DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, ADDRESS TO CONGRESS.
APRIL 19, 1951

When he returned from the Far East after his removal by President Truman, General MacArthur was greeted as a hero by a large section of the press and large numbers of people. He welcomed provided an outlet for sentiments about the Korean war. In a lengthy and flamboyant speech to Congress, excerpted here,

we examined now he thought the Korean war should
be waged.

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when we intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize sanitary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary—

(1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
(2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
(3) Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.
(4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized by critics, principally abroad, despite any understanding that even a military standoff

...
The views have been given in the past by practically every military leader concerning the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. I called for reinforcement but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if permitted to destroy the enemy's important bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese forces of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from gaining access from without, and if there were no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the campaign from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to salvation. Efforts have been made to divert my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition. It is very destructive on both sides and I have never advocated it, unless as a means of settling international disputes.

But once [war] is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

If war there can be no substitute for victory. There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. History teaches us unmistakable lessons that appeasement begets new and bloodier wars. It points to no single instance where the end has justified the means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked me, surrender military advantage to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some may say to avoid spread of conflict into an all-out war with China. Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. China is already engaged with the maximum power it can employ, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a siren, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relatively in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condenses the nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea above, up to now, is the sole one which has linked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scatter the Pacific."

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all they saw, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way. It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain in my thoughts and in my prayers always.
I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course which was placed before this committee. This course would seek to bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of hostilities.

I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the previous witnesses before your committee.

It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities to an end.

To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.

Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be weighed the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention, and of world war III, as well as the probable effects upon the solidarity of the free world coalition.

The advocates of this program make two assumptions, which require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Union will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.

As to Soviet reactions, we can be sure he is forecasting accurately what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on this question.

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

I cannot accept the assumptions that the Soviet Union will go its way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way. The view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble with the essential security of our Nation.

In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number of courses of counteraction open to the Soviet.

They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with "volunteer" crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They might participate with the Soviet Air Force and the submarine fleet.

The Chinese could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping and intervene with a half-million or more ground-force "volunteers"; or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.

Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possibilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.

We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.

They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war in the Far East—one which holds the possibilities of becoming a world war—particularly if it developed out of an American impatience with the progress of the effort to repel aggression, an effort which in their belief offers its own solution.

If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.

We cannot expect that our collective-security system will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose the people who are in the system with
They would ultimately demand to be used as a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.

In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective-security system.

The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the measures proposed, were to weaken that factor, particularly in the North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area which is vital to our own national security.

What this adds up to is that we are being asked to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collective-security system— all this in return for what?

In return for measures whose effectiveness is bringing the conflict to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military authorities.

DOCUMENT 15

JOHN FOSTER DULLES, TESTIMONY
ON THE POLICY OF LIBERATION,
JANUARY 15, 1953

Appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's designated Secretary of State, here attempted to clarify for Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin what was meant by the much talked about policy of "liberation."

THE CHAIRMAN (Sen. Wyly). I am particularly interested in something I read recently, to the effect that you stated you were not in favor of the policy of containment. I think you advocated a more dynamic or positive policy.

Can you tell us more specifically what you have in mind? This, of course, is subject always to your own qualification.

MR. DULLES. There are a number of policy matters which I would prefer to discuss with the committee in executive session, but I have no objection to saying in open session what I have said before: namely, that we shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one-third of all the peoples of the earth and is in the process of trying to extend its rule to many others.

Therefore, we must always have in mind the liberation of these captive peoples. Now, liberation does not mean a war of liberation. Liberation can be accomplished by processes short of war. We have, as one example, not an ideal example, but it illustrates my point, the defection of Yugoslavia, under Tito from the domination of Soviet communism.

Well, that rule of Tito is not one which we admire, and it has many aspects of deception, itself, but at least it illustrates that it is possible to disintegrate this present monolithic structure.

The present tie between China and Moscow is an unholy arrangement which is contrary to the traditions, the hopes, the aspirations of the Chinese people. Certainly we cannot tolerate a continuance of that, or a welding of the 450 million people of China into the servile instrument of Soviet aggression.

Therefore, a policy which only aims at containing Russia where it now is, is, in itself, an unsound policy; but it is a policy which is bound to fail because a purely defensive policy never wins against an aggressive policy. If our only policy is to stay where we are, we will be driven back. It is only by keeping alive the hope of liberation, by taking advantage of that wherever opportunity arises, that we will end this terrible peril which dominates the world. . . . But all of this can be done and must be done in ways which will not provoke a general war, or in ways which will not provoke an insurrection which would be crushed with bloody violence. . . .
LEWIS MUMFORD, LETTER ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
MARCH 15, 1951

Lewis Mumford, a prominent writer on American
architecture and city planning, and a historian of
American and European civilization, expressed in this
letter to the editor of the New York Times views
which many troubled Americans shared.

The power of the hydrogen bomb has, it is plain, given
paine even to the leaders of our Government. Their very
hesitation to give way the facis in itself gives away the
facts. Under what conditions, then, do they continue to hold
as secret the results we may expect from the use of
weapons of extermination—not merely on our own cities
and people but on all living organisms, not merely on
our present lives but on the lives of countless generations to
come?

Are our leaders aware that when the truth is known
our devotion to the preservation of scientific sources of
total destruction and extermination will turn out to be a
profoundly irrational one: repulsive to morality, dangerous
to national security, irrational in itself?

Do they suspect that the American people are still
enough to half the ideal aspirations that continues
in the face of Soviet Russia's equal scientific power, to
produce these fatal weapons?

Do they fear that their fellow-citizens may well
accept the advent of murder, which, under the guise
of ensuring an agreement or winning a cheap victory,
might incidentally destroy the whole fabric of civilization and
destroy the very essence of the human race?

Our secret weapons of extermination have been pro-
duced under conditions that have involved flagrant
unwarranted and short-sighted political and military
judgment. Under the pretense of security a succession of
false errors has been made, primarily in the result (since
1942) of our complete and extermination as a method of
warfare. These errors have been compounded by our count-
ing upon such dehumanized methods to preserve peace
and security.

In turn, our ready use for secrecy in an abortive
effort to reproduce technical and scientific knowledge, has
produced pathological symptoms in the whole body politic:
fever, suspicion, infatuation, hostility to critical judgment.
Above all, these methods of power based on fantasies of
unlimited extermination, is the only possible answer in
the political sense of the word. These practices of 1942
cannot be counted upon to neutralize such automatic instru-
cements of desensitization.

At a fatal moment our self-induced form may produce
the inculcated and treasured battle cry of our own
victory have gone as reason to dread. Only courage and
intelligence of the highest order backed by open discussion,
will give us the strength to turn from the suicidal path
that becomes evident since 1942.

Are there not enough Americans still possessed of
their sanity to call a stop to these irrational decisions;
which are insufficiently bringing to close to a non
extermination?

There are many alternative sources to the policy in
which we have committed ourselves, distinctly without
aware, the waste of all these alternative, admission to
Communist totalitarianism, would be still for worse than
the final destruction of civilization.

As at the best of these alternative, a policy of work-
ing closely toward justice and cooperation, and free
involvement with all other peoples, in the faith that love
is the only base of hatred, hatred—result, in all possi-
bilities, to the ever-increasing collapse of the strong political armor of our present morals.

Into the facts of our policy of total extermination
are publicly concealed, the final outcome, must
include, a force, I believe the American people are
still able to correct to a wise decision than our
Government had yet made. They will realize that what
this in fact that total extermination of both
sides is not victory: that a constant state of martial fear,
hostility and hatred is not security; that, in short, what
seems like unlimited power has become
impossible.

In the name of sanity let our Government now pause
and seek the counsel of wise men: men who have not
participated in the errors we have made and are not
committed, out of pride, to defending them. Let us cease
all further experiments with even more terrifying weapons
of destruction, and our ever-increasing forces further
upset our mental balance.

Let us all, as responsible citizens, put the covered
subjects in the all-party state, weigh the alternatives
and research new lines of approach to the problems of peace
and peace.

Let us deal with our own massive size and errors as
a step toward stabilizing firm relations of confidence
with the rest of mankind. And let us, first of all, have
the courage to speak up on behalf of humanity, on behalf
of civilization, on behalf of the whole of the method-
ology of barbarism in which we are now committed.

If as a nation we have become used it is then far
the worse to face now in that androcs. If we are still
human and sane, then it is time for the powerful voice of
sanity to be heard once more in our land.
4. The Philippines 1940s and 1950s

America's oldest colony

I wish to state the views of the White House, after eight years of Philippine and American administration to all you, gentlemen, that I have been a fresh and pray the Almighty God for light and guidance more than one day. And now are we going to end the war or don't know how it was? I give you these as my Philippine Islands, and as you Spaniards, that I said to you; (1) that we would not give them to Spain that would be absolutely and definitely free; (2) that we would not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rival in the Orient—that would be bad business and undesirable; (3) that we could not turn them over to Russia; that was the self-government, and they would soon have exactly the same as the other nations of the United States, and (4) that there was nothing to us in the United States. We will send them to Russia and Spanish, and as I mentioned and Spanish, and as I indicate the views of the Filipino people, and the people of the United States, and to you. As you indicated, the Filipinos, and the people of the United States, not to be influenced by the views of the Chinese.

—William McKinley, President of the United States, 1899

William McKinley's idea of doing the very best by the Filipinos was to employ the United States Army to kill them in the tens of thousands, burn down their villages, subject them to torture, and lay the foundation for an economic operation which was promptly reduced to the same as "unprofitable" by leading American economists and newspapers.

After the Spanish had been driven out of the Philippines in 1898 by a combined action of the United States and the Filipinos, Spain agreed to "cede" the islands to the United States for $25 million, but the Filipinos, who had already proclaimed their own independence, refused to accept the overtures of American officials, thus not only failing to bring about the type of national independence and self-government that they hoped for, but also causing the United States to declare the islands a U.S. territory. The Filipinos soon learned the hard way that they had no choice but to accept American rule, and that they must submit to American military occupation and control. The resulting inflow of American soldiers and other civilians to the islands led to a rapid expansion of American economic interests and influence, and to a rapid increase in the number of American businesses and institutions that had a presence in the Philippines.

The idea of American military occupation and control in the Philippines was not new. In fact, it had been a long-standing goal of American policymakers and business interests, and had been discussed and debated in American political circles and in the media for many years. The idea gained momentum during the early 1900s, as the United States began to expand its sphere of influence in the Pacific, and as the Philippines began to emerge as a potential source of natural resources and a market for American goods. The idea was also strengthened by the fact that the Philippines was a strategically important location, given its location on the Pacific rim and its proximity to other American colonies, such as Hawaii.

The American military occupation and control in the Philippines was not without its own problems and difficulties. The Filipinos were not happy with the American military occupation and control, and there were many clashes and conflicts between the two groups. But the American military occupation and control eventually proved to be successful, as the United States was able to establish a strong presence in the Philippines and to exert a significant influence over the island's political and economic affairs. The American military occupation and control in the Philippines was eventually replaced by a more civilian-oriented approach, as the United States began to focus on economic development and social reform in the Philippines. This approach was characterized by a greater emphasis on the role of the private sector in the economy, and by a greater focus on education, health care, and other social services.

In summary, the American military occupation and control in the Philippines was not without its own problems and difficulties, but it eventually proved to be successful in establishing American influence and control over the island. The approach was eventually replaced by a more civilian-oriented approach, which placed a greater emphasis on economic development and social reform.
The purpose of deploying those candidates then was equally transparent: the government was able to push through Congress the anti-Communist Philippine-US Trade Act—passed by two votes more than required in the House, and by nothing in the Senate—which provided the United States with a new weapon of influence in the Philippines, a country with which it had been fighting a war. The act allowed the United States to purchase weapons and equipment from the Philippines at preferential rates. The Philippine government also provided training to US military personnel, and the US provided economic aid to the Philippines, which was used to purchase weapons and equipment.

The deployment of the US military was followed by a wave of heavy brutality against the population. The murder rate in Mindanao, for example, increased significantly. The US military was accused of committing atrocities, including the massacre of civilians in the town of Bataan. The US military also used torture and other methods of violence to suppress the anti-Communist movement.

The US occupation of the Philippines, which lasted from 1944 to 1946, was an extension of the war in the Pacific. The US military used the Philippines as a staging ground for its operations in the Pacific War. The US government had invaded the Philippines in December 1941, and the war in the Philippines lasted until the end of the war in May 1945. The US military occupation of the Philippines was ended in 1946, when the Philippines gained independence.

The US occupation of the Philippines was a source of tension between the US and the Philippine government. The US military occupied the Philippines and continued to control the country, even after the war ended. The US military was accused of committing atrocities, including the massacre of civilians in the town of Bataan. The US military also used torture and other methods of violence to suppress the anti-Communist movement. The US occupation of the Philippines was ended in 1946, when the Philippines gained independence.
This law, known as the "Lencer's Law," was a technique described in a high secret intelligence report about the Canadian government. It was used to gain access to sensitive information. However, on other occasions, the CIA was accused of using similar methods in other regions of the world.

In the Philippines, human rights violations and civil unrest had been severe, with thousands of people killed or displaced as a result of political violence. The CIA had been involved in these events, providing military assistance and training to local forces. This led to the conclusion that the CIA was responsible for the human rights abuses in the Philippines.

Some critics argue that the CIA's actions were justified by the need to gain information about the local population and to support the anti-Communist movement. Others argue that the CIA's methods were inhumane and unacceptable. The debate continues to this day about the role of the CIA in the Philippines and the broader context of human rights violations.

The most significant aspect of the CIA's operations in the Philippines was its involvement in the country's political and economic affairs. The CIA's activities were often shrouded in secrecy, and its objectives were often unclear. However, it is clear that the CIA had a significant influence on the Philippines, and its actions had a profound impact on the country's development.

In conclusion, the CIA's involvement in the Philippines was a complex and controversial issue. Its actions were often criticized, but it is also clear that the CIA played a significant role in shaping the country's political and economic landscape.
5. Korea 1945-1953

Was it all that it appeared to be?

To this an answer is inescapably
negative, but how much so it would be
if one could do so that was true.

—H.L. Mencken, 1919

How is it that the Korean War snared the people which surrounded the war in Vietnam? Everything we've come to love and cherish about Vietnam had its forerunner in Korea the support of a corrupt tyranny, the evacuation, the escape, the mass slaughter of civilians, the cities and villages laid to waste, the calculated management of the news, the alienation of peace talk. But the American people were convinced that the war in Korea was an international case of one country invading another without provocation. A case of the big guys attacking the good guys who were being saved by the even bigger guys, sons of the historical, political and moral uncertainty that was the dilemma of Vietnam. The Korean War was seen to have begun in a specific manner. North Korea attacked South Korea in the early morning of 25 June 1950; while Vietnam...nobody seemed to how it all began, or how, or who.

And there was little in the way of accusations about American "imperialism" in Korea. Like United States, after all, was fighting as part of the United Nations Army. What was there to protest about? And of course there was McCarran, so powerful in the early 1950s, which further served to inhibit protest.

There were, in fact, rather different interpretations to be made of what the war was all about, how it was being conducted, even how it began, but these quickly succumbed to the rest of war from.

Shortly after the close of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United States occupied Korea in order to expel the defeated Japanese. A demarcation line between the Russian and American forces was set up along the 38th Parallel. The creation of this line is no way had the explicit or implicit intention of establishing two separate countries, but the cold war was soon to intrude.

Both powers insisted that unification of North and South was the principal and desired goal. However, they also desired to see this carried out in their own ideological image, and ended thereby into a regime of competing propaganda efforts and counter-propaganda, generally without success, and produced nothing in the way of an agreement during the ensuing years. Although both Moscow and Washington and their handpicked Korean leaders were not always pleased about the division of the country (on the grounds that half a country was better than none), official and citizen of both sides continued to genuinely call for unification on a regular basis.

That Korea was still one country, with unification still the goal, as the time the war began, was underscored by the chief US delegate to the UN, Warren Austin, in a statement he made shortly afterwards:

The artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence other than the efforts of a few countries to create one and make it stick. The Republic of Korea, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, has continued its policy of aggression.

The two sides had been clashing across the frontier for several years. What happens on that fateful day in June, 1950 could not be as bad as the consequences of an ongoing civil war. The North Korean government has claimed that in 1949 alone, its South Korean army of police perpetrated 2,017 armed incursions into the North to commit murder, kidnapping, pillage and arson for the purpose of causing social disorder and to cause, as well as to increase the combat capabilities of the invaders. As a result, the Korean government, thousands of soldiers were involved in a single battle with many casualties resulting.

A State Department official, Ambassador-at-large Philip C. Jessup, speaking in April 1950, put it this way:

There is constant fighting between the South Korean Army and bands who infiltrate the country from the North. There are many small battles, involving perhaps no more than twelve units. When you go to this boundary, as I did, you see troop movements, fortifications, and prisoners of war.

Seen in this context, the question of who fired the first shot on 25 June 1950 takes on a much reduced air of significance. As it is, the North Korean version of events is that their invasion was provoked by two days of bombardment by the South Koreans, on the 24th and 25th, followed by a surprise South Korean attack across the border on the 25th against the western town of Haji and other places. The information from the South Korean army is based on an attack on a road in the border area, and is based on the belief that the North Koreans were involved in the attack.

Contrary to general belief at the time, the United Nations general—whether the UN Military Observer Group in the field or the UN Commission on Korea in Seoul—witnessed, or claimed to have witnessed, the outbreak of hostilities. The Observer Group’s field trip along the Parallel ended on 23 June. Its statements about what took place afterward an admission or based on information received from the South Korean government or the US military.

Moreover, early in the morning of the 26th, the South Korean Office of Public Information announced that South Korean forces had already captured the North Korean town of Haji. The announcement stated that the army had accomplished some morning, but as American military satellite report as sighted on the 25th north of Juch’i, the South Korean army was only able to fire south in a devastating surprise attack, killing everything that lay before it, and forcing South Korean troops to retreat further south.

In other words, a military victory on the part of the South Koreans in the area would not necessarily mean that the North Koreans would have to leave the border. The attack on Haji was not a result of the invasion, but rather a result of the North Korean army’s efforts to maintain its hold on the border. The invasion was simply a means to the end of unification, but the attack on Haji was a result of the Korean War’s end.
The leak of South Korea's Supreme Court decision to the press has raised concerns about the implications of the decision. The government has denied any involvement in the leak and has expressed its commitment to upholding the rule of law. However, the leak has sparked speculation about possible political motives behind the decision.

The decision has significant implications for the future of the country, as it could potentially undermine the government's ability to hold accountable those who are found guilty of corruption. The government has announced plans to review the decision and to take action if necessary.

On the other hand, the opposition has praised the decision as a step towards accountability and transparency. They have called for the government to implement the decision without delay and to ensure that it is upheld in practice.

The situation is likely to remain tense for some time, as both sides continue to express their views and react to the decision. It remains to be seen how the situation will develop in the coming weeks and months.
over the refusal to see Communist China in place of Taiwan. If the Russians had been pre-
pared, they probably would have made the negotiations. Then everyone would have agreed to
an unenforceable agreement for which they claim the Communists were behind the North Korean
invasion. One of the most common explanations offered is that the Russians, as a CIA
memorandum stated, wanted "to challenge US specificity and to test the limits of US
resistance to Communist expansion." Instead, as during the existence of the Soviet
Union, the same analysis was put forth by American political pamphlets for virtually every
encounter between the United States and Israel anywhere in the world, before and after
Korea, it would appear that the test was going on for an interminable long period and one
one can only wonder why the hawks never came to a conclusion.

"The finishing touch," wrote L. F. Stimson, "was to make the United Nations force sub-
ject to MacArthur with no MacArthur subject to the United Nations. This came in
July 7 in a resolution introduced jointly by Britain and France. This is commonly sup-
posed to have established a United Nations Command. Actually it did nothing of the sort."17
The resolution recommended "that all nations providing military forces and other assistance ...
make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United
States" (emphasis added.) It further required "the United States to designate the comman-
der of such forces."18 This would be the ridiculous MacArthur.

It was to be an American show. Military personnel of some 16 other countries took
part in one way or another but, with the exception of the South Koreans, there would be the
idea of their doing it in a movie or on television. Eisenhower later wrote in his memoirs that
when he was considering US military intervention in Vietnam in 1954, also as part of a
"coalition," he recognized that the burden of the operation would fall on the United
States, but "the whole forces supplied by the other countries, as in Korea, would lend real moral
standing to a venture that otherwise could be made to appear as a brutal example of imperi-
alisn" (emphasis added).19

The war, and a brutal one it was indeed, was fought mostly in defense of the
South Korean regime. Case of books published by various South Korean governments,
it is rather difficult to find a kind word for the United States brought back to
Korea in 1941 to defend its allies. Korean voices are not as harsh as MacArthur's.
There were some who were more lenient toward the Communists. Those and the others
united, most of those who were still alive in Korea, perhaps did not welcome the
American occupation because the KPA, on balance, was probably too better for their taste, as it was for
the higher echelons of the United States. After 33 years the United States, any group or
government set up to unite the forces of colonialism had to have a revolutionary urge. It
was the Koreans in Korea who had collaborated with the Japanese; those in Japan who
tried to stand against them; and the makeup of the KPA. Not surprisingly, that was the
most consistent with the general political life.20

The significance of winning aside, the KPA went beyond that. John Gunther, hardly
a radical, summed up the situation this way: "So the first and best—chance for building
a united Korea was tossed away."21 Anti-Communist, a member of the American military
organisation of the time, has written that "in the Korean War, I am convinced that those in the
fifty-fifteen splinter groups in South Korea's political life."22

South Korea would be Washington's main出入orily pro-American, strongly anti-
Communist, sufficiently controllable. Its regime was one in which landlords, collaborators,
the wealthy, and other conservative elements readily found a home. Gunther has pointed out
that "had the American invaders been a political Right, associated in popular thought
with colonial rule, could not exist; but shortly afterward we were to foster at least three conserva-
tive groups.23

Committed to establishing a free enterprise, the United States sold off vast amounts of
American property, homes, businesses, industrial raw materials and other valuables. Those
who could afford to purchase these assets were collaboration who had lived
rich under the Japanese, and other conservatives. "With the wealth of the nation up for
demolishment," the American government was said.24

While the Russian did a thorough house-cleaning of Korea in the North who had
collaborated with the Japanese, American military government in the South allowed
many collaborators, and at last even the Japanese themselves, to retain positions of admin-
istration and authority, to the consternation of those Koreans who had fought against
the Japanese occupation of their country. To some extent, these people may have been
swayed in office because they were the most experienced at keeping the country running.
Another reason has been suggested to prevent the Korean People's Republican lives assuming
a measure of power.25

And while the White House implemented widespread and effective land reform and at
least nominal equality for women, the Korean regime remained hostile to these ideals. Two
years later, it enacted a land reform measure, but this applied only to farmers. Although
resistance against the Union administration was assisted by those who feared as well as because of
the suppression of the KPA and some very questionable elec-
tions. The rationale was that this should have been enough of an embarrassment to the United States for Washington officials to action to cut
off aid if he failed to do so and also improve the state of civil liberties. Apparently because of pressure, the decision taken on May 20 were fair enough to allow "constitutional" ele-
tions to participate, and, as mentioned earlier, the KPA was decisively repudi-
ed.26

The resentment was manifested in the form of frequent rebellions, including some guerril-
a warfare in the hills, from 1946 to the beginning of the war, and even during the war.
The rebellion were dimmed by the government as "communists-inspired" and regarded
accordingly, but, as John Gunther observed, "it can be safely said that in the eyes of Hodge
the commander of US forces in Korea and Rhee, particularly at the beginning, almost all
Koreans not as extreme rightist was a communist and potential traitor."27

General Hodge evidently permitted US troops to take part in the repression. Mark
Geyn, a correspondent in Korea for the Chicago Sun, wrote that American soldiers "lived on coconuts, conducted mass arrests, rounded the hills for snipers, and organized posses of Korean lightning, summary justice, and summary execution."2 Geyn quotes that some of Hodge's political advisers asserted his (Gray's) that Korea was not a fascist: "He is a man of one hundred years old, a man who has lived through sixty years of factionalism in this country."

Describing the government's anti-guerrilla campaign in 1948, pro-Western political scientist John Kin-Quang of Massachusetts Institute of Technology has written: "In these campaigns, the official theories of counter-insurgency were not always as accurate as the people who carefully researched the origin of the war, maintained its conduct, and publicized its goals."

A year later, when a committee of the National Assembly launched an investigation of the Rhee regime, the New York Times reported: "New York Times reported: "The committee has been asked to look into the charges of human rights abuses, and to determine the extent to which those abuses have contributed to the war effort."

Throughout the war, a continuous barrage of accusations was leveled at each side. At the end of the war, the United States and South Korea were left with a legacy of distrust and suspicion that would persist for years. The "Korean Incident," as it was known, involved suspicions of guerillas in the area, which was then occupied by the South Korean army, and was characterized by a constant state of war.

One day in which the United States contributed directly to the war's brutality was by introducing a weapon which, although used in the last stage of World War II, hit in Korea, was new to almost all observers and participants in Korea. It was called napalm. Here is a description of its effect from the New York Times:

A napalm raid hit the village three days after the Chinese were holding the village. The destruction of the village left it hopeless to go on, and the terrified villagers fled. The damage was extensive, and the village was left in ruins. The bodies of the villagers were found in the streets and on the sides of the road. The damage was extensive, and the village was left in ruins.

The United States may also have waged guerilla warfare against North Korea and China, as was discussed earlier in the chapter on China.

At the same time, the CIA reportedly was targeting a single individual for termination—North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. Washington sent a Chinese informant, code-named Buffalo, to Flan V. Tiber, a CIA officer based in Japan, who had agreed to serve in Kim Il Sung's mission. Buffalo was to receive a considerable amount of money if his mission succeeded. But it did not, and nothing further has been revealed about the incident.

Another widely-held belief is the United States during the war was that American prisoners in North Korea were dying of hypothermia because of Communist neglect and scarcity. The failure of this very emotional issue was framed by the presence of US soldiers to exaggerate the number killed. During November 1951, for example, one of the most effective countermeasures, the use of Chinese all-terrain vehicles, was abandoned, and the numbers continued to rise. The牌子 protruding from the ground, which would be picked up by the Chinese, was also abandoned, and the numbers continued to rise. The牌子 protruding from the ground, which would be picked up by the Chinese, was also abandoned, and the numbers continued to rise.

The study also concluded that "the Chinese failed to accord the high death rate the attention it deserves. The Chinese, as usual, were more interested in the numbers of Chinese prisoners themselves."

The study of Chinese casualties also began to come up with the same findings as those who were researching the Chinese. The study of Chinese casualties also began to come up with the same findings as those who were researching the Chinese.

The American public was also convinced, and probably still is, that the North Koreans and Chinese had "brainwashed" US soldiers. This story was to explain the fact that in many to 30 percent of American POWs who were captured or killed in Korea.
another, and "one man is every seven, or more than thousand per cent, was guilty of serious collaboration—writing diary, trainings, ... or agreeing to spy or organize for the Communists after the war."

Another reason for the withdrawal was, as Stalin demanded, that nations and nations' ministers within the broad sweeping umbrella that was created by the United Nations, and the big one was "to prevent a repeat of history's lessons."

But it's difficult not to believe in the rhetoric of the leaders of the nations involved. It's difficult not to believe that they were aware of the consequences of their actions.

The prisoners, as far as American psychiatrists have been able to discover, were not subjected to any type of differential treatment that would properly be called brainwashing. Indeed, the Communists announced that they were trying to help the prisoners, which made sense as the prisoner of war camps were run by the Communist Party of China and Communist China. The prisoners were treated with respect and the idea was that they would eventually be released and returned to their homes.

According to the study, however, some American prisoners of war were subjected to torture and mistreatment, which is a serious violation of the Geneva Conventions.

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The feared war that an apparently increasing number of them [American soldiers in Korea] said the situation right now that the Communists were making improper concessions, while the United Nations Command was not. They stated that this move was made under duress.

At some point during this same period, the Communists proposed that a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from the border line should take place while negotiations were going on, the United Nations Command reject these as it was a sign that the United Nations Command had lost the war. They stated that they could not go along with it.

Once upon a time, the United States fought a great civil war in which General Sherman attempted to reunite the divided country through military force. Did Korea or China face any other foreign power and send an army to slaughter Americans, charging Lincoln with aggression?

Why did the United States choose to wage full-scale war in Korea? Only a year earlier, in 1948, the North Korean government was formed in Manchuria, and the United Nations were on the brink of war. The United Nations, with American support, had intervened to mediate an armistice, not to send in an army to take sides and expand the fighting. And both those conflicts were in the nature of a civil war. Why then was the United States fighting in Korea and China? If the Korean conflict was to be seen as a civil war, perhaps the United States and China might have worked to resolve the conflict.

9. Iran 1953

Making it safe for the King of Kings

As the events unfolded, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown by a military coup. This coup was supported by the United States and Great Britain. The coup was carried out by a group of officers who were supported by the CIA and the British MI6.

The coup was justified by the United States as a means of preventing the spread of communist influence in the Middle East. The United States had a vested interest in preventing the spread of communism in the region, as it was seen as a threat to the stability of the region and to American interests.

The coup was carried out in collaboration with the British, who had their own interests in the region. The British had been involved in the region for many years, and they saw the coup as a means of maintaining their influence.

The coup was successful, and the Shah was replaced by the Liaquat Khan. The new government was pro-Western, and it was seen as a strong ally in the region. The United States and Great Britain were pleased with the outcome, and they saw it as a victory for democracy over communism.

The coup was a turning point in the Cold War, as it showed that American influence could be used to achieve political goals in the region. It also showed that the United States was willing to go to great lengths to achieve its goals, even if that meant overthrowing democratically elected governments.
1,000 miles long, he was not only the only, but also one of the few people in the world who could be considered a full-fledged national leader.

In summary, the role of the Shah in Iranian politics and the military was significant, as he was a key figure in maintaining the stability and power of the monarchy.

In conclusion, the Shah of Persia was a complex figure who played a critical role in shaping the political landscape of Iran for many years.
which was unexpected by many. It was surprising, and he was received very coldly and disinterestedly by the prime minister. Instead, he was obliged to leave the room with a person who signaled a reporter for the rest of the paper. The prime minister, who maintained that all, maintained, that he would demand that the Ministry of Information, that the Shah, supported by "extraordinary measures," had promised to take about 15,000 people. He then demanded that he be removed, and informed of the immediate arrest of all press and television personnel. He was then arrested by the police and sent to the Shah's prison in Tehran.

On 16 August, a National Front government replaced the Shah by the National Front, following the Shah's declaration of a "tahrik," or "revolutionary" attack, which took place in the capital and was carried out by the police on the same day. It was only then that he succeeded in winning a commitment of military support from Iraun, which had until that moment been reluctant to commit forces.

According to statements made by the National Front leader on 16 August, "the Shah will now face his people and his enemies in the street. The Shah will be forced to resign." However, in the event, the Shah's government was supported by the Iranian people, and the National Front government was not able to maintain control.

During the declaration, the Shah's government was forced to give up the idea of a "tahrik." It was forced to recognize the National Front government as the legitimate government of Iran. The Shah's government was forced to resign, and the National Front government was able to maintain control over the country.

The following day, 17 August, the National Front government agreed to a peaceful transition to the new government under the leadership of the National Front leader. The Shah was forced to resign, and the National Front government was able to maintain control over the country.

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regional," wrote Kenneth Lowe, a New York Times correspondent who was in Tokyo during the actual war of August. "But the Japanese had decided to try to win the war by a combination of swift, determined attacks on the United States, on Great Britain, on Russia, and on the Neutral Powers. The United States had no choice but to fight, and the United States did fight."

In July, the two countries of Japan and the United States declared war on each other. The United States declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and the United States declared war on Germany on December 11, 1941.

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the government's apparatus" in Iran.39 And in a decade after this, Fortune magazine, in one of its many articles, kept the city alive by noting that "Mosaddegh" dined with the Communist party of Iran, the 40Wahh, to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union.40

And what of the Islamist people? What is being said from accommodation to reform in the population of the country. The anti-Shah regime was seen as a great ally of the country's people. In the end, the Shah was a great ally of the country's people. "It was a great ally of the country's people."37

The last days of the Shah's rule were marked by a wave of unrest and violence. The Shah was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The new government faced a number of challenges, including the Iran-Iraq War and the international community's stance on the Islamic Republic. The country has since undergone significant changes, with the Islamic Republic facing ongoing challenges and pressures.

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