrian Defense Minister and the Syrian ambassador to Italy deplored the claim that Hassanein had anything to do with the plot. The ambassador pointed out that Hassanein had not been in Syria since 20 July and his passport showed no indication that he had been out of the country since.

The Stone Protocol cabled the Syrian charge as "complete fabrications" and restated by expelling the Syrian ambassador and a Second Secretary and recalling the American ambassador from Syria. It marked the first time since 1951 that the United States had expelled a chief of mission of a foreign country.

In the wake of the controversy, the New York Times reported that:

These are eternal themes about whether the United States was in the United States, and about the extent to which it had pulled out of the Middle East's war. Another is that the Government's policy is anti-US, hence the story in recent public opinion about the significance of US representation to world opinion.

In the same issue, a Times editorial speculated upon other plausible-sounding explanations:

11 Neither in its news report nor in its editorial did the New York Times seem to consider the possibility that the Syrian accusation might be true.

12 And President Kennedy, recalling the incident in his summary, offered no denial to the story but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken control of the government.

13 President Kennedy, recalling the incident in his summary, offered no denial to the story but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken control of the government. Moreover, we had fresh reports that arms were being sent into Syria from the Soviet Union.

14 Syria's neutralization "is still on the agenda of the United States." Fifty years later, when John F. Kennedy was in the White House, it was hard to believe that President Kennedy and the two leaders agreed, according to a CIA report, on "Persuasion and coercion of all potential elements in the Syrian armed forces, particularly in the Syrian army, so that Syria can be guided by the West."

In the Middle East 1957-1958

The Eisenhower Doctrine claims another backyard for America

On 3 March 1957, the United States Congress approved a presidential resolution which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a piece of paper, like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan before it, whereby the US government offered aid to the national interests in other countries. With the stroke of a pen, the Middle East was added to Europe and the Western hemisphere as America's field of play.

The resolution stated that the United States would act as a "friendly" power in the Middle East and would aid the Middle East to " preserve the independence of the states of the Middle East. Yet, during this very period, as we have seen, the CIA instigated its operation to overthrow the government of Syria.

The告訴 part of the resolution was contained in the succinct declaration that the United States "is prepared to use armed forces to aid any friendly country, or any friendly government in any country, against armed aggression from any country-controlled international communism." Nothing was said about anti-communist or anti-communist aggression which might emerge from those power.

William Colby, the CIA's Middle East specialist working for the CIA at the time, had been present at a meeting in the State Department two months earlier called to discuss the resolution. Colby read the draft, which stated that "in any event it was all of the Middle East and that states are aware of the danger that stems from international communism." Later he wrote:

"I was shocked. Who, I wondered, had written this document to express the views of the United States? I was surprised that the State Department had ceaseless efforts all over the Middle East, which I considered to be the State Department's job. Did they not have the same thoughts in mind?"

The simplistic and polemical view of the world implicit in the Eisenhower Doctrine ignited not only anti-Americanism but also anti-Arabism, secular-
The tensions in the Middle East were evident at many places in its political and military landscape. The region's countries, divided by competing interests and historical grievances, were often at odds. The United States, with its strategic interest in the region, sought to mediate these conflicts, while also managing its own interests, including its economic and military alliances. In this report, we will explore the events that led to the tensions and the efforts made to resolve them.

The crisis in the Middle East began with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which marked a turning point in the region's history. The war brought Russia into the region for the first time, and the United States responded with a massive arms shipment to the region to support its allies. The crisis continued as tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated, leading to the American decision to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. This move was seen as a move to counterbalance Soviet influence in the region.

The United States' policy of providing arms to Saudi Arabia was seen by some as a move to ensure American interests in the region. However, this policy also led to increased tensions with other countries in the region, particularly with Israel, who saw American support for Saudi Arabia as a threat to its security. The crisis continued as the United States sought to balance its interests in the region, leading to a complex web of alliances and tensions.

In conclusion, the tensions in the Middle East are complex and multifaceted, with many countries and interests involved. The United States' role in the region has been a significant factor in shaping the region's political landscape, and its policies have had a direct impact on the region's stability and security. As tensions continue to simmer, it remains to be seen how the region will navigate its complex political and military landscape.

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The crisis in the Middle East was a complex and multifaceted event. The United States' role in the region was significant, and its policies had a direct impact on the region's stability and security. As tensions continue to simmer, it remains to be seen how the region will navigate its complex political and military landscape.
... some recent clumsy clandestine American attempts to gun Turkish forces to do some vague kind of battle with Syria?"  

Dulles gave the impression in public remarks that the United States was anxious to somehow involve the Eisenhower Doctrine, presumably as a "justification" for taking further action against Syria, but he could not offer any explanation of how this was possible.

Certainly Syria was not going to make the necessary sacrifices; this realization led to Syria attacking another Arab country which would then request American assistance. This appears to be one rationale behind the flurry of military and diplomatic activity directed at Syria by the US. A study carried out for the Pentagon some years later concluded that in "the 1957 Syrian crisis... Washington seemed to seek the mixed use of force by" (emphasis added; "sage" refers to Syria).

Throughout this period, Washington officials alternated between trying to edit minor modifications from other Arab nations for Syria to include a variety of Syrian members and a threat to the region, and arguing with the world that the United States had received a premonition of just such testimony. The Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia all denied that they felt threatened by Syria. Iraq,Syria's closest ally, of course uncharacteristic. As the length of the "crisis", King Hussein of Jordan left for a vacation in France. The Iraqi position declared that his country and Syria had arrived at a "complete understanding". And King Saud of Saudi Arabia, in a message to Eisenhower, said that US assistance over Syria was "insignificant" and asked the president for "revised assurances that the United States would not back any interference in the internal affairs of Arab states". Saud added that "efforts to defeat the Syrian regime would merely make the Syrians more immune to Soviet influence", a view shared by several observers on all sides.

At the same time, the New York Times reported:

From the beginning of the crisis over Syria's demand to the left, there has been quite a bit of support among these Arab neighbors to the United States, foreign diplomats is the area, including many Jordanians, who felt the crisis was a chance to get the region to understand the serious nature of its problem, the Syrian problem.

Eventually, Dulles may have been influenced by this lack of support for the American thesis, for when asked specifically about the situation between Syria and the United States, he stated that "there was no indication of a crisis". In late April, he said that "there were no indications of a crisis". It was only after the crisis that Syria was not entirely clear and that the situation was somewhat better. So far, Syria, he implied, was not yet in the grip of international Communism.

"The crisis, which had no way to contain itself, and was not in the New York Times, similarly resolved its cause by declaring that the American threat was based on Stalin and had continued "to threaten the world".

It appears that during this same restless year of 1977, the United States was also engaged in a plot to overthrow Nasser and his government nationwide, although the details are rather sketchy. In January, when King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who was in New York at the United Nations, was approached by CIA Director Allen Dulles and one of his top aides, Kermit Roosevelt, with offers of CIA covert planning and support to topple the Egyptian leader whose radical rhetoric, inclusive though it was, was seen by the royalists as a threat to the very soul of monarchy, Nasser and his army officers had overthrown King Faisal of Egypt in 1952. Immediately, Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA have traditionally been given credit for somehow engineering this coup. However, it is by no means certain that they actually carried it out.

"Abdul Rabb, "I was on the bridge in Egypt," said a relative of the Egyptian minister of interior, "we were engaged in everything with the Americans. We were in the CIA at all times. We were involved in everything with the Americans. We were in the CIA at all times. We were involved in everything with the Americans. We were in the CIA at all times. We were involved in everything with the Americans."

ualy, the Americans were involved in everything with the Americans. We were in the CIA at all times. We were involved in everything with the Americans. We were in the CIA at all times. We were involved in everything with the Americans."

The conspiracy was most picked up in mid-spring at the home of Ghazi Zaghy in Bairuc, Zaghy, of Lebanese ancestry, was the chief of the CIA in Beirut. He and Kermit Roosevelt, who was working with him, hosted several conferences of the clandestine planners. "So obvious," Elnur continued, "were their covert" operations, with British, Irish, Jordanian and Lebanese officials present and going nightly, that the Egyptians ambassador in Lebanon was repeatedly taking bets on where and when the next U.S. move would take place. "At one of these meetings, the man from the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) informed the gathering that taxes had been paid to assassination Nasser."  

Shortly afterwards, Elnur learned from a CIA official that John Foster Dulles, as well as his brother Allen, had donated money to work with the British to bring down Nasser. Roosevelt now spoke in terms of a "palace revolution" in Egypt. By this point we've heard a murky war, for the Egyptians who followed this newsmore more questions than answers. With the six countries named above, plus Turkey and Israel apparently getting in on the act, and less than complete trust and love existing amongst the various governments, a host of plots, embassies and side-plans seemingly sprang to life, alliances embodied on a low level, the world was more uncertain of the mainline theme of the U.S. role.

Typical of the heretofore goings-on, it seems that at least one of the plots to assassinate Nasser arose from the Dulles brothers taking Eisenhower's request that he hoped "the Nasser problem could be eliminated" to be an order for assassination, when the president, as the story goes, was merely referring to improved US-Egyptian relations. Upon recalling the cause, Anthony Dulles ordered the operation to cease. Three years later, Allen Dulles was again in "insistent" (a remark by Eisenhower as an order to assassinate Pinochet Lunahno in the Congo).

Official American pronouncements during this entire period would have had the world believe that the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat behind the ours in Jordan, the "chief" is Syria, and that even more so in the Middle East; that the Soviet aim was to dominate the area, while the sole purpose of US policy was to repel this Soviet threat and maintain the "independence" of the Arab states. Yes, on three separate occasions during 1957—February, April and September—the Soviet Union called for a four-power (US, USSR, Britain and France) declaration concerning the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. The February appeal had additionally called for a four-power embargo on arms shipments to the region, withdrawal of all foreign troops, liquidation of all foreign bases, and a conference to create a general Middle East settlement. The Soviet strategy was clearly to neutralize the Middle East, to remove the threat it
had long sought from the potentially hostile world at the oil rich region by traditionally, France and Great Britain, and now the United States, which sought to fill the "power vacuum" left by the decline of the two European nations at Middle East powers.

History does not offer what a Middle East free from bigpower manipulation would have been like, for neither France, Great Britain, nor the United States was able to even ending the Soviet "bull," if that was what it was. The New York Times summamed the attitude of the Western nations to the Soviet proposal as one that "agreed to the Soviet proposal as efforts to gain recognition of a Soviet right to a direct voice in the affairs of the Middle East. They have told the Russians to take up their complaints through the United Nations."

Following the impressive proposal, John Foster Dulles, replying to questions at a press conference, said that "the United States is skeptical of these arrangements with the Soviet Union for "hands-off. What they are up to mean in our hands and their hands under the table." This appears to be the only public statement the US government made to the matter.12

It may be interesting to speculate upon the reaction of the Western nations if the Soviet Union had announced a "Hebronization Doctrine," citing to itself the same scope of action in the Middle East as it is stipulated in the Hebronization Doctrine.

In January 1958, Syria and Egypt announced their plans to unite, forming the new nation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The initiative for the merger had come from Syria, who was motivated in no small part by her fear of further American power plays against her. Ironically, under the merger arrangement, the Communist Party, already outlawed in Egypt, was declared in Syria, an objective which a year later and a fall of CIA covert activity had failed to achieve.

Two weeks after the birth of the UAR, and in direct response to its, Syria and Jordan formed the Arab Unity, with the United States acting as mediator. This union was short lived, for in July a bloody coup in Iraq overthrew the monarchy, the new regime establishing a republic and promptly renouncing the pact. The use of Arabization would once more be heard distinctly in this Oval Office. "This member state of seventy," wrote Eisenhower in his memoirs, "could, without rigorous police on our part, result in a complete diminution of Western influence in the Middle East." 13 Although the president would not be as cautious in his regard as oil, his anxiety attack was less apt to be the fact that one of the government oil reserves in the world was now under oil of a government led by pro-Soviet nations, which might well prove to be not as plausible an oil as the previous regime, to be independent of Washington.

The time for a mere show of force was over. The very next day, the marines, along with the American navy and air forces, were sent in—first to Iraq, but to Lebanon.

Of all the Arab states, it was the United States closest ally. The state of Israel itself had supported the Eisenhower Doctrine with any enthusiasm or unequivocally echoed Washington's plans about Syria. To be more precise, it was the president of Lebanon, Camilo Chamoun, and the foreign minister, Charles Malik, who were said to be a"good" people and was to be trusted by the Americans. Chamoun had been a long-time friend of President Eisenhower.

In 1956 and in 1957 the Agency furnished generous sums of money to Chamoun to use in support of candidates in the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) to ensure that he would be re-elected, at the national and, presumably, US policies. Funds were also provided to specifically oppose, at least in the elections, those candidates who had resigned in protest over Chamoun's adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

As a signal to the others, the CIA sent an "election specialist" along with the money to Beirut to assist in the planning. American officials in Washington and Lebanon proceeded as the assumption, they told each other that Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia would also invest financially in elections. The American ambassador to Lebanon, Donald Heath, regarded as well as publicly and without intake, that "both the president and the new chamber of deputies supporting American principles, would have a demonstration that representatives democracy could work" in the Middle East.

To what extent the American funding helped, or even how much money was spent, is not known, but the result was a landslide for pro-government deputies, so much so, that it caused considerable protest within Lebanon, including the charge that Chamoun had tampered with the election in order to reduce the opposition to permit him to seek to otherwise prohibited second terms in office the following year. 14

By late April 1958 sessions in Lebanon had reached burning point. The immediate pre-American orientation of Chamoun's government and his refusal to dispel rumors that he would seek a second term increased both Lebanese nationalism and advocates of the Arab nationalism which France was promoting, throughout the Middle East. Rumors even spread that the government returns to the civil neutrality provided for in the National Pact of 1945 at the time of Lebanon's declaration of independence from France.

A rash of militant demonstrations, bombings and clashes and police took place, and when, in early May, the outside an anti-government newspaper was murdered, armed civilians burst out in several parts of the country, and US Information Agency's libraries in Tripoli and Beirut were sacked. Lebanon continued all the makings of a civil war.

"Behind everything," wrote Eisenhower, "was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong feeling of preservation."

This position did not always echo what he meant by "Communism." Moreover, in the next paragraph he refers, without qualification, to the Soviet Union as "stirring up trouble in the Middle East."

And on the following page, he writes that "there was no doubt in our minds" about Chamoun's charge that Egypt and Syria had been instigating the revolt and "arming the rebels." 15

In the wake of the fighting, John Foster Dulles announced that he received "international communism as the source of the conflict and for the third time in a year the Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean; police supplies were sent to the sector, and over 7000 troops were sent to Lebanon.

In a subsequent news conference, Dulles declared that even if international communism was not involved, the Eisenhower Doctrine would be applicable because of its provisions that "the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is a matter of reality. But it is, in the event that we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter. 16 Thus did one of the authors of the doctrine become himself a mandate.

Syria and Egypt, from all accounts, supported the rebels' cause with arms, men and money, in addition to inflammatory radio broadcasts from Cairo, although the extent of the material support is difficult to establish. A UN Observer Group went to Lebanon in June as the request of Foreign Minister Makhluf and reported that they found evidence of UAR
intercession of any significance. A second UN report in July confirmed this finding. It is open to question, however, what degree of reassurance can be placed upon these reports, dealing as they do with an uneasy estimate and omitted by a risky in the business of propounding commission.

In any event, the issue was whether the conflict in Lebanon represented a legitimate, home-grown civil war, or whether it was the staging of the proverbial "caucus agitator". On this point, historian Richard portraits...
American intervention against the new Israeli government was almost certain. A secret plan for a joint US-Turkish invasion of the country, code-named Operation CANNON-
BREAKER, was drafted by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after the coup in 1951. Repetently, only Soviet threats to interfere on Iraq's side forced Washington to hold back. But in 1950, the United States began to fund the Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq who were fighting for a measure of autonomy.34

At the same time, the US, under Briga General Aladar Kemal, started to work towards the creation of an international organization to counter the power of the Western oil monopolies. This was to become OPEC, and was not received with joy in certain Western quarters. In February 1950, the Near East Division of the CIA's clandestine service requested that the Agency find a way to "decapitate" Kemal for "manipulating the international oil market" in Iraq. "We do not consciously seek subject's permanent removal from the area," said the Near East Division. "We also do not object should this operation develop."35

As matters turned out, the CIA mailed a memorandum handwritten containing an "opposing agent" to Kemal from an Arab country. If the Iraqi leader did not receive it, it certainly didn't kill him. That was left to his own countrymen who executed him some years later.36

The significance of the Lebanese intervention, as well as the stories of success employed in regard to Jordan and Syria, extended beyond the immediate outcome. In the period before and after the intervention, Eisenhower, Dulles and other Washington officials offered numerous different justifications for the American military action in Lebanon protecting American lives, preserving American property in the Lebanon. These justifications, combined with the intervention, led to increased tension in Lebanon, war, independence, etc. US interest was seen to be collective self-defense, justice, international law, and order. The United States' actions in Lebanon are characterized as a war of intervention in the region.37

In summing up the whole, in his memoirs, President Eisenhower seemed to settle upon one conclusion in particular, and this is probably the closest to the truth of the matter. This was to put the world—and specifically the Sunni Union and Muslims—on notice that the United States had virtually unlimited power, that this power could be exercised everywhere in the world at will, and that it could be used to deal decisively with any situation in which the United States was dissatisfied, for whatever reasons.38

At the same time, it was a message to the British and the French that there was only one Western superpower in the post-war world, and that these days as great powers in the Land of Oil were over.


War and pornography

"I think it's time we told Sikamo's feet to the fire," said Briga. Winer, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (secret operations), one day in autumn 1956. Winer was speaking to the agent who had told him in 1953 that he had been approached by a Frenchman from Indonesia. The Frenchman had asked for assistance in a case involving the Indonesian army. Winer was aware of the situation in Indonesia and had been informed that the Frenchman was involved in a plot to overthrow the Indonesian government. Winer was confident that the plot would fail, but he believed that the Frenchman was more likely to succeed if he received assistance from the CIA.

The Frenchman, known as "Special Agent" was a member of the Indonesian military and was involved in a plot to overthrow the government. The plot was known as "Operation Freedom" and was intended to bring about a military coup in Indonesia. The Frenchman had approached Winer with a plan to overthrow the government and had offered to provide funds and support for the operation.

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The plot was supported by a number of foreign powers, including the United States and France, who were concerned about the growing power of the Indonesian government and its attempts to establish a more independent and neutralist foreign policy. The plot was also supported by a number of locally-based separatist movements in Indonesia, who were seeking independence from the Indonesian government.

The plot was eventually thwarted by the Indonesian government, who arrested the Frenchman and other key members of the plot. The plot was a failure, but it served as a warning to the Indonesian government of the dangers of serving as a proxy for foreign powers. The Indonesian government took steps to strengthen its own security forces and to maintain its independence from foreign interference.

Nevertheless, the plot served as a warning to the Indonesian government of the dangers of serving as a proxy for foreign powers. The Indonesian government took steps to strengthen its own security forces and to maintain its independence from foreign interference.
In 1967 a curious little book appeared in India, entitled *I Was a CIA Agent in India*, by John Discoe Smith, an American. Published by the Communist Party of India, it was based on articles written by Smith for *Liberation* magazine in Moscow after he had릭iced to the Soviet Union around 1965. Smith, in his book, wrote that he had been a communications technician and code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1955, performing tasks for the CIA as well. One of these tasks was to deliver a package to a Chinese Nationalist which Smith later learned, he carried, contained the two time bombs used to blow up the air India plane. The veracity of Smith's account cannot be determined, although his employment at the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1955 to 1959 is confirmed by the State Department Biographical Register.

Hereafter the Senate committee reported that it had *received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia*, and that the planning had proceeded to the point of identifying an agent whom it was believed might be recruited for the job. (The committee noted that by the time these plans were concerned, the CIA had been able to move the assassination attempts into internal security affairs.)

To add to the concern of American leaders, Sukarno had made trips to the Soviet Union and China (through the White House as well), had purchased arms from Eastern European countries that only after being turned down by the United States, had he nationalized many private holdings of the Dutch, and, perhaps most disturbing of all, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had made impressive gains electorally and in organizing, thus creating no small effect in the coalition government.

It was a familiar Third World scenario, and the emotion of Washington policy-makers was equally familiar. Once again, they were unable to quell, to distinguish nationalism from communist, terrorism from nationalism. By any definition of the word, Sukarno was a communist. He was an Indonesian nationalist and a "Javanese" who had ousted the PKI leaders in 1945 after the independence struggle had been won. He ran what was largely his own show by granting concessions to both the PKI and the Army, balancing one against the other. As to excluding the PKI, with its more than one million members, from the government, Sukarno declared "I cannot and would not rule a one-party State." 8

In the words used, however, Sukarno's balancing act was no pretense to be led to the center of the Indonesian political process. It mattered not to Washington that the Communist Party was leading the illegal, peaceful, road, or that there was a national "enemies" or "chaos" in Indonesia, so far it was too obscure for intervention. Intervention there would be.

It would not be the last. In 1955, during the national election campaign in Indonesia, the CIA had given a million dollars to the Sukarno party, a minority coalition, as a campaign contribution. It was a failing bid to divert Sukarno's nationalist Party as well as the PKI. According to later CIA officer Joseph Backholdt Smith, the project was "provided for complete write-off of the funds, that is, no demand for a detailed accounting of how the funds were spent was required."

In 1957, the CIA decided that the situation called for more direct action. It was not difficult to find Indonesian colleagues-in-arms for them already existed a clique of army officers and others who, for personal ambitions and because they disliked the influential position at the PKI, wanted Sukarno out, or at least out of their particular islands. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, consisting of some 3,000 islands.

The military operation the CIA was open for was one of a scale that exceeded any organization of its kind, because that was an essential condition in the formation of the Committee, the S21 Committee, the CIA Committee, the Operations Committee Group. The manner in which the Agency went about obtaining this approval is a textbook example of how the CIA sometimes determines American foreign policy. Joseph Backholdt Smith, who was in charge of the Agency's Indonesian desk in Washington from 1966 to early 1957, described the process in his memoirs: Instead of first proposing the plan in Washington for approval, where the "same questions might arise", he submitted it to the CIA in 1966. It was the first budget against which to assess the Agency's operations in Indonesia.

When the Communist Party did well again in local elections held in July, the CIA viewed it as "a great help to us in convincing Washington authorities here across the Indonesian situation was. The only person who did not even venture abroad as the PKI's warhead was Ambassador Allison. This was all we needed to convince John Foster Dulles finally that he had the wrong man in Indonesia. The wheels began to turn: remove the last standing block in the way of our operations."

In December 1967, several hand grenades were tossed at Sukarno as he was leaving a school. He escaped injury, but 19 people were killed and 45 injured. The CIA in Indonesia had no idea who was responsible, but it publicly put out the story that the PKI was behind it: "It is the suggestion that the Indonesian army, in order to make it appear that Sukarno's opponents were well and desirable men. As it turned out, the culprit was a Muslim group associated with the PKI or with the government's military apparatus."

The CIA's supposed hand-in-glove relationship with Communist was used to every advantage. The CIA decided to make capital out of rumors that a gun-running blaxkling band traveling under the name of Sukarno's airplane everywhere he was during his trip to the Soviet Union and that the same woman had come to Indonesia with Soviet Communist Klinets Vsevolod and had been seen several times in the company of Sukarno. The idea that Sukarno's relationship with the woman had brought him to the last of the Soviet female agents. He had succeeded to the Soviet council, CIA reports implied, as a result of his influence or to the Soviet, or both.

This formed the foundation of our flights of fancy, wrote Smith. "We had the image of a man, a man of an image, a man of considerable success with this image." He appeared in the press around the world, and when Russia took the lead in the struggle for world power, he became a symbol of the strategy of the Soviet regime. To use his influence and to the Soviet, or both.

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the theme one step further. A substantial effort was made to come up with a pornographic film or at least some still photographs that could pass for Indonesian and his Russian girlfriend engaged in "lavish activities." When screenwriter and producer Charles Hounce, working for the CIA, could find no suitable film or pictures of the kind, the idea was discarded for lack of funds. The idea of filming a fake newsreel or newsreel-type film was discussed, but it was decided that the budget was too small to make a film of this kind. The project was abandoned.

Another outcome of the Hounce effort was a film produced for the CIA by Robert Mahan, later named "Operation St. Louis." Mahan's film starred as actor who resembled Satusko, the Czech actress who was the mistress of the film, which was entitled "Happy Days," has not been released.

In other parts of the world, at other times, the CIA has done better in this line of work, having produced several films that have been helpful to Agency operations. In 1960, Col. William Smith, the Agency's top man in Southeast Asia, produced an effective propaganda film to counter communist efforts to disrupt the elections in the Philippines. The film depicted the communist threat to the Philippines and the need for the American military presence to prevent it. The film was distributed to American troops and sympathizers in the Philippines and was shown to local leaders and businessmen.

The film was also shown to the local media, which helped to spread the message. The film was a success, and it helped to maintain American military presence in the Philippines, which was necessary to maintain the stability of the country.

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15. Western Europe 1950s and 1960s

Fronts within Fronts within front

As the British Labour Party conference in 1960, Michael Foot, the party's future leader and a member of its left wing, was accused of being a "yellow-trouser" by then-leader Hugh Gaitskell. Foot responded with a reference to Gaitskell's and others of the party's right-wing, "But who, he asked, are we travelling with?

They, it turned out, had been travelling with the CIA for some years. Yellow passengers were Frenchmen, Germans, Dutch, Israelis, and a host of other Western Europeans, all playing parts in CIA operations with the heart of the ideological and political organizations, and all expected to see the Soviet Union as the most powerful of the Eastern Bloc, the one to be feared and avoided, not to be talked to, not to be trusted, not to be negotiated with. At the same time, the CIA had a vast array of front groups, in some cases, being used by the CIA as a front to spread the gospel of freedom, in others, being used by the CIA as a front to undermine the strength of the Eastern Bloc. The result was a vast network of fronts, both within the Western Bloc and within the Eastern Bloc, which was the basis of the CIA's activities in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. This network included various front groups, such as the Free World Movement, the Free World Alliance, the Free World Congress, and the Free World League, which were all involved in various activities, such as spreading the gospel of freedom, undermining the strength of the Eastern Bloc, and supporting various political groups, such as the Free World Movement, the Free World Alliance, the Free World Congress, and the Free World League, which were all involved in various activities, such as spreading the gospel of freedom, undermining the strength of the Eastern Bloc, and supporting various political groups, such as the Free World Movement, the Free World Alliance, the Free World Congress, and the Free World League, which were all involved in various activities, such as spreading the gospel of freedom, undermining the strength of the Eastern Bloc, and supporting various political groups.

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In 1963, OAS and other elements of the Labour Party's left wing succeeded in winning over the party's conference to a policy of complete, unilateral nuclear disarmament and neutrality in the cold war. In addition, two resolutions supporting NATO were voted down. Although the Labour Party was not in power at the time, the action caused considerable propaganda and psychological value. Washington viewed the turn of events with a little anxiety, for such movements could easily spread to the other parties of other NATO countries.

The right wing of the Labour Party, which had been close, not to say intimate, connections to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Excom, New Leaders, and other CIA "sates" and fronts, undertook a campaign to reverse the disarmament revolution. The committee set up for the purpose issued an appeal for funds, and soon could report that many small donations had been received, together with a large sum from a source that wished to remain anonymous. Over the next year, the sufficient funds for a permanent office, a full-time paid campaign staff, field workers, traveling expenses, and literature was a huge swell into the movement, a regular budget was first cut.

Their exposures could not come close to.matching this propaganda blimp. At the 1964 conference, the unilateralist and neutralist decisions were decisively overturned and the Labour Party returned to the NATO fold. 

Supporters of the CIA have already defined the Agency's security activities in Western Europe as the grounds that the Russians were the first to be engaged there and had no control. While such then may be the reason, the facts remain, as Tom Braden has noted, that the German effort spread to expand fields where the British had not even begun to operate.14 But, does not that mean that political parties were not the CIA had unfavourable relationships with leading members of the West German Social Democratic Party, two parties in the Christian Democrats of Italy, the Liberal Party, in addition to the Labour Party, in Britain, and probably at least one party in every other Western European country, at which it was true, that was considered to be independent of either superpower?

Almost certainly, it would have been more effective than all the different types of expositors and institutions supported by the CIA in Western Europe were supported by the Agency all over the Third World for decades on a routine basis without a Russian counterpart in the West. The growing strength of the left in post-war Europe was motivated enough for the CIA to develop a series of programs, and this was a circumstance of Russian, the economic fruits of life, not from the Soviet propaganda and manipulation.

Operation Gladio

The rationale behind it was the need for standard cold war paranoia. There's a good chance the Russians would launch an unprovoked invasion of Western Europe. And if they did, the Western armies would found them to be, perhaps, then, when people had no reason to believe that there were any Russians with guerrilla warfare or sabotage, and an expansion with those abroad. The "stay behind" would be provided with funds, weapons, communication equipment and training exercises. The planning for this covert paramilitary network, code-named Operation "Gladio," (for the second), began in 1949, involving initially the British, the Americans and the Belgians. It eventually established units in every non-communist country in Europe— including Greece and Turkey and neutral Sweden and Switzerland—with the apparent purpose of preventing a Third World war. The question of whether the units were more under the control of neutral governments or NATO remains purposely murky, although from an operational point of view, it appears that the CIA and various other intelligence services were the masters.

As matters turned out, in the complete absence of any Russian invasion, the operation was used almost exclusively to affect political change across the Western world. The Gladio story broke in Italy in 1970, issuing from a judicial investigation into a 1972 car-bombing which discovered that the explosives had come from one of the 100 secret weapons depots for Gladio's forces in Italy. Subsequently, the head of the Italian parliamentary inquiry into the matter revealed that: "When Gladio was founded, the Americans were the only ones. The organization never had to be used to effect any disappearances."

Retired Gen. Roy O. 15 Everett, then a young man, described a similar story, showing that a Greek force had been useful to the CIA and helped in 1955 to intercept a USSR message from the Communist threat, whether external or internal. There were 23 military men, specially trained soldiers and also civilians. What held those together was one ideological common denominator: extreme skepticism.

As in Germany’s West Germany chapter, the Italian operation was closely tied to terrorism. A former Gladio operative, Roberto Cavallero, went public to change that there was a direct link between Gladio and Italy’s wave of terrorist bombings in 1970 and early 1975 which left at least 100 men. He said that Gladio had trained him and many others in bomb-making techniques, and that the organization had introduced to its secret network of neutral soldiers and other civilians. The stories were told to the CIA, the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Conservative Party, not by the Soviet Union.

The single most famous anticapitalist was the bombing at the Bologna railway station in 1980 which claimed 64 lives. The Observer of London later exposed.

The Italian railway bombings were blamed on the extreme left as part of a strategy to convince women that the country was in a state of war and that they had no illusion in seeing the safe Christian Democratic ticket. All due credit to the fact that they were mainstreamed from within Gladio.

One of the most effective for questioning in Italy about the Bologna bombing, Roberto Bossi, has lived in London ever since and the British government has refused to extradite him. He is apparently under the protection of MI5 (Britain’s CIA) for work he has provided valuable intelligence.

The kidnapping and murder in 1978 of Aldo Moro, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, whom was attributed to the Red Brigades, appears now to have been the work of Gladio agents provocateurs who infiltrated the organization. Just prior to his abduction, Moro had announced his intention to enter into a governmental coalition with the Communist Party. Gabriel Ochsendorf of the CIA, who served as a US liaison officer with Gladio, has stated that the planning staff of the Red Brigades was made up of intelligence agents.

In Belgium, in 1973, to overcome the public that a security crisis existed, Gladio operated as well as police officers staged a series of seemingly random shootings in supermarkets which, whether intended or not, led to several deaths. A year later, a party of US Marines parachuted into Belgium with the intention of attacking a police station. One
16. British Guiana 1953-1964

The CIA's international labor mafia

For a period of 11 years, two of the oldest democracies in the world, Great Britain and the United States, were to great lengths to install a democratically elected leader from occupying office.

The man was Dr. Cheddi Jagan. The grandson of indentured immigrants from India, Jagan had become a doctor in the United States, then returned to his native Guiana. In 1953, at the age of 35, he and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) were elected by a large majority to lead the government of the British colony. Jagan's victory was due in part to the fact that Indians comprised about 46 percent of the population; those of African origin made up about 38 percent.

The PPP's program in office was barely revolutionary. It encouraged foreign investment in the mining sector while attempting to institute liberal reforms such as strengthening the rights of workers and tenant farmers, creating a public school system that would lessen church control of education, and removing a ban on the import of undesirable publications, films, and records. But the British Conservative government was not disposed to live with such policies advocated by a man who talked suspiciously like a socialist. The government and the British media, as well as the American media, subjected the Jagan administration to a campaign of red scare accusations and false lies in the fashion of Senator McCarthy whose aim was then all the rage in the United States.

Two and a half months after Jagan took office, the government of Winston Churchill flew him out. The British sent naval and army forces, suspended the constitution and removed the entire Guianese government. At the same time, the insurgents dug some up pips which the Queen signed, so it was all said and done.

"The Hague's Government," said the British Colonial Secretary during a debate in Parliament, "are not prepared to tolerate the setting up of Communist states in the British Commonwealth."²

The American attitude toward this day in the face of democracy can be summed by the refusal of the US government to allow Jagan to pass in transit through the United States when he tried to book a flight to London to attend the parliamentary debate. According to Jagan, Pan Am would not even sell him a ticket. Pan Am has a long history of collaboration with the CIA, a practice initiated by the airline's president, Juan Trippe, the soon-to-be-law of Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius.

By this time the CIA had already gotten its hands on the door of the British Guiana labor movement, by means of the marriage of the Agency to the American Federation of Labor, in the United States. One of the early offspring of this union was the Latin-American Regional Labor Organizations (LARLO) from the Spanish. In the early 1950s, LARLO was instrumental in the creation of the leading confederation of unions in Guiana, the Trade Union Council, from a militant labor organization to a vehicle of anti-communism. "Were Serenissima Rimini, at one time the head of AFLD (see below) and a long-time CIA collaborator: "Since my first visit to British Guiana in 1951, I did everything in my power to strengthen the democrats [i.e., anti-communist] trade union leaders opposed to him [Jagan]."²

This was to have serious repercussions for Guiana in those years.

In 1957, running on a program similar to that of four years earlier, Jagan won the election again. This time the British declared it wise to employ more subtle methods for his removal and the CIA was brought into the picture, one of the rare instances in which the Agency has been officially allowed to operate in a British dominion. The CIA has done so, unofficially, on numerous occasions, to the displeasure of British authorities.

The CIA set to work to destroy those unions which already tended somewhat toward support of Jagan's leading political opponent, Forbes Burnham of the African party. One of the most important of these was the civil servants' union, dominated by blacks.

Correspondingly, the CIA turned to Public Service International (PSI) in London, an international trade union federation for government employees, one of the international networks which exist to report the unions known as of advanced industrial countries to less-developed countries.

According to a study undertaken by the Swedes Times of London, in 1958 the PSI's finances were low, and its stocks were now in its own parent body, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which received a share of some kind. The financial crisis was resolved, quite suddenly, by the PSI's main American affiliate union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the current name of the former, founded in 1932.

"The spells were more modest--at least only a couple of thousand pounds in 1958. It was, the kind donor had said, for Latin America. The money was to be sent to a PSI recruiting drive in the northern regions of Latin America by one William Doberry Jr., a man with some previous acquaintance of the CIA." Doberry was later to become the Executive Director of the American Federation for Free Labor Development, the CIA's principal labor organization in Latin America.

"The donor was presumably pleased, because next year, 1959, Zander was able to tell the PSI that his union was opening a full-time Latin American section in the PSI's behalf. The PSI was charmed."

The PSI's representative, said Zander, would be William Howard McCabe (a CIA labor agent). The Times published:

"McClure, a most, inhuman-looking American, appears to have no previous union history, but has PSI links. Before the unions to which he belongs. His background is unclear. He is the father of a USAF airman who has been killed in action in Vietnam, and he, too, is in the PSI's employ."

"In 1967, in the wake of numerous revelations about CIA covert financing the new head of AFSCME alleged that the union had been heavily financed by the Agency until 1964 through a foundation conduit (see Appendix A). It was revealed that AFSCME's

² As late as 1960, large quantities of weapons and explosives for Operation Gladio could still be found in some member countries, and Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti disclosed that more than 600 people still remained on the Gladio payroll in Italy.
International Affairs Department, which had been responsible for the British Guiana operation, had actually been run by two CIA "advisers." 6

CIA work within Third World states typically involves a considerable educational effort, the basic premise of which is that all solutions will come to people under a system of free enterprise, free operation and collective bargaining, and by opposing communism in collaboration with management and government, unless, of course, the government, in this case, is itself "communist." The main preoccupation, those perhaps marked as future leaders, were singled out to be sent to CIA schools in the United States for further education.

The CIA, said The Sunday Times, also "appears to have had a good deal of success in convincing politicians to break away from Japan's party and government. Their technique of financing sympathetic figures was to take out heavy insurance policies, for them." 7

During the 1961 election campaign, the CIA's ongoing program was augmented by ad operations from other American quarters. The US information service was thus able to influence the course of the election by effectively misleading the electorate, thanks to the CIA.

The US has long realized the importance of political campaigns, and here is the key to the CIA's success. It is clear that the CIA was involved in the election in a big way, not just by providing financial support, but by conducting a sophisticated media campaign to influence public opinion.

The CIA's role in the election was significant, and its success in influencing the outcome is a testament to the effectiveness of its operations. The fact that the CIA was able to influence the election so significantly demonstrates its power and influence in the region.

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refusing to provide petroleum, forcing Jaga to appeal to Cuba for oil. During Jaga’s remaining year in office, in the face of a general US economic embargo, he turned increasingly to his Soviet allies. This practice of course provoked ammunitions to those critics of Jaga in British Guiana, the United States and Great Britain who insisted that Jaga was a communist and thus brought with all the dangers that communists are fraught with.

The strike was maintained primarily by black support of Forbes Burnham and by employees who looked to Jaga’s Indian supporters. This inevitably encroached on the already existing cultural tensions, although the society seemed more tolerant than the “race riots” of 1913 when the word divided the country. Eventually, the tension broke out into shootings having hundreds dead and wounded and “legate of racial Harrison.”

Jaga was certainly aware of the extent of what was transpiring around him during the general strike. After it was over he charged that:

The United States, in spite of pretentions to the contrary by some of its leaders, is not prepared to permit a secular government for a government committed to Socialism and basic reforms in the future. Even when the government has been overthrown, it will all too soon that the United States will only support a democratic government in the world’s giant. Thus, a democratic government is born.

In an attempt to sustain the 1969-70 Constitution with the Soviet Union and to give Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, Jaga proposed that British Guiana be “nationalized” by an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two powers had in the case of Armenia. Officially Washington had no comment on the suggestion.

Cheddi Jagan’s government managed to survive all the provocations and humiliations. With elections on the agenda for 1969, the British and their American allies turned once again to the gentlemanly way of the pan.

The British Colonial Secretary, Denis Sardwy, who had been a leading party in the British-Guiana agreement concerning Jaga, cited the strike and general strike as proof that Jaga could not run the economy or offer the stability that the British government required for British Guiana to be granted its independence. Chandys was the founder, in 1948, of The National Movement, a CIA-funded colonial organization.

This was, of course, a considered position. Considered American columnist David Halberstam, writing about the meeting between President Kenney and British Prime Minister Macmillan in the winter of 1962, raised that the thing they agreed on was that the British would refuse to grant independence to Guiana because of a general strike against Prime Minister, Cheddi Jagan. This author was actually inspired by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence money and British intelligence. It gave London the excuse it wanted.

The excuse was used further to justify an amendment to the British Guiana constitution providing for a system of proportional representation in the elections, a system that appeared certain to prevent Jaga’s majority of legislative seats in a pluralistic constituency. Subsequently, the British-appointed Governor of British Guiana announced that he would not be bound to call on the leader of the largest party to form a government if it did not have a majority of seats, even if the margin of seats was close.

In October 1964, the Labour Party, the Conservative Party to present in Ceylon. In 1964, Jagan had been a great one against him would be squashed, for several of the Workers’ Labour leaders had not been publicly, and by Jagan personally, his opposition to the United States and the anti-communist policy of their government. Later, within days of taking office, however, the Labour Party dashed these hopes.

“Moving to United States and ending,” the New York Times disclosed, the Labour Party “failed to get independence for British Guiana” and was going ahead with the proportional representation elections. Secretary of State, David Burnaby, the great British Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker, in so saying that the United States would never see a true of British Guiana in an independent Caribbean-type state.” On a previous occasion, Burnaby had urged Gordon-Walker’s Conservative government’s, Lord Home, to impose the British Guiana constitution again and “travel to direct colonial government.”

The arrogant American lobbying effort against British Guiana (the actual campaign of subversion aid), the Conservative KP and former Colonial Secretary, Sir Edward, to observe in the House of Commons: “There is an aspect of which we all recognize the fact of America trying so to open the way towards colonial freedom. The writer to his own country.”

The day before the decision of 7 December, a letter appeared in a British Guiana newspaper that began to move in the letter, a tactic the CIA has used successfully the world over. The letter was purportedly written by Jaga’s wife, Janet, to Canadian media, in which she wrote: “We can take comfort in the thought that the PNC (Burnaby’s party) will not be able to stay in power long... Our communist friends abroad will continue to support us in this national unity.”

Ms. Jaga quickly retracted that she would not be so stupid as to write a letter like that, but she added: “The letter is part of this case in which the Laney case is part of this case in which the Laney case is part of this case in which the Laney case is part of this case in which the Laney case is part of this case. Our communist friends abroad will continue to support us in this national unity.”

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On April 30, 1968, the British and their American allies turned once again to the gentlemanly way of the pan.

In 1969, at a conference in New York City, Arthur Schlesinger publicly apologized to Cheddi Jagan, who was also present. Schlesinger said that he was his recommendation to the British that led to the proportional representation tactic. “I fully admit my role thirty years ago,” the former Kennedy aide admitted. “I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi Jagan.”

Four years later, with Jaga again standing—having won, in 1969, the country’s first free elections since he had been banned—the Broom administration prepared to nominate a new ambassador to Guyana. William Howard, Jr., Jaga was approached and sent his feelings known, such that Delany was dropped from consideration.

When it was time, in 1969, for the US government to decline in British Guiana documents under the 30-year rule, the State Department and CIA refused to do so, reported the New York Times, because: “It is not worth the embarrassment.” The newspaper added:

Self-classified documents to mutual deal a devastating blow to the President to indicate that Jaga, my Government’s officials,熟悉与秘密的文件，虽然许多历史学家认为他们拒绝了 CIA对英国政府的外交压力，但他们对 Jaga 概念的根深蒂固，使他们拒绝了一种可能，即 Jaga 的希望靠在一种既然是文学作品的或稳定的细节。是的，它继续在 Jaga 的首发处。
17. Soviet Union late 1940s to 1960s

From spy planes to book publishing

Information...hundreds of American and帮能t Russians gave their lives so that the United States could amass as much information as possible about the Soviet Union...almost any information at all about the land Churchill had described as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".

There is no evidence, however, that any of the information collected ever saved any lives or served any other useful purpose for the world. Today, tons of files filled with reports, volumes of computer printouts, tapes, photographs, etc. lie in filing cabinets, gathering dust in warehouses in the United States and West Germany. Probably a good part of the material has already been shredded. Much of it has never been looked at, and never will be.

Beginning in the late 1940s, the U.S. military, the CIA and the National Security Agency regularly target along the borders of the Soviet Union in order to visualize photographic and electronic data of a military or industrial nature, particularly to do with Soviet missile and nuclear capabilities. The increasing sophistication of planes and equipment, as well as satellites, submarines, and electronic listening posts in Turkey and Europe, have produced vast amounts of computer input. In time, the planes would unerringly drift over Soviet territory. At other times, they would do so intentionally in order to photograph a particular target, or to monitor radar installations so as to capture their signals, or to evaluate the reaction of Soviet ground defenses against an attack. It was a dangerous game of "hot chicken" said on many occasions the planes were rearmed by anti-aircraft fire or Soviet fighter planes.

In both 1950 and 1951, an espionage airplane with a crew of two was shot down, with no survivors. In 1959, a crew of 13 was lost, this time to North Korean fighters over the Sea of Japan. During the interesting years, there were dozens of air incidents involving American aircraft and Communist firepower, ranging from skirmishes, to near misses, espionage flights. Some of the spy planes made it safely back to base which might be in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Pakistan, Japan or Norway after being attacked, and even hit; others were downdropped with loss of life or with crew members captured by the Soviets.

There has been considerable confusion concerning the number and the fate of US planes captured by the Soviets after the planes were forced to land during the 1950s and 60s. Russian president Boris Yeltsin stated in 1992 that nine US planes had been shot down in the early 1950s and twelve American survivors had been held prisoner, even though fact not yet discovered. In early 2006, Russian General and former head of a Russian US commission investigating the whole question of missing Americans, told a US Senate committee that 730 Americans had been captured on cold war spy flights, from 1943 to 1981.

The most notable of these incidents was of course the downing of the U2 plane in 1960.

Francis Gary Powers was in the U2 April 1960. The high flying U2 had been developed because of the vulnerability of being shot down in planes flying at normal altitudes. The disappearance of Powers and his U2, somewhere in the Soviet Union, meant that the United States government publicly in an amendment of a false cover story, denied, and amendments to the story. Finally, when the kubans presented Powers and his plane to the world, President Eisenhower had no alternative but to admit the truth. He said, "We shot the Powers in the head" and "It was a Russian 'federal' of secrecy and counterintelligence". One of Eisenhower's advisors, former General John Hughes, was later to observe that the incident came only six days "to manifest as unhittable filmmaker into a movie rights." 4

On several occasions, the United States presented the Soviet Union about the渗透 of American planes which were not actually over Soviet territory, but over the Sea of Japan, for example. Though engaged in espionage, such flights, mildly speaking, appear to be acceptable under international law.

The lease transfers of the whole U2 fleet that was to be delivered to the Eisenhower-Ruskoff summit meeting which took place two weeks later in Paris, and upon which so much hope for some sort of détente had been placed by people all over the world.

The U-2 affair for the unfortunate timing of finding that a cover story had made it to the Col. J. Forrester Powers, USAF. He's suggested elsewhere. From 1955 to 1963, Powers served as the liaison between the CIA and the Pentagon on missions concerning military support of "special operations." In his book, "The Secret War," Powers suggests that the CIA and the Agen so's came to the Pentagon enmeshed this particular U-2 flight, the last one scheduled before the summit. They did this, presumably, because they did not want a blurring of cold war tension, their version.

The secret espionage, espionage warrants, was embarrassingly simple. The U-2's original design included a container of liquid hydrazine to provide the plane's insulating shroud, which placed it outside the range of Soviet firepower and interceptor aircraft. The hydrazine container was only partly filled with hydrazine. When she was shot down, the pilot would be able to escape to the plane's preplanned location.

In flight, the F-106s were able to intercept the U-2 in the normal high altitude with a radar, but this was probably a false alarm of four years of frustrating failures to shoot a horizontal plane with a missile, even when the plane was shot down over the Soviet Union.

In flight, the U-2's pilot was able to escape, but the F-106s were unable to locate the plane, so that the pilot was killed. The flight was never found, and the plane was never found. The presence of identification papers was a mystery. The U-2 was able to evade the F-106s, the U-2 was able to escape from the Soviet Union.

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No American plane dropped bombs on the Soviet Union but many of them dropped men assigned to carry out torture missions. The men who told their story were Russians who had escaped to the West where they were recruited by the CIA and other Western intelligence organizations.

The leading émigré organization was known as National Alliance of Russian Scientists, or the National Union of Labor (NTU). It was composed largely of two distinct groups: the sons of the Russians who had gone to the West following the revolution, and those Russian scientists who, through denunciations or choice, had wound up in Western Europe at the close of the Second World War. Members of both groups had collaborated with the Nazis during the war. Although NTU was generally classified in the right wing of the various émigré organizations, its collaboration had been motivated more by anti-Semitism than by pro-Nazi sentiments.

NTU was based primarily in West Germany, where, throughout the 1950s, the CIA was the organization's chief benefactor, often with the CIA's approval. As a CIA school set up in Germany, under the training of the Institute for Research on the USSR, as well as at schools in Great Britain and the United States, the Agency provided NTU members with extensive training before seeding them into Soviet territory. The men landed on their own and were quickly equipped, with everything from weapons to small airplanes, bicycles, frequency sets, and rubber mats for crossing electronically charged barbed-wire fences.

The Russians were returned to their homelands for a variety of reasons: to gather intelligence about military and technological installations, to confirm assessments, to free innocent victims of identification documents, to arrest Western agents on escape, to engage in sabotage, or to engage in psychological warfare. In all of these, the people who had been trained in the West were very successful. After their return to the Soviet Union, the CIA published a book in 1943 called Caught in the Act in which it lists the names and other details of about two dozen intelligence agents claimed to have captured, most of whom were immediately killed. Some were executed, others received prison sentences, one allegedly was an individual who had taken part in a mass execution of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory. The book states that there were many more caught who were not listed. This may have been a self-serving statement, but it was a relatively simple matter for the Soviets to infiltrate the agents' units in Western Europe and learn the entire operation.

The CIA, as usual, was not above using this practice. The Agency went so far as to train suspected defectors in Munich using such systems as to apply pressure to a man's testicles or scaling someone in a room and playing Indonesian music at deafening levels until he cried.

The Soviets further claimed that some of these smuggled in were furnished with special radios to broadcast news items in the Soviet Union, to disseminate intelligence, and to incite anti-American demonstrations.

So widespread is the emphasis on release企业管理 in Western espionage that the CIA has had to launch a major operation to prevent their exposure. After a successful campaign in the West, the CIA was very successful in getting its agents back into the Soviet Union, where they were immediately arrested. Some of these were executed, others received prison sentences, one allegedly was an individual who had taken part in a mass execution of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory. The book states that there were many more caught who were not listed. This may have been a self-serving statement, but it was a relatively simple matter for the Soviets to infiltrate the agents' units in Western Europe and learn the entire operation.

The propaganda offensive led the Soviet government into the book publishing business. Under a variety of arrangements with American publishers and American foundations, many, literary agents, and authors, the CIA and the United States Information Agency (USIA) protocol, subsidized or sponsored "well over a thousand books" by 1967 which were deemed to serve a propagandistic purpose. Many of the books were sold in the United States as well as abroad. None bore any indication of US government involvement. Of some, said the USIA, "we ordered the things from the very idea down to the final edited manuscript."

Some books were published, and at times written, after the Berlin or the CIA agreed to purchase a large number of copies. There was no way of determining what effect the financial incentive had upon a publisher or author concerning a book's tone and direction. In some cases, Washington relaxed classified restrictions to assist an author to assist him in writing the book. In 1967, following revelations about CIA domestic activity, the government dropped support for an act that included this practice. A Senate committee in 1976 noted that during the preceding few years, the CIA had been connected with the publication of some 150 books mostly in foreign languages. Some of these were most likely later republished in the United States.

The sexual desire of most of the books, however, is still classified. Among those which have been revealed are, The Double Agent Story by W. M. Burt, The New Czar of Western Europe by Michael Dohm, Conspiracies of the Communist Party by Robert A. Burton, The Foreign Aid Program of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China by Kurt Muller, in Pursuit of World Order by Richard N. Leffler, Taking People's Wars by Master

The most pervasive propaganda technique of the so-called free world was by means of the newsreels. Numerous professionals, tremendous output, and often round-the-clock programming brought the movies and radio to the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty to Eastern Europe, and the Voice of America to all parts of the world. With the exception of the last, the most influential individual was the American public, and its principal source is in actuality, the CIA covertly funded a number of the world's major newsreels. The Voice of America, however, is a cornerstone of the American political system.

Many of the Russians who worked for the various stations, which broadcast at length about freedom, democracy, and other democratic countries, were identified by the D-3 Joint Intelligence Department as members of the KGB's notorious Entrance Group, which spread up and killed numerous Jews in the Soviet Union. One of these warriors was Ivan Kirenski, who organized a mass murder of Jews in Byelorussia and was sent to a Jewish concentration camp after being convicted of a similar crime.

By the 1970s, the United States had to face the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were in a nuclear arms race. The United States had to maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to counter the Soviet threat.

The CIA's Russian agent in Washington, meanwhile, approached senators and representatives with the idea of forming a group to monitor Soviet Union and the United States nuclear policy.

The Soviet Union, which was best known for its anti-Semitic policies, had very few Jewish citizens. The CIA, however, was quick to point out that the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews was not as bad as it seemed. The CIA believed that the Soviet Union was not as bad as it seemed and that the United States should not be too concerned about it.

The CIA's strategy was to create a false impression of the strength of the Soviet Union. The CIA believed that the Soviet Union was not as strong as it seemed and that the United States should not be too concerned about it. The CIA also believed that the Soviet Union was not as interested in nuclear weapons as it seemed.

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the votes in this election.11 Counter funding was the name of the game. Victor Marchetti, former executive assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, has revealed that in the 1950s the agency "spent some $10 to $20 million a year, or more on these covert operations in Italy." Expenditures in the 1960s, he adds, came to about $10 million annually.12

The CIA itself has admitted that between 1948 and 1969, it paid a total of $62,100,000 to the Christian Democratic and other parties, labor groups, and to a wide variety of other organizations in Italy. It also spent an undisclosed amount in support of magazines and book publishers and other media of news and opinion manipulation, such as planning news events in non-Italian media centers the world which can influence public opinion there, then arranging for these stories to be repeated by friendly Italian media.13

It is now known, for example, that the CIA tried in vain to bring anti-Communist groups in Italy, a major Agency document of 1972 revealed contributions of some $10 million to political parties, trade unions, and $21 individual candidates in the parliamentary elections of that year.14 At least $8 million was paid to political leaders for the June 1976 elections.15

Moreover, the largest oil company in the United States, Exxon Corp., admitted that between 1963 and 1971 it made political contributions to the Christian Democratic and several other Italian political parties totaling $44 million to $47 million.16

The CIA also contributed to the Italian electoral process in the form of an average $50,000 a year since 1969 through 1973. There is no record that these contributions were derived from the CIA or the Italian Department, but it seems rather unlikely that the firm would engage in excessively in this unusual activity with complete anonymity.17

Much of the money given by the CIA to Italian political parties since World War II said a former high-level US official, ended up "inolla" in, vacations homes and in bank accounts for politicians themselves.18

A more direct American intervention in the 1976 elections was in the form of propaganda. The CIA, in political advertising, is not an Italian relative of the US Embassy to Switzerland, Paul Davis, arranged for the purchase of large blocks of time on Monte Carlo TV to present a daily "news" commentary by the editorial staff of the Italian newspaper Il Giornale. Davis, who was closely connected to the CIA, it is the newspaper that in May 1981, set in motion that particular piece of international disinformation was known as "The Kiss Plot to Kill the Pope." Another Italian newspaper, the daily "Il Popolo d'Italia" for decades the country's leading English-language paper, was for a long period in the 1950s and the 1960s a daily paper owned and managed by the CIA. The CIA had at least one newspaper in every foreign capital it has for many years, the CIA admitted in 1979, referring to papers owned outright or heavily subsidized, or spread frequently to have access passed which were used in the Agency's efforts to spread information.19

Another factor that has been involved in the Vatican's operations to strengthen and freedom after World War II. He had a long history of association with Western governance and intelligence agencies. In 1963, he became Pope Paul VI.20

A 1974 interview, Marchetti also spoke of the training provided by the Agency to the Italian ministry services.

They are trained, for example, to conduct disorders and mass demonstrations, to suppress strikes, to make the best possible use of their army and the return of individual centers, etc. in such words, to work over the coordination of their country with the means allowed by numbers.21

This is what...of...pension.22

- William Colby, late Director of the CIA, served in Italy in 1963 and devoted the next five years of his life to financing and advising on government organizations for the express purpose of inducing the Italian people to turn away from the Fascist idea, particularly the Christian Democrats, and keep it from taking power. In the 1958 elections, the accounts of this period justify the program on the grounds of supporting "democracy" and preventing Italy from becoming a Soviet satellite. Colby perceived all these threats and to be headed definitely toward the center of the political spectrum, and the Italian Communist Party to become an effective organization committed to achieving democracy and creating a society modeled after the "socialist" example of Soviet Russia. He does no evidence to support his conclusion about the Communists, presumably because he regards it as self-evident, as much to the worker as to himself. Neither, for that matter, does he explain what this was long called "communism" which he so abhors and which the Communists are to escape its own away with.23

Colby comes across as a technocrat who carried out the orders of his "superiors" and managed the party line without serious examination. When Giuseppe Balbo, the Italian publishing, interviewed him in 1974, she remarked on the close of a fascinating conversation, "had you been on the other side of the fence, you would have been a perfect Stalin." To which, Colby replied, "I repeat that statement. But...well...it might be, too. As it might not.24

American policy making deals with Italy in the decades subsequent to Colby's time there did not suffer any kias that he has from kiasmatics. Colby, after all, took pains to protect our liberal feelings. These were most visible to view the Italian Communist Party in its indigenous political context, but only as a "national security" threat to the United States and NATO. Yet, all these years, the party was proceeding along a path rectitude enough to make Lenin turn in his grave if he were as one. The path was marked
by billboards proclaiming the "democratic advance to socialism" and the "national road to socialism," the abandonment of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the denunciation of the Soviet union of Czechoslovakia. The party issued its "national" role as responsible opposition, participated in "the drive for productivity," affirmed its support for a multi-party system and for Italy remaining in the Common Market and in NATO, and was second to none in its condemnation of any form of terrorism. On many occasions, it was the principal political force in any governments including Rome, Florence and Venice, without any noticeable votes in Parliament, and was de facto participant in the running of the Italian state. (The Sociali Party, a prime target of the United States in the 1948 election, was a formal member of the government for much of the 1960s to the 1990s.)

In the face of this, however—or in the face of everything—American policy remained rooted in place, and in a time that was no longer, and probably never was, a policy that had nothing to do with democracy (be whatever definition) and everything to do with the conviction that a Communist government in Italy would not have been the supreme plant cost of the previous generation of Christian Democrat regimes used for decades. It would not have been enough for such a government to be independent of Moscow. The problem was that a Communist government was that it would probably have tried to adopt the same position towards Washington.

U.S. Arms Sales to the Third World

ARM NOW
PAY LATER

One of the largest growing markets for industrial products in the world today is the defense systems of Third World nations. Total military spending by the underdeveloped nation is growing at a rate of nine percent a year—twice as fast as developed countries, and also twice the rate of economic growth in the Third World.1 One survey of worldwide defense spending indicates that Third World expenditures on military hardware increased from $3.3 billion in 1970 to an estimated $5.2 billion in 1972.2 At least one-third of this amount is spent to acquire increasingly complex and sophisticated weapons, the production of which equipment tends to be concentrated in a handful of the most advanced industrial nations.3 In 1959 and 1969, four nations—the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France—supplied 87 percent of the arms to 39 countries.4 The United States, faced with mounting balance-of-payments deficits, has mounting balance-of-payments deficits, has

The Pentagon's arm sales effort, known as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, was shared with the M.P.O. program's Cold War goal of strengthening "free world" defense against anticipated Soviet invasions. George Thayer, . . . , the U.S.s. arm sales effort in his book

In the knowledge that most of our allies were militarily vulnerable and in the belief that the Soviet Union was about to march into Western Europe and several eastern areas, the United States began to ship large quantities of weapons to the allies who, it was hoped, would help stem the Soviet tide.5 Since, in the immediate postwar era, most of our allies were unable to shoulder the burden of their own and the common defense, the United States gave generously of its own resources to solidify Europe and the "forward defense areas" on the borders of the Soviet Union in Asia. Between 1945 and 1951, the United States gave away weapons worth a total of $2 billion, while new arms sales in the same period amounted to only $2.5 billion, or ten percent of the grant effort.

When President Kennedy took office in 1961, the goals of the FMS program changed radically. The Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who sought to expand the Pentagon's conventional warfare capabilities, recognized that overseas deployment of U.S. troops, and other war-related activities in Southeast Asia, would contribute to an over-increasing balance-of-payment deficit, an ever-increasing balance-of-payment deficit, to make substantial purchasers of U.S. arms. In order to compensate for increased U.S. military expenditures, therefore, he sought to persuade our allies to purchase U.S. arms. At the same time, McNamara discovered that Congress was increasingly unwilling to subsidize the defense expenditures of our least-fortunate Third World countries allies.6 U.S. grant aid to Third World countries dropped from $1.3 billion in fiscal 1963 to $678 million in 1967, and thus was established a...